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Abstract
Many corporate governance practices and reforms in emerging markets are
based on corporate governance practices and systems of developed markets, but fail to
recognize their suitability and compatibility to these markets. In Sri Lanka, most
corporate governance practices are developed based on British practices and they are
largely recommended through voluntary codes allowing companies to have considerable
discretion in their implementation. The ownership structure of Sri Lankan companies is
characterized by a prevalence of family ownership and concentrated ownership,
resembling the characteristics of the relationship-based model of corporate governance.
Therefore, the application of corporate governance practices originating in Anglo-Saxon
countries which typically experience dispersed ownership creates many compatibility
issues affecting overall efficiency of corporate governance systems in Sri Lanka.
However, no prior study has examined such issues empirically. This study contributes
to fill this gap in the academic literature through an in-depth examination of the
corporate governance practices of Sri Lanka.

This study examines the nature and the level of compliance with corporate
governance best practices by Sri Lankan public listed companies, with a view to
identifying critical issues of corporate governance practices, and the relationship
between level of compliance and firm performance in Sri Lanka. It also examines
stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka and the
impacts of ownership concentration on firm performance. Three separate data analyses
are carried out to achieve these aims.

First, the compliance with corporate governance practices is examined through
an analysis of a questionnaire survey covering 60 listed companies in Sri Lanka using a
corporate governance index. The results show that levels of compliance by Sri Lankan
companies to corporate governance best practices vary significantly among companies,
and find that such variations directly relate to ownership structures of companies. The
results provide prima facie evidence that family ownership and concentrated ownership
have a negative influence on corporate governance practices while foreign ownership
has a positive influence. The results further reveal that higher levels of compliance have
a positive impact on financial performance, but have no impact on market performance.
xi

Second, the stakeholder perceptions on eight aspects of the corporate
governance system in Sri Lanka are examined using a questionnaire survey of 277
stakeholders from seven stakeholder groups. The analysis of results shows the majority
of stakeholders are in agreement that sound corporate governance practices improve
corporate financial, market and social performance, and the present status of corporate
governance in Sri Lanka is not up to the required standard. Problems of corporate
governance identified by stakeholders include: a lack of education in and awareness of
corporate governance; inadequate regulations and enforcement; a lack of integrity and
independence of directors; insufficient ethical standards; a lack of transparency;
ownership concentration; and, political interventions, insider trading and corruption.
Overall, the companies and regulators have failed to satisfy stakeholders’ expectations
of corporate governance standards in Sri Lanka.
Third, on the premise of an agency theory framework, and using both accounting
and market-based performance indicators, the relationship between ownership
concentration and firm performance is examined. A regression analysis is carried out
based on pooled data of 846 firm-years collected from 157 listed companies over the
period of 2001 to 2009. The results provide evidence of a strong positive relationship
between ownership concentration and accounting performance measures, suggesting a
greater concentration of ownership leads to better performance. However, results found
no relationship between ownership concentration and market-based performance,
suggesting the prevalence of numerous market inefficiencies and anomalies in the Sri
Lankan stock market.
Overall, the results suggest that compliance with corporate governance practices
by respondent firms is closely associated with ownership structure and that better
governance seems to correlate with higher financial performance of the firms. The
companies with foreign ownership embrace the market-based governance framework
thoroughly whereas the companies with family ownership or concentrated ownership
raises the question how appropriate is the market-based model of corporate governance
for Sri Lankan companies. A policy implication of the results is that the corporate
governance reform efforts should pay more attention to enhance the effectiveness of
boards. More broadly, priorities should be given to making internal corporate
governance mechanisms work better and enhancing the roles of regulatory agencies.
xii
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1 Introduction
International interest in exploring effective corporate governance systems and
practices has increased since the collapse of a large number of well-known companies.
In response, many governments made incremental changes to their financial markets’
corporate governance requirements (OECD, 2009, Kirkpatrick, 2009). Although there
are a large number of studies on different aspects of corporate governance in developed
markets, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1993, Mourdoukoutas and Papadimitriou,
1998, Gompers et al., 2003, Jackson and Moerke, 2005, Flora, 2006, Lawrence and
Marcus, 2006), studies of corporate governance in emerging markets are sparse. The
investigation of corporate governance practices in emerging markets is necessary
because of vast differences in their social, cultural, and economic factors compared to
developed markets.
The contextual settings of emerging markets differ vastly from those of
developed markets. It is argued that the empirical findings of studies regarding
developed markets have limited applicability in emerging markets (Dennis, 2006, Roy,
2007, Art and Kim, 2007). For example, the governance survey in Asia by Classens and
Fan (2002) reveals that most Asian markets have governance systems with weak
institutions and poor property rights, supporting the argument that conventional
corporate governance systems have limited effectiveness in these economies. Poor
corporate governance is widely viewed as one of the structural weaknesses in Asian
economies, and it is considered as the main cause of the 1997 Asian economic crisis
(Nam and Nam, 2004). The salient characteristics of most companies in Asian countries
are the presence of controlling owners and family ownership with family members
holding senior managerial positions (Nam and Nam, 2004). Therefore, additional
research is needed on corporate governance problems associated with a concentrated
ownership as such an agency problem means that controlling owners are able to pursue
their private interests easily at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. Many
reforms are based on the Anglo-Saxon model 1 of corporate governance, owing to
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The Anglo-Saxon model for corporate governance is a market oriented style of corporate governance
which is largely characterized by dispersed share ownership, and strong and liquid capital markets due to
good investor protection.
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various countries’ historical and/or economic contexts. Sri Lanka, being both a former
British colony and an emerging market, is not an exception. Given this background, this
study examines the nature of corporate governance practices and ownership
concentration of Sri Lankan companies, their impacts on company performance, and the
arising implications for Sri Lankan corporate governance regulation.

This chapter provides the overview of this study, specifically: the background;
the objectives; the significance; scope of the study; research design and methods, and,
limitations of the study. The organization of the thesis is provided in the final section of
chapter.

1.2 Background of the Study
Sri Lanka, after nearly 150 years of British colonization, gained its
independence in 1948. As a result, a plantation-based mercantile economy emerged and
British business practices and regulations were introduced into Sri Lanka. Accordingly,
components of its corporate governance system such as its: commercial and company
law; accounting practices and regulations; education system; and, business practices
were inherited from the British. The introduction to Sri Lanka of English company law
and the commencement of share trading activities are major contributory factors to its
development of corporate governance in the colonial era (Cabraal, 2003).

The business environment of Sri Lanka showed significant changes after 1977 as
a result of the introduction of open economic policies. The development of capital
markets accelerated when Sri Lankan economy shifted to market-orientated policies in
1977. Many economic changes took place with the introduction of open economic
policies. Large scale development projects were funded by the international funding
agencies. A Free Trade Zone program opened the door for foreign direct investments
and multinational corporations. Imports and foreign exchange restrictions were relaxed
for commercial businesses to grow. New forms of export-led industries such as
garments were encouraged (Kelegama, 2004). As a result, many new developments
have been introduced to the institutional (e.g., establishment of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1987) and regulatory (e.g., Companies Act No.17 of 1982)
framework of the country to regulate the corporate governance functions of the
companies.
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Although Sri Lankan company law was periodically amended in response to
changes in British company law, it did not keep pace with British law. For example,
until the Companies Act of 2007 was enacted, the Sri Lankan companies were governed
by the Companies Act of 1982 which was enacted based on the English Companies Act
of 1948 (Wickramasinghe, 2006).

In this context, regulators and stakeholders recognized the need for further
initiatives to ensure effective corporate governance practices by listed companies
(Cabraal, 2003). The codification of Sri Lanka’s corporate governance practices was
commenced by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL). Their first
code, relating to financial aspects of corporate governance, was developed in 1997. This
was followed by additional codes developed by professional accounting institutions. In
2008, a code of best practices was developed by ICASL jointly with the Sri Lankan
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, none of these codes is
mandatory and therefore considerable freedom is enjoyed by the companies in
implementing practices. Such discretionary behaviour leads to variations between
companies. Further, these codes are adopted or adapted from codes developed in the UK
and other developed countries. Consequently, Sri Lanka uses corporate governance
practices originating in developed countries, despite noted differences in business and
governance environments. This study examines the nature and levels of compliance
with codified corporate governance practices by Sri Lankan companies.

Ownership structures of Sri Lankan companies make it difficult to implement
best corporate governance practice. Samarakoon (1999) examined ownership structures
of companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE), finding that their
ownership is highly concentrated, and that there is a controlling shareholder of most
companies. Ownership structures of Sri Lankan companies are characterized by: a wide
prevalence of family ownership as ultimate owners; extensive use of pyramid ownership
structures; cross-holdings; controlling shareholders’ participation in management; and,
the absence of a large community of arms-length institutional shareholders (Senaratne
and Gunaratne, 2007). Such domination by controlling shareholders is similar to the
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insider model of corporate governance 2, but Sri Lankan governance practices are drawn
from UK governance practices. Hence the presence of controlling shareholders,
widespread family ownership and the participation of controlling shareholders in
management raise the question whether or not regulation based on the Anglo-Saxon
model is appropriate for Sri Lankan companies,

given this model is developed

presuming that ownership of publicly traded companies is widely held, and their
management are professional managers.
In the light of the above background, this study examines the compliance and
performance implications of corporate governance practices, and the impacts of
ownership structures on both levels of corporate governance regulatory compliance, and
performance of Sri Lankan listed companies. Further it examines these issues from
stakeholders’ points of view.

1.3 Research Problem and Questions
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms of public
companies, for example boards’ and managements’ composition and operation, is
subject to debate. This issue is particularly relevant for emerging markets which seek to
implement suitable corporate governance systems for their economies.

As highlighted in the background of the study, Sri Lankan corporate governance
practices are predominantly derived from the British practices. However, Sri Lankan
corporate governance characteristics such as ownership concentration and bank led
financing resemble the characteristics of relationship based model (Senaratne and
Gunaratne, 2008). Further, corporate governance practices are largely recommended
through voluntary codes. As a result, managers of public listed companies in Sri Lanka
have considerable discretion in deciding the types and the extent of corporate
governance practices implemented in their companies. Therefore, the issue addressed in
this study is the effectiveness of corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan listed
companies, by way of examining: the nature and level of compliance with best
practices; and, the implications of ownership concentration on levels of compliance and
firms’ financial performance. This study recognizes that compliance itself does not
2

The insider system of corporate governance is a relationship-based style of corporate governance which
is characterized by highly concentrated shareholdings, concentrated voting power, cross corporate
shareholding and inter-firm relationships.
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reflect effectiveness, unless stakeholders are also satisfied with the prevailing system.
Therefore, stakeholders’ perceptions of the present corporate governance system in Sri
Lanka are also examined. Accordingly, the following six specific questions are
investigated.
(1) What is the historical development and current status of the corporate governance
in Sri Lanka?
(2) What is the nature and level of compliance maintained by Sri Lankan companies in
respect of the corporate governance best practices?
(3) Does the concentration of ownership with family, foreign or controlling owners and
ownership structure have an impact on levels of compliance with corporate
governance practices in Sri Lankan companies?
(4) Does facilitation of corporate governance best practices enable improvement in
corporate performance in Sri Lankan companies?
(5) Do the current corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka meet stakeholders’
expectations?
(6) Does ownership concentration influence firm performance of Sri Lankan
companies?

1.4 Objectives of the Study
This study also provides an analysis of the nature and level of corporate
governance practices applied by listed companies in Sri Lanka. The objectives of the
study are eight-fold, as indicated below.
(1)

assesses the corporate governance environment and the process of corporate
governance codes’ development in Sri Lanka;
Under this objective, the historical evolution of corporate governance practices,

and the legislative and institutional frameworks governing corporate governance
requirements of Sri Lankan public listed companies are examined. Furthermore, these
are evaluated to understand the governance practices applicable to Sri Lankan listed
companies.

(2)

examine the nature of compliance with corporate governance best practices
recommended by prevailing codes;
The nature of compliance with corporate governance best practices is assessed in

this study based on a questionnaire survey carried out among board members of public
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listed companies in Sri Lanka. The study specifically examines levels of compliance
with corporate governance requirements, under eight dimensions of governance
practices recommended by national and international governance codes.

(3)

assesses menthe levels of compliance with corporate governance best practices
through the development of a Sri Lankan corporate governance index;
Levels of compliance with corporate governance best practices are assessed

based on scores derived from the development and application of a specific Sri Lankan
corporate governance index (CGI), constructed using questionnaire survey data. The
CGI is developed with eight sub-indices representing corporate governance dimensions
examined in the study.

(4)

examines the impact of ownership on levels of compliance with corporate
governance best practices;
This study examines the impact of three ownership dimensions: namely; family,

foreign, and controlling ownership on levels of compliance. A comparative analysis is
carried out using sub-indices scores and scores for individual practices. Furthermore,
the impact is assessed using statistical analysis.

(5)

examines the impacts of compliance with corporate governance best
practices on firm performance proposing that a higher level of compliance
enhances firm performances;
Corporate governance is considered a decisive factor in promoting efficient

markets and enhancing better corporate performance. Although some corporate
governance practices are made mandatory through listing rules, a considerable amount
of freedom is enjoyed by corporate managers in adopting best governance practices in
their firms, since most of the practices are recommended by way of voluntary codes.
Therefore, levels of compliance can be varied considerably amongst Sri Lankan
companies. This study explores the proposition that a higher level of compliance
enhances firms’ performance. Hence, this study examines the impact of levels of
compliance, as measured by scores of the developed CGI and its sub-indices, on the
firm performance as measured in both financial terms and market terms.
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(6)

assesses stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance practices, strategies
and identified issues;
This study uses a questionnaire comprising a 5-point Likert scale, to collect

primary data from seven stakeholder groups, about their perceptions of aspects of
corporate governance in Sri Lanka. As it is important to examine the current status of
Sri Lanka’s corporate governance system from stakeholders’ points of view, the study
considers several aspects including overall status, identified issues, strategies, practices,
and major promoters of corporate governance in Sri Lanka.

(7)

examines the impacts of ownership concentration on firms’ performances; and,
This examination addresses the impacts of ownership concentration on firms’

performances, on the premise that high ownership concentration will enhance firms’
performances by decreasing their monitoring costs. Ownership concentration is
measured in terms of the first three largest shareholders’ ownership, and the Herfindahl
Index. Firm performance is measured both in financial terms and market terms. Several
control variables are also employed in the analysis to control the size, age and leverage
of the sample companies.

(8)

recognises features of current corporate governance practices, and make
recommendations.
The findings of empirical investigations are used to determine issues and salient

features of corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan companies, in order to make
recommendations to improve the corporate governance environment of Sri Lankan
companies.

1.5 Significance of the Study
With the introduction of open economic policies in Sri Lanka in 1977, and the
continuity of these policies by successive governments, the private sector has become
the dominant force in the Sri Lankan economy. As a result there has been a significant
growth in the corporate sector, particularly of the public listed companies. Economic
policy changes have provided avenues for opening investment opportunities in the
capital market for both local and foreign investors, resulting in significant
improvements in contributions made by the corporate sector particularly the public
listed companies to economic growth. Hence, corporate governance is now a vital issue
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for the Sri Lankan economy as it facilitates increasing investors’ confidence and thereby
securing access to capital through the stock market. In addition, the failures of a large
number of well-known companies and the regional economic crisis (e.g. East Asian
Crisis 1997) have intensified an understanding of the need for corporate governance in
economic development. In this context, it is important to review existing regulatory and
institutional frameworks of corporate governance in Sri Lanka and to assess the
governance practices of Sri Lankan companies.

As outlined in the background of the study, the social, cultural and economic
conditions of Sri Lanka are significantly different to those of western countries. Owing
to these differences, studies that have examined the efficiency of corporate governance
practices in developed countries, especially western countries, may have limited
applicability to evaluate corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan companies. More
importantly, some governance practices may need to be adapted or new practices
needed to suit local conditions. Furthermore, non-compliance with some of these
practices may be due to non-compatibility to company-specific conditions such as
ownership concentration, family ownership and representation of owners on boards.
However, only limited information is available due to a dearth of prior studies
examining these issues in Sri Lanka. Hence, it is imperative to conduct an in-depth
study to assess the current status of corporate governance practices in order to identify
deficiencies and to find out remedial actions to improve the existing corporate
governance practices.

The other consideration of this study is the impact of ownership structure on Sri
Lankan firms’ compliance levels and financial performance. Corporate governance
policies and practices are not developed in a vacuum; but rather, reflect underlying
company-specific characteristics in addition to socio-economic conditions. Therefore, it
is important to identify the company specific factors. Such an analysis provides a
comprehensive view of governance practices of Sri Lankan companies and their impacts
on performance. Hence, this study contributes to the existing body of knowledge in
these areas in the Sri Lankan context.
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1.6 Scope of the Study
The study is based on the Sri Lankan public listed companies of the Colombo
Stock Exchange (CSE) and their stakeholders. The objectives of the study are achieved
through three empirical investigations: first a survey of compliance with corporate
governance best practices; second a survey of stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka; and, third an examination of the impact of ownership
concentration on firm performance in listed companies. Furthermore, an analysis of
legal and institutional frameworks of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka and
their evolution is also undertaken to assess the present status of corporate governance
requirements.

The first empirical investigation is based on a questionnaire survey carried out
among the CEOs and the Chairmen of listed companies. All listed companies of CSE
are included in the initial sample, and the final analysis is based on questionnaire
responses of 60 companies. This investigation examines both the nature and the level of
compliance with corporate governance best practices by Sri Lankan public companies.
The nature of compliance with best corporate governance practices is evaluated based
on questionnaire survey data using percentage and frequency analysis. The level of
compliance with corporate governance practices is assessed based on the corporate
governance index developed on questionnaire survey data. Furthermore, the impacts of
ownership concentration on compliance with corporate governance practices are also
examined based on the corporate governance index scores.

The second investigation examines the perception of various stakeholder groups
in relation to present status, strategies, practices and main issues of corporate
governance and as to how these issues should be addressed in Sri Lankan context based
on the questionnaire survey. The final analysis is based on 277 responses from seven
stakeholder groups consisting of Non-executive Directors; Independent Audit
Professionals; Accountants; Government Policy Makers; Government Audit and Tax
Officers; Academics; and Investors.

The third investigation examines the performance implications of ownership
concentration based on a sample of 157 listed companies over the period of 2001 to
2009. The final sample consists of 846 firm-years. The bank, finance and insurance
9

sector is excluded from this sample due to its non-comparable nature of applicable
regulations on ownership concentration and performance measures.

1.7 Concepts, Research Design and Methods
Corporate governance is defined as “the structure of relationships and
corresponding responsibilities among a core group consisting of shareholders, board
members and managers designed to best foster the competitive performance required to
achieve the corporation’s primary objective” (OECD, 1999, p.198). It is one of the key
elements in improving economic efficiency and investors’ confidence in the market.
The corporate governance structure of a firm is expected to motivate managers towards
improving their business through supervision of their performance and ensuring their
accountability to shareholders. Thus, the OECD (2004) advocates that companies
should continuously pursue good corporate governance practices in order to use
resources more efficiently and thereby achieve high growth. International guidelines on
corporate governance prescribe the application of governance principles and practices as
a whole. It is important to study the governance system of a firm as a whole instead of
focusing only on a particular aspect of corporate governance. Thus, this study examines
corporate governance categorizing eight dimensions: 1) board structure and
independence; 2) board procedure and effectiveness; 3) directors' remuneration; 4) audit
committee procedure; 5) disclosure and transparency; 6) disclosure reliability; 7)
shareholders’ rights; and, 8) related party transactions. The corporate governance
practices are recognized based on Sri Lankan codes, OECD (2004) principles, and the
findings of previous studies. These practices are further scrutinized through the perusal
of international codes especially codes developed in U.K. Thus, principles and practices
recommended by the Sri Lankan governance code (ICASL and SEC, 2008), the codes
developed in U.K. and OECD (2004) principles form the basis for recognition of
‘corporate governance best practices’ of the study.
The use of a particular method for a research project depends on the scope,
purpose and target population of the study, as well as the resources available to the
researcher (Gill and Johnson, 2002). The descriptive research method is primarily
employed considering the nature of the empirical investigations of the study. The causal
research method is also employed in examining causal relationships between ownership
concentration and firm performance. Descriptive research provides information
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regarding the current status and the characteristics of a particular phenomenon. This is
usually exploratory in nature and determines the status of a particular area (Heppner et
al., 2008). Thus, this study primarily applies descriptive research methods to explore the
present status of corporate governance in Sri Lanka, and surveys corporate governance
compliance and stakeholders’ perception in the study. The main advantage of
descriptive research is its usefulness in describing the occurrence and characteristics of
the phenomena that is being studied, and therefore it is useful to develop remedial
actions as input into managerial decision-making. However, as causal relationships
cannot be analysed using descriptive methods, the causal research method employed in
examining the impact of ownership concentration on Sri Lankan firms’ performance.
Accordingly, the approach described below has been followed in achieving the
objectives of the study.

In objective one, first the historical evolution of corporate governance practices
in Sri Lanka is examined to identify the influential sources of corporate governance in
Sri Lanka. Existing legislative and institutional frameworks are evaluated. Thereafter,
the corporate governance requirements for listed companies are examined based on
company law, codes of best practices, and other regulatory requirements. As this is an
exploratory study, the analysis is primarily descriptive.

The questionnaire survey method is used in realizing objectives two to five. The
development of the questionnaire has undergone two stages. In the first stage attributes
of the Sri Lankan corporate governance system and associated practices have been
identified by reference to national and international codes, regulations and guidelines.
These attributes are classified into eight dimensions representing various aspects of
corporate governance. In the second stage specific questions are developed by reference
to these attributes and prior research studies. A questionnaire survey was conducted to
collect data from the CEOs and Chairmen of listed companies regarding compliance
with identified best corporate governance practices. After conducting different validity
test on the responses, the data were analysed using mean values, percentages and
frequency distribution to understand the nature of compliance to corporate governance
practices.

11

Another aspect considered in the study is the assessment of levels of compliance
with corporate governance best practices amongst sample companies. The relative
levels of compliance are assessed based on a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) which
was constructed using survey data. The CGI consists of eight sub-indices representing
major corporate governance aspects examined in the study. The CGI scores of sample
companies indicate the extent to which they have complied with the best practice. The
scores of the CGI and the sub-indices are analysed using descriptive statistics and
frequency analysis to find out overall behaviours of compliance levels of corporate
governance practices. As the compliance to governance practices can significantly be
different across the nature of ownership of the firm, the analysis is carried out across
three ownership dimensions namely; family, foreign and controlling ownership. Both
family and foreign owners become part of controlling ownership if they function as the
controlling owners. A comparative analysis is also carried out for subgroups identified
on these ownership dimensions.

The impact of ownership on the level of compliance is assessed in the next
stage. As the level of compliance can differ across the firms due to their ownership
composition, a comparison is carried out between two sub-groups identified for each
ownership dimension. The comparison is carried out using the scores of the overall
index and sub-indices. In order to discover the impact of ownership on the level of
compliance, the mean differences of the overall index scores and the sub-indices scores
of subgroups are compared using the independent samples t-test. Accordingly,
subgroups of family ownership, foreign ownership and controlling ownership are
compared separately.
The impact of levels of compliance with corporate governance practices on the
performance of the firms is analysed on the proposition that a higher level of
compliance enhances firm performance. The CGI scores of sample companies are used
as the indicator of levels of corporate governance compliance. In order to examine the
performance implications of levels of compliance, the sample is divided into two subsamples, high compliance and low compliance companies, based on index scores. As
performance indicators, both financial and market performance measures are alternately
employed in the analysis. The impact of levels of compliance on performance is
assessed based on correlation analysis and the t-test for independent samples.
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In objective six, the perceptions of various stakeholder groups in relation to the
present status of Sri Lankan corporate governance is assessed using the questionnaire
survey method. The questionnaire was conducted among seven identified stakeholder
groups: 1) non-executive directors; 2) independent audit professionals; 3) accountants;
4) government policy makers; 5) government audit and tax officers; 6) academics; and,
7) domestic individual investors. The questionnaire includes seven questions with 70
items on a 5-point Likert scale. It collects primary information from these stakeholder
groups about their perceptions on seven aspects of corporate governance, namely: 1)
important components of corporate governance; 2) performance implications of
corporate governance; 3) present status of corporate governance; 4) major issues of
corporate governance; 5) corporate governance strategies; 6) corporate governance
practices; and, 7) key players and promoters of corporate governance in Sri Lanka.
These elements are identified by the researcher as relevant to the study and there are no
existing standard definitions of these aspects of corporate governance. The survey data
is analysed using percentages and mean values. The average score of each item is
calculated for the overall sample and for the sub-samples of seven groups separately, to
assess the pattern of respondents’ perceptions on the given issues. The Kruskal-Wallis
test is carried out to find out whether there are significant differences among the seven
stakeholder groups.

In objective seven, the impact of ownership concentration on firms’ performance
is examined based on secondary data obtained through the OSIRIS database, the CSE
database, and the annual reports of the sample companies. The ownership variables
consist of both ownership structure and ownership concentration variables. Both
accounting and market performance measures are alternately employed as the dependent
variable in the analysis model, as it explores diverse performance implications of
ownership variables. The performance of a company depends on various factors such as
operational efficiency, size of the firm and financial risk. To control the effects of these
factors, size, age and leverage of sample firms are included as control variables in the
data analysis model. The analysis is carried out on the premise of agency theory, which
argues ownership concentration and individual shareholders’ share ownership make
positive impacts on firm performance. Based on the assumed causal relationship, a
regression analysis is carried out to measure the impact of ownership concentration on
firm performance, using the statistical package SPSS.
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1.8 Limitations of the Study
Since the questionnaire survey is used as one method of data collection, the
limitations commonly applicable to questionnaire surveys are equally applicable to this
study. Second, the scope of this study of corporate governance survey is limited to
public listed companies. Due to practical reasons, no attempt was made to include both
government sector organizations and non-listed companies. Thus, the level of
compliance to corporate governance practices by government owned enterprises and
non-listed companies cannot be discerned by analysing the results of this study.
Furthermore, the analysis of the corporate governance survey is limited to 60 listed
companies due to data collection limitations. The small sample size prohibits an indepth statistical analysis of the relationships between the variables. Therefore,
additional statistical analyses such as regression could not be employed in analysing
survey data. Third, the CGI of the study is based on the codes of best practice that have
been developed in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. This is because both the Sri
Lankan Companies Act and the codes of best practice are primarily based on the British
model. However, the practices developed in the Anglo-Saxon model may not fully
address the requirements of Sri Lankan companies. Therefore, benchmarking
governance practices of local companies with this model may not fully reflect the exact
state of their governance. Finally, the analysis of performance implications of
ownership concentration is limited to direct shareholdings of owners without analysing
ultimate ownership, due to the practical difficulty in obtaining indirect ownership
information of Sri Lankan companies.

1.9 Organization of the Thesis
The study is organized into eight chapters including this introductory chapter,
which provides an overview of the study. It deals with the research issue, the objectives,
significance, and the research design and method of the study. It also briefly explains
the scope and limitations of the study.

Chapter two presents the literature review of the study. This chapter reviews: the
literature on theoretical perspectives and different models of corporate governance;
standardization and measurement of corporate governance practices; determinants of the
level of corporate governance; and, the performance implications of corporate
governance.
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Chapter three examines the evolution of corporate governance practices with
special reference to the legislative and institutional frameworks of corporate governance
of Sri Lankan public listed companies. It also examines the development of corporate
governance codes, main players and their roles in developing governance codes. Hence,
this chapter describes the codes of best practice of corporate governance and regulatory
requirements of corporate governance applicable to public listed companies.

Chapter four discusses the research design and methods used to examine the
corporate governance practices and their association with corporate performance. The
research methods have been developed based on the existing literature and describe in
detail the sample, sample selection criteria, data, data collection and definition of
variables of the study, and the models and tests used in the study for data analysis.

Chapter five explores the nature and level of compliance of corporate
governance practices. The first section of this chapter provides a detailed descriptive
account of corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan listed companies followed by
the analysis of the level of compliance using the scores of CGI and sub-indices for each
dimension of corporate governance practices. The next section provides analysis of
ownership dimensions and their impact on levels of compliance. The final section deals
with the analysis of performance implications of corporate governance compliance.

Chapter six presents the analysis of the stakeholders’ expectations of corporate
governance practices of Sri Lanka. The first section provides the analysis of overall
responses to the survey, the non-responses bias and the important characteristics of
respondents. This is followed by an analysis of stakeholders’ opinions on current
practices and issues of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. The next section discusses
the further issues raised by stakeholders and their recommendations.

Chapter seven examines the impact of ownership concentration on the
performance of Sri Lankan listed companies. The first section provides a brief
discussion of the background of the study and the regulatory requirements regarding
shareholdings of Sri Lankan listed companies. The profile of the sample companies and
the nature of ownership concentration are examined in the next section. The final
section deals with the analysis and empirical findings of the study.
15

Chapter eight provides a summary of findings of analyses carried out in chapters
three, five, six and seven, the conclusion and recommendations based on the empirical
analysis along with the directions for future research.
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Chapter 2 : Theoretical Perspectives and SocioEconomic Setting of Corporate Governance: Literature
Review
2.1 Introduction
Corporate governance concerns the exercise of power to direct and control
companies (Clarke, 2004). The OECD: defines corporate governance as “the structure
of relationships and corresponding responsibilities among a core group consisting of
shareholders, board members and managers designed to best foster the competitive
performance required to achieve the corporation’s primary objective” (OECD, 1999a,
p.198). Corporate governance structures specify the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among different participants such as; board, managers, shareholders and
other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on the
affairs of a corporate entity. Furthermore, corporate governance provides the structure
for the setting and achieving of corporate objectives. However, corporate governance
has wider implications for the economic development and social well-being of a
country, by way of providing incentives to achieve business performance, and
accountability and transparency to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth (Clarke,
2004)

The recent global financial crisis has encouraged moves towards better corporate
governance, and therefore has driven many governments around the world to make
incremental changes to the corporate governance requirements in their financial markets
(OECD, 2009, Kirkpatrick, 2009). Corporate governance has significant implications
for the financial stability and performance of companies and thereby the economic
growth of a country (Rezaee, 2009). Thus, the relative efficiency of different corporate
governance systems, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms, and
compliance with corporate governance practices have become important practical issues
in the corporate governance debate (John and Senbet, 1998). These issues receive
greater attention in emerging markets, when they seek to implement suitable corporate
governance systems for their economies.

Corporate governance in developed markets has evolved gradually over several
centuries as a result of the economic development of industrial capitalism (Chowdary,
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2003). Thus, corporate governance systems are considered to be formed nationally by
their economic, political and legal backgrounds. As a result, corporate governance of a
country becomes a complex system including legal and institutional frameworks; legal
provisions; corporate governance guidelines and codes; code of ethics; professional
institutions; and, social, political and economic environment. However, in emerging
markets most of these components have missing links due to historical and economic
reasons. For example, poor corporate governance is considered as one of the main
causes of the Asian economic crisis (Nam and Nam, 2004). Therefore, the development
of a good corporate governance system for these markets becomes a complex issue
(Chowdary, 2003). Sri Lanka, being an emerging market, is not an exception. As the
establishment of strong corporate governance system is imperative for any county to
ensure the economic health of companies, corporate governance should be evaluated in
broader conceptual and contextual settings.
This chapter presents the literature related to various concepts of corporate
governance with special reference to corporate governance systems, and their
implications for firm level corporate governance practices and performance. In order to
understand the literature on a broader conceptual setting, this chapter examines the
various definitions, theoretical perspectives and different systems of corporate
governance in the next three sections. In section five, the corporate governance debate
on convergence and contextualization is examined. Sections six and seven present the
literature relating to standardization of corporate governance practices and measurement
of the levels of compliance with recommended practices. The review of literature
regarding performance implications of corporate governance and ownership structures
are presented in sections eight, nine and ten. The evidence on Sri Lankan corporate
governance is presented in section eleven, as the study examines levels of compliance
with corporate governance practices and their performance implications in the Sri
Lankan context. A summary is then provided in the final section.
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2.2 Corporate Governance Approaches and Definitions
Corporate governance is popularly understood as the system by which
companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992). The corporate governance
system of a country is a part of wider institutional structure that regulates the
relationship between executives who control the organization’s resources and activities
and those social and economic stakeholders who possess a legitimate vested interest in
the firm’s activities (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001) Corporate governance can therefore
be viewed as a socially constructed force that determines the activities and strategic
behaviour of firms.

Although the terms ‘governance’ and ‘management’ are often used together they
differ from each other. Corporate management is the general process of making
decisions within a company. Corporate governance is the set of rules and practices that
ensure that a corporation is serving all of its stakeholders. At the most fundamental level
corporate governance is about economic health of companies.

The term ‘corporate governance’ is a relatively new one in academic debate
although the issues it addresses have been in existence for much longer, even prior to
Smith (1776). The pioneering work by Berle and Means (1932) addresses the main
issues of a corporation which provides essential impetus for a corporate governance
debate. Among those issues, the consequences of the separation of ownership from
control, the concentration of economic power in a large corporation, and the emergence
of a powerful class of professional managers who are insulated from the pressure of
stockholders and the larger public have received much attention (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Berle and Means (1932) further state that the interests of managers diversify
from those of owners of the firm, which is the prime concern in modern agency theory.
Tricker (2000) expresses a similar view and states that governance issues arise when a
corporate entity acquires the status of legal entity, in which ownership is separated from
its management. Separation of ownership from management intensifies the need to
search for good governance practices in order to secure owners’ interests, which is the
concern of the agency theory. However, corporate governance is extensively examined
under different models such as the finance model, the stewardship model, the
stakeholder model and the political model. These theoretical perspectives provide
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different approaches to investigate modern corporations and their governance, resulting
in various concepts and definitions of corporate governance.
Berghe and De Ridder, (1999) explore a range of contemporary definitions for
corporate governance and claim that it is hard to define the term without ambiguity.
They have identified three groups. The first group defines corporate governance in
terms of governance policy and supervision.

The second group focuses on the

relationships of the parties involved and balancing their interests. The third group
focuses on the mission of the enterprise and its outcomes. All these definitions explicitly
or implicitly refer to the existence of conflicts of interest between insiders and outsiders,
with an emphasis on conflicts arising from the separation of ownership and control.
Viewing the corporation as an association of explicit and implicit contracts,
Lewin claims that “corporate governance is a socially contracted force field of driving
and preventing forces that shape a firm’s strategic behaviour” (quoted in Carney and
Gedajlovic, 2001, p.337). Donaldson (1990, p.370) defines corporate governance as
“the structure whereby managers at the organisational apex are controlled through the
board of directors, its associated structures, executive incentive, and other schemes of
monitoring and bonding.” They also observe that monitoring and bonding is carried out
through various contracts.

Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) use an agency perspective in analysing
governance issues, defining corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of
finance to companies assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.”
Prowse (1998b, p.2) expresses a similar view by focusing on accountability towards
outside investors and defines corporate governance as “the rules, standards and
organizations in an economy that govern the behaviour of corporate owners, directors,
and managers and define their duties and accountability to outside investors, i.e.,
shareholders and lenders”. The proponents of agency theory overwhelmingly focus on
the conflict of interest between management and external investors, ignoring other
stakeholders and their roles in corporate governance.

The proponents of stakeholder theory provide broader definitions covering a
wider range of groups involved in the corporate governance process. For example,
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Demb & Neubauer (1992, p.9) state that “Corporate Governance is the process by
which companies are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders”.
Turnbull (1997) describes corporate governance as “the influences affecting the
institutional processes, including those for appointing the controllers and/or regulators,
involved in organizing the production and sale of goods and services.” A similar
concept is suggested by Solomon and Solomon (2004, p.14) who define corporate
governance as “the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity”.
Monks & Minow (1995) view corporate governance as the relationship among various
participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. John and
Senbet (1998, p.372) propose that “corporate governance deals with mechanisms by
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and
management such that their interests are protected”.

Gomez (1997) effectively distinguishes between management and governance
and describes the two-tiered governance model adopted by most of the European
countries as follows.
“management… the more or less rationalised mechanical organisation of the
hierarchies and power to achieve efficiency, once the objectives have been
defined…; governance… the choice of objectives and the means to achieve
them in order to check that they have actually been achieved in the interest of
the parties in the enterprise”(quoted in Berghe and De Ridder, 1999 p.21).
Gomez’ definition of corporate governance in terms of supervisory level is more
suitable to explain the two-tiered board adopted in European model. But it is less
applicable to explain a single tiered or unitary board since in unitary board the division
between ‘policy’ and ‘governance’ is not always clear.
The OECD provided a comprehensive definition incorporating not only the
expected performance implications of a firm, but also the expected economic impacts of
society at large, as follows:
“the rules and practices that govern the relationship between the managers and
shareholders of corporations, as well as stakeholders like employees and
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creditors- contributes to growth and financial stability by underpinning market
confidence, financial market integrity and economic efficiency” (OECD,
2004, p.1).

It is clear that corporate governance refers to the authority to direct, organise,
and control the corporate entity. Therefore when considering corporate governance
practices, one has to focus on the processes used to direct and manage the business
affairs of an entity with the intention of balancing the following: the attainment of
corporate objectives; the alignment of corporate behaviour with the expectations of
society, and, the accountability to owners. The process of corporate governance
involves: responsibilities (who should do what?); accountability (to whom should those
with responsibilities account? and how?); and, checks and balances (the system of
supervision and control procedures and communication flows). However, many issues
can arise in carrying out these responsibilities.
Viewing the corporation from an agency point of view Hart (1995) argues that
all corporate governance issues revolve around two main conditions. First, there has to
be an agency conflict involving members of the organization: owners; managers;
workers, and, consumers. Second, transactions costs are such that this agency problem
cannot be dealt with through a contract. According to the Cadbury Code (1992),
members of boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies.
The responsibilities of boards include: the setting out of the strategic aims of the firm;
providing the leadership to put them into effect; supervising the management of the
business; and, reporting to stakeholders on their stewardship. The shareholder’s role in
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and satisfy themselves that an
appropriate governance system is in place. However, conflict between these parties is
one of the main reasons for most of the corporate governance issues faced by modern
corporations, and causing the evolution of corporate governance systems around the
world.
Different governance systems have evolved around the world to address the
relationship between the firm and society, owing to numerous differences in
institutional and cultural norms, resource endowments, political traditions and legal
systems (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001). However, effectiveness of these governance
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systems is not agreed upon universally. Different theoretical perspectives are generally
applied to evaluate these governance systems and their related concepts and issues.
However, the various issues and concepts of corporate governance are subject to
different interpretations under these different theoretical perspectives. For example,
accountability, one of the important concepts of corporate governance, has undergone a
paradigm shift from stewardship, to agency, to accountability to stakeholders
(Sternberg, 1999).
Furthermore, most of these emergent theories are examined extensively in
developed economies, assuming that contextual conditions of these economies provide
universal reference. However, owing to the existence of vast differences between
developed and emerging markets, these theories need to be tested in the different
contextual settings, especially within an emerging market context in order to validate
their claims. The theoretical perspectives of corporate governance, irrespective of their
preconception towards western thought, provide an analytical framework to view the
nature and efficiency of different governance systems across counties. The different
theoretical perspectives of corporate governance, which are useful in evaluating the
corporate governance system of a country, are discussed in the next section. This study
contributes to the literature by examining the corporate governance environment of Sri
Lanka, in order to assess the compliance to good corporate governance practice by Sri
Lankan companies, and the implications for their performance.

2.3 Established Perspectives of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance becomes a multifaceted issue owing to the development
of complex corporate organizations and globalization of business operations. Thus, an
analysis of corporate governance requires strong theoretical foundations to capture the
efficiency of existing corporate governance mechanisms in different contextual
conditions. However, most theories of corporate governance offer a single analytical
framework which could have limitations in explaining complex corporate governance
issues. Thus this section provides an analysis of different theories in order to understand
their relative strengths and relevance in analysing corporate governance issues.

The corporate governance survey by Hawley and Williams (1996) identified
four theoretical models that were extensively applied in analysing various aspects of
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corporate governance. These models include (1) The Finance Model; (2) The
Stewardship Model; (3) The Stakeholder Model; and (4) The Political Model.

In

addition, other theoretical models such as the Resource-Dependence Model, the
Institutional Model, the Participative Model, the Policy Governance Model, and the
Strategic Leadership Model are also applied in analysing efficiencies of different
corporate governance mechanisms in diverse theoretical studies (Ho, 2005). These
theories have however, produced contradictory results regarding firm performance and
corporate governance, in particular relating to different cultural contexts. Despite these
contradictions and different theoretical perspectives, evidence clearly supports the link
between various dimensions of corporate governance and firm performance (Demsetz
and Villalonga, 2001, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Sanjai and Brian, 2007).

2.3.1 Agency theory
Agency theory emerged from the seminal papers of Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognising the firm as a nexus of contracts among
individual factors of production. Thus, agency theory rests upon the contractual view of
the firm. The essence of the agency problem is the separation of the management from
the suppliers of finance to the firm. Agency theory focuses on the relationship between
principals such as shareholders, and agents such as company executives and managers.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define this relationship as a contract under which the
principal engages the agent to perform some service, expecting the agent to act and
make decisions in the best interests of the principals. However, due to opportunistic
behaviour, the agent may not necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the
principals (Padilla, 2002). Such a problem was first highlighted by Adam Smith in the
18th century in his famous book ‘Wealth of Nations’ as follows:
“The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the managers
rather of other peoples’ money than of their own, it cannot well be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own. Like the
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as
not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation
for having it. Negligence and profession, therefore, must always prevail, more
or less, in the management of affairs of such a company.” (quoted in Jensen
and Meckling, 1976, p.305)
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Agency theory argues that managers are focused on self-interest rather than on
the interests of the owners. This suggests that ownership and managerial interest may
not be aligned, leading to agency costs and internal inefficiencies. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) claim that agency costs consist of three different components: monitoring costs,
bonding costs and residual loss. Monitoring costs are the control costs incurred by the
principal to mitigate the devious behaviour of the agent. Bonding costs are incurred to
ensure that the manager makes decisions beneficial to the principal. Residual loss is a
potential cost that occurs when both monitoring costs and bonding costs fail to control
the divergent behaviour of the manager. Due to the existence of agency costs and
internal inefficiencies, agency theory argues that the purpose of corporate governance
mechanisms is to provide shareholders with some assurance that managers will try to
achieve outcomes that are in the shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The internal and external governance mechanisms such as an effective board structure,
compensation contracts, active monitoring of executives through concentrated
ownership and market for corporate control, help to bring the interest of managers in
line with those of shareholders. However, a basic conclusion of agency theory is that the
value of a firm cannot be maximized as managers normally hold the executive power
which allows them to expropriate value for their own interest (Turnbull, 1997).
Irrespective of this claim, agency theory provides a broad analytical framework to
examine how successful corporate governance systems can curb opportunistic
managerial behaviour, securing a fair return on investment for the suppliers of finance.

2.3.2 Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theory assumes that managers are not opportunistic agents, but
good stewards of corporations who diligently work towards owners’ interests by
securing high level of corporate profits and shareholders’ returns (Donaldson and Davis,
1994). Hence, stewardship theory differs from agency theory with respect to the motive
of managers. According to Gay (2002) stewardship theory is also derived from the
economic model of human behaviour, classified by McGregor as Theory Y, which
assumes that people are inherently motivated to work and perform a good job.
Therefore, stewardship theory purports there is no conflict between managers and
owners, and the optimum governance structure allows coordination of the companies to
perform most effectively towards the betterment of the owners’ interest.
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Donaldson and Davis (1994) note that managers are principally motivated by
their needs for achievement of responsibility. Therefore, they argue that organizations
are better served by specialist executive managers who are free from rigid control by
non-executive director dominated boards. They further argue that most research studies
examining board composition make the assumption that independent boards are good
and produce the expected findings. However, Donaldson and Davis (1994) point out
that a non-executive board of directors is, by its design, an ineffective control device
that might fail to present good firm performance. Thus, the proponents of stewardship
theory expect superior corporate performance if the majority of board members
represent inside directors, as they work to maximise profit for shareholders.
Furthermore, they claim that inside directors understand the business better than outside
directors, and therefore, inside directors are able to make superior decisions (Donaldson,
1990, Donaldson and Davis, 1994). The underlying argument for this assertion is that
the managers are naturally trustworthy and there will be no major agency costs
associated with managers.

As a result of this appreciative view of management, stewardship theory takes a
more relaxed view in respect of CEO duality and favours boards having more specialist
executive directors instead of having independent outside directors. However, Turnbull
(1997) claims that the inclination of individuals to act as stewards or self-serving agents
may be dependent upon the institutional and cultural context. In this case, both
stewardship and agency theories can be seen as sub-set of political and other broader
models of corporate governance. Thus the validity of theoretical arguments relating to
managers’ behaviour in achieving better corporate performance and the role of
corporate governance mechanism in this respect has to be evaluated with due
consideration to political framework within which these constituents are operated.

2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory views the firm as a system of stakeholders operating within
the larger system of the host society, which provides the legal and market infrastructure
for the firm’s activities (Clarkson, 1994). Freeman and Reed (1990) define the
organisation as multilateral agreements between the enterprise and its stakeholders.
According to these views, the firm should not be regarded as bundles of assets
belonging to shareholders but rather, as institutional arrangements for governing the
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relationship between all of the parties that contribute firm-specific assets. According to
Freeman (1984) the original list of stakeholders includes shareholders, employees,
customers, lenders, and suppliers. However, a wider definition of stakeholders tends to
consider any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
organisation’s objective. Jones and Wicks (1999) recognises the following as the
essential premises of stakeholder theory: (1) the corporation has relationships with
many constituent groups (stakeholders) that are affected by its decisions; (2) the theory
is concerned with the nature of these relationships in terms of both processes and
outcomes for the firm and its stakeholders; (3) the interests of all (legitimate)
stakeholders have intrinsic value, and no set of interests is assumed to dominate others;
and (4) the theory focuses on managerial decision making. The stakeholder view of
corporate governance focuses on the needs and concerns of all stakeholder groups and
how their interests are taken into account and protected by corporate managers.
In the premise of stakeholder theory, corporate governance can be viewed as
control mechanisms designed for the efficient operation of a corporation on behalf of its
stakeholders. The control mechanisms themselves are necessitated by separation of
ownership from control, which is common to any market economy.

John and

Senbet(1998) view corporate governance as a means by which various stakeholders
apply control over a corporation by exercising certain rights, which are established in
the existing legal and regulatory frameworks as well as corporate bylaws. Thus
stakeholder theory could be reconciled with the agency theory by broadening the
classical agency relationship between managers and owners to incorporate the
relationships between managers and all stakeholders. The adoption of the stakeholder
theory has led companies to re-examine their vision, mission and values, and also the
different types of performance measures applicable to various stakeholders.

The

stakeholder approach is seen as a commercial necessity in a world where competitive
advantage stems more and more from the intangible values embodied in human and
social capital. Hence, it has become common for companies to set goals which take
account of environmental quality and social equity in addition to the traditional
measures of economic performance. Therefore, the future course of corporate
governance is likely to be strongly influenced by societal pressures, where the
companies have to focus their attention on the wider community of stakeholders.
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2.3.4 Political Theory
Political theory aims to explain, justify or criticize the nature of power in
society. It outlines the balance of power between states, groups and individuals. At the
macro level, the political model of corporate governance recognizes the allocation of
corporate power, privileges and profits between owners, managers and other
stakeholders and how this is done by the government through its various constituencies.
Hawley and Williams (1996) claim that governments have exercised strong political
influence on firms and as a result, politics has influenced the governance structures of
firms. For example, political theory brings the approach of developing voting support
from shareholders, rather than purchasing voting power.

Corporate governance studies which examine the political behaviour of a
corporation focus their discussion on the micro aspects of the political model (Pound,
1993, Hawley and Williams, 1996). The micro level political model focuses on how
controlling power can be operated by dispersed shareholders through a political process.
For example, Pound (1993) claims that the political model of governance is an approach
in which active investors seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support
from dispersed shareholders, rather than by simply purchasing voting power or control.
Hence, this becomes a new form of governance, where politics, rather than finance,
plays a dominant role. This approach is exceptionally less expensive than takeovers as a
method of acquiring controlling power (Pound, 1993). Therefore, the political model of
corporate governance places severe limits on the traditional economic analysis of the
corporate governance problem. Political theory looks at governance through a different
lens from other theories. It locates the issue of performance implications of corporate
governance in a broader political context. Thus, it becomes necessary to understand the
political marketplace to analyse the performance implications of corporate governance
practices. The roles played by capital market mechanisms in governance become
vulnerable to a political marketplace. For example, Gordon & Pound (1991) show that
corporations with fewer anti-takeover provisions in their constitutions out-performed
those with anti-takeover measures in place. Hence, proponents of the political theory of
corporate governance claim that a proper understanding of political marketplace
behaviour is imperative to carrying out critical examination of major governance issues,
such as the role played by capital market mechanisms in corporate governance and the
performance implications of governance practices.
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2.3.5 Other Approaches for Analysing Corporate Governance
The theories discussed so far are largely focused on internal monitoring issues of
corporate governance. However, there are other theoretical approaches such as the
resource-dependence model, cultural perspectives, institutional models, and policy
governance models that are focused, rather, on external governance mechanisms
including external challenges and securing resources from the external environment. For
example, resource-dependence models concentrate on the role of the board of directors
in providing access to resources needed by the firm. It claims that successful
organizations develop internal structures to satisfy environmental requirements. Pfeffer
(1972) argues that a company’s board size and its composition are a rational response to
the conditions of the external environment. According to Hillman et al.(2000), directors
bring resources to the firm, such as: information; skills; and, access to key constituents
such as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, and social groups. They also bring
legitimacy. Thus, directors are viewed as linking networks which connect the business
to its strategic environment. It has been argued that this network secures the continuous
supply of required resources to enhance organizational functioning and performance.
The identification of such networks, and the directors’ role in building those networks,
provide another insight into governance processes and powers. Thus, a resourcedependence model provides another analytical dimension in respect of performance
implications of corporate governance systems and practices.

Cultural perspectives provide an alternative approach for the analysis of
corporate governance. Hofstede (1980, p.25) defines culture as “the collective
programming of the mind which distinguishes the member of one human group from
another’. He recognizes four dimensions which distinguishes one culture from another.
These dimensions include individualism versus collectivism, large versus small power
distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity versus femininity.
It is revealed that differences within these dimensions diversely influence trust
relationships of stakeholder groups of the corporate entity. For example, according to
Hollingsworth et al. (1994, p.6) corporate transactions are conducted “on the basis of
mutual trust and confidence, which is normally sustained by stable, preferential,
mutually obligated and legally non-enforceable relationships”. The parties involved in
transactions may be kept together either by value consensus or resources dependency
through culture or community. Turnbull (1997) states that this claim recognizes the fact
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that the transactions are governed by the networks which exists at Meso-level i.e. the
intermediate location between the micro level of the firm and the macro level of the
whole economy. La Porta et al. (1997) examine the role of trust and social capital in
motivating individuals to assist socially, in order to increase productive efficiency. They
found that trust is greatly and positively correlated to firm efficiency and civil
participation. They also found that the dominant religion in a culture can affect trust.
For example, they observed that as the proportion of the population involved in
hierarchical religions, like Catholicism, decreases, trust in large organizations increases.
The hierarchical character appears to have a strong negative correlation with trust and
seems to have a negative influence on the quality of institutions. Stulz and Williamson
(2003) evaluate the influence of religion on financial development, by distinguishing
between the rights of the shareholders and those of the creditors. They observe that only
religion has a decisive influence on the rights of creditors. Its explanatory power
appears superior to that of language, openness of international trade, individual income
level and the legal origin. Licht (2001) proposes the use of concepts of intercultural
psychology in order to evaluate the effects of cultural differences on the national system
of governance, having considered the national culture as one of the principal
determinants of efficiency. These conceptual arguments and empirical evidence show
that the culture has indirect authority on corporate governance and corporate
performance, and so national culture influences corporate efficiency. Therefore, cultural
perspectives of corporate governance provide a different standpoint to evaluate the
efficiency of various governance mechanisms and practices.

2.3.6 Current Status of Theorizing Corporate Governance
Corporate governance does not have any widely accepted theoretical base.
Although the existing theories make various attempts to explain how the modern
corporate is run, corporate governance lacks any form of coherence either empirically or
theoretically (Pettigrew, 1992). Despite growing academic interest in corporate
governance, research so far fails to offer a convincing explanation of how corporate
governance works. Practices of the subject are only marginally contributed to by the
research findings and theory building. Most professional developments of practice are
motivated by consequences of corporate corruption and collapse. The corporate
governance codes in developed nations and in emerging economies have been based on
the experience and conventional wisdom of the company directors and their advisers,
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but not based on the conclusions of rigorous academic research (Tricker, 2009). The
importance of corporate governance is recognized by investors, regulators and other
stakeholders of the company. Its influence on the long-term success of the corporation is
also understood by business leaders and other stakeholders. However, the theoretical
underpinnings of the subject are not strong enough to capture the reality of corporate
governance as it is practiced. At present, various theoretical perspectives shed some
light on different aspects of governance, highlighting some issues while leaving others
in shadow. Any general theory of corporate governance is certainly a premature
suggestion (Tricker, 2009). However, it is recognized the importance of carrying out
more research covering broader perspectives of governance including: regulatory levels
of laws and regulations; advisory levels involving voluntary codes; and, personal levels
covering an individual’s beliefs and behaviour.

2.4 Different Systems of Corporate Governance
The development of corporate governance is closely linked with the economic
development of industrial capitalism (Chowdary, 2003). The different forms of
incorporation are designed for alternate business opportunities arising with industrial
development. As a result, different governance mechanisms with different governance
practices also emerged around the world. Adherence to best corporate governance
practices is a prerequisite for any organisation to manage effectively in the globalised
market. Therefore, the examination of efficiency of the prevailing governance systems
has become one of the main issues in corporate governance (Jensen, 1993, Miller,
1997).
The corporate governance system of a country is embedded in its unique history,
culture, laws and economic environment. Weimber and Pape (1999) undertook a
comprehensive overview of governance in the industrialised world. They define a
system of corporate governance as “a more or less country specific framework of legal,
institutional and cultural factors, shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders
exert on managerial decision making” (Weimer and Pape, 1999, p.152). Furthermore,
they prepare taxonomy of these systems, and identify four groupings of similar
corporate governance systems within industrialized countries. These are: (1) AngloSaxon countries (USA, UK, Canada and Australia); (2) Germanic countries (Germany,
Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Denmark, Norway and Finland); (3) Latin countries
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(France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium); and, (4) Japan. They also identify eight
characteristics of governance: the prevailing concept of the firm; the board system; the
salient stakeholders’ ability to exert influence on managerial decision making; the
importance of stock markets in the national economy; the presence or absence of an
external market for corporate control; the ownership structure; the extent of which
executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance; and, the time horizons
of economic relationships. The legal, institutional and cultural dimensions of these
characteristics have provided the basis for the identification of the groupings of four
corporate governance systems. For comparative purposes, these corporate governance
systems are ``market-oriented'' systems and ``network-oriented'' systems. The main
weakness of this taxonomy is its inability to pay attention to the governance systems
prevailing in emerging economies. However, it provides a strong foundation to examine
the main characteristics of market oriented and network oriented systems.

A characteristic of the market-oriented system is an active external-market for
corporate control. By contrast, network-oriented systems have relatively stable
relationships among small groups that influence managerial decision making. For
example, Clark (2005) observes an outside system of market-based corporate
governance prevails in the USA and UK, while an inside system of relationship-based
corporate governance is found in Europe and Asia-Pacific. Clark (2005) identifies the
key differences between the two systems are related to the place where the corporate
monitoring and control are located, and how the applicable rules are operated by the
participants. In an insider-based system, corporate governance functions are carried out
by a small number of readily identifiable economic agents, such as ‘main banks’ or
large parent firms. The corporate control events are subject to a high degree of internal
regulation by the key parties concerned, including incumbent management. In marketoriented systems, a diverse set of monitoring and control mechanisms, particularly
external control mechanisms are applied. Hence, a key distinction between the two
systems is made in terms of who plays the dominant role in monitoring and control of
the company’s affairs.

Although the systems of governance are designated either as market-oriented or
network oriented systems at the highest level of abstraction, the literature on corporate
governance identifies the existence of diverse governance systems around the world
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(Denis and McConnell, 2003, Bhasa, 2004b, Jansson, 2005, Murphy and Topyan,
2005). For example, Bhasa (2004b) identifies four different systems of corporate
governance viz.: outsider system (market-centric model); insider system (relationshipbased model); transition model; and, emerging governance model. These models are
widely different in terms of monitoring and control, and how those associated are
accountable in the process of the separation of ownership and control within the
organization. These different systems of corporate governance are discussed in
subsequent sections.

2.4.1 Market Based Systems (Anglo-Saxon Model)
The market centric economies are largely characterized by: the existence of a
widely held ownership structure; highly liquid stock markets due to good investor
protection; and, control of companies by professional managers on behalf of the
scattered shareholders (Bhasa, 2004b). In these economies, corporate managers have
more power to make decisions. As the power of shareholders to select directors and vote
on key issues of the company is limited by the fragmentation of ownership, regulatory
bodies have to offer adequate shareholder protection and an equal access to information.
Consequently the main concern of corporate governance is the conflict between strong
managers and weak dispersed shareholders, and in this spirit the roles of directors, stock
options, takeovers, and minority shareholder protections are frequently investigated by
researchers (Gay, 2002, Denis and McConnell, 2003, Jansson, 2005). Since the
managers are not the owners of the firm, they can have other objectives rather than
maximizing shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Prowse, 1998b). This may
give rise to agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that agency costs are to be
incurred to align the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders. Agency
costs consist of three different components: monitoring costs, bonding costs and
residual loss. Monitoring costs are the control costs incurred by the principal to mitigate
the devious behaviour of the manager. Bonding costs are incurred to ensure that the
manager takes decisions beneficial to the principal. Residual loss occurs when both the
above kind of costs fail to control the divergent behaviour of the manager. The voting
control is not concentrated in a few hands in these economies as the shareholdings are
widely dispersed. The ultimate authority to determine corporate strategy and to appoint
members of the board rests with a large number of anonymous investors, not with a
single or a small group of dominant investors. This system of corporate governance
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could be seen in countries such as United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand.

In this system, dispersed investors require reliable and adequate information
flows in order to make informed investment decisions and therefore this model is
recognized as a disclosure-based model. Regulation is intended to ensure all investors
remain fully informed and to prevent privileged groups of shareholders sharing
information amongst themselves. The board of directors should have some degree of
independence from management, as it is responsible for monitoring managerial
performance. However, board independence often poses a problem in reality and the
board is regarded as a relatively weak governance device (Denis and McConnell, 2003,
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Thus, in the market-oriented system the capital markets
play a primary role in corporate governance. When managers fail to maximize the
firm’s value, they expose it to the threat of a take-over; the market for corporate control
may be a more effective disciplinary device than either the monitoring by institutional
investors or boards of directors (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Murphy and Topyan, 2005).
Thus this model is termed the “market-based” or “market-oriented” system of corporate
governance. Gay (2002) identifies the following features as key characteristics of a
market-based system: exercise of more influences by the shareholders than other
stakeholders in managerial decision making; existence of a one-tier board of directors;
playing important role by stock markets; existence of active market for corporate
control with frequent takeovers; widely disperse ownership; availability of performance
based compensation schemes for executives; and, close monitoring of company
performance on short term basis.

However, even within the market based governance systems differences are
evident depending on the legal systems of individual countries. According to Tricker
(2009) a basic distinction has developed in recent years between the US model of
corporate governance and that of the UK/Commonwealth model. The US model is
fundamentally ‘rule based’ where as UK/Commonwealth model is ‘principle based’. In
the US governance is regulated by mandatory rules and therefore directors face legal
penalties for non-compliance. This emphasis of governance is further strengthened with
the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. In the USA, the board of directors
is entrusted with an important responsibility to monitor the company on behalf of the
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shareholders. Therefore, attempts have been made to introduce a majority of nonexecutive directors on to the board. Further, board committees are established to
enhance the oversight function of the board and limit the powers of the CEO. The board
committees are usually appointed to oversee the nomination of new board members,
remuneration of executive directors, and auditing (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Murphy
and Topyan, 2005).

In contrast, jurisdictions such as the UK and Commonwealth countries have
adopted Codes of Corporate Governance-benchmarks. The codes play a beneficial role
due to their flexibility compared to mandatory rules. The UK is the first country to
develop a corporate governance code i.e. Cadbury Code in 1992. This is followed by
Hampel Report in 1998 and Combined Code in 2003. Since, corporate governance in
the UK remains linked to the notions of a unitary board and the primacy of the
shareholder. Codes of corporate governance principle determine board responsibilities,
not the rule of law. Companies are required to report that they have followed the
principles, or otherwise state the reasons for their non-compliance. Thus this model is
often referred to as the ‘comply or explain’ model of governance (Loke, 2002, Tricker,
2009).

2.4.2 Network-oriented System (Relationship-based Model)
The insider system of corporate governance, which is common in continental
Europe and some Asian counties such as Japan and Korea, is characterized by highly
concentrated shareholdings, concentrated voting power, cross corporate shareholding
and inter-firm relationships (Maher and Andersson, 2000). In the relationship-based
model, more diverse groups of stakeholders are actively recognized including
employees, customers, banks, local communities and national governments. The main
feature of ownership is the dominance of financial institutions. Banks dominate the
ownership shares by holding large amounts of equity in companies. They become
directly involved in the operations of the firms in terms of monitoring and decisionmaking, etc. Banks are committed to saving companies that are in financial crisis.
Hence, the governance model is largely known as a relationship-based model
(McCauley and Zimmer, 1994, Becht and Roell, 1999, Gay, 2002, Bhasa, 2004b). It is
possible to see long-term large shareholdings in these companies. These long-term large
shareholders give a degree of protection to the company from both the stock market and
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the threat of takeover. Substantial cross ownership between firms is a main
characteristic of this model. Bhasa (2004a) recognizes Jananese keiretsu 3, Korean
chaebol 4, French verrouillage (complex network of cross-shareholding) and German
relationship investing model as the glaring examples of this governance model.

In many European Countries a key feature is the concentration of ownership. La
Porta et al. (1999) show that in most European counties, ownership and control are held
by cohesive groups of insiders who have long-term stable relationships with a company.
The groups of insiders tend to know each other well and have connections with the
company in addition to their investments through: family interests; allied industrial
concerns; banks; or, holding companies. For instance large French companies are
usually dominated by controlling shareholders, and the relationships between these
companies and the state remain significant (Bhasa, 2004a). The large French companies
are not primarily financed by outside capital market investors, but through family, the
banks and the state.

Further, a relatively strong concentration of ownership of

individual enterprises is seen in German companies too. Though the ownership is shared
by different groups of investors—banks, investment institutions, companies,
government etc., yet banks control more of the corporate activities (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997, La Porta et al., 1999, Bhasa, 2004a). Hence, many of the legal and non-legal
aspects of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance are absent, or unimportant, in these
countries.

A dominant corporate governance regime in the Asian Region is Japan. From a
Japanese perspective, corporate governance by definition rests with the conduct of
board of directors who are appointed to run the company on behalf of shareholders. The
Interim Report of the Corporate Governance Committee of the Corporate Governance
Forum of Japan (1997, p.1) states “The directors are entitled to govern the company,
and to supervise and monitor the company’s management in order to promote effective
management and ensure prudent accountability to the shareholders. The board of
directors therefore is the primary overseer in the company, monitoring management to
3

A set of companies with interlocking business relationship and shareholdings

4

A large conglomerate of family-controlled firms of South Korea characterized by
strong ties with government agencies
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ensure that it is a) always endeavouring to maximize corporate value in long term for
the shareholders, and b) always prepared to be accountable its actions to all the
stakeholders and - in particular - to the shareholders.” Hence, Japanese corporate
governance principles have been developed with a view of firmly establishing the
governance powers of directors. In the Japanese model special emphasis is placed on the
shareholders and on the board of directors, who function simultaneously as
shareholders’ delegates and as promoters of the benefits of all concerned shareholders.
Two pivotal elements of the Japanese system are the important role played by ‘main
banks’ and large parent firms, and the high degree of interlocking shareholdings, as they
are the building blocks of the insider-based system of corporate governance (Aoki,
1990, Fukao, 1995).

According to Bhasa (2004a) the Japanese system relies heavily on trust and
relationships. Japanese companies experience a lower cost of capital, which is assumed
to be the result of close relationships between corporations and banks and other longterm investors (McCauley and Zimmer, 1994, Fukao, 1995), consequently Japanese
firms have higher return of investment than their U.S. counterparts (Prowse, 1998b).
The conventional Japanese model consists of a dual structure: the board of directors,
which carries out the functions of strategic decision-making, and the board of auditors,
which audits management’s execution of business activities. Although the board of
directors carries out decision making functions they do not have real decision making
powers. Instead decisions are taken by the ‘management board’, or by the ‘management
board of directors.’ Most members of the board of directors are ‘executive’ directors
and therefore are often ‘employees’ of the company (Cooke and Sawa, 1998, Aoki,
1990, Fukao, 1995). When discussing the Japanese corporate governance systems two
main notable differences from the Anglo-Saxon model can be witnessed. They are (1)
the Japanese system is based on the concept of the company as a community in contrast
to Anglo-Saxon model which is based on the concept of the company owned and
governed by shareholders, and (2) the Japanese system is seeking profits for ‘pluralisticoriented’ constituencies in contrast to Anglo-Saxon system which is seeking profits for
‘individualistic-oriented’ shareholders.

According to Nestor and Thompson (2002) the difference between market-based
and relationship-based systems of corporate governance is that the former emphasizes
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competition and market processes, while the latter emphasizes cooperative relationships
and reaching consensus. Further, they argue that the agency problem in the relationshipbased system is much less severe, as insider groups continuously monitor management.
In a relationship-based system, banks and other financial institutions often have
complex and long-standing relationships with companies, rather than having arm’s
length relations with equity markets. Hence, in contrast to the heavy emphasis on public
disclosure in market-based systems, the insider system is based on a deeper, but more
selective, exchange of information amongst insiders. Such different structures of
separation of ownership and control under these systems lead to different solutions for
governance issues. While agency problems in the USA seem to stem from conflicts of
interest between managers and dispersed shareholders, in Europe conflicts of interest lie
between controlling shareholders and powerless minority shareholders (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986). Maug (1998) investigated whether higher market liquidity which is
normally a characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries, enhances the performance of firms.
He finds that in a highly liquid market, shareholders who receive adverse information
about a firm are able to sell their shares quickly, and in doing so put more pressure on
managers to perform better. However, in European countries, where market liquidity is
relatively low, shareholders are forced to hold on to their investments. However, due to
concentrated ownership, they are able to use their voting power to influence a
company’s management to achieve better performance. Renneboog (2000) finds that
dispersed ownership leads to free-riding on control where as strong concentration in
ownership limits this effect. He further explains that when firm performance is poor, the
presence of large shareholdings is followed by higher board turnover. However,
disciplining of underperforming management is accomplished by large shareholders
with superior monitoring abilities. Consequently, management enjoy dominant power in
market-centric economies. The market-centric and relationship-based models have been
widely discussed in governance literature providing evidence as to how the differences
in economic characteristics and governance structures of companies bring about
different performance implications. However, only limited studies have been carried out
within the Asia–Pacific governance system in this respect.

2.4.3 Emerging Governance Model
While an increasing body of literature refers to the potential economic, social
and cultural differences between emerging and developed markets, less discussion is
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available with respect to the emerging corporate governance model. These economies
are characterized by the existence of a lively capital market; successful transition of
state held specialty sectors to widely-held firms; the existence of both relationshipbased and market-centric governance mechanisms; the existence of formal and
functional legal systems; and, the existence of both family-held as well as widelydispersed firms (Claessens et al., 2000, Khan, 2003, Bhasa, 2004a, Bhasa, 2004b). The
emerging market model has arisen as a result of attempts to impose and replicate aspects
of both the relationship-based and market-based governance models into emerging
economies (Bhasa, 2004b). Researchers have attempted to understand this model in the
light of relationship-based and market-based governance models, and therefore countryspecific characteristics of this model and their implications are largely unexplored
(Zingales and Rajan, 1998, Bhasa, 2004b).

Countries of the Asia-Pacific have rich cultural diversity, with different political
and legal structures, and social traditions. Therefore, significant national differences are
seen in corporate governance policy and practice among companies in the Asian region.
Furthermore, most of the large corporations in this region are owned and controlled by
families, with family members holding key managerial positions (Nam and Nam, 2004).
Therefore, the agency problem exists not between the management and owners, but
between the management (the controlling family) and minority shareholders.
Prowse(1998a)shows that the most common company form is the diversified
conglomerate that is controlled and managed by a single extended family. Companies
with widely dispersed ownership are rare in Asia. In this context, it is difficult to protect
the rights of minority shareholders. Although there are laws and penalties against
insider trading and related party transactions, it is open to question how often and how
rigorously these laws are enforced. Therefore, in this context the relevance of both
separation of ownership and control, and the principal-agent relationship is
questionable. In Asian countries majority shareholders usually dominate boards.
Furthermore, institutional shareholders and fund managers are not sufficiently active in
corporate control, and therefore they do not play a lively role in the governance
mechanism. However, banks and other financial institutions do play a dominant role in
companies, as a major supplier of corporate finance. Therefore, they take a role in
ensuring companies follow corporate governance principles and implement prudent
financial controls.
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A survey conducted by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
(ACCA) (2002) examines the attitudes of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to corporate
governance in China and South East Asian Countries. The findings show that there is a
heightened awareness in the South East Asia region of the relevance of sound corporate
governance for corporate success. Asian CFOs perceive that their performance relative
to international benchmarks is improving. However, the study particularly notes that
business models in Asia are historically different from those in western economies, as
majority shareholdings controlling Asian companies are usually single families. Familycentred shareholders tend to look after themselves, rather than acting in the best
interests of minority shareholders. Further, this study reveals several notable features of
governance practices in China and South East Asian Countries: CFOs are reluctant to
endorse the view that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring effective corporate
governance rests with the board as a whole, as executive directors are clearly identified
as responsible for putting best practice in place; CFOs do not see their responsibility as
going much beyond disclosure and financial reporting because while financial reporting
has a high priority, the introduction of internal controls and ensuring the independence
of bodies such as the audit committee are seen as less urgent by them; and, there is
widespread acceptance of the importance of corporate governance and, especially, of
non-executive directors, in the protection of minority shareholders. The ownership
structure of many Asian companies, however, acts as a barrier to the development of
truly independent non-executive directors.

Khan (2003) asserts that financing of companies in market-based systems and
bank-led governance systems is dominated by corporate finance. However, he argues
financing of family-based companies is normally generated from three different sources:
internal family funds; external bank financing; and, equity financing. In the initial stage,
larger proportion of required capital comes from the internal sources. This financing
system appears to be functioning effectively at the early development stages of the
business. This is due to the fact that family-based funds reduce transaction costs
(Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 2007).

However, many young and attractive

companies in emerging markets often find that internal funds flows are insufficient for
the growth of their businesses. As a result, the role of banks in supply of finance
becomes more prominent. In the third stage, external equity finance becomes the most
significant source of corporate finance. However, as the transaction costs of external
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funds are expensive, managers in emerging markets are often inclined to invest in assets
which are able to be funded internally (Mueller, 2004).Thus, Khan (2003) claims that
neither the banks nor equity markets ultimately control the family business group in
Asia.

The transition from family-based financing to equity-based financing continues
to be a challenge for most stock exchanges in Asia (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek,
2007). According to The World Bank and the IMF, governance weaknesses, especially
the Asian way of doing business, are a cause of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The IMF
reform programme for the crisis-affected Asian countries suggests that Asian countries
should abandon this governance model and adopt the US corporate model. However,
this has been highly criticized as the US model has limited application for developing
countries due to structural differences, imperfect share prices and the imperfect market
for corporate control (Singh and Zammit, 2006).

2.5 Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence or
Contextualization?
Globalization and the increasing volume of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
flow into developing countries have led to a debate around the importance of
converging corporate governance systems. FDI is an important international issue due to
shareholders and other stakeholders now being global, rather than local. As a result,
studies in search of an optimal system of corporate governance receive much attention
among corporate governance scholars over the last two decade ((Carati and Rad, 2000,
Reed, 2002, Ratnatunga and Mohamed, 2005, Goergen et al., 2008). Is there an optimal
system of corporate governance? Are national governance systems effectively
converging towards a particular system of corporate governance? Can one governance
system outperform other systems economically? These are the questions receiving much
attention from those who focus on economic efficiency (or performance implications) of
different governance systems. Increased cross-border contact between corporations has
generated very compelling debate about the convergence of corporate governance
practices. However, there are competing models about the effects of globalization on
corporate governance. Ahunwan (2003) summarizes three models in this regard,
namely, the convergence model, the path-dependence model and the hybrid model.
According to convergence theorists, economic efficiency of globalization will
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ultimately pressure global corporate governance towards a single model. Further,
convergence theorists claim that the governance structures and behaviours around the
world would converge into a single model either in terms of the rules and forms, or in
terms of the functions (Coffee, 1999, Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Goergen et al.,
2008). However, proponents of the path-dependent model argue that because of the
evolution of corporate governance systems is path-dependent, the legal and institutional
limitations, national history trajectories and peculiarities of social and cultural aspects
countries would prevent governance systems converging towards a single model
(Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). The theorists of a hybrid model take the middle path, and
argue that while global corporate governance is unlikely to converge into a single
model, it extracts best practices from different models of corporate governance (Carati
and Rad, 2000).

Analysis of advantages and disadvantages of each model triggers debate around
convergence of corporate governance practices (Gordon and Roe, 2004). It is observed
that the impact of national governance systems on corporate performance varies.
Therefore, one should expect that market competition would eventually bring about a
convergence between systems (Goergen et al., 2008).

According to Blair (2002)

changes in corporations’ performance in countries does from time to time change the
focus on corporate governance systems. During late 1980s and early 1990s corporate
governance studies focused on Japanese and German systems, as the companies of these
countries were performing well in global markets. However, this trend changed in the
mid 1990s towards a market-based system, due to the growth in high-technology and
communication companies in USA. The Asian crises in 1997 and subsequent collapse
of the Russian economy dramatizes the view that the US system of corporate
governance is better than alternative systems. From mid 1990's Anglo-American
corporate governance became the dominant model for large, public firms in the
international business and it was adopted in many parts of the world including both
developed and developing countries. However, with the collapse of Enron and other
large corporations in the USA and other countries, where market-based governance
systems operate, confidence was lost especially in respect of the incentive structures of
corporate directors and managers and checks and balances built into the market-based
governance system. Nevertheless, functional convergence towards the market-based
system is occurring. It is driven by many forces such as the increasing influence of
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regional stock exchanges, the accelerating convergence towards international
accounting standards, and the sustained wave of international mergers and acquisitions.
This functional convergence is supported by the development of international codes and
standards of corporate governance by recognized international institutions such as the
OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other international
bodies. Although all these policies usually rejected the notion of ‘one size fits all’,
emphasize is given to the move towards more market-based systems.

However, it is noted that corporate ownership and governance structures differ,
even within the most developed economies in the world (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).
What explains these differences? Notwithstanding the powerful forces of globalization
some key differences have thus far persisted. And should they be expected to persist or
to disappear? The proponents of path dependence theory shed some light on these issues
through their theoretical and empirical analysis. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) recognize the
differences of corporate ownership and governance structure that exist, even in
advanced economies, background forces against global convergence. According to
them, structure-driven path dependence and rule-driven path dependence play a vital
role in deciding the corporate governance and ownership structure of a country. The
direct effect of initial ownership structures on subsequent ownership structures
(structure-driven path dependence), and the legal rules that govern the relationship
between the corporation and its investors, stakeholders, and managers (rule-driven path
dependence), explain the reasons for differences in governance structures around the
world. Path dependence can therefore be recognised as one of the important forces
shaping the corporate governance structure of a country.

This has led to another debate among corporate governance scholars as to
origins of corporate governance systems, whether legal, political or other. Loke (2002)
points out that the law cannot do much to build conditions for good corporate
governance. It can set a number of mandatory conditions that would be conducive to
effective monitoring. He argues that good corporate governance results depend upon
management, controlling interests, and the discipline of the market. There is another
school of thought, which says that corporate finance and governance are strongly based
upon and shaped by the political and cultural outlook of a country. All these arguments
are consistent with the theoretical arguments of the path dependence model.
43

“To assume that all countries will adapt to the same corporate governance
structures is unrealistic. It is likely that fundamental features of the European or Asian
approaches will be maintained, even when the apparatus of market based systems are
formally adopted. Often these differences will be perceived as a part of cultural integrity
and economic dynamism of the country in question. At the same time, countries will
adopt the important international corporate governance codes, as there is a commitment
to strive for the highest standards of governance around the world.”(Clarke 2007, p.265)

2.6 Corporate Governance Codes, Best Practices and
Principles
Since many governance problems result from the separation of ownership and
control, a good governance framework should principally address these problems. One
of the prime tasks of any governance framework is to ensure the shareholders’ rights
enhance the value of a firm. Thus, a governance framework should be able to provide a
structure that can minimize agency costs inherent in any system. The most difficult task
in this respect is to provide a proper mechanism which makes possible achievement of
an optimum balance between power and accountability. Good corporate governance
should provide proper incentives for the management to pursue objectives that are in the
interests of shareholders, and should facilitate effective monitoring; thereby ensuring
better performance of a firm. Hence, it is essential to determine best practices in
corporate governance that emphasizes the duty of the board to ensure the shareholders’
interests and to maximize shareholder value.

2.6.1 Corporate governance Codes and Best Practices
Davies and Schlitzer (2008, p.533) recognize corporate governance codes as
“the voluntary sets of principles, standards or best practices that are related to the
internal governance of businesses.” The corporate governance codes recommend the
role and composition of the board of directors, relationships with shareholders and top
management, auditing and information disclosure, and the selection, remuneration, and
dismissal of directors and top managers (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).

Most of the codes identify the quality improvement of companies’ board
governance and the increase of accountability of companies to shareholders, while
maximizing shareholder value as the main objective of the codes. The corporate
44

governance codes are generally prepared by various professional institutions or
government authorities. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) classify the type of issuer
of governance codes into six categories: (1) stock exchanges, where the issuer is the
stock exchange or securities and exchange commission; (2) governments, where the
issuer is the central or federal government or one of its ministries; (3) directors’
associations, where the issuer is an association of directors; (4) managers’ associations,
where the issuer is an association of managers; (5) professional associations, where the
issuer is an association of accounting or law professionals; and (6) investors’
associations, where the issuer is an association of investors. They further argue that
codes are developed in response to a combination of endogenous and exogenous
pressures to solve deficiencies in a country’s corporate governance system. According
to them, internal pressures aim to increase efficiency in the system, and exogenous
pressures seek to acquire legitimacy. Therefore, content of the code varies across
countries. Further, they have argued that it is important to understand the issuers of
codes in their different national contexts because identifying these issuers provides
critical information regarding reasons for development of the codes, and the strength of
their enforceability.

There is no single system of good corporate governance acceptable to all, owing
to various differences. As described in Section 2.4 and 2.5, different legal systems,
institutional frameworks, economic conditions and traditions have resulted in
developing different corporate governance approaches around the world. Despite these
differences, countries with effective corporate governance systems become attractive to
both domestic and foreign investors and therefore most of the countries promote best
governance practices through corporate governance codes (Aguilera and CuervoCazurra, 2004). Furthermore, a number of international agencies have taken a proactive role in promoting sound corporate governance standards and principles over the
last decade. The OECD was the first international body to establish an intergovernmental task force in order to produce a set of globally acceptable principles of
corporate governance (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). The OECD principles provide a
framework in developing and establishing a corporate governance system and practices
of a country in accordance with its own legal, institutional and regulatory environment
(Frederick, 1999). Thus, these principles have significantly influenced the development
of corporate governance codes by various countries.
45

2.6.2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
OECD Principles (1999) represent the first initiative by an inter-governmental
organisation to develop the core elements of a good corporate governance system and
principles. The development of these principles has led the way in creating an
international corporate governance code. Hence, the governments could use these
principles as a benchmark to evaluate and improve their national rules and regulations.
These principles highlight five broad areas of corporate governance, which are essential
to any sound model of governance. They are: the rights of shareholders; the equitable
treatment of shareholders; the role of stakeholders; disclosure and transparency; and, the
responsibilities of the board (OECD, 1999b). These principles are described in
subsequent paragraphs.

The rights of shareholders include the right to: ownership registration; convey or
transfer shares; obtain relevant information on the corporation in a timely and regular
way; participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; elect members of the board;
and, share in the profits of the corporation (OECD, 1999b, p.17). The equitable
treatment of all shareholders including minority and foreign shareholders is also
recognised as the important principle. As per this principle, all shareholders should have
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. All shareholders
of the same class should be treated equally. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing
should be prohibited, and members of the board and managers should be required to
disclose any material interests in transactions or matters affecting the corporation
(OECD, 1999b, p.19).

The OECD principles (1999) state that the corporate governance framework
should recognize the rights of stakeholders as established by law, and encourage active
co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the
sustainability of financially sound enterprises. It specifically covers the following: “the
corporate governance framework should assure that the rights of stakeholders that are
protected by law are respected; where law protects stakeholder interests, they should
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights; the
corporate governance framework should permit performance-enhancing mechanisms for
stakeholder participation and where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance
process, they should have access to relevant information.” (OECD, 1999b, p.20)
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“The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding corporation, including the financial
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company. Disclosure should
include, but not be limited to, material information on the financial and operating results
of the company, company objectives, major share ownership and voting rights,
members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration, foreseeable risk
factors, issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, and governance structures
and policies. The information should be prepared, audited, and disclosed in accordance
with high quality standards of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure, and
audit.”(OECD, 1999b, p.21) An independent auditor should conduct an annual audit in
order to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which financial
statements have been prepared and presented.
The responsibilities of the board state that “the corporate governance framework
should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of
management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the
shareholders.”(OECD, 1999b, p.22) Thus, the “board members should act on a fully
informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the
company and the shareholders;”(OECD, 1999b, p.22) treat all shareholders fairly where
board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently; ensure compliance
with applicable law and take into account the interests of stakeholders; fulfil certain key
functions such as reviewing and guiding corporate strategy and major plans of action;
“selecting, monitoring and replacing key executives, and overseeing succession
planning; reviewing key executive and board remuneration, and ensuring a formal and
transparent board nomination process; monitoring and managing potential conflicts of
interest of management, board members and shareholders; ensuring the integrity of the
corporation’s financial reporting systems;”(OECD, 1999b, p.22) and monitoring the
effectiveness of the governance practices; and the board should be able to exercise
objective judgement on corporate affairs independent, in particular, from management.
“In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate,
relevant and timely information.”(OECD, 1999b, p.23)

Since these principles were first issued in 1999, they have gained worldwide
recognition as an international benchmark for sound corporate governance. They are
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actively used by governments, regulators, investors, corporations and stakeholders in
both OECD and non-OECD countries (Frederick, 1999). The principles introduced in
1999 were revised in 2004 to response to corporate governance developments and
experiences of both OECD member and non- member countries. Accordingly, these
principles have been advanced in three main areas: ensuring the basis for an effective
corporate governance framework which was before largely implicit; the effective
exercise of ownership; and dealing with conflict of interest. Since corporate governance
weaknesses in many non-OECD countries, especially emerging markets have been
attributed to lack of effective ownership; special emphasis is placed on the protection of
shareholders’ rights.

2.7 Measurement of Corporate Governance Practices
To encourage the implementation of the best corporate governance practice,
various institutions have developed corporate governance indexes to rank companies by
the level of compliance to best practices. However, these indexes vary in terms of their
focus and coverage. In previous studies, various proxy variables are used to assess the
level of compliance to corporate governance practices and these variables are
recognised under different aspects of corporate governance such as: board structure;
board procedure; audit committee practices; directors compensation; shareholders’
rights; and, related party transactions (Balasubramanian et al., 2007); board structure;
stewardship; strategic leadership; capital structure and market relations; and, social
responsibilities (Ho, 2005); and presence of independent directors; availability of audit
committees; conduct of the external audit; and the percentage of shares held by
outsiders and insiders (Susilowati et al., 2005). Furthermore, the professional
associations and rating agencies have also developed governance indices covering a
broad range of areas. The variables and coverage of these indexes are discussed in the
following section.

2.7.1 Governance Indexes of Professional Rating Services
Professional ratings agencies come up with various governance rating
methodologies which are capable of measuring governance scores of companies. These
scores provide the basis for rankings and evaluating effective implementation of best
governance practices. They include Governance Metrics International Rating (GMI,
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2010) 5, the corporate governance Quotient of the Institutional Shareholders Services
(CGQ, 2010) 6, the Corporate Governance Score of Standard and Poor’s (CGS, 2010)7
and the Board Effectiveness Rating (BER, 2010) 8 of the Corporate Library. Most of
these rating services obtain required data for developing rating scores from the publicly
available sources. These rating systems are developed covering the aspects and
determinants of governance mechanisms such as board characteristics, ownership
structure etc. Allen et al. (2004) analysed aspects included by these governance rating
systems, as shown in Table 2.1. These governance ratings focus on several general
categories namely; board characteristics, ownership structure, compensation plans, antitakeover devices, financial disclosers, internal control and director education (Donker
and Zahir, 2008).

Diverse variables are considered under each category by these rating systems.
Although considerable differences exist in respect of the number and the nature of
variables under each of these categories by different rating systems, it is possible to
identify common characteristics of concepts upon which these variables are derived. For
example, the variables under board structure and accountability focus on common
principles or concepts of: independence of board members; board size; board members’
attendance; chairman/CEO separation; directors serving on boards of other companies;
composition of audit committees; nominating committees and compensation
committees; annual election of the board of directors; disclosure of corporate
governance guidelines; code of conduct and ethics; and, share ownership of executive
directors.

5

GMI, a US based rating organisation, was formed in April 2000 to monitor corporate governance and
presently provides GMI Ratings for over 4,200 companies.
6

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) was founded in 1985 with the goal to promote good corporate
governance in the private sector. In 1986, ISS launched its Proxy Advisory Service to assist institutional
investors in fulfilling their fiduciary obligations with comprehensive proxy analysis. Risk Metrics Group
acquired ISS in January 2007.
7

Standard & Poor’s (S&P), a US based credit-rating agency, began to develop methodology to benchmark
corporate governance in early 1998. Governance Services unit of S&P launched a corporate governance
scoring service in 2000. Standard & Poor’s ratings have been used in many research studies.

8

The Corporate Library is an independent research firm focusing on corporate governance. The firm was
founded in 1999, and continues its focus on corporate governance matters.
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Table 2.1 Categories of Corporate Governance Rating Systems
Institutional Share
Holder Services
(ISS)
Corporate
Governance Quotient
(CGQ)
61 Variables in 8
Categories
Overall Plus 8
Categories

Corporate
Governance Quotient
(CGQ)
Over 80 criteria in 4
Categories
Overall Plus 4
Categories

Governance Metric
International (GMI)

Board Effectiveness
Rating (BER)

600 Variables in 7
Categories
Overall Plus 7
Categories

6 Categories

1

Board structure and
compensation

Board structure and
effectiveness

Board accountability

Board structure and
make-up of skills

2

Executive and
director compensation

Shareholder rights
and stakeholder
relation

3

Director and officer
stock and ownership
Charter and by-law
provisions

Ownership structure
and influence
Financial
transparency,
disclosure and audit

Executive compensation CEO compensation
contracts and
compensation
practices
Ownership base and
Outside director
potential dilution
shareholdings
Financial disclosure and Ownership
internal control

Rating
Variable and
Categories
Number
of
scores
Categories

4
5

Audit

6

Takeover practice

Standard and Poor’s
(S&P)

Governance Metric
International (GMI)

Market for control
Reputational and
socially responsible
investment issues
Shareholders’ rights

7
Director education
8
Qualitative factors
Source: Allen et al., 2004, p. 40; (Modified)

The Corporate
Library (TCL)

Overall Plus 6
Categories

Accounting and
audit oversight
Board decision
making

Variables included in the directors’ compensation category include: the level and
form of compensation; performance evaluation criteria; independence and integrity of
the compensation setting process; shareholder approval of the compensation policy;
pension plans; stock options policy; and, company loans to directors etc.

In shareholder rights categories, issues include: a one vote system; ability to
amend the charter or bylaws with a simple majority vote of shareholders; ability to call
special meetings by shareholders; the presence of a majority shareholder; and, staggered
board appointments. The number of variables considered under each category varies
considerably across alternate rating services. However, it is common practice for many
of the rating systems to give high scores for governance practices which are usually
considered good practices, such as having a high proportion of independent members on
the board, high member attendance at meetings etc. despite the fact that these have not
necessarily been shown to improve company performance (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002).
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In contrast to other ratings services, Standard & Poor’s score corporate
governance for both individual company and countries. The Corporate Governance
Score (CGS) of a company focuses on the internal governance structure and processes
at an individual company and it reflects the assessment of a company’s corporate
governance practices and the extent to which these serve the interests of the company’s
financial stakeholders, with an emphasis on shareholders’ interests. The country
governance assessment discloses the effectiveness of the legal, regulatory, information
and market infrastructure of a country, and it reflects how external forces at a macro
level influence the quality of a company’s corporate governance (Standard & Poor’s
Governance Services, 2004). The corporate governance analytical framework of
Standard & Poor’s is given in Table 2.2. The company level governance practices and
policies are measured against pre-determined corporate governance criteria and related
analytical issues which have been developed based on a synthesis of international codes,
governance best practices and guidelines of good governance practices. It employs a
numeric scale for its corporate governance scores on a 1 to 10 basis with 10 being the
best possible score.

Table 2.2 Corporate Governance Analytical Framework
Country Analytical
Structure
Category
Market Infrastructure

Legal Infrastructure

Company Analytical Structure
Category
Ownership Structure and
Influence of External
Stakeholders

Criteria
Transparency of ownership
Concentration and influence of ownership and
external stakeholders

Shareholder Rights and
stakeholder relations

Shareholder meeting and voting procedure
Ownership rights Takeover defences
Stakeholder rations
Regulatory Environment
Transparency, Disclosure and Content of public disclosure
audit
Timing of and access to public disclosure
Audit process
Informational
Board Structure and
Board structure and independence
Infrastructure
Effectiveness
Role and effectiveness of the board
Directors and senior executive compensation
Source: Standard and Poor’s Governance Services, 2010; (Modified)

The corporate governance scores provide several advantages for various
interested parties such as the provision of a: systematic overview of all relevant issues
of good governance for investors and analysts, a basis for analysing quality of
governance; and, set of scores to investors allowing them to set minimum scores in
controlling policy of their general investment portfolio (Donker and Zahir, 2008).
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However, there is no one model of corporate governance that works in all countries as it
a product of political, legal, cultural and social systems of the country.

Having

recognized the advantages and relative nature of governance structure, various
institutions have made attempts to develop governance indexes suitable for different
contextual settings.

Wakasugi et al. (2003) of the Japan Corporate Governance Research Institute
have developed the Japan Corporate Governance Index (JCG Index), based on a mail
questionnaire survey carried out among all firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The JCG Index was developed using 201 responses received out of 1523 listed
companies. It covers four main sections: corporate objectives and CEO responsibility;
structure and function of board of directors; management system; and, transparency and
communication to shareholders. The seven main governance principles underlay the
JCG Index, namely; governance by the shareholders; clear and measurable corporate
goals; a system to assure the responsibility of the CEO and top management team for
realizing the goals; an independent board with capability to monitor and motivate
management; systems for managerial decision-making; implementation, and riskmanagement; accountability to shareholders through providing timely and sufficient
information and securing shareholders’ trust through investor relations activities; and,
maintenance of transparency through disclosure to all stakeholders. Based on survey
responses, the JCG index reports the degree to which a firm adheres to these principles
on a scale of 1 to 100 points. They further analyse the relationship between the JCG
Index and corporate performance, and find that high JCG Index firms achieved superior
performance as measured by ROA, ROE, stock return and employee growth.

The Conference Board Canada (2000) has produced ‘The Governance Index’ to
rate the boards of companies. It covers three main sections: responsibilities assumed by
the board; independence from management; and, effective functioning of the board and
its committees. This is a self assessment questionnaire and any board member of a firm
can use this to rate the effectiveness of the board. Seventeen questions are raised under
board responsibility and seven each under independence and effective functioning of the
board. Each of the three sections should be marked separately by scoring one point for
each ‘yes’ response. The three sub-totals should be added for a final index score, and
they are rated in terms of their score.
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Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 9 (2001) produced its first report on
corporate governance for global emerging markets, covering 115 of the largest
companies in 25 emerging markets in 2000. This is based on a questionnaire survey
among its analysts in each country, for the companies that they cover. In 2001, another
survey with a larger sample of 495 companies covering the emerging markets of Asia,
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa was conducted, with a revised
questionnaire which included 57 questions requiring only binary answers (yes/no), to
reduce analyst’s subjectivity. The questions related to main aspects of corporate
governance grouped under seven categories: management discipline; transparency;
independence; accountability; responsibility; fairness; and, social responsibility. A
composite governance rating is computed by giving an equal weight of 15% to the first
six categories and a weight of 10% to social responsibility. The key findings of the
study show that there is a high correlation between corporate governance and financial
ratios, valuations and share-price performance of companies with larger market
capitalization.

2.7.2 Corporate Governance Regulation Indexes
The economic effects of corporate governance regulation have received much
academic attention in recent years. La Porta et al. (1998) investigate empirically the
relationship between law, economic growth and governance of firms. They develop the
tools that enable researchers to compare institutional environments across countries and
to study the effects of corporate regulation. These tools comprise of a country
classification by legal origin, and indices that characterize the quality of regulation in
protecting the rights of shareholders and creditors. In this study corporate governance
indices are constructed using a comparative approach. Legal systems of different
countries are comparing with US corporate law, which is used as the reference legal
system. The key legal provisions in the governance of US companies are compared
with similar provisions present in the law of other countries. It is therefore, the countries
with legal systems most closely resembling that of the US that receive the highest score
on the rating. The main weakness of this approach is that it ignores the regulatory

9

CLSA is an Asia’s leading, independent brokerage and investment group. The company provides equity
broking, capital markets, merger and acquisition, and asset management services to global corporate and
institutional clients. Survey conducted in 2001 rates corporate governance practices of 495 companies
covering 25 countries and this survey is quoted in several research papers.
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principles that prevail in other countries, but not in the US. The main objective of the
corporate governance system in the US, which is commonly known as a shareholderbased system, is to protect corporate investors from being expropriated by the firm’s
management. However, most European and Asian countries where stakeholder-based
governance systems are implemented the expropriation of investors by the management
is naturally prevented via monitoring by the firm’s larger shareholders, creditors or
employees. Therefore, the address of this problem takes less attention at the regulatory
level in those countries.

A corporate governance system is a broader concept than corporate governance
regulation. Governance system of any country covers a broader set of institutional
settings such as the quality of legal protection of corporate communities, concentration
of ownership and control and the development of capital markets etc. The governance
regulations of a country therefore, have to be evaluated in comparison with a national
governance system. Martynova and Renneboog (2007) developed new governance
regulation indices to reflect the quality of national regulations in protecting better
number of stakeholders groups: namely, (i) corporate shareholders from being
expropriated by the firm’s management, (ii) minority shareholders from being
expropriated by the large block holders, and (iii) creditors from being expropriated by
the firm’s shareholders. This study employs functional approach instead of comparative
approach and identifies all major provisions of corporate laws by country and classifies
them according to the degree of protecting the rights of above mentioned stakeholder
groups. Three governance regulation indices have been constructed: namely, (i) the
shareholder rights protection index, (ii) the minority shareholders protection index and
(iii) the creditor rights protection index.

The variables for each of the indices have

been identified based on the regulatory provision of the law system of the country. This
study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance
regulatory systems in 30 European countries and the US. The indices indicate how the
law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between main
stakeholder groups. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the country itself
provides better understanding as to how corporate law works in a particular country and
which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals.
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2.8 Ownership and Level of Corporate Governance
The literature on the relationship between ownership and corporate governance
is widespread. Much of corporate governance theory is focused on the Berle and Means
Hypothesis (1932) of the separation of ownership and control. According to them the
most prevalent form of corporate entity is the widely held corporations, in which
ownership of capital is dispersed between small shareholders and control is
concentrated in the hands of managers. However, La Porta et a1. (1999) study on
corporate ownership around the world based on 27 wealthy economies sets out some
useful factors on corporate ownership that differ from the original idea of Berle and
Means proposition. According to this study the separation of ownership and control in
listed public companies suggested by Berle and Means proposition is not common in
most countries. Further, it finds that many of the largest firms are controlled by families,
widely held firms is most common in countries with good shareholder protection and
family and state control are more common in countries with poor shareholder
protection. There is little separation between ownership and control in family controlled
firms. Demtez and Lehen (1985) also state that substantial amount of publicly held
corporations are characterised by concentrated ownership. Further, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) state that concentrated shareholdings and a predominance of controlling
ownership rule the world.

The shareholding patterns of companies have a significant influence on their
governance. Shlefier and Vishny (1997) state that in companies which are managed by
professional managers, large shareholders play an active role in corporate governance.
In companies, which are controlled by owner-managers, the issue is how to monitor and
control owner-managers. La Porta et a1. (1999) state that it is important to recognise the
exception to widely held corporations to understand corporate governance in most of the
countries in the world. They point out that in many economies the primary agency
problem is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling
shareholders rather than that of restricting the activities of professional managers
unaccountable to shareholders. This is a common issue for most companies in the
emerging markets. For example, Bhattacharyya (2004) states that in India, companies
are continued to be managed by promoter-managers and financial institutions exercise a
passive control. Therefore, he suggests that Indian companies should have an effective
internal monitoring system as in this context the agency conflict usually arises not
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between owners and managers but between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders.
Gillan and Stark (2003) consider the role of institutional investors in corporate
governance and show that the institutional investors, often-foreign institutional investors
play a central role in promoting change in many corporate governance systems. They
also show that the foreign investment plays an important role in corporate governance
of a firm as the firms are motivated to improve their corporate governance in order to
attract foreign capital. On the other hand, increased investment by foreign institutions
provides those institutions with the power to enforce governance changes in firms in
which they invest. In addition to direct intervention by foreign investors, indirect
supply-demand effects have also led to improved governance. This evidence suggests
that there is a relation between the foreign ownership and the level of corporate
governance standards in a firm. Mitton (2002) suggests that during the 1997 Asian
financial crisis firms with more concentrated ownership had better stock price
performance. Black (2001) provides that a correlation exists between the market value
and corporate governance of Russian firms. Gillan and Stark (2003) also highlight that
numerous factors influence governance of companies. These factors include board of
directors, financing arrangements, law and regulations, labour contracts, and the market
for corporate control.

2.9 Board Structure and Corporate Governance
The board of directors is the most important internal governance mechanism that
ensures stakeholders’ rights, corporate direction and accomplishment of corporate
objectives, and safeguard owner’s wealth. Fama & Jensen (1983) view the board as “the
apex of internal decision control systems of organizations.” Scholars identify several
roles of the board of directors depending on deferent theories and perspectives. Two key
roles emerge from internal environment perspective: conformance and performance role
linking with agency and stewardship theory (Ingley and Vander, 2001). According to
this view two functions of strategy formulation and policy making form performance
role of the board whereas conformance role is viewed as amalgamation of two roles:
providing accountability; and, monitoring and supervising of management activities.
However, emphasis on the prime functions of board performance role significantly
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varies across different political, economical, social and cultural context of each country
(Ingley and Vander, 2001).

Johnson et al. (1996) outline three widely recognized functions of boards of
directors, namely the control, service and resource dependence roles. Most literature on
the control function of the board draws on agency theory perspective, which recognizes
the boards as the primary internal mechanism for controlling managers’ opportunistic
behavior, thus helping to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests (Jensen 1993).
Service role entails directors giving strategic advice to the CEO whereas the resource
dependence perspective views the board as an instrument for sourcing critical resources
to create sustainable competitive advantage (Dalton & Daily 1999).

Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) point out that, there are three primary issues
addressed in the empirical studies concerning board of directors. These issues are; the
relationship between various board characteristics and firm performance; the impact of
various board characteristics on the observable actions of the board; and, the factors that
affect the makeup of boards and their evolution over time. Two characteristics of the
board of directors that received much attention in the literature are board size and the
relative independence of the board members. With respect to size, most studies
generally hypothesize that smaller boards are more effective because they can hold
more candid discussions and make decisions more quickly. Jensen (1993) argues that
large boards are less effective and are easier for the CEO to control. When a board gets
too big, it becomes difficult to co-ordinate and process problems.

Leblanc (2004) asserts that effective decision making by board depend upon the
independence of judgment, and specific competencies and behaviours of individual
directors. Sharma (2004) studied the relationship between board independence and
fraud across a sample of 62 Australian listed companies. He found that the presence of
independent directors on company boards, and the absence of CEO duality significantly
reduced the likelihood of fraud. According to Shen (2005), non-executive directors
(NEDs) are in position to contribute to achieve corporate success. Mayer, (1997) asserts
that NED dominated boards add value to their corporations through CEO changes than
those of insider dominated boards. Role of the NEDs differ in different contexts and
contribute positively for organizational success. It is argued that NEDs play a
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supervisory role and they are responsible for review of directors’ decisions and solve
conflicts between shareholders and directors (Solomon, et al., 2003).

Turnbull (1997) argues that both composition and the structure of the board are
not significant factors in determining its effectiveness. He further argues that NEDs are
constrained by lack of information independent of management; expropriation by
dominant shareholders and management; and, lack of will power to act best of their
ability. Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004) conducted a survey of the opinions of
Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles in the boards and found that,
although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently from
management, in practice, they are unable to do so because they rely on this same group
to provide them with the information necessary for decision making.

Much of the academic literature concerning corporate governance and board
composition has sought to establish causal relationships between board structure and
firm performance. Most theories of corporate governance have hypothesized a link
between various characteristics of the board and corporate performance. Agency theory
is concerned with aligning the interests of owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) and it is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the
interests of a firm’s owners and its management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, agency
theory leads to normative recommendations that boards should have a majority of
outside and, ideally, independent directors and that the position of chairman and CEO
should be held by different persons (Bosch, 1995 and OECD, 1999). In contrast,
stewardship theory claims that managers are essentially trustworthy individuals and
therefore good stewards of the resources entrusted to them (Donaldson, 1990;
Donaldson and Davis, 1994). Proponents of stewardship theory argue that superior
corporate performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they work to
maximise profit for shareholders.

The empirical studies can be found to support the predictions of both agency
theory and stewardship theory concerning the relationship between the proportion of
outside directors or CEO duality and corporate performance. Beasley (1996), for
example, examined the 75 fraud and 75 no-fraud firms and found that no-fraud firms
had boards with significantly higher percentages of outside members than fraud firms.
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McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) conducted interviews with 108 UK directors and found
that part-time board members did not simply ratify decisions made by all powerful
executives, and were able to influence the processes of strategic choice leading to high
performance. In contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found that more outsiders on
the board were negatively related to performance. A meta-analysis based on 159
samples of board composition and their relationships with corporate performance found
that there is no substantive relationship between board composition and firm
performance (Dalton, et al., 1998). On the other hand, in a similar meta-analysis based
on 37 samples from previous studies, Rhoades, et al. (2000) concluded that the
proportion of outside directors had a positive relationship with firm performance.
Overall there is a general lack of consistent evidence of any significant relationship
between the composition of boards of directors and corporate performance.

2.10 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Corporate governance is considered a performance diver of the firm and much of
the discussions of corporate governance focus on the assumption that the governance
mechanisms influence firms’ performance (Ali El and Sound, 2008). However, there is
no conclusive empirical evidence on how corporate governance mechanisms influence
corporate performance. Most research examine the influence of specific aspects of
corporate governance such as board of directors, directors’ remuneration policy
ownership structure and capital structure on firm performance (Agrawal and
Knoeber,1996, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, Jackson and Moerke, 2005, Thomsen et
al., 2006).

The prior studies regarding the relationship between various aspects of corporate
governance and financial performance (or firm value) have produced mixed results. For
example, Beasley (cited in Ho, 2005) carried out an analysis of 75 fraud and 75 nofraud firms which indicated that no-fraud firms had boards with significantly higher
percentages of outside members than fraud firms. However, Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) found that more outsiders on the board were negatively related to firm
performance. In an attempt to reconcile these divergent evidences, Udayasankar and
Das (2007) notionally explained the performance implication of corporate governance
in the context of the exogenous environment supported with multiple theories of
corporate governance such as agency, stakeholder, resource-dependence, and
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institutional theories and argue that the regulation and competitive forces in the
environment interact with the governance practices of firms resulting in idiosyncratic
effects on performance. However, it is commonly perceived that good corporate
governance is very important in assuring accountability and performance which provide
the competitive advantages for the firms. Ho (2005) finds positive relationship between
the broad attributes of corporate governance and corporate performance. The market for
corporate control view emphasizes those firms with poor corporate governance
standards are subject to the risk of being acquired. The resource-dependence view of
corporate governance suggests that firms with better corporate governance are likely to
have better access to critical resources which are essential to achieve competitive
advantage (Chung-Cheng et al., 2006).

The board is the prime internal corporate governance mechanism that ensures a
company takes correct corporate direction to accomplish its objectives in order to
safeguard shareholders’ interests. In this respect, the key roles of board consist of its
conformance role and performance role (Hung, 1998). Accordingly, the functions of
strategy formulation and policy making form the performance role of the board,
whereas ensuring accountability, and monitoring and supervision form the conformance
role. However, a single theoretic approach especially an agency theory perspective is
less capable of understanding the effects of the board on firm-level financial
performance since it does not capture the broad spectrum of directors’ roles as a result
its overemphasis on directors’ monitoring and supervision role by marginalizing other
roles (Jinyu and Mahoney, 2006). As a result, some empirical studies began to use a
multi-theoretic framework to capture the effectiveness of the board by means of various
factors such as board size, composition of independent directors in the board, CEO
duality, and managerial ownership (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Jinyu and Mahoney
(2006) develop a theoretical model based on empirical evidence of the prior research in
the light of the resource-dependence, the agency and the social capital theory
perspectives and identified that the board capability drivers firm-level competitive
behaviour which leads to better financial performance. However, emphasis on the two
prime roles of board significantly varies across different political, economical, social
and cultural context of each country resulting different performance implications of
board functions (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001).
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Companies do not operate isolation and therefore ability of a company to
transform into competitive positions with better performance is influenced by factors
such as distortions in market economy; perfect or imperfect competition; competition
regulation; corporate or securities laws, trade barriers, industry norms and finance
providers (Dignam, 2005). Therefore, corporate performance is largely determined by
the corporate governance system of a country. For example, in the US where marketbased governance system is in operation, the companies achieve better performance
through liquid stock markets, venture capital and strong labour markets whereas the
companies in Japan and Germany, where relationship-based system is in operation,
achieve better performance through practices such as network based production models,
incremental innovation and shop floor skills (Jackson and Moerke, 2005).
Mourdoukoutas & Papadimitriou (1998) argue that the corporate practices lead to better
performance are largely influenced by the corporate governance system and therefore
practices could only be transferred to similar governance system.

2.11 Corporate Ownership and Firm Performance
The corporate governance mechanisms vary around the world resulting different
ownership effects on firm performance. For example, market-centric economies are
largely characterized by the existence of a widely held ownership structure, and
governance of companies by professional managers on behalf of scattered shareholders
(Bhasa, 2004). Therefore, corporate managers enjoy more power in decisions making
process. These decisions may frequently be in their own interest resulting higher agency
costs and thereby reducing overall firm performance. Hence, agency theory argues that
ownership concentration may improve firm performance by decreasing agency costs
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).

Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrate theoretically how the allocation of shares
among insiders and outsiders can influence the agency costs and firm value. Since these
authors’ work, the relationship between ownership and firm performance has attracted
special attention. Agency theory and the empirical literature thereof usually consider
insider ownership as the main corporate mechanism that increases firm value. However,
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between ownership concentration and
financial performance (or firm value) has produced mixed results (Agrawal and
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Knoeber, 1996; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Thomsen et al., 2006). Despite the
existence of a wealth of research, the question of whether concentrated ownership
contributes to reduced agency costs and thereby improves firm value and financial
performance remains unanswered.

The agency theory hypothesis is first challenged by Demsetz (1983), who argues
that the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous
outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. Demsetz asserts that no
systematic relationship should exist between variations in ownership structure and
variations in firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence of the
endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure, using a measure of the profit rate on a
fraction of shares owned by the five-largest shareholdings, and found no evidence of
any relationship between profit rate and ownership concentration. Conversely, Shleifer
and Vishny (1986) show the importance of the role played by large shareholders, and
how the price of a firm’s shares increases as the proportion of shares held by large
shareholders rises. They argue theoretically for a positive relationship between
ownership concentration and firm value.

Morck et al. (1988) ignored the endogeneity issue altogether and re-examined
the relationship between corporate ownership structure and performance, measured in
terms of Tobin’s Q, and propose a non-linear relationship between insider ownership
and firm performance. They found a positive relationship between corporate ownership
structure and Tobin’s Q for less than five per cent board ownership range, a negative
relationship in the 5–25 per cent range and a positive relationship for ownership
exceeding 25 per cent. However, their results are not supported by accounting-based
performance measures. Wu and Cui (2002) found a positive relationship between
ownership concentration and accounting profits, indicated by return on assets and return
on equity, but the relationship is negative with respect to the market value measured by
the price-earnings ratio and market-to-book-value ratio.

The literature extensively examines corporate governance issues under various
theoretical perspectives, such as the agency, stewardship, stakeholder and political
models. Most of these theories are developed and examined in the developed
economies, assuming contextual conditions of these economies provide universal
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reference. Tricker (cited in Turnbull, 1997, p. 187) states that “stewardship theory,
stakeholder theory and agency theory are all essentially ethnocentric. Although the
underlying ideological paradigms are seldom articulated, the essential ideas are derived
from Western thought, with its perceptions and expectations of the respective roles of
individual, enterprise and the state and of the relationships between them”. An
increasing body of literature refers to the potential differences in the economic
characteristics of developing countries. However, the interaction of these economic
characteristics with governance and ownership structures, and the performance
implications of these factors have not been examined thoroughly. Therefore, these
contextual differences across countries create another dimension to the ownership
structure and performance issue.

Because of the contextual differences across countries, different relationships
between ownership structure and firm performance might be expected. For example, in
emerging economies, where firm ownership is highly concentrated with family
ownership, a significant positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance
is proposed. This argument is confirmed by the study of Zeitun and Gary (2007), which
examined the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance both in
terms of accounting measures and market measures using a sample of public listed
companies on the Jordan stock exchange. They found a significant positive relationship
between ownership concentration and accounting performance measures. Abor and
Biekpe (2007) investigated the effects of corporate governance and ownership structure
on the performance of SMEs in Ghana. They found that CEO duality, board size, board
composition, inside ownership, and family ownership have significant positive impacts
on profitability. Despite these efforts, the various performance implications of
ownership concentration and structure are yet to be explored with a particular focus on
emerging economies.

2.12 Summary
This chapter reviewed the literature relating to corporate governance systems,
practices and their impact on the performance from different theoretical perspectives.
The literature shows that the corporate governance practices and their efficiency are
largely determined by the corporate governance system of a country. Thus, the practices
that are appropriate and efficient in one country are not necessarily appropriate for
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another country. Although there are arguments for the convergence of corporate
governance models due to globalization of business activities, the research evidences
suggest that full convergence is far from reality due to contextual differences of
countries. The literature further shows that the ownership structure of a company plays
an important role in determining the level of compliance to corporate governance best
practices. However, the studies of corporate governance and firm performance report
mixed results.

The research findings identified that the level of compliance to corporate
governance practices and their impact on corporate performance is determined by the
corporate governance system and other contextual conditions of a country. As the study
is designed to examine the efficiency of corporate governance practices adopted by Sri
Lankan listed companies, it is important to explore the corporate governance
environment in Sri Lanka. Thus, the historical development of corporate governance;
legislative and institutional framework of corporate governance; and, corporate
governance codes development process in the Sri Lankan context are explored in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 3 : The Corporate Governance Environment in
Sri Lanka: Regulatory Framework and Recent
Developments
3.1 Introduction
Corporate governance regulation in Sri Lanka comprises: the Companies Act
No.07 of 2007; SEC regulations; CSE listing rules and other regulations; Sri Lankan
Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No.15 of 1995; industry specific Acts; and,
other by-laws. Voluntary and mandatory corporate governance codes of ICASL and
SEC also promote corporate governance best practice. This chapter outlines the
evolution of corporate governance in Sri Lanka and discusses various provisions,
specifically: an overview of the local historical development of corporate governance;
the legislative and institutional frameworks with reference to quoted public companies;
legislative requirements aimed at ensuring improved corporate governance; and, the
provisions of corporate governance codes of Sri Lanka. A chapter summary is provided
in the final section.

3.2 Historical Developments of Corporate Governance
The history of corporate governance in Sri Lanka dates back to its period under
the British regime nearly 150 years before it gained independence in 1948. From the
18th Century onwards, imperialism penetrated Sri Lanka causing two effects on its
feudal society. “The first was the transformation of kingship into the colonial state and,
the second was the emergence of plantation based mercantile economy” (Alawattage
and Wickramasinghe, 2004, p.8). With the establishment of plantation companies, the
funds and expertise were channelled from Britain. British investors contributed capital
through the London stock market and the Colombo Brokers Association (CBA).

In the early days, companies were governed by English law, which was
introduced to Sri Lanka in the Civil Law Ordinance of No. 5 of 1852. The Joint Stock
Companies Ordinance No. 4 of 1861 was the first company law enacted specially for Sri
Lanka. With the development of the plantation sector, “cultivators experimented with
new ways of getting money for their business. They started local companies and
distributed shares to the general public” (The Registrar of Companies, 2011). As a
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result, steps were taken to amend the 1861 Ordinance and to introduce the Companies
Ordinance No 51 of 1938. In introducing this new ordinance, the necessity of a separate
institution to fulfil the needs of the companies and to effect the provisions had been
identified. Accordingly the Department of the Registrar of Companies was established
in 1938 (The Registrar of Companies, 2011). The CBA commenced the trading of
shares in limited liability companies in 1896. Since the CBA was the authority for
granting public quotations, its rules and regulations were applicable to all public
companies wishing to have their shares quoted in the official list. The by-laws of the
association were derived from those of the London Stock Exchange and were more
advanced than those of the local Companies Ordinance of 1938 (Perera, 1975). The
fundamental corporate governance framework of the country during the colonial era
was provided by the provisions of the Companies Ordinance and the listing rules and
guidelines stipulated by the CBA.

Attention to corporate governance in Sri Lanka again re-emerged after 1977,
following the shift from socialist to market-oriented policies with the introduction of
open economic policies. The passing of the constitution in 1978 opened the doors to a
free economy and many economic changes, by shifting controls from the government to
the private business sector. Large scale development projects were funded by the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. A ‘Free Trade Zone
Program’ opened the door for foreign direct investments and multinational corporations.
Imports and foreign exchange restrictions were relaxed and commercial businesses
grew. New export industries such as the garment industry were encouraged (The Central
Bank of Sri Lanka, 1998). The entrance of a large number of new companies into the
market created a highly competitive environment, making Sri Lanka attractive to
foreign investors.

With foreign investment came international methods of evaluating business, for
example, a firms’ financial performance became as a key factor informing investor
decision-making. Local investment managers and other related professionals also
became attentive to the financial performance of companies. As a result, many new
institutional and regulatory developments were introduced, for example the
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987, and the introduction
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of the Companies Act No.17 of 1982. These reforms led the standardization of
corporate governance functions in the country.

The Companies Act No. 17 of 1982 (The Act) incorporated many provisions that
encouraged good governance practices, providing the legal framework which governs
the commercial affairs of the country. The Act regulates: disclosures in companies’
annual financial statements; conduct of board proceedings; conduct of shareholders’
meetings; directors’ responsibilities and reporting; audit procedures; provisions relating
to the winding up of companies; and, processes connected to borrowings by companies.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Sri Lanka was established
in 1987 through the Securities and Exchange Commission Act No.36. From its inception
the Commission was active in developing rules and regulations for financial reporting
and the capital market in Sri Lanka. This act was amended in 1991 empowering the
SEC to regulate, for example: unit trusts, stock brokers; registration of market
intermediaries; and, to grant licenses to stock exchanges. The next amendment to this
Act in 2003 added to its powers the regulation of: underwriters; margin providers; credit
rating agencies; investment managers; and, clearing houses, and widened the
investigation powers of the SEC. The 2009 amendment further allowed for the
regulation of derivatives, and gave the SEC authority to issue directives to listed
companies. With these amendments, the infrastructure is in place for the SEC to play a
dynamic role in Sri Lanka’s capital market development, and improve governance
practices in the country (SEC, 2011).

The CBA ran The Colombo Share Market for almost a century until 1985. The
CSE, which took over operations of stock market from the CBA, was established in
1985 to formalize the share trading in Sri Lanka. The CSE is a company limited by
guarantee, established under the Companies Act No. 17 of 1982. The CSE has power to
regulate the share trading to establish an orderly and fair market, through its listing
rules. These include accounting and reporting regulations. All companies listed on the
CSE must abide by these rules (Colombo Stock Exchange, 2011).

Despite establishing legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance
as described above, in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Sri Lanka witnessed many
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corporate failures, especially finance companies. Many reasons were attributed for these
failures, but nobody took responsibility. The disappointed investing public lost their
faith in the regulatory frameworks and made accusations of their being inefficient
financial reporting and auditing procedures in Sri Lanka (Sobhan and Werner, 2003).
This crisis paved the way to address Sri Lanka’s weak enforcement of its financial
reporting and auditing standards. As a result The Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Sri Lanka (ICASL) established a task force to study all aspects regarding enforcement
of the Sri Lanka Accounting Standards (SLAS). The task force recommended the
setting up of an ‘Accounting Standard Monitoring Unit’, which resulted in the
enactment of the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standard Act No. 15 of 1995. This
Act empowered the ICASL to adopt Sri Lanka Accounting Standards (SLAS) and Sri
Lanka Auditing Standards (SLAuS). Furthermore, this 1995 Act made provisions to
establish the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board
(SLAASMB) to carry out an independent monitoring function. All specified business
enterprises (SBE) (refer Appendix 1 for the list of SBE) under this 1995 Act are
required to prepare their financial statements in compliance with SLAS, and be audited
as per the SLAuS. It also requires every SBE to submit a copy of its annual reports to
the SLAASMB for examination. This process compels SBE’s to comply with mandated
accounting and auditing standards, which in turn is expected to generate higher quality
financial statements.

The establishment of an Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF) by the ICASL in 1993
was another milestone in attempting to improve financial reporting quality, and thereby
strengthen companies’ governance structures. The UITF has a mandate to give
interpretations and clarifications of accounting and auditing standards in their
application in different practical situations. This committee is regarded by the business
and financial sector as a prominent institutional mechanism in understanding and
applying SLAS and SLAuS (Sobhan and Werner, 2003).

Sri Lanka developed formal corporate governance codes of best practice after
the 1990s, through its regulatory regimes. The first real effort in codifying corporate
governance practices began in 1996 when the Council of the ICASL formed a
committee to make recommendations on financial aspects of corporate governance
(Sobhan and Werner, 2003). After this initiative, several other regulatory organizations,
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professional institutions and ICASL developed new codes, in keeping with the
development of corporate governance codes globally, especially in the UK. The
Schedule of Corporate Governance Codes developed by various institutions is given in
the Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1 The Development of Corporate Governance Codes in Sri Lanka.
Year
Dec.
1997
July
2001

May
2002
June
2002
March
2003
May
2004
March
2007
June
2008
July
2008
April
2008
Oct.
2008

Code
The Code of Best Practice:
Matters relating to Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance
Handbook on Corporate Governance:
Principles and Guidelines to Best Practice
in Sri Lanka
Code of Best Practice on Audit
Committees
Code of Corporate Governance for Banks
and Other Financial Institutions
Code of Best Practice on Corporate
Governance
Guidelines for Listed Companies in
respect of Audit and Audit Committees
Standard on Corporate Governance for
Listed Companies (Section 6 of Listing
Rules)
Code of Best Practice on Corporate
Governance
Guidelines for Appointment of Auditors of
Listed Companies
The Banking Act Direction No.1:
Corporate Governance
Finance Company Direction No.3:
Corporate Governance

Institutions
ICASL

Implementation
Voluntary

Institute of Chartered
Secretaries and
Administrators in Sri
Lanka
ICASL

Voluntary

The Central Bank of Sri
Lanka
ICASL

Voluntary

SEC & ICASL

Voluntary

CSE with the support of
SEC and ICASL

Mandatory

ICASL & SEC

Voluntary

SEC

Voluntary

The Central Bank of Sri
Lanka
The Central Bank of Sri
Lanka

Mandatory

Voluntary

Voluntary

Mandatory

The introduction of a revised Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 incorporating further
corporate governance provisions, and the formulation of several mandatory corporate
governance codes in 2008, are important to Sri Lanka’s corporate governance regulatory
framework. This modernised 2007 Act was influenced by its Canadian and New
Zealand counterparts and is in line with global legislation, dealing comprehensively
with matters relating to: transparency; accountability; directors’ duties; and, the
protecting interests of all stakeholders (Senaratne, 2011).

The ICASL, jointly with the SEC, developed a voluntary corporate governance
code of best practices in 2008 for listed companies, to be used in combination with the
requirements incorporated in the CSE Listing Rules (which themselves were made
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mandatory in April 2008). The Central Bank of Sri Lanka also issued two mandatory
codes – the Banking Act Direction No. 1 of 2008 and the Finance Companies Direction
No. 3 of 2008 on Corporate Governance, applicable to licensed commercial banks and
finance companies respectively. Both codes took effect from 1st January 2009. These
codes set out fundamental governance principles and rules in relation to commercial
banks and finance companies.

Throughout the period described above, as now, the media in Sri Lanka were
active in highlighting business and commercial issues. Potential investors and
stakeholders make use media sources to gain knowledge about what is happening in the
business world. Companies are aware of the importance of positive publicity and
maintaining the media’s goodwill.

Engaging good corporate governance practices

assists companies’ relations with the media, and ensures the general public as well as
shareholders and other various groups of stakeholders are informed that they are
meeting their corporate governance responsibilities.

3.3 Legislative and Institutional Framework of Corporate
Governance
Section 3.2 describes the historical development of the Sri Lankan corporate
governance legislative and institutional framework. Relevant identified legislation and
regulations pertaining to Sri Lankan corporate financial reporting are the: Companies
Act No. 07 of 2007; Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995; Securities
and Exchange Commission Act of 1987; and, the Continuing Listing Requirements of
the CSE. In addition, there are sector specific acts, for example, The Banking Act No. 30
of 1988, The Finance Companies Act No. 78 of 1988 and The Insurance Act No. 43 of
2000.

Institutions that regulate and monitor corporate governance requirements of Sri
Lankan companies include the: Registrar of Companies; SEC, CSE, Central Bank of Sri
Lanka, ICASAL; and, the SLAASMB. This legislation and these institutions are
discussed in subsequent sections.
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3.3.1 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
As introduced in Section 3.2, the SEC of Sri Lanka was established through the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No.36 of 1987, to regulate the
securities market in Sri Lanka for the protection of investors and the maintenance of
order and fairness in securities trading in the market, and to operate a compensation
fund to protect investors (Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka, 2010).
The Securities and Exchange Commission Act sets out the legal framework for the
formalisation and regulation of the securities market of Sri Lanka.

The SEC is active in developing a securities market in Sri Lanka by playing a
role in corporate governance, financial reporting and regulatory issues of listed
companies. The SEC established the ‘Central Depository System’, formed the Mergers
and Takeovers Code of 1985, and implements laws relating to insider trading, etc.
(Sobhan and Werner, 2003). The SEC issues guidelines and rules pertaining to
accounting, auditing, and listing requirements for both routine and non-routine
disclosures of public listed companies. For example, the SEC issued the ‘Guidelines for
Appointment of Auditors of Listed Companies’ in 2008 with a view to strengthening the
effectiveness of audits while enhancing the accuracy, transparency, constancy and
reliability of financial reporting. Further, through a Memorandum of Understanding
with the SLAASMB, the SEC has agreed to refer cases of non-compliance with SLASs
to the SLAASMB (Senaratne, 2011).

The activities of the SEC have been criticized on a number of issues, such as:
conflicts of interest; slow responses to public complaints and concerns; unfair and
arbitrary rulings; not being up-to-date with international and regional developments; not
maintaining a sufficient level of independence and objectivity; and, alleged biased
decisions made by some SEC members (Sobhan and Werner, 2003). These issues erode
public confidence in the capital market of Sri Lanka. As the SEC plays an important
role in enforcing standards of corporate governance, any deficiency in discharging its
duties has a negative impact on corporate governance system of the country.

3.3.2 Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE)
The CSE, a company limited by guarantee, was established in 1985 under the
Companies Act No. 17 of 1982 of Sri Lanka and is licensed by the SEC to operate as a
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stock exchange in Sri Lanka. The CSE evolved over a long period of time. Share trading
in Sri Lanka commenced in 1896 when Sri Lanka was under the British rule, to raise
finances for tea plantation companies. At its inception, stock trading was done by the
CBA. The CSE took over the operations of the Colombo Stock Market in 1985 from the
CBA and commenced public trading using the open outcry system, facilitating
secondary trading of equity and debt instruments. The listing of companies is on a tiered
basis, with the ‘Main Board’ used for larger companies, and the ‘Second Board’ used
for small and medium companies. It also operates an ‘Over-the-Counter Market’ (OTC)
for unlisted companies (Bandaranaike, 2002).

The developments of the CSE are closely associated with economic policy
changes of the country. The free market economic policies of 1978 and the emergence
of the private sector as the dominant force of the economy caused a restructuring of the
stock market. The post 1977 economic reforms such as: an opening up of the banking
sector to both foreign owned and local private banks; a reduction in taxes on transfers of
property and share purchases; the privatisation of state-owned enterprises; the
promotion of foreign investments; and, granting of permission for foreign funds to
operate in the stock market all contributed to the revitalisation of the CSE after 1977. In
1997, trading activities on the CSE were automated. The CSE had 241 companies
representing 20 business sectors as at 31st December 2010. The market capitalisation of
the CSE stood at Rs. 2,210.45 billion as at 31st December 2010 (Colombo Stock
Exchange, 2011).

The policies of the CSE are formulated by its board comprising nine directors, of
whom five directors are elected by its members at the AGM, while four members are
appointed by Finance Minister on the recommendation of the SEC. The board of the
CSE has established five sub-committees to deal with administrative and regulatory
aspects of the stock exchange. These committees are the: Rules and Bylaws Committee;
Finance Research and Development Committee; Arbitration and Disciplinary
Committee; Audit Committee; and, Client-Broker Dispute Resolution Committee.

The CSE is a self-regulatory organization which has several rules and
regulations that govern listed companies and member firms. These rules and regulations
are: listing rules; member regulations; rules of clearing, settlement and depository
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activities; and, conditions of trading rules. The listing rules, especially continuing listing
requirements, ensure listed companies comply with best corporate governance and
corporate disclosure practices. In order to strengthen the corporate governance best
practices of listed companies, the CSE incorporated standards of corporate governance
best practices into its listing rules in 2008. Compliance to listing rules is continuously
monitored by the CSE. A separate division headed by a senior manager is entrusted with
the responsibility of market monitoring and surveillance. This includes monitoring the
continuing listing requirements of listed companies, compliance by member firms of the
member regulations, and on-line market monitoring and surveillance (Bandaranaike,
2002). These developments have contributed to improving corporate governance of
listed companies as well as the overall corporate governance systems in the country.

3.3.3 Accounting Profession in Sri Lanka
The first national professional accounting body, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL) was established in 1959 under the Parliament Act
No. 23 of 1959. The ICASL replaced the Accounting Board which functioned as the
only authoritative accounting body in Sri Lanka during the period of 1941 to 1959
(Wijewardena and Yapa, 1998). This paved the way to produce chartered accountants
locally. The ICASL has significant influence over national policy formulation in areas
of accounting, auditing, and tax. It is the sole authority in setting accounting and
auditing standards in Sri Lanka. The Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of
1995 ratifies the ICASL to issue and manage accounting and auditing standards which
are applicable to listed companies and other SBEs identified in The Act. In addition to
these activities, the ICASL has been active in setting corporate governance codes since
1996. The first effort in setting the codes of corporate governance in a structured
manner began in 1996 by a committee appointed by the council of ICASL. This
initiated the evolution of corporate governance principles and practices in Sri Lanka.
Thereafter, many initiatives followed, as described in Section 3.5 of this chapter.

Other Sri Lankan professional accountancy bodies include the Association of
Accounting Technicians of Sri Lanka (AATSL), the Society of Certified Management
Accountants of Sri Lanka (CMASL), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the
Institute of Public Finance and Development Accountancy (IPFDA). British
professional accountancy bodies also have a strong and growing presence in Sri Lanka.
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The two most significant bodies are the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
(CIMA) and the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA). CIMA
supports management accounting practices of firms and improving the management
accounting profession worldwide. ACCA’s scope includes financial reporting, auditing
and management accounting and sustainability reporting (Wijewardena and Yapa,
1998).

3.3.4 The Registrar of Companies
The Registrar of Companies (ROC), established in 1938, is the administrative
authority of all companies established or registered in Sri Lanka. It is responsible for the
implementation of the Companies Act, and is empowered to incorporate public and
private limited liability companies and to register foreign and off-shore companies. The
ROC is also required to act in vigilance in respect of effective functioning of all
companies in accordance with the Companies Act. The registrar functions as an exofficio member of the board of the SEC, in order to reduce overlaps in regulatory
monitoring exercised by the ROC and the SEC in the areas of investors’ protection and
accounting disclosures.

3.3.5 Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring
Board (SLAASMB)
SLAASMB was established through the Accounting and Auditing Standards Act
No. 15 of 1995 to monitor and enforce compliance with accounting and auditing
standards by SBEs. It comprises thirteen members representing regulatory bodies and
professional accounting institutions. These members include: three ex-officio members
being the Registrar of Companies, the Commissioner General of Inland Revenue, and
the Director General of the SEC; and, ten members appointed by the minister including:
an officer of the Central Bank as the nominee of the Governor; three members of
ICASL; a member of the Sri Lanka Division of the CIMA; two company directors; a
senior lawyer; a senior banker; and a nominee of the University Grants Commission.
The Act (1995) requires every SBE to forward a copy of its annual report to the
Monitoring Board for examination of its compliance with accounting standards. The
Act (1995) has an indemnity provision for the Monitoring Board and its officials with
regard to their actions against non-compliance. The Monitoring Board functions support
compliance with best corporate governance practices by companies.
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3.4 Legislative Requirements
3.4.1 The Companies Act
The Companies Act No.07 of 2007 came into operation on 3rd May 2007 by
replacing the Companies Act of No. 17 of 1982, which had been based on the 1948
Companies Act in U.K which was written 60 years previously and behind contemporary
times in terms of global developments in international trade and commerce. The new
Act has provisions on accounting, auditing, disclosures and other corporate governance
requirements which encourage good governance practices. Extensive sections of the
Companies Act deal with: maintenance of proper accounting records; disclosures in the
annual financial statements; conduct of board proceedings; conduct of shareholders
meetings; particulars regarding proxies; directors’ reports; responsibilities of directors;
appointment of auditors; and auditors’ functions. The Companies Act also sets out the
provisions relating to the winding up of companies, and certain procedures connected to
borrowings by companies. These provisions serve as a useful framework for proper
governance of companies.

The requirements to keep accounting records and financial statements are
specified in the sections 148 to 151 of The Companies Act. As per section 148, “a
company has to keep proper accounting records and these records should enable (a) the
financial position of a company to be determined with reasonable accuracy, (b) directors
to prepare financial statements in terms of the Act, and (c) the company’s financial
statements to be properly audited”. A Company has to prepare financial statements
within 6 months of the Balance Sheet date (section 150) in a way that gives “a true and
fair view” of the state of the affairs of company as at the balance sheet date, and the
profit or loss of the company for the accounting period ending on the balance sheet date
(section 151). The financial statements have to be certified by the person responsible for
their preparation that they are in compliance with the requirements of The Companies
Act, and signed by two directors on behalf of the board. It further requires financial
statements should comply with the requirements of any other laws which apply to a
company’s financial statements. Thus, preparation of financial statements includes
compliance with the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995.
Furthermore, the financial statements of Public Listed Companies should also comply
with the Securities and Exchange Commission Act. These provisions enhance the
reliability of financial statements.
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The Companies Act has specific provisions dealing with the annual report of
companies in addition to the provisions on the maintenance of accounting records and
the preparation of financial statements. Sections 166 to 169 of The Companies Act
regulate company annual reports with respect to their: preparation; contents; distribution
to shareholders; and, implications of failing to distribute it to shareholders. A company
has to prepare an annual report on its affairs within six months of balance sheet date,
and distribute a copy to shareholders 15 days before its AGM, which should be held
each calendar year not later than six months after the balance sheet date of the company,
and no later than fifteen months after the previous AGM (section 133). Further, a
company has to deliver an annual return to the Registrar of Companies each year as
specified in section 131. The annual report should contain both financial as well as nonfinancial information as detailed in section 168. These requirements not only facilitate
but also encourage shareholders to monitor company affairs, ensuring the board is
vigilant in complying with best corporate governance practices.

The Companies Act requires that the financial statements of companies be
audited annually. It also deals with the appointment and remuneration of auditors, and
disqualifications for appointments as auditors. The auditors should report to the
shareholders on the accounts examined by them (section 163). The first auditor of a
company is appointed by the board (section 159) and thereafter the auditor is appointed
at the AGM (section 154). The fees and expenses of an auditor are approved at the
AGM (section 155). The Directors’ Report is to be attached to every annual report,
which should contain information as to: the state of a company’s affairs; the amount that
directors recommend to be paid as dividends to shareholders; directors’ direct and
indirect interests in contracts and the nature of such interests; and, whether there were
any directors’ declarations of interests in meetings of the directors. Furthermore,
directors’ duties to: act in good faith and in the interests of company; comply with the
requirements of The Act; delegate powers and maintain supervision and monitoring of
these delegated responsibilities, are also specified with greater detail in The Companies
Act, ensuring proper functioning of the boards of companies.

3.4.2 Accounting and Auditing Standards Act
The Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995
formalizes the accounting and auditing standards-setting process empowering the
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ICASL, and provides the framework for their implementation and monitoring in SBEs
operating in Sri Lanka. The Act also provides for the formation and functioning of the
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) and Auditing Standards Committee (AuSC)
that make recommendations to the Council of ICASL for the adoption of accounting
and auditing standards respectively under the authority vested in it by section 2 of this
Act. The objective of the ASC is to keep SLAS harmonised with International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Hence, it makes recommendations on the adoption of IFRS
as SLAS after making necessary modifications to suit the regulatory conditions of Sri
Lanka. Such modifications are kept minimal to ensure that SLAS comply with IFRS in
material aspects.

This Act has also established the SLAASMB to monitor and enforce compliance
with SLAS and SLAuS. Such monitoring is essential to ensure that the accounting
standards are rigorously interpreted and applied by companies. The Act also requires
that professionally qualified members, who shall be members of the ICASL with a
certificate to practise, should audit the accounts of SBE in terms of SLAuS.

3.5 Sri Lankan Corporate Governance Codes
The codification of corporate governance practices began in 1996 when the
ICASL formed a committee to make recommendations on matters relating to financial
aspects of corporate governance, with the support of the: CSE; SEC; Ceylon Chamber
of Commerce; and, the Institute of Directors of Sri Lanka. One recommendation was to
have a ‘Code of Best Practices’ applicable to all listed companies. Accordingly, the
ICASL published the first report on the Code of Best Practice on Matters Relating to
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 1997. After this initial effort, several
other regulatory organizations, professional institutions and ICASL developed
subsequent codes in keeping with the development of corporate governance codes
globally, especially in the UK. A ‘Schedule of Corporate Governance Codes’ that were
developed by various institutions, is given in Table 3.1.

Both these voluntary and mandatory codes aim to improve the governance
practices of companies listed on the CSE. All have been devised based on the codes
developed in the UK. These include: the Cadbury Committee Report (1992); the
77

Hampel Report, 1998 (known as The Combined Code 1998); the Turnbull Committee
Recommendations (1999); the Smith Committee Report on Audit Committees (2003) and
the Combined Code (2003) (Watawala, 2006). In developing these codes representations
have also been received from institutions such as The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce,
CIMA Sri Lanka Division, The Institute of Chartered Secretaries, Sri Lanka Bankers
Association and Sri Lanka Institute of Directors. Some deal with specific areas of
corporate governance. The ‘ICASL Code of Best Practice on Audit Committees 2002’
provides detailed guidance on the scope and functions of the audit committee of listed
companies. Similar examples are the ‘Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and
Other Financial Institutions 2002’ issued by the Central Bank, and ‘Guidelines for
Listed Companies in respect of Audit and Audit Committees 2004’ issued by the SEC.
However, the Codes of Best practices of Corporate Governance developed by ICASL in
2003 and 2008 capture the broader aspects of corporate governance with special
emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors (Senaratne, 2011).

All the Codes of Best Practices of the ICASL have been developed based on the
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, due to the close association of Sri Lankan
accounting and company law requirements with the British system. As Sri Lanka was
under the colonial rule of Britain from 1796 to 1948, many Sri Lankan firms’ roots go
back to pre-independence under the British rule. As a result Sri Lankan companies are
influenced by British systems. Most of the corporate governance codes are largely
focussed on the responsibilities, structure and organization of a board of directors with
the aim of improving its monitoring role. These codes have been developed on the
assumption that ownership and control of corporate entities are separated. As a result,
the board of directors is considered crucial in establishing the relationship between the
shareholders and the management of these entities. Hence, the central issue addressed in
these codes is the protection of shareholders’ rights. Thus, they advocate improvement
of accountability, integrity, efficiency, and transparency as the core corporate
governance perspectives.

Corporate governance best practices for Sri Lankan companies evolved from the
introduction of the first voluntary code of best practice in 1997, to the mandatory codes
on corporate governance in 2008. The first mandatory code; Standard on Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies is incorporated into the Listing Rules of the CSE,
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effective from 1st April 2007. However, the companies are given some flexibly in
compliance with these governance rules in the first year of operation. These rules were
mandatory from 1st April 2008 for all listed companies. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka
has also issued mandatory codes – the Banking Act Direction No. 1 of 2008 and Finance
Companies Direction No. 3 of 2008 on Corporate Governance for the licensed
commercial banks and the finance companies respectively. These codes are in operation
with effect from 1st January 2009. The developments in best practices have been
influenced to a greater extent by the continuous international dialogue on the need to
strengthen the corporate governance practices to achieve economic prosperity. The main
features of these codes are discussed in the subsequent sections.

3.5.1 Code of Best Practice of ICASL - 1997
The first code of best practice of corporate governance was issued in 1997 by
ICASL to deal with financial aspects of corporate governance of Sri Lankan listed
companies. This was developed after studying such reports published in other countries.
However, the rules embedded in the code were primarily based on The Cadbury Report
(Watawala 2006). The scope of this code is extended to embrace all listed companies,
unit trusts, fund management companies, finance companies, banks, and insurance
companies for voluntary compliance. It deals corporate governance aspects under two
main headings: ‘Board of Directors’ and ‘Audit’.

This code is developed on the Anglo-Saxon model and therefore roles and
responsibilities of the board of directors have been given more emphasis. Section one
(The Board of Directors) of The Code provides the governance practices to improve the
effectiveness of the board. This section deals with the separation of the roles of
chairman and CEO; independent non- executive directors and their advisory role;
directors’ training and professional advice; structure and responsibilities of the audit
committee; structure and appointment of the remuneration committee; and, board
responsibility for the preparation of financial statements. Section two (Audit) of The
Code deals with governance practices relevant to external audit. These include
procedures to ensure the effectiveness of external audits; responsibilities of the audit
committee; procedures for the rotation of auditors; and, the disclosure of audit fees in
the financial statements.
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This Code was not comprehensive and only addressed the financial aspects of
corporate governance. Thus, this Code was replaced by the ICASL Code of Best
Practice on Corporate Governance in March 2003.

3.5.2 The Code of Best Practice of ICASL - 2003
Owing to the changes in the global corporate governance landscape, the ICASL
appointed a committee in 2001 to revise the existing 1997 code to strengthen corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka. This code is largely based on The Combined Code,
1998 (Hample Report) of the UK. Accordingly the ICASL Code (2003) covers
corporate governance requirements under two main sections: ‘The Company’; and,
‘Institutional Shareholders’ (refer Appendix 2). In addition, The Code includes
schedules of: terms of reference for nomination committees; boards’ self-assessment
checklist; terms of reference for remuneration committees; provisions for the design of
performance-related remuneration; matters for consideration when making a going
concern assumption; and, a summary of governance disclosures to be included in the
Annual Report. Compliance with this code is voluntary, but the companies are required
to incorporate a corporate governance report in their annual report, setting out the
manner and extent to which the company has complied with the established principles
and practices of this code. In the event of non-compliance, companies are required to
disclose the reasons for such non-compliance.

Section One of the Code deals with the governance principles pertaining to the
board of directors, namely: board procedures and meetings; the role of the chairman;
separation of the roles of chairman and CEO; the financial acumen of directors; board
balance of executive and non-executive directors including independent non-executive
directors; supply of information to directors; appointments to the board through a
nomination committee; re-election of directors; appraisal of the performance of the
board and the CEO.

It also encompasses requirements pertaining to directors’

remuneration, namely: responsibilities of the remuneration committee; the amount and
composition of remuneration for both executive and non-executive directors; and,
disclosures on remuneration. Requirements for relations with shareholders include: the
constructive use of the AGM; and, disclosure of major transactions to shareholders.
Aspects of audit and accountability addressed include: financial reporting; internal
control; responsibilities of the audit committee and auditors; and, inclusion of a
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‘Corporate Governance Report’ in the Annual Report). Section Two (Institutional
Shareholders) of the Code deals with governance principles relevant to institutional and
other investors of a company, and, especially with institutional shareholders’ role in
voting and evaluating governance disclosures, and individual shareholders’ investing or
divesting decisions and voting.

The ICASL Code also recommends making several governance disclosures in the
annual report of a company. They are: Corporate Governance Report; Directors’ Report;
Management Report; Directors’ Statement setting out their responsibility for the
preparation

of

financial

statements;

auditors’

statement

on

their

reporting

responsibilities; directors’ statement on the going concern of the business; directors’
statement on internal controls; statement on remuneration policy; details of
remuneration; and, membership of audit and remuneration committees. Further, on
appointment of a new director, it is required to disclose a brief resume of the director,
nature of his/her expertise in relevant functional areas, and other companies in which
he/she holds directorships and membership of board committees (Schedule F).

Although the ICASL Code (2003) was developed taking into account global
corporate governance initiatives, it has not kept pace with the corporate governance
developments that had taken place, particularly after the collapse of Enron in 2001. The
key deficiencies of the ICASL Code can be observed in relation to the provisions for:
non-executive directors; nomination committees; performance evaluation of boards;
directors’ training; shareholders; and, corporate governance disclosures.

The following limitations can be identified in relation to non-executive directors:
the role of non-executive directors is not specifically mentioned; the criteria to decide
their independence are not given; there is no requirement for non-executive directors to
meet regularly as a group without the presence of executive directors; and, no specific
provisions relevant to the appointment and tenure of non-executive directors. The role
of the nomination committee is limited to making recommendations to the board on new
appointments. Its role in succession-planning for board appointments and senior
management positions of the company is not specifically identified. Further, there is no
requirement that the membership of the nomination committee should consist of a
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majority of non-executive directors. Performance evaluation of a board is limited to its
self-assessment and appraisal of its CEO. It does not cover the performance evaluation
of board committees and other directors. The directors’ training requirement is limited
to induction training. No reference has been made to provide training continuously to
update directors’ skills and knowledge (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2008).

The section on shareholders does neither address the need to maintain a dialogue
with institutional shareholders, nor require that the board committee chairmen should
participate at the AGM to answer shareholders’ questions. The following limitations can
be seen in relation to the prescribed corporate governance disclosures: the specific
disclosures to be made in the Corporate Governance Report are not identified; the
application of the system of internal controls and risk management processes are not
covered in the Statement on Internal Controls; and the provision of board committee
reports and the distinction of audit and non-audit fees are not specifically addressed
(Senaratne, 2011).

3.5.3 The Code of Best Practice of ICASL – 2008
The ICASL Code (2003) was subsequently replaced by the ‘Code of Best
Practice on Corporate Governance (2008)’, which was prepared by ICASL jointly with
the SEC in consultation with CSE. The joint committee developed the Code (2008) for
voluntarily compliance by listed companies in conjunction with the mandatory rules on
corporate governance that have been incorporated into the CSE Listing Rules. The
mandatory rules prescribe a minimal level of corporate governance without imposing an
excessive regulatory burden. The voluntary code was developed after studying various
corporate governance reports published in other countries. The foreword to the Code
(2008) recognizes that the committee has reviewed the Combined Code (2003) of U.K.,
the NYSE Code of U.S., Code on Corporate Governance of Singapore, Principles for
Good Governance and Best Practices Recommendations of the Australia Stock
Exchange, the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance and the Corporate Governance
Report of the Securities and Exchange Board of India.

The code provides its recommendations under the two broad headings: The
Company; and, Shareholders (refer Appendix 2). It covers principles on corporate
governance in relation to directors, directors’ remuneration, relations with shareholders,
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accountability and audit, institutional investors, and other investors. All these aspects
are covered in greater detail when compared to ICASL Code 2003. Thus, this code
addresses most of the limitations of previous governance codes (The ICASL Code
2003). The special recommendations made in this code in addressing the limitations of
previous codes include: the proportion or minimum number of non-executive directors
in a board: the criteria and definitions to determine the independence of non-executive
directors; requirement for the non-executive directors to meet regularly as a group
without the presence of executive directors; provisions in case of CEO duality;
provisions regarding the evaluation of performance of board committees; disclosure of
information in respect of directors; terms of reference specifying purpose, duties and
responsibilities of audit committees and provisions regarding the conduct of regular and
structured dialog with shareholders. Another special feature of this code is that it
requires companies to adopt a ‘Code of Business Conduct and Ethics’ for directors and
senior management.

3.5.4 Standards on Corporate Governance in Listing Rules – 2007
The ICASL and the SEC in consultation with the CSE undertook a joint
initiative in 2006 to formulate standards on corporate governance for mandatory
compliance of the listed companies in the CSE. These standards have been developed
after taking into consideration the latest developments in the corporate governance
standards of UK and USA and they cover: the minimum number of non-executive and
independent directors to be present on the board; the criteria for determining
‘independence’ of non-executive directors; disclosures required to be made by listed
companies in respect of its directors; and, the minimum requirements to be met by
listed companies in respect of the audit committee and the remuneration committee
(refer Appendix 3). In respect of both audit committee and remuneration committee, the
composition, functions and the relevant disclosures in the annual report have been
specified.

These standards have been included in section 6 of CSE Listing Rules of 2007
and in section 7.10 of the amended Listing Rules of 2009. The compliance with these
rules is mandatory for listed companies from 1st April 2008. Failure to comply with
listing rules would result in incurring penalties. In the event of violation or noncompliance with the Listing Rules, securities of the entity will be transferred to the
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“Default Board” which may publicly reprimand such entity. Continued violation of the
Listing Rules will result in suspension of trading of securities of such an entity for any
period of time, or delisting of the entity from the exchange.

These rules provide only the minimum standards to be met by a listed company,
and the ICASL Code (2008) is voluntarily, to be applied in conjunction with mandatory
rules. The introduction of mandatory corporate governance listing requirements is a
significant move towards the improvement of governance practices of Sri Lankan listed
companies.

3.5.5 Code of Best Practice on Audit Committees of ICASL, 2002
This Code sets out the role, objectives and the composition of audit committees
of Sri Lankan listed companies. It states that the role of an audit committee is to oversee
the financial reporting system of the company, with a view to safeguarding the interests
of its shareholders and the other stakeholders. In order to fulfil this role, the audit
committee should assist its board of directors to ensure: a sound financial reporting
system is in place that is well managed; that the board carry out business risk
management; manage internal controls; comply with laws and company policies; and,
assess the independence of external auditors and monitor their functions. The
composition of the audit committee set out in the Code is same as that of the Cadbury
Report of the U.K. It also covers audit committee meetings and communications with
internal and external auditors of the company. The most important aspect of this Code is
that it sets out the methodology that an audit committee should follow to achieve these
objectives. The methodology covers the committee’s relationship with the finance
director, the internal auditor and the external auditor. This section provides the
companies with a checklist to evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees.

3.5.6 SEC Guidelines for Audit and Audit Committees of Listed
Companies, 2004
The objectives SEC Guidelines (2004) are to strengthen the effectiveness of the
existing audit process and to promote adoption of corporate governance practices
relating to audit and audit committees which are comparable with global standards.
Further it intends to enhance the accuracy, transparency, and reliability of financial
statements of listed companies in order to instil investor confidence. These Guidelines
are focused on two areas: guidelines for external auditors to be followed in auditing the
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listed companies; and, guidelines for audit committees of listed companies. The former
deals with amongst other things: the qualifications, appointment, powers and
remuneration of auditors; audit partner rotation; conflicts of interest; independence of
auditors; disclosure requirements; financial reporting; and, restricted and permissible
non-audit services which can be practiced by the external auditor. The latter deals with
the: composition; objectives; powers; and, duties of audit committees.

3.6 Corporate Governance Studies in Sri Lanka
As in many other emerging markets in Asia, the ownership of Sri Lankan
companies is highly concentrated, with a presence of controlling shareholders in most
enterprises. The study by Samarakoon (1999) examines the ownership structure of 222
companies listed in the CSE during the financial year 1997/98 and finds that the
ownership of these companies is highly concentrated with the presence of controlling
shareholders in most companies. These findings suggest that large shareholders have a
significant influence on corporate governance structure and practices of Sri Lankan
companies. However, the focus of this study is limited to the distribution of corporate
ownership among various types of shareholders such as: large vs. small; resident vs.
non-resident; and institutional vs. individual.

The study by Senaratne and Gunaratne (2007), which examines the ownership
structure and corporate governance of the sample of 60 listed companies in Sri Lanka,
reveals that the ownership of Sri Lankan companies is concentrated and characterized
by certain features, such as: holding controlling ownership by another corporate entity;
wide prevalence of family ownership as the ultimate owners; existence of pyramid
ownership structure; and, the absence of active institutional shareholders. Therefore,
corporate control in Sri Lanka often lies in the hands of a few individuals, families or
corporate groups who hold the majority of ownership. The results of the study suggest
that the concentrated ownership structure could have a significant influence on the
governance structure of the companies. The existing governance structure of Sri Lankan
companies, characterized by their domination by controlling shareholders, shows some
similarity to the insider systems of corporate governance model. However, whether this
type of ownership structure affects firm performance has not been examined in any
prior research on Sri Lanka.
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SEC of Sri Lanka carried out a survey in 2005 to identify the composition and
structure of audit committees of the listed companies in Sri Lanka. It reveals that out of
132 listed companies responded the questionnaire, 50 companies did not have audit
committees. The survey also revealed much variation in the composition, functions and
operational modalities with regard to audit committees. It further revealed that the
regulatory framework does not provide definitive guidance on audit committees.
However, this survey is limited to the functions of the audit committees.

A survey conducted by Cabraal (2003) using annual reports disclosures relating
to corporate governance of 50 public listed companies in Sri Lanka, report that there is
no sufficient evidence to suggest that many of corporate governance practices that
corporate entities said publicly that they were following, were in fact being practiced
professionally. The study reports that certain listed companies in Sri Lanka were merely
setting out certain sections of the corporate governance best practices or the practices
recommended in Cadbury Report without a clear link to the rest of their reports. Further,
there were no guidelines in the annual report as to how these are actually followed in the
company. As findings of the study suggest non-availability of an established mechanism
to verify the actual level of compliance by companies with the best practices aggravates
this problem.

The Sri Lankan studies reviewed in this section provide empirical evidence
regarding ownership structures and the corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan
listed companies to a certain extent. However, the studies reviewed do not provide
sufficient evidence regarding corporate ownership structure and corporate governance
practices and their influence on corporate performance. There is no study which
examines the stakeholders’ perception on corporate governance in Si Lanka. Hence,
there are many unresolved areas in the efficiency of corporate governance practices and
governance structure of Sri Lankan companies. Although the suitability of corporate
governance practices which are adopted from developed countries (refer Section 3.5) to
Sri Lankan companies is questionable, no prior research has examined the validity of
these practices to Sri Lankan companies. Therefore, an objective of this study is to fill
this gap by examining the compliance of corporate governance best practices by Sri
Lankan companies with ownership implications, and to analyse this issue from
stakeholders’ points of view.
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3.6 Summary
This chapter describes the regulatory and institutional frameworks of corporate
governance requirements, and the provisions of corporate governance codes applicable
to Sri Lankan listed companies. Further, this Chapter outlines the historical
development of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka. Players in the legal and
institutional frameworks in Sri Lanka include the SEC, the CSE, the Registrar of
Companies, the SLAASMB, and professional Accounting institutions especially
ICASL. It is concluded that there is a sound regulatory framework for corporate
governance in Sri Lanka. The legislative corporate governance requirements for listed
companies in Sri Lanka are primarily provided by the Companies Act, SEC rules, CSE
listing rules and Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act. In addition to
regulatory requirements, the corporate governance codes play a vital role in promoting
corporate governance best practices in Sri Lankan companies. Several attempts have
been made by the ICASL and the SEC to introduce the codes of corporate governance
best practices to Sri Lankan companies, which have been strongly influenced by
economic policy changes, especially the adoption of open economic policies after 1977.
Further, the governance systems of Sri Lankan companies show characteristics of the
Anglo-Saxon system as they are strongly influenced by British systems. In addition, the
international developments of corporate governance have strongly influenced the
current changes in governance practices of Sri Lankan companies. This chapter further
indicated that there is a vacuum of research in Sri Lanka in the areas of corporate
governance suggesting needs for further studies.

On this background, the study design three empirical investigations to explore
the efficiency of corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan listed companies. These
empirical investigations are: a survey of compliance to corporate governance best
practices; a survey of stakeholders’ perception of corporate governance practices and
the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in Sri Lankan public listed
companies. The design and the methods of these investigations are discussed in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 4 : Research Design and Methods
4.1 Introduction
This research is conducted in order to determine whether Sri Lankan listed
companies comply with best corporate governance practices, and whether concentrated
ownership of these companies influence levels of firm compliance and firm
performance. Stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance in Sri Lanka are also
examined. In order to achieve these research objectives, a survey was conducted
amongst the CEOs and the Chairmen of Sri Lankan listed companies. Further, the
views of seven stakeholder groups were also obtained through a survey questionnaire
structure in Likert-scale format. The impact of ownership concentration on firm
performance is assessed using secondary data obtained from a database and the annual
reports of sample companies. Data gathered from these devices are then analysed for
interpretations with the support of literature.

This chapter presents the research design and the methods used in examining the
objectives of the study. It describes the sample, the methods of data collection,
measurement of variables and the methods of data analysis used in relation to three
empirical investigations carried out in the study. First, the research problem, research
questions and research design are discussed in order to provide a framework of the
study. Secondly, methods applied in examining: 1) the nature and level of compliance
with corporate governance best practices by Sri Lankan companies; and, 2) impacts of
ownership concentration on the levels of compliance and firm performance are
described. Thirdly, methods applied in examining stakeholders’ perceptions of
corporate governance practices are described. Fourthly, methods applied in testing the
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance are explained. The last section
presents a summary of this chapter.

4.2 The Research Problem
The relative efficiency of alternate corporate governance models and systems,
especially relative efficiencies between the market model and the relationship-based
model of corporate governance, is an important issue for many corporate governance
researches (John and Senbet, 1998). This issue attracts more attention when emerging
markets seek to implement suitable corporate governance systems for their economies.
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The governance reforms of most emerging markets are influenced by practices of the
market informed Anglo-Saxon model, owing to their historical and economic links with
developed economies. But, it is argued that this conventional corporate governance
system has limited effectiveness in emerging markets, as most of these economies have
governance systems with weak institutional frameworks, poor property rights and their
public companies are subjected to concentrated ownership (Claessens and Fan, 2002).
Further, it is argued that the theory derived from the studies of developed countries is
limited in applicability to emerging markets (Farinha, 2003).

Although efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms, especially internal
governance mechanisms of public listed companies in emerging markets is an important
aspect to be examined in governance reforms, there is a dearth of research on firm level
corporate governance practices in these markets. Furthermore, ownership structure and
the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance are issues that are
yet to be explored in Asian markets (Claessens and Fan, 2002). While there are many
studies which examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance
most of these studies are conducted in developed economies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Morck et al., 1988, Thomsen et al., 2006). The contextual
settings of developed countries differ vastly from those of emerging markets and
therefore the results of these studies cannot be generalized without paying thorough
attention to contextual idiosyncrasies (Claessens et al., 2000).Therefore, there is a
vacuum in academic literature on corporate governance, especially firm level
governance practices of emerging markets.

Sri Lanka has been using corporate governance practices originating in
developed countries, especially British practices, despite the fact that there have been
vast differences in their business and governance environments compared to Sri Lanka.
Sri Lankan corporate governance characteristics such as ownership concentration and
bank-led finance resemble the characteristics of the relationship-based model (Senaratne
and Gunaratne, 2008). Further, corporate governance practices are largely
recommended through the voluntary codes. As a result, managers of public listed
companies in Sri Lanka have considerable discretion in deciding the types and the
extent of corporate governance practices implemented in their companies. However,
there is a lack of research studies which examine firm level corporate governance
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practices and their performance implications in Sri Lanka. Therefore, this study
examines the nature and level of compliance to best practices, and the implications of
ownership concentration on the level of compliance and firm performance of Sri Lankan
listed companies. Further, it examines the stakeholders’ perceptions of the corporate
governance system of Sri Lanka in order to assess the efficiency of corporate
governance practices of Sri Lankan listed companies. Six specific questions are
addressed in the study.
(1) What is the historical development and current status of corporate governance
practices in Sri Lanka?
(2) What is the nature and level of compliance maintained by Sri Lankan companies in
respect of corporate governance best practices?
(3) Does the concentration of ownership with family, foreign or controlling owners
have an impact on the level of compliance with corporate governance practices in
Sri Lankan companies?
(4) Do facilitating corporate governance best practices enable improvement in
corporate performance in Sri Lankan companies?
(5) Do current corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka meet the stakeholders’
expectations?
(6) Does ownership concentration influence firm performance of Sri Lankan
companies?

4.3 Objectives of the Study
The surveys and investigations of the study realise eight objectives. Specifically,
this study of Sri Lankan listed companies:
(1) assesses the corporate governance environment and the process of corporate
governance codes’ development in Sri Lanka;
(2) examines the nature of compliance with corporate governance best practices
recommended by prevailing codes;
(3) assesses the level of compliance with corporate governance best practices through
the development of a Sri Lankan corporate governance index;
(4) examines the impacts of ownership on levels of compliance with corporate
governance best practices;
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(5) examines the impact of compliance with corporate governance best practices on
firm performance, proposing that a higher level of compliance will enhance firm
performance;
(6) assesses stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance practices, strategies and
identified issues;
(7) examines the impacts of ownership concentration on firms’ performances; and,
(8) recognizes features of current corporate governance practices, and makes
recommendations.

4.4 Research Design and Approach
The research is oriented in a positivist theoretical perspective, and the
descriptive method of research is used in the empirical investigations of the study. The
aim of descriptive research is to provide information regarding the current status and the
characteristics of a particular phenomenon. This is usually exploratory in nature and
attempts to determine the status of a particular area (Heppner et al., 2008). The
descriptive research aims to verify formulated hypotheses that refer to the present
situation. This method can be used either with qualitative or quantitative data or both,
giving flexibility in selecting the devices for data-gathering. It is useful in describing the
occurrence and characteristics of the phenomena that are being studied, and therefore is
useful for developing remedial actions. Thus, the findings are useful in managerial
decision-making (Creswell, 1994).

The use of a particular method for a research project depends on the scope,
purpose and target population of the study, as well as the resources available to the
researcher (Gill and Johnson, 2002). As depicted in the ‘Overall Research Framework’
given below, three empirical investigations have been carried out in this study: first a
survey of compliance with corporate governance best practices; second a survey of
stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka; and, third the
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in Sri Lankan public listed
companies. Furthermore, an analysis of legal and institutional frameworks of corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka and their evolution is also undertaken to assess the
present status of corporate governance requirements. The aim of this research is to
assess the efficiency of compliance with corporate governance requirements in Sri
Lankan listed companies based on these empirical investigations. Furthermore, the
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descriptive method is advantageous to these investigations due to its flexibility in
accommodating both quantitative and qualitative analysis of data gathered through
questionnaire surveys and other secondary sources.

Figure 4-1Overall Research Framework

1. Survey of compliance with corporate governance best practices
Despite the presence of legal and institutional frameworks, regulatory requirements,
and voluntary corporate governance codes governing public listed companies in Sri
Lanka, how these instruments are applied may deviate from their intended
application. In the first empirical investigation of this study, compliance with best
corporate governance practices by Sri Lankan quoted public companies, and the
impacts of ownership concentration on levels of compliance and firm performance
are examined.
2. Survey of stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance
The second investigation examines the perceptions of stakeholder groups regarding
the present status and issues of corporate governance in Sri Lanka.
3. The impact of ownership concentration on firm performance
The third investigation examines the impact of ownership concentration and
ownership structure on a firm’s performance on the premise of agency theory
assumptions.
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In this context, this chapter deals with the methods used to examine the
objectives of study except objectives one and eight. Objective one is addressed in
chapter three whereas objective eight is addressed in chapter eight. This chapter
describes methods of three empirical investigations relating to objectives two to seven.
The Section 4.5 describes the method applied in achieving objectives two, three, four
and five while Section 4.6 describes the method applied in achieving objective six. The
method applied in testing the impact of ownership concentration on performance is
explained in the Section 4.7.

4.5 Survey of Compliance to Corporate Governance Practices
This investigation examines the nature and level of compliance with best
corporate governance practices by Sri Lankan quoted public companies. In the first part
of the study, the nature of compliance with best corporate governance practices is
evaluated based on questionnaire survey data using percentage and frequency analysis.
In the second section, the level of compliance with corporate governance practices is
assessed based on the corporate governance index developed on questionnaire survey
data. It is expected that concentration of ownership by family, foreign or controlling
owners could have significant impacts on compliance with best corporate governance
practices. In the third section, impacts of such ownership concentration on compliance
with corporate governance are examined based on the corporate governance index
scores. Finally, the impacts of compliance with corporate governance practices on
firms’ performance are examined. Through these examinations, the study aims to
address the research questions (2), (3) and (4) mentioned above.

4.5.1 Selection of the Sample
As the study considers the level of compliance with corporate governance best
practices by Sri Lankan companies from a capital market perspective, it is based on
public listed companies in Sri Lanka. All companies listed on the CSE during the
2009/10 financial year are considered in the initial sample of the study. After excluding
delisted companies as per the listing schedule of CSE, 230 actively trading companies
are selected for the final sample, representing all industry sectors of the CSE (refer
Table 4.1).
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4.5.2 Data, Data Collection, and Measurement of Variables
The study uses both primary data and secondary data. Collection of primary data
in relation to compliance with corporate governance practices is done through a
questionnaire survey. Secondary data in relation to accounting performance, market
price data and additional governance information were obtained from three sources: the
annual reports of the relevant companies, Bureau Van Dijk’s OSIRIS database
(OSIRIS), and the CSE database. Items of interest to this study were: relevant balance
sheets and income statements; ownership structures; shareholdings of main
shareholders; market prices of shares; and, the size and composition of the board of
directors. Datarelating to accounting performance measures were obtained from the
OSIRIS database. Information on ownership structure, major shareholdings and the size
and composition of the board was extracted from annual reports. Share price
information of sample firms was obtained from the CSE database. Data collection
methods and the corporate governance variables are discussed in detail in the
subsequent sections.
4.5.2.1 Questionnaire Survey
Copies of questionnaire (refer Appendix 4) were mailed to either the Chairman
or the CEO of the sample companies from December 2009 to January 2010. An address
data base was developed using information available on the CSE website and/or the
websites of sample companies. The questionnaire was mailed to a sample of companies
classified under each industry sector, as shown in Table 4.1. The mailed questionnaire
method is considered appropriate in this study as it covers a large sample of companies
cost effectively. The response rate of a mailed questionnaire survey can be improved by
sending follow-up letters, incorporating self-addressed postage paid return envelops and
keeping the questionnaire brief and clear (Sekaran, 2000). Accordingly, the
questionnaires were sent with a covering letter addressed to the personal name of
recipients, and a postage-paid reply envelope. Further, a copy of the ‘Participant’s
Information Sheet’ (refer Appendix 5) which is a requirement of the ethics committee is
also attached to convey the confidentiality of individual data of the study to the
participants. Recipients were asked to return the completed questionnaire by mail.
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Table 4.1 Sample Companies across each Industry Sector
Industry Sector

Questionnaire Mailed

1 Bank Finance and Insurance

33

2 Beverage Food and Tobacco

18

3 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals

9

4 Construction and Engineering

3

5 Diversified Holdings

11

6 Footwear and Textiles

3

7 Health Care

6

8 Hotels and Travels

32

9 Information Technology

1

10 Investment Trust

9

11 Land And Property

20

12 Manufacturing

31

13 Motors

6

14 Oil Palms

5

15 Plantation

18

16 Power and Energy

3

17 Services

6

18 Stores and Supplies

5

18 Telecommunication

2

20 Trading

9
230

Several approaches were adopted to improve the response rate. The
questionnaire was allowed to be completed by either the Chairman or CEO or a suitable
representative on their behalf. Reminder letters were posted approximately three weeks
after the first post of questionnaires (refer Appendix 6). The same questionnaire was
developed into digitally answerable format and sent through e-mails where email
addresses of intended recipients were available. Based on the researcher’s personal
contacts, assistance from two senior partners of leading audit firms in Sri Lanka (Ernest
& Young and KPMG) were obtained to distribute questionnaires personally among
CEOs using their capacity as the audit partners of these companies.

4.5.2.2 Design of the Questionnaire
The development of the questionnaire has undergone two stages. In the first
stage main attributes of corporate governance practices have been identified by referring
to national and international codes, regulations and guidelines. These attributes are
95

classified under eight dimensions of corporate governance, which form the basis of the
questionnaire. In the second stage specific questions were developed by reference to
prior research studies covering these attributes (Nam and Nam, 2004, Balasubramanian
et al., 2007, Jongsureyapart, 2006, Ho, 2005, Institute of Corporate Directors, 2007,
KPMG in Sri Lanka, 2007). Additional questions were also developed suitable to the
context of the study. All questions are shown in closed form and the majority of
questions expect a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response, as it surveys compliance with corporate
governance best practices. Furthermore, this form of questioning is used as a strategy to
improve the response rate.

The questionnaire consists of thirty-five questions, classified in four parts,
namely; general information; board structure and practices; stakeholders’ rights; and,
related party transactions (refer Appendix 4). In Part I, questions 1 to 3 focus on
information about the participants such as: official positions; gender; and, educational
background. Questions 4 to 7 focus on company characteristics such as: overall
ownership; family ownership; foreign ownership; influential groups in policy making;
and, the status of labor unions of the company. These questions are adopted from Nam
and Nam (2004).

Part II is focused on the composition and procedures of the boards and
subcommittees including: board composition; board functions and meetings;
committees’ procedures; and, appointment, remuneration and performance evaluation of
directors. Questions 8 and 9 seek data about the composition of the board such as:
proper balance of the board; minority and institutional shareholders’ representation;
and, both independent and non-executive directors on the board. These questions are
developed by reference to the Sri Lankan corporate governance requirements. Questions
10 and 11 relate to boards’ procedures, while questions twelve to fourteen relate to
boards’ meetings. The governing bylaws, non-executive directors’ appointment, their
participation, recording of minutes, and frequency, duration and participation in board
meetings are examined by these questions which are adopted from Nam and Nam
(2004), Ho (2005) and Balasubramanian et al. (2007).

Questions 15 to 19 investigate board sub committees recommended by
governance codes. Frequency of meetings is examined by questions 15 and 16, in order
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to access the active contribution of sub-committees in boards’ decision making
processes. Question 17 has ten sub-items relating to audit committees, such as:
structure, operational mechanism, independence, and members’ qualifications. Question
17 is adopted from Nam and Nam (2004). A similar approach is adopted in questions
18 and 19, which are designed to investigate the efficiency of remuneration and
nomination committees respectively. Operating mechanisms, committee independence
and the conduct of meetings are considered in these questions.

A high proportion of family ownership and holding of managerial positions by
family members are common characteristics of most Asian companies (Khan, 2003,
Nam and Nam, 2004, Bhasa, 2004). Those observations are applicable to Sri Lankan
companies (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). Hence, board appointments and
remuneration procedures of directors are given prominence in designing the questions.
Question 20 seeks information relevant to fair and transparent appointments to the
board, whereas question 21 interrogates remuneration policies, approvals, and the
relationship between remuneration and performance.

In the context of high

concentration of family ownership, the appointments and remuneration can be decided
based on personal relationships instead of experience or skills of appointees. The
establishment of a proper performance evaluation system of the directors is desirable to
enhance overall board performance and to secure shareholders’ rights. Questions 22 and
23 are designed to investigate these attributes. Directors’ code of conduct and ethics is
an important attribute, especially in a relationship-based governance model. Question 24
gathers information on this aspect, including training opportunities available to
directors.

Part III (questions 25 to 31) investigates the stakeholders’ rights and disclosures,
addressing whether the shareholders’ rights are protected with respect to: voting;
participation in shareholder meetings; conduct of shareholder meetings; and, disclosure
of adequate information including related party transactions. Question 26 gathers
information on the external audit function as an auditor’s role is vital for the protection
of the shareholders’ rights. Question 27 inspects the extent of obtaining non-audit
services from external auditors as it may affect auditors’ independence. Questions 30
and 31 investigate the availability of information on the company’s web-site and in its
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annual report. These questions are adopted from Nam and Nam (2004), Ho (2005) and
Balasubramanian et al. (2007).

Related party transactions have been identified as an important aspect which
requires adequate controls and disclosures by many governance codes, guidelines and
accounting standards. Conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders is
an important issue of corporate governance, as controlling shareholders are able to
tunnel company assets for their own benefit, either through direct participation or by
influencing management (Johnson et al., 2000). As the ownership of Sri Lankan
companies is highly concentrated some with family ownership, the related party
transactions require special attention. Part IV of the questionnaire focuses on related
party transactions which include all transactions between the firm and its related parties
such as board members, principle owners, management and their immediate family
members and affiliated companies. Questions 32 to 35, which are adopted from
Balasubramanian et al. (2007), gather data on the nature and size and required approval
levels of related party transactions.

To improve the understandability, practical applicability and overall validity of
the questionnaire several procedures were adopted. The draft questionnaire was sent to
two senior members of the Corporate Governance Code Development Committee of the
ICASL, asking them to assess the practical application of the questionnaire. To improve
the overall validity, the questionnaire was reviewed by a company director. This
procedure confirmed that the questions are suitable for the intended audience. Some
minor modifications to incorporate their comments were made before administering the
questionnaire.
4.5.2.3 Corporate Governance Variables
The corporate governance variables used in this analysis indicate practices
prescribed in national and international corporate governance codes. The Sri Lanka
Corporate Governance Code (2008), Listing Rules (2009) of CSE (refer Section 3.5),
OECD principals (2004) (refer Section 2.3) and the prior research studies (Nam and
Nam, 2004, Balasubramanian et al., 2010, Balasubramanian et al., 2007, Ho, 2005,
Gompers et al., 2003) are used in the process of identifying appropriate governance
variables for the study. These practices are categorised under eight dimensions, namely:
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board structure & independence; board procedure and effectiveness; audit committee
procedure; directors' remuneration; disclosure and transparency; disclosure reliability;
shareholders rights; and, related party transactions. These variables were investigated
using information obtained through the questionnaire.

Table 4.2 Variables Investigated in the Questionnaire
Dimensions

Variables investigated

Question
Reference

General Information:
1. Information about respondents

1-3

2. Company characteristics

1 Board structure and
independence

2.1 Nature and family ownership

4

2.2 Foreign ownership
2.3 Policy influence

5
7

3. Board structure composition
3.1 Composition and size
3.2 CEO Duality

2 Board Procedure and
Effectiveness

8,9
& 11

4. Board Procedure
4.1 Board Practices

10

4.2 Board Meetings

12 - 14

4.3 Board Committees

15 & 16

5. Appointment of directors
5.1 Nomination Committee

19

5.2 Appointment procedure
6. Performance evaluation of the
Directors

20

6.1 Executive Directors

22

6.2 Non-executive directors
7. Code of conduct and assistance

23
24

3 Directors' Remuneration

8. Remuneration Committee
9. Remuneration procedure

18
21

4 Audit Committee Procedure

10.Audit committee
10.1 Structure

17

10.2 Meetings
10.3 Practices

16
17

5 Disclosure and Transparency 11. Information Disclosure
11.1 Disclosure in the Web
11.2 Disclosure in the Annual
Reports

30
31

6 Disclosure Reliability
7 Shareholders Rights

12. Auditor’s independence and work

26 & 27

13. Applicable rules and meetings

25,28,29

8 Related party transactions

14. Nature and magnitude
15. Required approval level

32 & 33
34 & 35
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The main variables recognised in each dimension are sub-classified into fifteen
categories, including information of respondents and responding companies as indicated
in Table 4.2. These variables are designed to analyse the nature of compliance to
important aspects of corporate governance such as: board composition; board practices,
board meetings; practices of board sub-committees; appointments to the board;
performance evaluation of the board and directors; remuneration procedure; audit
committee procedure; disclosure and disclosure reliability; shareholders’ rights and
related party transactions.

Dimensions one to four address a board’s structure and practices. The board
should be structured in such a way that good governance practices are facilitated and not
hindered. Corporate governance is centred on the board of directors, since they are
responsible for setting objectives and formulating strategies to attain those objectives.
Further, they are responsible for overall supervision, and carrying out proper monitoring
to ensure the rights of shareholders. The associated principles of these dimensions
include: a structure supporting distinct roles of supervision and executive management;
composition of the board; the experience of directors; a formal and transparent
procedure for the election of directors; re-election requirements; compensation of
executives and directors; performance evaluation; and, audit committees.

Dimensions five to eight focus on the shareholders’ rights and disclosures. The
board is responsible for protecting shareholders’ rights and ensuring equitable treatment
to all shareholders, including regulatory safeguards, transparency and accountability.
The key functions of the board include effective supervision and monitoring, ensuring
accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders. The effective governance system
provides the mechanism which ensures the supervisory and monitoring roles of the
management. These dimensions include attributes such as rules for safeguarding
shareholders’ rights; frequency of having shareholders meetings; existence of a written
governance policy; participation of both executive and non-executive directors in
shareholders meetings; regular and rigorous review of board performance, internal
control and audit, related party transactions, and, risk assessment reports. These
variables are employed in evaluating the nature of compliance to corporate governance
best practices by sample companies.
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4.5.2.4 Construction of Corporate Governance Index and Level of Compliance
Another aspect considered in objective three is the assessment of the relative
levels of compliance with corporate governance best practices amongst sample
companies. The relative levels of compliance are assessed based on the scores of
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) constructed in the study (refer Appendix 7). The
CGI scores of sample companies indicate the extent to which they have complied with
the best practice. The subsequent sections describe the basis of preparation, variables
and scores of the CGI.

(a) Basis of Preparation of the Corporate Governance Index:
The CGI is constructed consisting eight sub-indices representing corporate
governance dimensions (refer Table 4.2) examined in the study. The variables of CGI
are recognised through the synthesis of the SLCGC (2008), the OECD principles and
relevant international guidelines (refer Section 2.6). The recommended practices of
SLCGC (2008) and the requirements of Companies Act No.07 of 2007 are provided the
basis for the construction of the CGI. Further, some of the practices are identified
through the perusal of OECD principles since the study aims to investigate compliance
to best practices in a broader perspective.
The CGI is constructed referring to the previous research studies
(Balasubramanian et al., 2010, Ho, 2005, Susilowati et al., 2005), and the corporate
governance indices of rating agencies (refer Section 2.7). In previous studies, various
proxy variables are used to assess the level of compliance to corporate governance
practices and these variables are recognised under different aspects of corporate
governance such as: board structure; board procedure; audit committee practices;
directors compensation; shareholders’ rights;

and, related party transactions

(Balasubramanian et al., 2007); board structure; stewardship; strategic leadership;
capital structure and market relations; and, social responsibilities (Ho, 2005); and
presence of independent directors; availability of audit committees; conduct of the
external audit; and the percentage of shares held by outsiders and insiders (Susilowati et
al., 2005). Furthermore, the professional associations and rating agencies have also
developed governance indices covering a broad range of areas using variables as
discussed in Section 2.7 (refer Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). This structure and variables of
these indices have provided useful guidance in developing the CGI. However, the CGI
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of the study differs to other indices in terms of its focus, coverage and purpose. The
CGI consists of 90 variables classified under eight dimensions. The main aspects
covered in this index are discussed in the following section.
(b) Variables of Corporate Governance Index and Sub-indices:
There is much focus on the conduct of board members and effective discharge of
their responsibilities as the roles and responsibilities of a board reinforce corporate
governance structure of a company securing better performance. Hence, the board
functions are given high priority in constructing the CGI. The practices required for
effective corporate governance are identified under eight dimensions namely: board
structure & independence; board effectiveness; directors’ remuneration procedure; audit
committee procedure; disclosure substance; disclosure reliability; shareholders rights;
and, related party transactions.
The CGI is based on the data gathered through the questionnaire. Sub-indices
represent each of the dimensions, and are constructed to evaluate a level of compliance
with each of these aspects. The number of variables of each sub-index consists of: board
structure & independence (07); board effectiveness (25); directors’ remuneration (08);
audit committee procedure (10); disclosure and transparency (15); disclosure reliability
(05); shareholders rights (12); and, related party transactions (08). Accordingly, the
maximum score of the CGI is equal to 90, which is the addition of maximum marks of
its eight sub-indices (refer Appendix 7). A brief description of each sub-index is given
below.
(I)Board structure & independence: This sub-index deals with the ability of a board
to work independently to secure the rights of shareholders and to enhance the overall
performance of the firm. The variables considered in sub-index include the following:
board composition; the balance of executive and non-executive directors; the
independence of non-executive directors; CEO duality; the selection of non-executive
directors; and the active participation of non-executive directors in board decisions.
Overall, the ability of non-executive and independent directors to work independently
on the board and their contribution towards the board’s decision making process are
considered.
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(II) Board Effectiveness: This sub-index covers how directors discharge their roles
effectively to enhance the overall performance of the firm, and to protect the interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders. The variables included in this sub-index cover the
following: role of the board; board practices; board meetings; board committees; the
appointment and re-election of directors; the appointment procedure; the existence and
role of a nomination committee; performance evaluation of the board and succession
planning; provision of information to the directors and their professional development;
conduct of board and board committee meetings; outside commitments of directors;
financial acumen of board members; and, the presence of a code of conduct and ethics
for directors.
(III) Audit Committee Procedure: This sub-index covers the governance principles
relevant to the conduct of the audit committee of a company, which acts independently
from the executives, to ensure that the interests of shareholders are properly protected in
relation to financial reporting and internal controls. Hence, the variables included in this
section cover the composition, authority, and responsibilities of the audit committee,
and its relationship with the auditors (both internal and external) of the company.
(IV) Directors’ Remuneration: This sub-index deals with governance principles
relating to the determination of directors’ remuneration, as it is important to align
directors’ interests with the overall performance of the firm. The variables included in
this sub-index cover: the procedure of deciding directors’ remuneration (the
appointment of a remuneration committee and its composition); the remuneration policy
of the company; performance related elements of remuneration; and, whether there is
shareholders’ approval for long-term incentive schemes.
(V) Disclosure Substance: This sub-index addresses disclosures relevant to enhance
the rights of shareholders and other stakeholders. The disclosure of annual and quarterly
financial statements, directors’ reports and directors’ share transactions on the firm’s
web page are considered as key variables. In addition, the variables included in this subindex cover the following: related party transactions; internal controls and risk
management policies; the audit committee’s report; directors’ remuneration; reports of
remuneration and nomination committees; resumes of directors; and, audit and nonaudit fees. These disclosures are necessary for the shareholders to assess the
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effectiveness of the governance structures of companies, in order to supervise and
control the conduct of those who control the company.
(VI) Disclosure Reliability (Auditor independence):This sub-index covers the
governance principles required to secure disclosure reliability. The variables included in
this section cover the independence of external auditor. The magnitude of non-audit
services provided by the auditor, rotation of audit partners, reviews of the auditor’s
work by an audit committee, and the full board review of the audit report are considered
as the key variables.
(VII) Shareholders Rights: This sub-index covers the governance principles relevant
to the shareholders’ rights in respect of voting, conduct of AGM, pre-emptive rights and
related party transactions. The variables included cover the following: exercise of voting
rights of shareholders; voting by mail and proxy rights; constructive use of AGM;
availability of board committee chairmen to answer shareholders’ questions at the
AGM; availability of written guidelines for directors’ share dealings and other related
party transactions; and, representation of minority shareholder in the board.
(VIII) Related party transactions: As the ownership of Sri Lankan companies is
highly concentrated with family owners, the related party transactions require special
attention. It is possible to use related party transactions as a means of tunnelling firm
resources. The governance principles relevant to execution and disclosure of related
party transactions have been identified in this sub-index as the main variables. The
variables included in this sub-index cover the following: nature and magnitude of the
related party transactions; required approval level for the execution; and, review of
these transactions by the board.

4.5.3 Methods of Data Analysis
The analytical techniques used in the study are both quantitative and qualitative
in nature. The quantitative data analysis methods include percentage analysis, frequency
analysis and other statistical analysis. The level of compliance to corporate governance
best practices is determined based on the scores of the CGI and the sub-indices. A
statistical analysis is carried out using the SPSS Statistical Package in order to examine
the impact of levels of compliance on firm’s performance and the impact of ownership
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on the level of compliance. These analytical techniques are discussed in detail in the
subsequent sections.
4.5.3.1 Nature of Compliance to Corporate Governance best practices
The analysis of compliance to corporate governance best practices is carried out
using the governance variables as identified in Table 4.2. Non-responding bias and other
data limitations are assessed prior to the analysis of compliance. The significance of
non-response bias is estimated by comparing the means of selected financial and
governance variables of responded and non-responded firms using an independent
sample t-test. Other data limitations such as incomplete respondent knowledge and selfresponding bias are discussed descriptively.
The First section of the analysis consists of general information regarding
respondents and responding companies. A percentage analysis is carried out to examine
the nature of family ownership and foreign shareholdings of Sri Lankan companies. The
survey results are analysed using percentage and frequency analysis. This is
contextualised referring to relevant literature, specifically Sri Lankan governance codes
to identify the strength and weakness of each aspect considered. Variables used are:
board structure composition; board procedure; appointment of board members;
performance evaluation of the directors; code of conduct; audit and remuneration
committee procedure; information disclosure; disclosure reliability; shareholders’
rights; and, related party transactions.
4.5.3.2 Level of Compliance to Corporate governance Best Practices
The scores of CGI and sub-indices are analysed based on a number of methods
in assessing the level of compliance of corporate governance best practices by sample
companies. Scores of the CGI and the sub-indices are analysed using descriptive
statistics and frequency distribution to find out overall behaviours of compliance level
of corporate governance practices. As the compliance to governance practices can
significantly be different across the nature of ownership of the firm (Nam and Nam,
2004, Balasubramanian et al., 2010) three pairs of sub samples are indentified based on
the family ownership, foreign ownership and the presence of controlling shareholders of
the companies. The subgroups family based (FB) and non family based (NFB) are
identified using the family ownership whereas subgroups of substantially foreign owned
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(SFO) and less foreign owned (LFO) are identified using foreign ownership of sample
companies. The controlling ownership is one of the main features of Asian companies.
Thus, the third sub groups are identified based on the presence of controlling owners.
These three categories of subgroups are recognized based on the information collected
through the questionnaire and the analysis of annual reports of the sample companies.

The analysis is carried out across subgroups of each ownership dimension in
order to identify whether there are significant differences across sub groups regarding
compliance to corporate governance best practices. The comparative analysis of subindex scores across subgroups is carried out to identify the level of compliance with
each aspect of corporate governance. Furthermore, comparative analysis of individual
variables in each sub-index across subgroups is carried out to find out whether there are
significant differences between subgroups regarding compliance to each variable. It also
illustrates the behaviour of the scores of individual variables of the CGI and how these
variables contribute to its total score. Hence, this analysis provides a comprehensive
view of the level of compliance to governance practices of sample companies. The
comparison of corporate governance scores of three subgroups are carried out in order
to reveal the distinguishing features and associated issues of corporate governance
practices of these ownership dimensions.

4.5.3.3 Impact of Ownership on Level of Corporate Governance Compliance
The compliance to governance practices can be different across the firms due the
influence of the controlling owners of the firms. The controlling ownership can be
concentrated on family members or foreign owners. Similarly, without any particular
group ownership, it can be concentrated on few individuals. In order to achieve the
forth objective of the study, a t-test is carried out to find out whether there is a
significant difference between corresponding sub-samples identified based on three
dimensions of ownership. The mean differences of the scores of CGI and the subindices of sub samples are compared using independent samples t-test.
4.5.3.4 Impact of Corporate Governance Compliance on Firm Performance
The main aspect considered in objective five of the study is the impact of
compliance to corporate governance best practices on firm performance. This
examination is carried out on the proposition that a higher level of compliance will
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enhance the firm performance based on the theoretical assertion and the findings of
research studies as discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.7 respectively. The total corporate
governance scores and sub indices scores of sample companies are used as the indicator
of the level of corporate governance.

The performance variables include return on assets (ROA) (net profit before tax
to total assets) and return on equity (ROE) (net profit after tax to total equity) as the
accounting performance measures. The market performance variables include the proxy
Tobin Q (TQ) (market value of a firm’s equity plus the book value of its debt to the
book value of total assets) and market-to-book-value ratio (MBR) (market value of a
firm’s equity to its book value).

These variables are measured using share price

information and data extracted from the annual reports of sample companies.

ROA and ROE is measured in terms of five-year average during the period 2006
-2010. The market value of equity is measured in terms of monthly average market
price of shares for the year 2010. The book value of debts and total assets are extracted
from the financial statements for the year 2009/10 of sample companies. The variables
are measured using average values to minimise the effect of temporary fluctuations. In
order to examine the performance implications of corporate governance compliance, the
sample is divided into two sub samples, as high compliance and low compliance
companies based on the overall index score. Based on mean value of the index score, a
company that has scored 61 or more for the overall index is defined as a high
compliance company, whereas an overall index score less than 61 is considered as a low
compliance company.

The study is based on the assumption that the level of compliance to corporate
governance best practices would improve overall management efficiency and thereby
overall performance of the company. The accounting performance measures are
employed to capture the impact of overall performance of the company. Further, the
level of corporate governance would have a positive impact on investors’ expectation on
market share prices. Therefore, market performance measures are applied to capture the
impact of compliance to corporate governance practices on market value of the shares.
Based on the assumed casual relationship, the following hypotheses are developed to
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examine the relationship between corporate governance variables and the performance
variables.
1 Companies with higher corporate governance index scores are likely to have a
higher accounting performance.
2 Companies with higher corporate governance index scores are likely to have a
higher market performance.
In order to test these hypotheses, a comparative analysis of corporate governance
index score of sub-samples is carried out based on correlation analysis and the t-test for
independent samples.

4.6 Survey on stakeholders’ perception on corporate
governance
This investigation examines the perception of various stakeholder groups in
relation to present status, strategies, practices and main issues of corporate governance
and as to how these issues should be addressed in Sri Lankan context using the
questionnaire survey method. Over the last decades, the interest on corporate
governance increased greatly, making it a central topic of various discussions among
stakeholder groups of the companies. The large-scale corporate collapses and increased
regulatory requirements have created stronger stakeholder interest in corporate
governance practices across the globe. Thus corporate governance has become a subject
of considerable public interest. As a result, the empirical examination of stakeholder
perception on corporate governance has become the subject matter of various studies
focused on corporate governance issues (Mckinsey, 2002, Nam and Nam, 2004, Ho,
2005). However, most of prior studies on this aspect are confined to one or two
stakeholder groups or consider only internal stakeholders of the company. For example,
Nam and Nam (2004) examine the directors’ opinion on various corporate governance
aspects of four Asian countries where as the survey of McKinsey Co (2002) is confined
to institutional investors. In order to address this limitation, this survey uses seven
groups including both internal and external stakeholders.

4.6.1 Selection of the Sample
Since the purpose of conducting questionnaire survey is to find out perception of
stakeholder groups of companies, an attempt is made to incorporate key stakeholder
groups who could make substantial contribution, either directly or indirectly, towards
the reforms of corporate governance policies in Sri Lanka. After having careful
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examination of various stakeholder groups in other studies (Mckinsey, 2002, Nam and
Nam, 2004, Ho, 2005) and considering the Sri Lankan situation, it is decided to use
seven influential stakeholder groups who are instrumental in implementation,
monitoring, or policy formulation of corporate governance. These groups are: Nonexecutive Directors (NED); Independent Audit Professionals (IAP); Accountants
(ACC); Government Policy Makers (GPM); Government Audit and Tax Officers
(GATO); Academics (ACD); and Investors (INV).

The sample is drawn from the employees representing first six groups and
investors who are located in Colombo, the business capital of Sri Lanka. Considering
the difficulties in getting responses to questionnaire survey, two methods are adopted in
distributing and collecting questionnaires. The first method is to distribute and collect
the questionnaire by the researcher himself and through a number of persons with whom
the researcher has personal contacts. Based on this method 290 copies of questionnaires
were distributed among prospective respondents of IAP, GMP, GATO, and ACD
groups during January and February 2010. The second method employed is a mail
survey in which 375 copies were mailed to the Home/Office addresses of the
prospective respondents of NED, ACC and INV groups. The questionnaires were sent
with a covering letter addressed to personal name of the recipients and a postage-paid
reply envelope.

A sample of 150 non-executive directors was selected from public listed
companies. The questionnaires were mailed to them using same address data base
developed for corporate governance compliance survey. Their names were extracted
from the websites of respective companies. Accordingly, 150 copies were mailed to
their office addresses. The sample of accountants was also chosen from public listed
companies. The questionnaires were mailed to the accountants of randomly selected 125
companies using same address data base. The sample of 100 investors was selected
using the information obtained from the CSE. The questionnaires were mailed to their
home or office addresses depending on the availability of information.

The independent audit professionals comprise partners, qualified managers and
senior audit assistants of the audit firms. The sample of 70 audit professionals was
drawn from two leading audit firms. The questionnaire was distributed personally with
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the assistance of senior partners of these firms (Ernest & Young and KPMG). The
government policy makers include the employees of three leading government
organizations namely; the SEC; the Treasury of Sri Lanka and the Central Bank of Sri
Lanka. The sample of 80 employees was drawn from the staff grade officers of these
institutions and the questionnaire was personally distributed among them.

The

government audit and tax officers consist of the audit officers (audit superintendents) of
the Auditor-General’s Department of Sri Lanka and the tax officers (assessors) of the
Inland Revenue Department of Sri Lanka. The questionnaire was personally distributed
among the sample of 100 officers of these organizations. The sample of academics
comprises of 40 senior lectures/lectures from the management and commerce faculties
of University of Sri Jayewardenepura and University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. The
selected lectures were handed over the copies of the questionnaire personally based on
the researcher’s long standing working relationship with these universities.

Every attempt was made to obtain a high response rate for the questionnaire with
a view to minimise the effect of non-response bias. As for the mailed questionnaire, the
remainder letters were posted approximately three weeks after the first post of
questionnaires. The same questionnaire was developed into digitally answerable format
and sent through e-mails where email addresses of intended recipients were available.
As for personally distributed questionnaire, the researcher himself visited the
respondents’ working places to collect completed copies of the questionnaire. Since
some respondents did not return the completed questionnaire in the first attempt, several
visits had to be repeated. However, even after several visits some respondents did not
return the completed questionnaire and in some cases prospective respondents were not
contactable.

4.6.2 Data Collection and Questionnaire Design
The study uses a questionnaire on a 5-point Likert scale to collect primary data
from the seven stakeholder groups selected for the sample about their perceptions of the
several aspect of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. The major aspects of interest to the
study are: important components of corporate governance system; performance
implications of corporate governance; present status of corporate governance; major
issues of corporate governance; corporate governance strategies; corporate governance
practices that need improvement; key players and promoters of corporate governance
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and alternative approaches to promote corporate governance practices. The
questionnaire is designed to collect information on these aspects in Sri Lankan context.

The development of the questionnaire has undergone two stages. In the first
stage main aspects of corporate governance have been identified by reference to
corporate governance guidelines and prior research studies as discussed in Section 2.4.
In the second stage specific questions were developed by reference to these guidelines
and prior research studies (Mckinsey, 2002, Nam and Nam, 2004, Ho, 2005, KPMG in
Sri Lanka, 2007). Additional questions were also developed to suit to the context of the
study. The questionnaire consists of seventeen questions classified under five parts
namely; participant information; important components and performance implications;
current status and major issues; strategies and practices; key players and promoters, and
personal information of respondents (refer Appendix 8).

Part I of the questionnaire is designed to gather general information about the
respondents. In seven questions in Part I, the respondents are asked to tick the
appropriate answer box for each question. The questions 1 to 5 focus on the
participants’

occupations,

gender,

professional

qualifications

and

educational

background where as questions 6 and 7 focus on their share investment information and
company directorship experience. Ten questions are given in Part II to Part V. Seven
questions of these require respondents to indicate their perceptions of the agreement or
the importance on a 5-point Likert scale. The scale for each of these items range from 1
(strongly disagree/ less important) to 5 (strongly agree/more important). These
questions consist of 69 items focusing on various aspects of corporate governance. The
remaining three questions allow respondents to make their own comments. One such
question requires respondents to choose from the given options and the other two are
open ended questions which seek respondents’ opinion in their own initiation.

In Part II question 8 is designed to evaluate stakeholder perception on the
importance of corporate governance components. The question includes both internal
and external corporate governance mechanisms with a view of assessing stakeholders’
broader understanding of corporate governance. Question 9 focuses on the performance
implication of corporate governance. This question comprises eight performance
indicators covering financial, market and social performance in order to assess
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respondents’ opinion on broader aspect of performance implications. These questions
are adopted from the studies of KPMG of Sri Lanka (2007), Nam and Nam (2004) and
Ho (2005).

The aims of Part III (question 10 and 11) are to investigate current status and
major issues of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. As most of the corporate governance
issues in Asian countries are similar in nature (Nam and Nam 2004) this question is
adopted from the studies of Nam and Nam (2004) and Ho (2005). Questions 12 and 13
in part IV aim to assess the appropriate corporate governance strategies and practices as
per stakeholders’ point of view. Question 12 recognizes six strategies that can be
adopted to improve good corporate governance practices based on general governance
literature. Question 13 list fourteen specific practices which are designed based on
OECD (2004) principles. Question 14 in Part V examines the key players who involve
in promotional activities of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. These players have been
recognize by reference to legal and institutional framework of corporate governance in
Sri Lanka (refer Section 3.2 and 3.3). Questions 15 to 17 are designed to allow
stakeholders to provide their own opinion on corporate governance approaches, issues
and recommendations.

4.6.3 Methods of Data Analysis
This section discusses the analytical techniques used in examining respondents’
perception on corporate governance in Sri Lanka. The questionnaire include seven
questions with 69 items on a 5-point Likert scale to collect primary information from
seven stakeholder groups about their perception on corporate governance. The analysis
of data is carried out on seven aspects of corporate governance considered in the study.
The responding bias is first assessed prior to the analysis of stakeholders’
perception. The significance of non-response bias is evaluated by comparing the
differences in responses between early respondents and late respondents of the survey
(Innes and Mitchell, 1995). The survey data in respect of each corporate governance
aspect is analysed using percentage and mean analysis. The average score of each item
is calculated for overall sample and the sub sample of seven groups separately to assess
the pattern of respondents’ perception on the given issues. The percentage of agreement
or disagreement is also analysed for both overall sample and sub samples separately for
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each items. Both 4 and 5 answers are considered agreed while both 1 and 2 answers are
considered as disagreed in ascertaining agreed and disagreed percentages. The KruskalWallis test is carried out for all 69 items listed in the questionnaire to find out whether
there are significant differences among seven stakeholder groups with regard to each
issue addressed in the survey.

The responses to open ended questions, which seek respondents to identify
major corporate governance issues and to make recommendations to improve the
corporate governance practices of Sri Lanka, are investigated using content analysis.
The major issues recognized by the respondents are summarised by counting various
aspects of the issues. These issues are classified under several themes based on the
summary result of counting. The most referred issues are provided as the basis for
recognizing themes. The final evaluation of issues is carried out with each of the themes
in order to assess the severity of the issues as per stakeholders’ point of view. A similar
approach is adopted in evaluating recommendations made by respondents in respect of
corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka. The major themes of recommendations are
identified through the content analysis. The most referred similar recommendations are
formed into groups in recognising major themes of recommendations. An evaluation of
recommendations is carried out for each theme in order to assess its importance.

4.7 The Impact of Ownership Concentration on Firm
Performance
4.7.1 The Sample and the Sample Selection
The study considers the impact of ownership concentration on the firm
performance of non-financial companies listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE)
of Sri Lanka. The sample includes all industrial sectors of the CSE, excluding the bank,
finance and insurance sector. This sector is excluded from the initial sample due to noncomparability of applicable regulations concerning share ownership concentration,
profitability measures and liquidity assessment compared to other sectors. The sample
period of the study is nine years from 2001 to 2009. As per the CSE website, 232
companies including 30 financial companies are listed on CSE in 2010. Thus, initial
sample included approximately 200 companies per year.
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4.7.2 Data and Data Collection
The data for the study are obtained from three main sources: OSIRIS database;
database of CSE which provides share price information of Sri Lankan stock market and
the annual reports of sample companies. The major items of interest to this study are
balance sheets, income statements, ownership structure, shareholdings of main
shareholders and the market prices of shares. The balance sheet, income statement and
share ownership information are obtained from the OSIRIS database. The information
on ownership structure (individual vs. institutional ownership) and the ownership of ten
largest shareholders are obtained from the annual reports of sample companies. The
market share price information of sample firms is obtained from the database of CSE.

4.7.3 The Variables: Definition and Measurement
As this study aims to explore the diverse performance implications of ownership
variables, both accounting and market performance measures are alternately employed
as the dependent variables in the analysis model. The ownership variables consist of
both ownership structure and ownership concentration variables. The literature
generally recognizes additional independent variables that have explanatory power
when examining firm performance and corporate governance (Demsetz and Villalonga,
2001, Hovey et al., 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007). The performance of company
depends on various factors such as operational efficiency, size of the firm and financial
risk. To control the effect of these factors three control variables are also included in the
data analysis model. These control variables represent size, operational experience and
leverage of the sample firms. The size is represented by total sales while the operational
experience is represented by the age of the firm. The financial risk is measured using
leverage of the firm. These control variables are well established and are the most
commonly used control variables in prior studies (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001,
Hovey et al., 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007). The definition and measurement of
variables and the prior expected signs of the independent variables are described below.

Performance: The return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are employed as
the accounting performance measures while proxy Tobin Q (TQ) and market to bookvalue ratio (MBR) are used as the market performance measures in the study. These
performance variables were measured using pooled data of sample companies for the
sample period of 2001- 2009 as given below.
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ROA:

Net profit before tax to total assets

ROE:

Net profit after tax to total equity

TQ:

The market value of a firm’s equity plus the book value of its debt to the
book value of total assets.

MBR:

Market value of a firm’s equity to its book value
As the performance measures, accounting and market variables have their

inherent strengths and limitations and therefore both accounting and market measures
are employed in the study. Both accounting and market performance measures are
concurrently used in most previous empirical studies which examine the performance
implication of ownership concentration (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Morck et al., 1988,
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, Thomsen et al., 2006,
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). They argued that the accounting and market
performance measures are varied at least in two important respects. The first relates to
the time horizon: accounting profit is based on the historical performance of the firm,
and is therefore a backward-looking measure; while market performance reflects the
investors’ expectation, and is therefore a forward-looking measure. The second
difference arises due to measurement problems: accounting profit is largely distorted by
accounting principles, concepts and standards. In contrast, TQ and MBR are based on
market values, and therefore are affected by investors’ expectations about future events,
which are subject to manipulations, signalling, group behaviour, and mistakes
(Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). As this study aims to explore the diverse
performance implications of compliance to corporate governance practices, both
accounting and market performance measures are alternately employed in the analysis.

Ownership Concentration and Structure: Ownership concentration (OC) is measured
using four variables: (1) the percentage of shares held by first three-largest shareholders
(SH3); (2) the percentage of shares held by first five-largest shareholders (SH5); (3) the
percentage of shares held by first ten-largest shareholders (SH10); and (4) the Herfindahl
Index (HERF). The HERF index, which is the sum of squared percentage of shares
controlled by each of the top-five shareholders, can be considered a special
concentration variable, because it lends more weight to larger shareholders.
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Similarly, the ownership structure (OS) is measured using two fraction ratios:
(1) the fraction owned by individuals (F-Ind), and (2) the fraction of shares owned by
institutions (F-Com). The

prior

research

studies

argued

that

the

ownership

concentration by individuals rather than institutions tends to produce better
performance. These studies claim that individual owners (compared to corporate
owners) are actively engaged in operational activities or are highly influential in
monitoring the functions of firms. As a result, agency costs are expected to be reduced
resulting in higher performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Zeitun and Tian, 2007,
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). In order to examine this assertion, the ownership
structure ratios are employed as separate variables in the analysis model.

In order to examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm-performance
the ownership concentration with 10 largest shareholders are considered. The variables
are estimated based on the findings of relevant prior studies which are given in Section
4.7.3 (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Morck et al., 1988, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996,
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, Thomsen et al., 2006, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007).
The types of ownership (such as family, foreign, individual, institutional etc.) are not
considered in estimating concentration variables as only the ownership concentration is
considered in the investigation.

The main argument in relation to the influence of OC on firm performance is
that a high concentration improves performance through the reduction of agency costs.
For example, Berle and Means (1932) argue that disperse ownership adversely affects
firm performance. In consistence with this assertion, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue
that ownership concentration may improve performance by reducing the problem of
small investors and decreasing monitoring costs. As such the agency theory assumes a
positive relationship between performance and OC of a firm.

The studies that examine the performance implication of ownership structure
claim that higher individual ownership leads to higher firm performance whereas higher
corporate ownership leads to poorer firm performance. This is achieved through
individual owners’ monitoring capabilities and incentive to pursue personal interest.
When individuals own majority of shares of a firm, they are more likely to be involved
in monitoring of operational activities. Also, they may become insider owners who
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always pursue their own interest leading to better overall performance. Both situations
have a positive influence on the better performance of the firms. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that relative to the amount of ownership, insider owners have incentives to
pursue activities to serve their own interests, and conclude that both a firm’s value and
its performance increase with the level of insider ownership. Conversely, if corporate
entities own shares, their ultimate owners are less likely to be capable of monitoring
firm performance, due to their indirect ownership. Thus, individual ownership is
expected to have a positive relationship with performance whereas institutional
ownership is expected to have negative relationship.

Leverage: The leverage is represented by total debt to total assets (TD/TA) ratio. The
leverage is expected to relate negatively to firm performance, because debt exposes
firms to a higher risk through refinancing and the cost of capital commitments.
However, agency theory assumes either a positive or a negative relationship between
performance and leverage of a firm.

Firm Size: Firm size is measured using log total sales (LN TSal) of sample companies.
The size is expected to have a positive influence on firm performance since larger firms
perform better than smaller firms through economies of scale and are resilient during
economic downturns, leading to consistent performance both in terms of accounting
profit and market return. A number of studies examining the impact of firm size on firm
performance found a significant positive relationship between the two (Gleason et al.,
2000, Zeitun and Tian, 2007) while some studies (Durand and Coeurderoy, 2001,
Tzelepis and Skuras, 2004) found positive but insignificant impact of firm size on the
firm's performance.

Age: The operational experience of the firm is represented by the age of the firm. It is
measured using log age (LN-Age) of the sample companies and is expected to be
positively related to the performance, because experience reduces operational costs via
economies of scale and the operational processes efficiencies.

4.7.4 Methods of Data Analysis
Based on the assumed causal relationship the regression analysis is carried out to
measure the impact of ownership concentration on the firm performance. The analytical
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framework of the study hypothesizes that the performance (variously measured) of firm
i in period t depends upon the ownership concentration and structure of firm i in period t
along with other additional independent variables which are directly relevant to the
performance of firm i in period t. The analysis is carried out on the premise of agency
theory which argues ownership concentration and individual shareholders share
ownership make positive impact on firm performance. The analytical model is specified
below.
Yit =+
β 0 β1 X 1it + β 2 X 2it + β3 X 3it + β 4 X 4it + β5 X 5it + uit

Pooled Model

Where, Yit is alternately ROA, ROE, TQ, and MBR for firm, as a measure of
performance of firm i in year t.
X 1 = OC (alternately one of the concentration variables)
X 2 = OS (alternately F-Ind and F-Com)
X 3 = Size (LN-Tsal)
X 4 = Age
X 5 = Leverage (TD/TA)
uit = residual error of firm i in year t.

As stated earlier, there are theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that the
ownership concentration and structure of a firm affects its performance. In investigating
the effect of ownership concentration and structure on the performance of Sri Lankan
companies, a pooled model is estimated assuming no firm or time specific effects on
firm performance. The central regression assumption of pooled model is that the
independent variables and the error term are uncorrelated. If the independent variables
correlate with the error term (endogeneity), the estimates are biased. This is a limitation
of the analytical method employed in the study.

4.8 Summary
This chapter dealt with the research design and the methods used in examining
the objectives of the study. It described in detail the sample, the methods of data
collection, measurement of variables and the methods of data analysis used in relation to
three empirical investigations carried out in the study. The survey on compliance to
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corporate governance practices is carried out on a sample of quoted public companies in
Sri Lanka. This questionnaire survey is administered among the chairman or the CEO
of the sample companies. In order to examine the level of compliance to corporate
governance practices and its impact on firm performance, a Corporate Governance
Index is developed in the study. In the second investigation, stakeholders’ perception on
corporate governance practices and issues are surveyed. The sample consists of seven
stakeholder groups who are directly or indirectly involved in implementing or
monitoring of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka. In the third investigation,
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance is examined based on a sample
of quoted public companies in Sri Lanka. A combination of quantitative and qualitative
methods is used in data analysis. These methods include descriptive statistics, frequency
analysis, percentage analysis, non-parametric tests, correlation analysis, regression
analysis and qualitative interpretations. Chapters Five, Six and Seven presents the
analysis of the study carried out based on these methods.
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Chapter 5 : Survey on Compliance to Corporate
Governance Best Practices: Analysis, Results and
Performance Implications
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the empirical analysis and findings of objectives two and
three of the study. The data collected from the questionnaire are analysed and discussed.
First, the survey responses and problems of data collection are examined, and nonresponse bias is analysed in order to observe the validity of the findings. Secondly, the
influential characteristics of the respondents and their firms are examined. Thirdly, the
nature, level, and associated issues of corporate governance practices of the responding
companies are analysed across eight dimensions of this study. Finally, the impact of the
level of corporate governance on accounting and market performance measures of the
sample companies is examined. In order to analyse the performance implications of
corporate governance compliance, the sample is divided into two sub samples: high
compliance; and, low compliance, based on the constructed index ranking.

5.2. Survey Responses and Data Limitations
All 230 listed companies, excluding delisted companies as per the listing
schedule of the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) website in 2009, have been selected as
the initial sample of the study. The questionnaires were mailed to either the Chairman or
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of these companies. In total 230 questionnaires were
sent to the personal names of the recipients, and they were asked to return the
questionnaire by mail. Several approaches were adopted to improve the response rate.
The questionnaire could be completed by either the CEO, or the Chairman, or a suitable
representative on their behalf. Reminder letters were posted approximately three weeks
after the first posting of the questionnaires. The same questionnaire was developed into
a digitally answerable format, and sent by e-mail where email addresses of intended
recipients were available. Further, the assistance from senior partners of two leading
audit firms in Sri Lanka was obtained to distribute questionnaires among CEOs, using
their capacity as audit partners of these companies.
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5.2.1 Survey Responses
Sixty-three responses were received, and out of these responses sixty
questionnaires are usable as they completed all questions. This is a response rate of 26
per cent. Four recipients sent letters indicating that they did not answer the
questionnaire because of their company’s policy of non-participation in questionnaires.
Table 5.1 provides summary information of the firms in each industry sector to which
questionnaires were sent, and those numbers of firms that responded. In most industry
sectors the response rate is above 30 per cent. Some questions require detailed
knowledge of the company, and its board’s proceedings. Thus, it was important to
ensure that the survey was completed by a knowledgeable person. Of the sixty
respondents, forty-six were a board member of their respective companies, and the rest
are senior managers (Refer Table 5.3). It is inferred that most of the respondents have a
full understanding of their company and their board’s proceedings, which is the central
focus of the questionnaire.
Table 5.1 Firms Surveyed and Response Rates.
Number of firms
Firms in the Sector &
Responded
Surveyed

Sector

% of
Surveyed

Bank Finance and Insurance

33

10

30.30

Beverage Food and Tobacco

18

6

33.33

Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals

9

3

33.33

Construction and Engineering

3

2

66.67

Diversified Holdings

11

5

45.45

Hotels and Travel

30

8

26.67

Manufacturing

31

8

25.81

Motor

7

3

42.86

Plantation

18

6

33.33

Trade, Services and Supplies

31

9

29.03

Other Industry Sectors

39

0

0.00

Total

230

60

26.09

Of the 60 respondent companies, nine firms belong to different sectors according
to the sector categorization of the CSE. These nine firms belong to: Stores and Supplies;
Services; Footwear and Textiles; and, Trading Sectors. In this study, these firms are
regrouped into one sector, as Trade Services and Supplies, considering similarities in
their business operations. The sample of 60 companies is obtained from all actively
trading listed companies representing 26% of the market. The sample is spread across
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13 sectors of 20 sectors as per the sector categorization of the CSE. Thus, the sample
can be considered as a representative sample of the market. Further, as the analysis of
survey is carried out primarily using descriptive research method, the sample is
adequate for achieving objectives of the study.

5.2.2 Non-responding Bias
One of the major problems of a survey is sample selection bias. Selection bias
can enter into the results in two ways: in the choice of firms selected for the survey; and,
in which firms responded (Balasubramanian et al., 2007). The scope of this study is the
governance practices of quoted public companies in Sri Lanka. The entire population of
quoted public companies on the Colombo Stock Exchange were included in the initial
sample. The overall response rate is 26 per cent, but respondent firms could differ
systematically from non-respondent firms. For example, firms with strong compliance
to corporate governance best practices could be more likely to respond to the survey.
Hence, any existence of non-respondent bias was evaluated by comparing the
respondent companies (60) with a sample of non-respondent companies. Of the nonrespondent firms, a sample of 104 firms is matched with respondent firms from the
same industrial sectors. The firms are randomly selected. Data for calculating both
financial and governance variables are obtained using the OSIRIS Database and annual
reports of the firms.
Table 5.2 Comparison of Responded and Non-responded Firms
NonMean
tSig. (2Respondent Respondent difference statistics tailed)
Number of Companies

60

104

Financial Characteristics (Mean)
− Total assets (Rs. 000's)

8,215,837

7,093,708 1,122,129

0.282

.778

− Market capitalization (Rs. 000's)

3,569,057

3,392,608

176,448

0.075

.940

− ROA (%)

4.56

3.34

1.21

0.620

.536

− Tobin Q

1.15

1.09

0.07

0.758

.450

− Leverage (TD/TA)

0.60

0.50

0.11

1.601

.111

7.9

7.6

32.17%

45.84%

75%

75%

Governance Characteristics
− Average Board Size
− Non-Executive/Total directors (%)
− CEO separate from Chairman
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Table 5.2 provides a comparison of the means of the financial variables: total
assets, market capitalization, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q and leverage; and,
governance variables average board size, percentage of non-executive directors on the
board, and if the CEO is separate from the Chairman, for the respondent and nonrespondent firms. In order to find out whether there is a significant difference between
the two samples, the independent sample T-test for mean difference was carried out in
respect of the financial variables. On the whole, the financial characteristics of
respondent and non-respondent firms were similar. The t-tests for mean differences for
any of the variables are not statistically significant. As indicated in Table 5.2, the
governance characteristics are also closely resembled. These results suggest that there is
no non-responding bias in the survey. This further suggests that the responses in this
study can be regarded as a representative sample of the population.

5.2.3 Other Data Limitations
It is possible to have other data limitations owing to inherent deficiencies of this
kind of questionnaire survey. Incomplete knowledge of respondents and self-reporting
bias are generally considered as weaknesses of a questionnaire survey. If the
respondents do not have proper knowledge about the issues addressed in the questions,
the responses may lead to a missing or ‘don't know’ answer. Nevertheless, in this study
all the survey questionnaires (except three which were omitted from the analysis) were
received without missing, incomplete or ambiguous answers. This is due to the
respondents’ capacity in their respective firms. Of sixty respondents, forty-six are board
members of their respective firms. Therefore incomplete knowledge of the respondents
is assumed to be not a major issue in the survey. However, whether the respondents
have reported with bias cannot be assessed directly. This can be measured using indirect
measures such as responses’ diversity, percentage of negative answers especially in
respect of legally obligatory practices, and annual report disclosures. The survey
responses are largely varied across the firms. Further, a high percentage of negative
answers (on average 28 per cent) in respect of compliance to corporate governance best
practices are also found in the responses. This indicates that the bias is not severe.
Furthermore, responses for some governance variables can be confirmed using annual
report data. The random check is affected wherever possible, and shows no systematic
differences between the two sources.
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5.3 Profile of Respondents and Respondent Firms
5.3.1 Profile of Respondents
The questionnaire was administered among the chairmen or the CEOs of
companies listed on the CSE, who delegate the survey to a suitable representative to
complete on their behalf. The analysis of the offices held by the respondents is given in
Table 5.3. Of the sixty respondents, 56 per cent represent chairmen and CEOs, whereas
20 per cent of respondents represent either executive or non-executive directors. Thus,
in total 76 per cent of respondents were board members.

Table 5.3 Respondents Official Capacity and Professional Background
Office Held

Number

Percentage

Chairman

10

16.67

CEO/Managing Director

24

40.00

Executive director

8

13.33

Non-executive director

4

6.67

Company Secretary

3

5.00

Senior Manager
Total

11
60

18.33
100.00

Business executive

15

25.00

Accounting or Financial professional

28

46.67

Lawyer

1

1.67

Other professional

8

13.33

Other
Total

8
60

13.33
100.00

Male

55

91.67

Female
Total

5
60

8.33
100.00

Professional Background

Gender

Source: Questionnaire Survey
Furthermore, an analysis of the professional background of the respondents
indicates that a majority (46 per cent) of the respondents are accounting professionals
(see Table 5.3). The Sri Lankan Corporate Governance Code (2008) requires firms to
have at least one board member with financial or accounting expertise. As the majority
of respondents are accounting professionals, most of the firms surveyed comply with
the said requirement.

As most of the respondents are qualified professionals, the

questionnaire responses are considered valid.

124

5.3.2 Profile of Respondent Firms
Table 5.4 provides a profile of the surveyed companies, giving an indication of
their size, operational experience and profitability. This shows a significant dispersion
amongst sample companies in respect of: size, as measured by total assets and sales;
age; and, profitability. The total assets of the sample companies over the 2009/10
reporting period range from 30 million rupees to 261,990 million rupees, showing a
substantial disparity, while the average total assets of the surveyed companies is 8,215
million rupees. The total assets of a sizeable proportion of these companies (43 per
cent) were less than 2,500 million rupees. A similar situation emerges when the size of
the companies is measured in terms of sales, which vary from 36 million rupees to
54,763 million rupees. This also shows a substantial disparity between the sample
companies.
Table 5.4 Profile of the Respondent Firms
Total Assets
Rs millions
Frequency
%
0–500
3
5.0
501–1000
6
10.0
1,001–2,500
17
28.3
2,501–5,000
14
23.3
5,001–10,000
6
10.0
>10,000
14
23.3
Total
60
100.0
Descriptive statistics
Rs millions

Sales
Rs millions
Frequency
%
0–100
3
5.0
101–500
9
15.0
501–1,000
6
10.0
1,001–2,500
14
23.3
2,501–10,000
17
28.3
>10,000
11
18.3
Total
60
100.0
Descriptive statistics
Rs millions

Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum

Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum

8215
36661
30
261990

Age
ROA
Years
Frequency
%
Per cent
Frequency
0–5
1
1.7
−10 – 0%
13
6–15
6
10.0
0
– 2.5%
12
16–25
18
30.0
2.5 – 5%
12
26–50
20
33.3
5
– 10%
12
51–100
11
18.3
10 – 15%
6
> 100
4
6.7
> 15%
5
Total
60
100.0
Total
60
Descriptive statistics
Years
Descriptive statistics
Mean
Mean
38
Standard deviation
Standard deviation
31
Minimum
Minimum
5
Maximum
142
Maximum
Source: Annual Reports (2009/10) of respondent firms
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7020
12012
36
54763

%
21.7
20.0
20.0
20.0
10.0
8.3
100.0
Per cent
4.56
9.62
-8.29
46.75

The sample of companies consists of both young and old enterprises, with their
age ranging from 5 to 142 years. 42 per cent of companies in the sample are under 25
years old, while only 25 per cent of companies are over 50 years old at the time of the
survey. As for the profitability level of companies, once again there is a wide disparity.
While 47 firm-years in the sample reported positive returns, the remaining 13 firm-years
reported negative returns on their assets from the sample period. The average
profitability ratio of the sample companies was 4.56 per cent, while the majority of
companies (61 per cent) earned less than 5 per cent return on their assets.

5.3.3 Ownership Concentration, Structure and Control of
Respondent Firms
The ownership concentration of sample firms is evaluated using four variables:
namely: first the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders (SH1); secondly
the percentage of shares held by the first two largest shareholders (SH2); thirdly the
percentage of shares held by the first five largest shareholders (SH5); and, fourthly the
percentage of shares held by the first ten largest shareholders (SH10). These variables
are measured based on the twenty largest shareholders’ share ownership schedule
published in the annual reports of respondents’ firms for the year 2009/10.

The

frequency distribution of these variables is given in Table 5.5, and shows a very high
ownership concentration in the sample of Sri Lankan firms. The mean value of SH1 is
48 per cent while the mean values of all other concentrations of variables are above 60
per cent, with a maximum mean value of 83 per cent. The data also indicates that there
is a substantial variation in ownership concentration across firms, from a minimum of
11 per cent to a maximum of 98 per cent. Furthermore, the data in Table 5.5 reveals that
the first 10 largest shareholders of 65 per cent of the sample firms hold over 80 per cent
of the shares. This indicates that a majority of firms are not in compliance with the CSE
listing rule requirement which stipulates that a minimum float of 25 per cent of shares
should be held by at least 1000 shareholders.

The analysis of the frequency distribution (see Table 5.5) further shows that for
48 per cent of the firms surveyed, the largest shareholder owns over 50 per cent of the
share capital. In 70 per cent of the firms, the largest two shareholders own over 50 per
cent of the share capital. If the ten largest shareholders are considered, this number
becomes 97 per cent. This indicates the presence of a controlling shareholder in most
Sri Lankan firms surveyed. The prevalence of a single controlling shareholder in the
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majority of sample companies indicates that quoted public companies with diffuse share
ownership are lacking in Sri Lanka. This finding is consistent with previous studies.
Samarakoon (1999) examines the ownership structure of 222 out of 240 listed
companies in Sri Lanka during the financial year 1997/1998 and provides evidence of
the presence of a controlling shareholder in most of the companies. This is a common
phenomenon in many parts of the world. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) report that
ownership structure is generally not dispersed in 27 wealthy economies in the world.
They show that even the largest firms tend to have controlling shareholders and these
controlling shareholders typically have considerable control over firms in excess of their
cash flow rights. Faccio and Lang (2002) also find that in 55 per cent of Western
European companies shares are not widely held and have a single ultimate owner.

Table 5.5 Frequency Distribution of Share Ownership Concentration
Table shows frequency distribution of ownership concentration with the largest shareholders. The types
of ownership such as family, foreign, individual or institutional are not considered in estimating
concentration variables
Largest
Two Largest
Five Largest
Ten Largest
Concentration of
Shareholder
Shareholders
Shareholders
Shareholders
Share Capital
(SH1)
(SH2)
(SH5)
(SH10)
(Range)
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
0% - 20%
4
6.67
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
21% - 40%

18

30.00

8

13.33

2

3.33

0

0.00

41% - 50%

9

15.00

10

16.67

1

1.67

2

3.33

51% - 60%

12

20.00

12

20.00

6

10.00

1

1.67

61% - 70%

4

6.67

8

13.33

9

15.00

3

5.00

71% - 80%

8

13.33

8

13.33

15

25.00

15

25.00

Over 80%

5

8.33

14

23.33

27

45.00

39

65.00

Total

60

100

60

100

60

100

60

100

Descriptive Statistics
Minimum

11.07

20.70

30.27

41.49

Maximum

93.46

93.81

98.33

98.77

Mean

48.09

61.45

76.59

83.06

Std. Deviation

21.97

19.53

15.13

11.95

Source: Annual reports 2009/10: Twenty largest shareholders’ share ownership schedule

In addition to ownership concentration, ownership structure in terms of family or
foreign shareholdings is another important factor to consider in evaluating the
observance of good corporate governance practices by respondent firms.

In this study,

specific questions are focused on ownership structure and control, in terms of a firm’s
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family and foreign shareholdings, and any controlling shareholder’s influence on the
decision making processes of the firm. In Sri Lanka, the Company Takeovers and
Mergers Code of 1995 stipulates ownership limits of quoted public companies, and the
Banking Act No. 30 of 1988 defines ownership limits of banks. According to the
direction given by the Sri Lankan Monetary Board under section 46(1) (d) of the
Banking Act No. 30 of 1988, no person or company may hold more than 15 per cent of
issued share capital carrying voting rights in a licensed commercial bank incorporated in
Sri Lanka. The Company Takeover and Merger Code of 1995, as amended in 2003,
imposes restrictions on acquiring a large block of shares of a company where the target
company is a public limited company. The purpose of this Code is to ensure fairness for
all shareholders, especially for non-controlling shareholders in relation to a takeover.
Despite these regulatory limitations, concentration of ownership is a common
characteristic of most Sri Lankan listed companies. Concentrated ownership gives a few
individuals the ability to control the activities of the firm, which could have a negative
impact on: the firm’s compliance to best practices of corporate governance; the
protection of minority shareholders’ rights; and, the growth of the capital market.
Hence, it is interesting to know how ownership concentration in conjunction with
family or foreign shareholding has impacted on the compliance to best corporate
governance practices. Family ownership concentration has been recognized as one of
the dominant characteristics of Asian companies (Nam and Nam, 2004). According to
Claessens et al. (2000) two thirds of East Asian firms are controlled by a single
shareholding, which is often turns out to be a family. The patterns of family and foreign
shareholdings in Sri Lankan firms, and the impacts of this on corporate governance are
yet be explored. The impact of family ownership on corporate governance practices
could be different to the impact of foreign shareholdings on governance practices.
Hence, it is important to explore the pattern of shareholding prior to analysing its
impacts on corporate governance. In order to facilitate this, the nature of shareholdings
and the control structure of respondent firms are analysed, and the results are given in
Table 5.6.

The composition of family ownership patterns found in the sample of companies
is given in Table 5.6. It shows that over 33 per cent of companies surveyed are family
based. It further reveals that 15 percent of the respondent firms are subsidiaries of
family based groups. This indicates that family based business groups use their
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subsidiaries as a means of raising funds through the share market, without losing
control. This analysis shows that family ownership is prevalent in Sri Lankan quoted
public companies, as in the case of other Asian countries. Claessens et al. (2000) show
that in family controlled Asian firms, the controlling shareholders often act the
managers at the top level of the company. Faccio and Lang (2002) find similar results in
family owned companies in Western European countries. They find that in more than
two-thirds of family controlled firms, the controlling shareholder acts as a top manager.
Family ownership with controlling shareholder representation in top management could
have a direct impact on corporate governance and adherence to best governance
practices. In order to evaluate the level of compliance of corporate governance practices
the sample companies are formed into two groups; family based, and non-family based.
The analysis results are given in Section 5.5.

Table 5.6 Nature of the Ownership and the Control Structure of Firms
Nature of the firm and family ownership

Number Percentage

Family-based stand-alone company

8

13.33

Subsidiary of a family-based group

9

15.00

Holding company of a family-based group

6

10.00

Subsidiary of a non-family based group

15

25.00

Holding company of a non-family based group

22

36.67

Total

60

100.00

There is no foreign investment

20

33.33

There is little ownership by foreign investors

27

45.00

There is substantial ownership by foreign investors

8

13.33

Subsidiary of a foreign firm

5

8.33

Total

60

100.00

The largest shareholder of the firm

35

58.33

Several bulk-shareholders collectively

8

13.33

Board of Directors as there is no dominant shareholders or group

17

28.33

Total

60

100.00

31

51.67

No

29

48.33

Total

60

100.00

Nature of Foreign ownership and Investment

Control Structure: (Parties having greatest influence over the firm)

The existence of a labour union(s)

Yes

Source: Questionnaire Survey - Question 4, 5, 6 and 7
The foreign affiliation is determined based on the responses of question 5 in the
questionnaire. As shown in Table 5.6, companies with substantial foreign affiliation are
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relatively low. 33 per cent of respondents indicated that they had no foreign investment
in their companies suggesting that these companies were entirely owned by Sri
Lankans. Only 22 per cent of sample firms have substantial foreign affiliations.
However, for these companies, foreign affiliation could have a direct impact on
management policies and corporate governance practices. Foreign affiliated companies
have a tendency to follow governance practices and rules for the protection of
shareholder rights more closely, owing to the influence of their parent companies. For
the analysis of questionnaire responses, the sample companies are formed into two
groups as foreign affiliated companies and local companies, and the analysis results are
shown in Section 5.5.

More often than not, Sri Lankan business groups are owned by an individual, a
family, or a closely held company as discussed above. The analysis results given in
Table 5.6 show that in over 71 per cent of companies, the controlling shareholder(s) has
the greatest influence over policies of the firm. This evidence suggests the existence of
controlling shareholder(s) for most of Sri Lankan firms. In these firms, the control rights
are highly concentrated and the controlling owner has both incentives and the means to
expropriate wealth from non-controlling shareholders, as shown in the studies of
Claessens et al. (2000) and Bertrand et al. (2008). Hence, these ownership structures
allow controlling shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their
equity ownership. Bebchuk et al. (1999) show that these arrangements have the
potential to create very large agency costs, which are larger than the benefit associated
with controlling shareholders. Furthermore, intra-group transactions could be used to
manipulate reported profits and net worth. Therefore, the critical governance problem in
Sri Lankan companies is the protection of non-controlling shareholders from the
controlling shareholders’ opportunism. Ownership concentration and the dominance of
a controlling owner could have a direct impact on corporate governance practices. In
order to evaluate these impacts, the ownership concentration is also taken into
consideration in exploring the questionnaire responses.

5.4 Analysis of the Survey Results
This section provides a detailed overview of the corporate governance practices
of responding Sri Lankan listed firms. As indicated in Section 4.5.2, the analysis of the
questionnaire survey is carried out under eight dimensions of governance practices,
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namely: board structure and independence; board procedure and effectiveness; directors'
remuneration; audit committee procedure; disclosure and transparency; disclosure
reliability; shareholders’ rights; and, related party transactions.

5.4.1 Board Size, Structure and Independence
The important determinants of board effectiveness consist of board size and
composition. A board should have a proper mix of executive and non-executive
directors (NEDs), with adequate qualifications and experience to make effective
strategic decisions and to judge management’s performance objectively. If a board
needs to be independent it should consist of a substantial proportion of independent
directors. The importance of having a substantial share of NEDs on the board is that
they can be assigned tasks where there are potential conflicts of interest, such as
financial reporting and board nomination and board remuneration (OECD 1999). The
separation of the CEO and chairman positions can be considered as another indication
of board independence. Furthermore, the representation of foreign nationals on the
board may also be considered as an indication of board independence. In addition to the
composition of the board, independent directors’ behaviour can be judged to identify
their earnest independence in the decision making process. The meeting of NEDs
without executive directors to discuss the firm’s affairs, and making alterations to board
meeting agendas are some examples of independent directors’ behaviour which can be
used to assess their independence. However, independent directors might not behave
independently, if the CEO or controlling shareholder dominates influence over the
selection and reappointment of directors. In this study, these aspects have been analysed
using survey data of Sri Lankan companies, and the results of the analysis are discussed
in the following sections.

Table 5.7 provides information on the size and composition of the boards of
responding firms, for which data is obtained from the annual reports of 2009/10. As the
responding firms include a sample of 60 companies representing 26% of the listed
companies and these companies spread across 13 sectors in the Sri Lankan market the
sample provide solid foundation to analyse the composition of Sri Lankan firms. The
size of the board of directors of respondent companies ranged from five to fourteen
members. The results presented in Table 5.7 show that 17 of the responding companies
have seven board members, while 13 of the respondent companies each have eight
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board members. The overwhelming tendency is for boards to have six to ten members
(86 per cent). Nam and Lum (2005) argue that the most effective size of a board for
corporate governance purposes is no more than twelve members. Salmon (2000)
suggests that the optimum size of a board is between 8 and 15 people for large, publicly
traded companies. Further, he claims that a board is likely to have difficulty in staffing
audit, compensation, and other committees if the board members are fewer than eight.
The finding that a majority of boards consist of six to ten members could have positive
implications for adherence to best corporate governance practices. Furthermore, this
tendency could improve the board efficiency as well as the firm’s performance.
Table 5.7 Board Composition of Sample Firms
Table shows frequency distribution of number of Total Directors, Executive Directors (excluding CEO)
and Nonexecutive Directors with the classification of Non-independent and Independent directors of the
sample.
Non-executive Directors
Directors
Total
Executive
NEDs
Range
Directors
Directors
Non Independent
Independent
(a)
(b)
(c )
(d)
(e)
(f)

14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

1
1
3
5
9
13
17
8
3
-

2
1
9
6
10
12
15
5

1
3
4
5
16
12
6
8
5
-

1
3
3
5
13
8
10
6
11

5
1
5
18
16
12
3

Total
60
60
60
60
60
Mean
7.93
2.63
5.32
2.9
2.44
Median
8
2
6
3
2
Minimum
5
0
2
0
0
Maximum
14
7
10
8
6
Note:
(a) Directors range represents possible number of total directors or each type of directors in a board
(b) Number of companies whose Boards have total directors equal to the number given in (a)
(c) Number of companies whose Boards have executive directors equal to the number given in (a)
(d) Number of companies whose Boards have non-executive directors equal to the number given in (a)
(e) Number of companies whose Boards have non-independent directors equal to the number given in (a)
(f) Number of companies whose Boards have independent directors equal to the number given in (a)
Data Source: Annual reports of responded firms (2009/10)
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Principle A.5 of the Sri Lankan Corporate Governance Code (SLCGC) 2008
contains minimum board independence requirements. It requires listed firms to have
NEDs with sufficient calibre. This principle requires that the NEDs should be at least
two or 1/3, whichever is higher, and in the case of CEO duality NEDs should be the
majority. If the board has only two NEDs, they must be independent. In all other cases
two or 1/3 of NEDs, whichever is higher, should be independent. Table 5.7 suggests that
most surveyed firms have managed to find independent directors. The maximum
number of independent directors observed in this study is six. Under the principle A5 of
the SLCGC (2008), a company must have a minimum of two independent directors. 76
per cent of the respondent companies have at least two independent directors on the
board consistent with the minimum requirement stipulated in the SLCGC. However, 24
per cent of the respondent companies have lower than the mandatory number of
independent directors. Of these companies, three do not have a single independent
director on their boards. This is an obvious violation of the Sri Lankan Governance
code. Nam and Lum (2005) point out that low numbers of independent directors have
negative implications for corporate governance. Irrespective of lack of independent
directors, all responding companies have at least two NEDs on their boards. However,
principle A.5 states that NEDs should be at least 2 or 1/3, whichever is higher. The
frequency distribution of percentage of different classes of directors to total directors is
further analysed in order to find out the compliance to the given rules. The results are
given in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 provides information on the number of boards, with different
percentages of executive, non-executive (non-independent) and independent directors.
Notable is the high representation of NEDs in Sri Lankan companies. For example, 39
(65 per cent) of companies have more than 60 per cent of directors as non-executive
directors on their boards, giving a low representation of executive directors. However,
four firms (7 per cent) do not comply with the requirement of at least 1/3 of NEDs in the
board. In addition, 29 (48 per cent) of firms have less than 30 per cent of independent
directors on their boards. The final column of Table 5.8 shows the number of firms
which have separate individuals as CEO and chairman, within a particular range of
percentage of independent directors. This indicates that 15 companies do not have
separate persons as their CEO and chairman, and out of those companies 12 companies
have less than 40 per cent of independent directors on their boards. Though the majority
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of companies have more than 60 per cent of NEDs on their boards, 71 per cent of
companies have less than 40 per cent of independent directors on their boards. This
evidence signifies that a majority of companies maintain a low level of independence on
their boards. However, most of the companies comply with the requirements for NEDs.
Table 5.8 Percentages of Different Types of Directors to Total Directors
Table shows frequency distribution of percentages of executive, nonexecutive (non-independent and
independent) to total directors of sample Sri Lankan listed firms. Further it shows distribution of separate
CEO and Chairman for the range of Independent directors.
Separate CEO and
Non-executive Directors (NEDs)
Chairman (Based
on Independent
% to Total
Executive
Directors Range
Directors
Directors
NonTotal
Independent independent
NEDs
Yes
No
≥0%<20%

21

16

18

0

14

2

≥20%< 30%

11

13

8

4

8

5

≥ 30%<40%

7

14

9

5

9

5

≥40%<50%

8

9

8

9

6

3

≥50%<60%

5

5

5

3

5

≥60%<70%

4

1

4

8

1

≥70%<80%

4

2

4

12

2

≥80%≤100%

0

0

4

19

0

60

60

60

60

45

Mean

33%

30%

37%

67%

Median

29%

33%

38%

71%

Minimum

0%

0%

0%

29%

Maximum

71%

75%

100%

100%

15

Total

Source: Annual reports of responded firms (2009/10)

Table 5.9 Board Representation and CEO Duality
Table shows representation of board by various shareholder groups and position of CEO duality
Yes
Board Representation:

No

Number

%

Number

%

− Representative(s) of institutional investors

18

30

42

70

− Representative(s) of non-controlling shareholders

24

40

36

60

− Representative(s) of controlling shareholder’s family

29

48

31

51

23

38

37

62

45

75

15

25

12

80

3

20

− The board has foreign nationals
CEO Duality:
− Separate persons for the Chairman and the CEO
− The board appoints a senior independent director if
the same person for the CEO and the Chairman
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Table 5.9 shows the percentage of responding firms with one or more directors
in the indicated categories. Of the 60 responding companies, only 40 per cent of
companies indicate that they have non-controlling shareholders’ representative(s) on the
board. The institutional representation is only 30 per cent. However, the boards often
include members of controlling shareholders’ families (Claessens et al., 2000 and
Bertrand et al.,2008). The inclusion of controlling shareholders’ family representatives
could have a negative impact on board independence. Bertrand et al. (2008) state that
pressure from family members is likely to have negative impacts on the implementation
of corporate governance practices, and is likely to cause conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, the principle A 5.6 of SLCGC (2008) requires senior independent
directors to be appointed, and disclosures of this in the annual reports, in cases of CEO
duality. Fifteen companies have stated that their CEO and chairman positions are held
by the same person. Out of these, three companies indicate that they have not complied
with the A5.6 rule of SLCGC. This evidence further suggests the lack of board
independence in some Sri Lankan companies.

Table 5.10 Selection of Non-executive Directors
Frequency Percent
Who has the strongest voice in the selection of non-executive
directors?
− Board or its nomination committee (autonomously)

43

72

− CEO

3

5

− Controlling shareholder(s) who is not the CEO

14

23

60

100

Total

Table 5.10 shows the most influential parties in the selection of NEDs. Boards
or their nomination committees have a strong voice in selection of NEDs in 72 per cent
of the respondent companies. However, the remaining companies indicate that their
selection of NEDs is determined by either the CEO or the controlling shareholder. This
phenomenon raises reasonable doubt regarding the independence of NEDs.

The characteristics of ‘independence’ proposed by the regulatory bodies and the
proponents of best governance practices are varied. Salmon (2000) recognizes the core
characteristics of an independent director as being: free from any significant family or
business relationship with the management or with controlling owners; and, free from
any relationship with the company in the capacity of employees or representatives of
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affiliated companies, suppliers, providers of professional services, and important
customers. The Cadbury Report (1992, Code 2.2) advocates: independence from
management; and, independence from any business or other relationship with the
company as central characteristics of an independent director. However, the OECD
(2003) recognizes that precise definitions of independence and legal norms, and
rigorous enforcement cannot ensure that independent directors will always act
independently.

If the NEDs are selected by the CEO or controlling shareholder, the
independence of NEDs is largely at risk. Nam and Nam (2004) state that in most Asian
countries, executives as well as NEDs are mostly handpicked by controlling
shareholders, and therefore boards of directors in family-based enterprises tend to
primarily serve the interests of controlling families, rather than of all shareholders. A
similar behaviour is observed in respect of the selection of NEDs in the respondent
companies to this study. A relatively high percentage (over 25 per cent) of respondent
companies state that the selection process of NEDs is dominated by the CEO or
controlling shareholder. Hence, it cannot be expected that the independent directors
always act independently in board decision-making processes in those companies. There
is a strong possibility that the board’s decision making process could be centralized
towards the CEO or controlling shareholder. Hence it is inferred that not only the
composition of boards, but also the selection process of directors can have negative
implications on the independence of boards.

5.4.2 Board Procedure and Effectiveness
The board of directors is expected to provide strategic guidance to the
management of a company. The objective of the board is to maximize the value of the
firm, and thereby protect the interests of shareholders. The SLCGC (2008) and the
Companies Act No.07 of 2007 of Sri Lanka recognize the functions and responsibilities
of the board of directors quite clearly. In summary, the functions and responsibilities of
boards of directors identified in SLCGC (2008, principles A.1.1 and A.1.2) include: to
review, formulate and monitor the implementation of strategy; meet regularly (at least
one meeting per quarter); ensure the competence of the CEO and management team;
adopt an effective CEO and management succession plan; secure an effective
information, control and audit system; ensure compliance with legal and ethical
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standards; and, ensure the management of risks. Responses were sought to a series of
questions regarding the boards’ practices and processes including: conduct of board
meetings; information about board committees; directors’ appointments; and,
performance evaluation practices of directors. The results are discussed in the following
section.
5.4.2.1 Board Practices
Table 5.11 indicates to what extent the responding firms adhere to recommended
board practices. 62 per cent of respondent firms have bylaws to govern board meetings.
The remaining 38 per cent of firms have no specific bylaws, which is a major drawback
in the procedure of carrying out board meetings. Good governance practices require that
companies record detailed minutes of board meetings and committee meetings, as well
as any dissenting motions. Nam and Nam (2004) suggest that compiling detailed
minutes of board meeting discussions may encourage independent directors to behave
more independently, and enhance their performance. The survey results show that 92
per cent of the respondent companies have recorded dissenting views in their minutes,
and over 90 per cent of the boards have a schedule of matters reserved for consideration.
These practices provide strong evidence regarding the proper conduct of board meetings
by Sri Lankan companies. However, the absence of bylaws to govern the board
meetings for 38 per cent of respondent companies raises serious doubts regarding the
consistent application of board procedures, as these could be violated in a crisis
situation.

Table 5.11 Board Practices
Yes
Characteristics
− The board has bylaws to govern board meetings
− The board has a schedule of matters reserved for its
consideration
− Dissents recorded in the board minutes
− The board has Accounting and Finance
professional(s)
− Separate meetings for non-executive directors
− The board periodically evaluate its performance
− Directors’ performance assess individually

No

Number

%

Number

%

37

62

23

38

54
55

90
92

6
5

10
8

56
26
47
24

93
43
78
40

4
34
13
36

7
57
22
60

The principle A.4 of SLCGC (2008) requires the board to ensure an availability
of financial acumen amongst its members. Having accounting and finance professionals
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as board members strengthens governance practices, due to their familiarity with
financial and reporting issues. It seems that this requirement has been well adhered to,
as indicated by 93 per cent of the sample companies having board members who are
accounting and finance professionals.

The lack of independence of non-executive directors seems to be a common
phenomenon in the Asian Region. The OECD White Paper on Corporate Governance
in Asia (2003) reveals that the concept of independent non-executive directors is not a
real life experience in Asia, unlike in other regions. To improve the independence of
NEDs, SLCGC (2008, principle A.5.8) requires the chairman to hold a meeting with
NEDs without executive directors at least once a year. Allowing non-executive directors
to conduct separate meetings gives them an opportunity to express their views in an
unbiased fashion, without any influence from executive directors. In this study, it can be
seen that only 43 per cent of the respondent companies have separate non-executive
director meetings.

The SLCGC (2008, principle A9) expects a board to evaluate its own
performance, and its committees’ performances, in discharging their responsibilities.
This study finds that 22 per cent of firms surveyed indicate that they do not evaluate
board performance collectively. Furthermore, 60 per cent of the firms state that an
individual director’s performance is not evaluated. This evidence suggests that it is not
crucial for the retention of a director’s position on a board to demonstrate the efficient
discharging of duties and responsibilities, either individually or collectively as a board.

5.4.2.2 Board Meetings
As a practical matter, how much time and effort directors devote to board
meetings may be considered as an indicator of board effectiveness. For instance, the
frequency and length of board meetings, and the directors’ attendance rate can be used
to assess the effective functioning of board meetings. The SLCGC (2008) requires a
minimum of four meetings to be conducted per year. However, no such requirements
can be found in relation to the duration of board meetings or directors’ attendance.
Table 5.12 indicates for this study’s respondents, the number of board meetings per
year, average duration of meetings and the average percentage of directors’ attendance
at board meetings. Apart from 7 per cent of the respondent companies, all others
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complied with this requirement of holding four meetings per year. Similarly 28 per cent
hold meetings almost every month. The results further indicate that 48 per cent of the
responding companies’ meetings have an average duration of two to three hours, while
20 per cent of the companies’ meetings have durations of over three hours. Duration of
board meetings is an important indicator of good corporate governance, because it infers
directors have time to address all relevant issues. Attendance of directors at board
meetings is positively related to their governance performance. The survey results
indicate that 80 per cent of the responding companies have a directors’ attendance rate
at board meetings of 90 per cent and above, while only three per cent of companies
surveyed have an attendance rate at board meetings below 75 per cent.

Table 5.12 Board Meetings
Number of Board Meetings per year

Frequency

Percent

Less than 4 times

4

7

4 – 6 times

29

48

6 – 10 times

10

17

More than 10 times
Average duration of Board Meetings

17

28

Less than 1 hour

3

5

1-2 hours

16

27

2-3 hours

29

48

Over 3 hours

12

20

90% - 100%

48

80

75% - 89%

10

17

60% - 74%

2

3

Average Percentage of attendance at Board Meetings

5.4.2.3 Board Committees
Some specific board functions are performed better if they are carried out by
specialized committees consisting of members with expertise in the related field. When
there are a number of board members, decision making is not effective in certain
circumstances due to conflicts of interest. Thus formulating specific committees
facilitates effective decision making by the board. Having recognized the importance of
these committees, SLCGC (2008) requires companies to set up three such committees;
namely audit, compensation, and nomination committees. The importance of the role of
independent directors is also recognized, as these committees deal with conflicts of
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interest. Table 5.13 summarizes the findings of this study on the existence, and evidence
of the functioning of these committees.
Table 5.13 Board Committees and Frequency of Meetings
Audit Committee

Remuneration
Committee
Yes
%
58
97
Freq.
%

Yes
60
Freq.

%
100
%

Once

3

5

29

2 – 3 times

17

28

4 – 6 times

35

More than 7 times

5

Not Applicable

Existence of committees
No. of Meetings per year

Nomination
Committee
Yes
%
27
Freq.

45
%

48

17

63

23

38

8

30

58

6

10

2

7

8

0

0

0

0

-

-

2

3

33

-

60

100

60

100

60

100

It is noted that 100 per cent of the sample comply with the requirement of
having an audit committee. The audit committee is actively functioning in the majority
of companies. For example, 58 per cent of the responding firms have four or more audit
committee meetings per year. Eight per cent were meeting more than seven times per
year, and only five per cent were meeting once a year. The frequency of meetings is
likely to be a factor in effective monitoring of performance, which enhances the
application of other corporate governance practices (Balasubramanian et al., 2007).
These results indicate that audit committee meetings are held frequently which is a
positive indicator of the effective monitoring of performance in Sri Lankan companies.
However, the effectiveness of an audit committee cannot be measured only by analysing
the frequency of meetings. Other aspects such as composition, independence and
practices also play an important role, and these aspects are analysed separately in
Section 5.4.4.

The vast majority of respondent companies (97 per cent) have remuneration
committees. The primary function of a remuneration committee is to assist the board in
ensuring appropriate and effective remuneration packages and policies for its directors.
The existence of a remuneration committee in most of the Sri Lankan firms surveyed is
considered a strong indication of good governance practice with regard to directors’
remuneration. The frequency of committee meetings is a sound indicator of the active
functioning of this committee. Over 50 per cent of the respondents have had two or
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more committee meetings per year. 10 per cent were meeting four to six times per year.
However, 48 per cent of these committees met only once a year. Hence, the range of
frequency of meetings indicates the diverse practice in relation to the active functioning
of remuneration committees.

The SLCGC (2008) advocates a transparent procedure for the appointment of
new directors and requires that a nomination committee be established to lead the
process for board appointments, and to make recommendations to the board. However,
only 45 per cent of the responding firms have nomination committees. This is a
relatively low percentage when compared with audit and remuneration committees. This
behaviour suggests that the appointment of directors is generally dominated by the CEO
or controlling shareholder in Sri Lankan companies, as mentioned earlier.
Furthermore, the inactive functioning of nomination committees has aggravated the
problem of the low prevalence of nomination committees. For example, 63 per cent of
nomination committees met once a year. Only 7 per cent had meetings four to six times
per year. This indicates inactive functioning of nomination committees in Sri Lankan
companies.

It is speculated that this suggests a CEO or controlling shareholder

dominance in board appointments.

5.4.2.4 Appointment of Directors
It is important that the board has proper balance in terms of executive and nonexecutive directors, and in terms of the experience, qualities and skills that individual
board members are capable of bringing to board operations. The appointment of board
members should be objective and free from any influence or bias. Thus, the nomination
committee has to play key a role in selecting and making recommendations to the board
in respect of board appointments, and in ensuring objectivity of appointments. However,
impartiality of the nomination committee is dependent upon its composition, policies
and mode of operation. Having recognized the importance of a nomination committee
in board appointments, SLCGC (2008) formulates terms of reference for this committee
as a separate schedule (Schedule A) to the Code. This requires the majority of
nomination committee members to be NEDs. The nomination committee is to be
chaired by a NED appointed by the board, and nomination committee minutes are to be
circulated among all members of the board. Furthermore, it recognizes major duties of a
nomination committee include: proposing a suitable charter for the appointment and re141

appointment of directors; providing advice to the board on appointments; and, regular
review of the size, composition and competencies of the board.
Table 5.14 Appointment of Directors
Yes
Characteristics
Nomination Committee (NC)
− NC exists
− Firm has written terms of reference governing the NC
− NC comprises exclusively of non-executive directors
− NC is chaired by an independent director
− NC minutes are circulated among all board members
− Dissents are recorded in the committee minutes
Director terms and appointment
− All appointments to the board are made only through
the NC
− Firm has transparent procedures for the election of
directors
− Directors are subject to re-election at least once in
three years
− Directors are subject to a limit on the number of
directorships in other firms

No

Number

%

Number

%

27
19
11
19
19
20

45
70
41
70
70
74

33
8
16
8
8
7

55
30
59
30
30
26

22

37

38

63

46

77

14

23

56

93

4

7

14

23

46

77

Table 5.14 shows the results of this study relating to the appointment of
directors. According to the sample survey only 37 per cent of the firms made all
appointments to the board through the committee, although 45 per cent of firms had
established nomination committees. This indicates that even if nomination committees
are established, they are not in operation fully. Only 70 per cent of the companies had
written terms of reference, though proposing a suitable charter is recognized as one of
the duties of the nomination committee. In order to express an unbiased view, the
independence of the directors is a major component. 41 per cent of the firms had their
committees comprising exclusively of NEDs. 70 per cent of the responding firms had
their nomination committees chaired by an independent director. 70 per cent circulated
minutes among all board members. 74 per cent of the committees recorded dissents in
the minutes.

Limiting the tenure of directors to a maximum of three years and limiting the
appointment of a single director to different boards indirectly regulate the influence of a
director. 93 per cent of the companies surveyed adhere to limiting the tenure of
directors, whereas only 23 per cent allow a limit on the number of directorships one can
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hold. 23 per cent of the respondent firms stated that they don’t have a transparent
procedure for the election of directors, although this has been recognized as a principle
of the code (A.7, SLCGC 2008). The absence of a nomination committee in the
majority of companies in combination with low adherence to the recommended rules of
the governance code, are explicitly evident from the survey results in respect to the
appointment of directors. This raises doubts regarding the objective functioning of
boards in Sri Lankan companies.

5.4.2.5 Performance Evaluation and a Code of Conduct for Directors
It is suggested that the board needs to have a formal procedure to evaluate both
their own collective performance and that of individual directors (OECD, 2006). The
SLCGC (2008) recognizes the importance of evaluating the board as a whole, and
evaluating the CEO’s performance separately. It requires a CEO’s performance to be
evaluated at least on an annual basis against a set target, given at the beginning of each
financial year. However, individual director’s performance evaluation does not
recognize as specific principles. The SLCGC (2008) provides a board evaluation
checklist, given in Schedule B of the document, which recognizes various dimensions of
performance evaluation including: the board as whole; board committees; and,
executive and non-executive directors individually. Furthermore, the SLCGC (2008)
requires company directors and senior management to adopt a ‘Code of Business
Conduct and Ethics’ and for the company to disclose whether this code has been
adhered to by its directors and senior management. Table 5.15 provides the criteria used
in evaluating the performance of CEO and other directors. These criteria are taken
directly from the Sri Lankan Corporate Governance Code (2008).

Table 5.15 summarizes the responses to questions about the performance
evaluation of the CEO and other directors, and the application of a code of business
conduct for directors. 58 per cent of the responding firms evaluate the performance of
the CEO annually, whereas 50 per cent evaluate executive directors’ performance
annually. However, by considering the existence of this practice alone it cannot be
assessed how rigorous these evaluations are. To evaluate this aspect another question,
whether the board has replaced the CEO during last five years, has been asked. 33 per
cent of companies responded positively to this question. The question doesn’t
specifically focus on whether these replacements were due to poor performance. In
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some cases, CEOs could have taken better opportunities. When questioned about the
CEO succession plan, only 68 per cent of the companies had a positive answer. This
evidence suggests that the CEOs of Sri Lankan companies appear to be at a low risk of
losing their job due to poor performance.

Table 5.15 Evaluation of CEO and other Directors
Yes
Characteristics
CEO and Executive Directors (EDs)
− Board evaluates the CEO’s performance annually
− Board evaluates the EDs’ performance annually
− Succession plan for the CEO and the senior
managers
− Board replaced the CEO during last 5 years
Non- Executive Directors (NEDs)
− Board evaluates the NEDs’ performance annually
− Retirement age for NEDs
− NEDs receive retirement pay
− NED(s) resigned due to a policy disagreement during
last 3 years
− Chairman holds separate meetings for non-executive
directors
− NEDs can obtain professional advice at the company
expense
Code of Conduct
− Firm has a written code of conduct & ethics for
directors
− Written guidelines for directors’ share dealings of the
firm
− Members generally receive materials at least seven
days prior to board meeting
− Firm provide training opportunities for newly
appointed directors

No

Number

%

Number

%

35
30

58
50

25
30

42
50

41
20

68
33

19
40

32
67

14
28
0

23
47
0

46
32
60

77
53
100

0

0

60

100

16

27

44

73

36

60

24

40

26

43

34

57

34

57

26

43

52

87

8

13

23

38

37

62

With respect to the performance evaluation of NED’s, only 23 per cent of the
firms responded positively. 47 per cent of the companies prescribed a retirement age for
the NED’s. However, neither did they record a retirement pay, nor record an event of a
NED resigning during the last three years due to a policy disagreement. Independence
of the NED’s is questioned in the sample, as only 27 per cent of the firms’ chairmen
conducted separate meetings for NEDs. Only 60 per cent of the sample firms allowed
NED’s to receive professional advice at their company’s expense.
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For independent directors to discharge their duties effectively as a board
member, they should be provided with certain requirements. They should be able to
hold separate discussions with the employees. Further, they should have access to
documents such as financial records and their board’s meeting agendas, and they should
be provided with proper training at the company’s expense. Once these requirements are
fulfilled and once they are familiar with their role, it is assumed that the independent
directors will have less chance of being manipulated by the CEO or a controlling
shareholder. However, only 38 per cent of the responding companies provide such
training to directors. 87 per cent provide materials to directors seven days prior to board
meetings.

Only 43 per cent of the responding firms have a written ‘Code of Conduct and
Ethics’ for directors. It is difficult to restrain insider dealings on the Sri Lankan share
market, due to market anomalies and a lack of competent oversight by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Sri Lanka, although it has the legal authority.
Thus, it is important for companies to have written guidelines in respect of directors’
share dealings. However, only 57 per cent of firms have written guidelines regarding
share dealings of their directors with the company.

5.4.3 Directors' Remuneration
The area of executive remuneration is always controversial due to an agency
conflict between managers and shareholders. The SLCGC (2008) states “companies
should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive
remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual Directors”
(principle B.1). It further requires companies to establish remuneration committees
consisting exclusively of NEDs. The NEDs’ remuneration should be determined by the
board as a whole. However, companies are given flexibility in deciding levels of
remuneration for both executive and non-executive directors. It requires at least part of
executive directors’ remuneration to be linked to corporate and individual performance
(SLCGC, 2008).
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Table 5.16 Directors’ Remuneration
Yes
Characteristics
Remuneration Committee (RC)
− RC exists
− Firm has written terms of reference governing the RC
− RC comprises a majority of independent directors
− RC is chaired by an independent director
− RC minutes are circulated among board members
− Dissents are recorded in the committee minutes
Remuneration policies and practices
− Firm has written policies on directors’ remuneration
− Board reviews CEO compensation annually
− Executive directors’ remuneration (at least part)
performance based
Share Options
− Non-executive directors’ remuneration includes
share options
− CEO is given share options
Disclosure and Shareholder Approval
− Performance based remuneration requires
shareholders’ approval

No

Number

%

Number

%

58
39
45
47
40
47

97
67
78
81
69
81

2
19
13
11
18
11

3
33
22
19
31
19

30
45

50
75

30
15

50
25

38

63

22

37

1
8

2
13

59
52

98
87

7

12

53

88

As per the requirements, the remuneration committee plays a major role in
deciding the remuneration of executive directors and senior managers. It also deals with
share options and performance based compensation policies. Table 5.16 provides the
summarized information on the functions and composition of remuneration committees,
remuneration policies and practices of respondent companies. The existence of
remuneration committees in most of the companies (97 per cent) does not necessarily
indicate the effectiveness of those committees. To be effective, a remuneration
committee should be established formally with clear terms of reference. However, only
67 per cent of companies surveyed have written terms of reference, indicating potential
inconsistent application of remuneration policies in some of the respondent companies.
The fact that remuneration committees consist exclusively of NEDs does not necessarily
indicate the independence of the committee. The independent directors’ majority
representation, and a committee chaired by an independent director however, are sound
indicators of independence. 78 per cent of firms surveyed have a majority of
independent directors on their remuneration committees, while 81 per cent of
remuneration committees are chaired by an independent director. A high percentage of
independent directors’ involvement in remuneration committees is a good governance
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practice adhered to by Sri Lankan companies. However, it is observed that about one
fourth of the companies are not adhering to these practices. Furthermore, for the
remuneration committees to be effective, committee minutes have to be maintained
properly and circulated among all board members. However, only 69 per cent of the
committees circulated minutes among members. Dissents are recorded in the
remuneration committee minutes of 81 per cent of the companies surveyed.

The establishment of a remuneration committee prevents executive directors
setting their own remuneration packages. The remuneration committee is also
responsible for implementing formal and transparent procedures for setting executives’
remuneration, including appropriate targets for performance based compensation.
Making recommendations on remuneration policies, and reviewing CEO’s and other
executives’ remuneration are important tasks of the committee. However, despite
having remuneration committees in 97 per cent of the companies surveyed, only 50 per
cent of these companies have written policies on directors’ remuneration. This shows
divergence from best practice of the remuneration committees for these companies. The
proportion of executive directors’ remuneration is not attached to performance for 37
per cent of the companies surveyed. This indicates performance, either by the company
or the individual, is not a limiting factor for directors to receive regular remuneration.
Further, survey evidence shows that even if the companies have a performance based
remuneration component, 88 per cent of these companies do not require shareholders’
approval for these remuneration recommendations.

One of the tasks of the board is to review the compensation of the CEO. 75 per
cent of the responding firms undertake this task. Only 13 per cent of Sri Lankan firms
compensate their CEO using stock options, suggesting that share market performance is
not a deciding factor for CEOs to secure their remuneration. As the directors and CEOs
are not at risk of losing their remuneration for poor firm performance, there may not be
satisfactory motivation for them to perform in the interests of their shareholders. This
could have a negative impact on firm performance, leaving shareholders at risk.

5.4.4 Audit committee procedure
The audit committee (AC) is arguably the most important of the board subcommittees and therefore governance codes contain extensive requirements for audit
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committees. The SLCGC (2008) requires companies to set up audit committees on the
grounds that “the board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for
considering how they should select and apply accounting policies, financial reporting
and internal control principles and maintaining an appropriate relationship with the
Company’s Auditors” (Principle D.3). Thus an audit committee is required to assist the
board over matters such as accounting and financial statements, compliance with
regulations, internal control, going concern assessment and external auditor’s
independence and performance. As per SLCGC (2008), an audit committee should
have written terms of reference indicating the purpose, duties, and responsibilities of the
committee. Further, it requires an audit committee to have two independent NEDs or
exclusively NEDs with a majority of independent directors.
Table 5.17 Audit Committee Structure and Practices
Yes
Characteristics
Existence and membership
− Audit committee exists
− AC includes someone with expertise in accounting
− AC comprises of exclusively non-executive
directors
− AC has majority of independent directors
− AC is chaired by an independent director
Powers and processes
− Firm has written terms of reference governing audit
committee
− AC minutes are circulated among board members
− AC recommends the external auditor to full board
− Minority shareholders can elect an AC member
− Hold meetings with the external auditor
− Members are paid a fee or allowance for serving on
the committee

No

Number

%

Number

%

60
57

100
97

2

3

47
52
54

80
88
92

12
7
5

20
12
8

54
45
51
8
52

92
76
86
14
88

5
14
8
51
7

8
24
14
86
12

45

76

14

23

Effectiveness of the AC depends upon the composition of the committee, and its
processes. Composition concerns:

the number of independent directors’; having

accounting and finance professionals on the committee; and, having an independent
chairman. Processes deal with: the role of selecting auditors and maintaining a working
relationship with them; procedures regarding minutes; remuneration of committee
members; and, written terms of reference for committee proceedings. The analysis of
this study’s survey results concerning the practices of Sri Lankan companies’ audit
committees are summarized in Table 5.17. As to the independence of the members of
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audit committees, 92 per cent of the firms surveyed were chaired by an independent
director, while 88 per cent of the firms had committees comprising a majority of
independent directors, out of which 80 per cent were exclusively comprised of
independent directors. The survey results further show that 97 per cent of the firms had
an accounting professional on the committee. A relatively high compliance is observed
in relation to the best governance practices of audit committees in comparison to the
practices of nomination and remuneration committees. However, 20 per cent of the
companies surveyed have not complied with the practice of having a composition of
exclusively NEDs on the audit committee. This is a major drawback as far as
independence of the committee is concerned.

Focusing on the processes of the audit committees, one can see that committees
of 92 per cent of the responding firms had written terms of reference, 76 per cent
circulated audit committee minutes among members, 86 per cent recommended the
appointing of external auditors to the board, 88 per cent held meetings with the auditors,
and 76 per cent paid a fee to their members for holding office. This evidence further
suggests that the majority of audit committees of Sri Lankan companies are functioning
actively and carrying out their duties properly.

5.4.5 Disclosure and transparency
Disclosure of information plays a major role in corporate governance, as it is the
means of conveying to the public how effectively management discharges their duties to
shareholders. Confidence of the public can be gained only if such information is
disclosed in a manner which ensures transparency, usefulness and understandability.
The Cadbury Report (1992) recognizes that the foundation of any structure of corporate
governance is disclosure. Iskander and Chamlou (2000) claim that openness is the basis
of public confidence in the corporate governance system. The SLCGC (2008) requires
boards to ‘present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company's position
and prospects’ (Principle D.1). Further, it states that the board is responsible for
submission of interim reports and all price sensitive information to the shareholders.
Principle C.2 of SLCGC (2008) requires disclosing all proposed major transactions to
shareholders. In this respect the board is responsible for disclosing all facts of all
transactions which would materially affect net assets of the company. The Cadbury
Report (1992) also states that boards should aim for the highest level of disclosure
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without compromising the competitive position of the company. It further recognizes
the importance of disclosing fees paid to audit firms for non-audit work, directors’ total
emoluments, and the emolument of the highest paid director including stock options.
Due to these requirements, the items for which information must be disclosed have
recently been expanded significantly. Companies are required to disclose much more
detailed information than in the past about related-party transactions.
Table 5.18 Disclosure and Transparency
Yes
Disclosures on the Company Website
− Quarterly financial statements
− Audited Annual reports
− Directors’ report
− Directors’ selling or buying shares in the firm (if any)
−
− Related-party transactions (if any)
− Resume or background of directors
− Individual remuneration of directors
− Policies on risk management
− Corporate governance report
− Separate disclosure of audit and non-audit fees paid
− Members of board sub committees
− Audit committee report
− Remuneration committee report
− Nomination committee report
Disclosures on the Annual Reports
− Related-party transactions (if any)
− Resume or background of directors
− Individual remuneration of directors
− Policies on risk management
− Corporate governance report
− Separate disclosure of audit and non-audit fees paid
− Members of board sub committees
− Audit committee report
− Remuneration committee report
− Nomination committee report

No

Number

%

Number

%

33
37
34
14

55
62
57
23

27
23
26
46

45
38
43
77

9
12
4
7
7
8
7
6
7
4

15
20
7
12
12
13
12
10
12
15

51
48
56
53
53
52
53
54
53
23

85
80
93
88
88
87
88
90
88
85

59
60
17
49
60
51
58
54
44
18

98
100
28
82
100
85
97
90
73
67

1
0
43
11
0
9
2
6
16
9

2
0
72
18
0
15
3
10
27
33

Table 5.18 summarizes the responses to survey questions regarding whether
companies provide different types of information on their websites, as well as separately
in their annual reports. Information was obtained from surveyed companies’ websites.
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Table 5.18 highlights the type of information disclosed on company websites for the
sample firms. The analysis of survey responses shows that over 60 per cent of the firms
surveyed disclose financial information (both annual and quarterly) on their company
website. Also 57 per cent disclose their Directors’ Report on the web. However, only 23
per cent of the companies surveyed disclose their directors’ share transaction
information. Despite the fact that the board is responsible for disclosing all price
sensitive information including major transactions and important reports, this
information is not adequately disclosed by Sri Lankan companies on their websites.
Less than 20 per cent of the firms disclosed important price sensitive information such
as: related party transactions; the resume or background of directors; directors’
remuneration; policies on risk management; audit and non-audit fees; memberships of
sub committees; and, committee reports, indicating a lack of transparency for most of
the Sri Lankan companies surveyed.

Apart from the audited financial statements, companies are required to publish
information on related party transactions, the resumes and remuneration of directors,
corporate governance reports, and committee reports etc. in their annual reports.
According to the data of the responding firms, most of the required information is
available in their annual reports. Every firm in the sample has disclosed the resume or
background of their directors and a corporate governance report in their annual report.
Related party transactions are declared by 98 per cent of the firms in the annual report.
More than 80 per cent of the companies have declared policies on risk management and
the quantum of audit and non-audit fees paid. Memberships of boards’ sub-committees
are declared by 97 per cent of the sample. Disclosure of the reports of the audit,
remuneration and nomination committees are made by 90 per cent, 73 per cent and 67
per cent of the companies respectively. However, only 28 per cent of the firms give
information on directors’ remuneration, which is the lowest level of disclosure. It is
interesting to note that lower levels of disclosure are observed in relation to directors’
remuneration (23 per cent), remuneration committees’ reports (73 per cent), and
nomination committees reports (67 per cent). As this information relates to lower levels
of disclosure for directors’ remuneration and appointment, it can be argued that an
agency conflict is one of the major issues in Sri Lankan companies. Sri Lanka
experienced a series of finance company failures in the late 1990s, and the breakdown
of major groups of companies including financial institutions in 2009, largely due to
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high incidents of fraud committed by company directors. Lack of disclosure has a
negative effect on corporate governance practices (Susilowati et al. 2005). Focus on
more disclosure, specifically on price sensitive information and information directly
related to directors’ affairs, should be given priority by policy makers.

5.4.6 Disclosure reliability
The quality and the reliability of financial disclosures are largely influenced by
the review and the assurance that is provided by external auditors, and reliance upon
their independence. The external auditor provides both audit and non-audit services. As
non-audit services can have a negative impact on the independence of the auditor, the
survey focuses on audit committees’ contributions to maintaining high quality work by
external auditors, and other measures implemented by the firm to protect the quality and
independence of external auditors.

Tables 5.19 and 5.20 indicate the quantum of auditors’ independence and the
non-audit fees paid to the auditor. 58 per cent of the firms obtained non-audit services.
68 per cent of the companies rotate the audit partner once every five years. A review of
the auditor’s work by the audit committee is carried out by 88 per cent of firms. The
review of audit recommendations by the entire board is followed by more than 80 per
cent of the responding firms. 48 per cent of the firms who obtained non-audit services
limited their non-audit service fees to less than 20 per cent of the audit fees. However,
31 per cent of the firms had non-audit fees of 21 per cent to 50 per cent of audit fees,
while 20 per cent of the firms paid non-audit fees over 50 per cent of the audit fee. This
evidence suggests that most of the auditors who provide non-audit services are
dependent on the non-audit assignment, which could have a negative effect on their
independence, and the perception of their independence.

Table 5.19 External Auditor
Yes
Characteristics
− Audit committee conducts formal reviews of the
auditor’s work
− Audit partner rotation every 5 years
− Audit recommendations are subject to full board
review
− Auditor provides non-audit services to your firm
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No

Number

%

Number

%

53
41

88
68

7
19

12
32

57
35

95
58

3
25

5
42

Table 5.20 Auditor’s Involvement in Non-audit Assignment
Non-audit Fee as a Percentage of Total Audit Fee

Frequency

Per cent

Less than 20%

17

48

21% - 50%

11

31

Over 50%

7

20

Not Applicable

25

-

60

100

5.4.7 Shareholders’ Rights
From an agency theory perspective shareholders are viewed as the principal, and
the objective of management is to maximize the interests of shareholders. Agency
theory argues that managers are focused on self-interest rather than on the interests of
owners. This suggests that ownership and managerial interest are not aligned, leading to
agency costs and internal inefficiencies. Due to the existence of such agency costs and
internal inefficiencies, agency theory argues that one of the purposes of the corporate
governance mechanism is to provide shareholders with assurance that managers achieve
outcomes that are in the shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus,
there should be adequate provisions in governance codes to protect the shareholders’
rights.

Shareholders should be given rights and opportunities to participate directly in
monitoring their firms. Their basic rights include: obtaining relevant corporate
information on a timely and regular basis; participating in and voting at general
shareholders’ meetings; and, electing board members (OECD 2004). Even if
shareholders cannot physically attend meetings, they should be able to participate in
decision making through designating proxies or voting by mail. The shareholders
should be provided with adequate information about agenda items and be encouraged to
ask questions, make comments, and raise issues at meetings. Thus the length of
shareholders’ meetings and the number of shareholders in attendance might yield
information about the effectiveness of shareholders’ meetings.
The SLCGC (2008) requires the board to use the Annual General Meeting
(AGM) to communicate with investors and encourage their participation (Principle C.1).
Further it states that all proxy votes should be counted and separate resolutions should
be in force for substantial issues and the adoption of accounts. The chairpersons of subcommittees are required to be present at the AGM to respond to questions raised by
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shareholders. Individual investors are encouraged to participate in AGMs and exercise
their voting rights. Companies are required to send notice of AGMs and related papers
to shareholders before the meeting and circulate a summary of the procedures governing
voting at General Meetings (SLCGC, 2008; Principles C.1.1 – 1.5).

Many Asian

countries have introduced a range of provisions to protect shareholders’ rights,
especially after the economic crisis (Nam and Nam, 2004). This survey is concerned
with whether in the Sri Lankan context there is effective participation in decision
making, with the election of directors, and the upholding of other shareholders’ rights.
The summarized results of the survey are given in Table 5.21.
Table 5.21 Shareholders’ Rights
Yes
Characteristics
− Voting by mail is allowed
− Anybody can serve as a proxy
− Shareholders requested an extraordinary meeting in last
3 years
− Firm discloses director candidates to shareholders prior to
AGM
− Chairpersons of sub-committees are always available at
the AGM
− Adequate time is given for asking questions at the AGM
− Shareholders’ priority subscription rights are adequately
protected
− Related-party transactions fully disclosed at the AGM
− Firm does not deviate from the one-share one-vote rule
−

No

Number

%

Number

%

17
58

28
97

43
2

72
3

6

10

54

90

43

72

17

28

57
60

95
100

3
0

5
0

44
58
54

73
97
90

16
2
6

27
3
10

All of the responding firms allow adequate time to shareholders to ask questions
at the AGM. This appears to be a sound governance practice in ensuring the protection
of non-controlling shareholders’ rights. However, as appears in Table 5.22, the average
duration of the AGM of 65 per cent of the firms surveyed is less than one hour. 28 per
cent of the firms had an AGM lasting for one to two hours, and none of the firms had an
AGM of over three hours. Duration of the AGM is important since the shareholders
need adequate time to raise issues, discuss matters, and make comments etc. The limited
time duration of the meetings suggests that AGMs of Sri Lankan firms are largely
inactive. This fact can be corroborated by analysing the voting behaviour of the AGM.
For example, the average voting rights exercised at the AGM for 30 per cent of the
companies is less than 10 per cent, suggesting low priority given by shareholders for
AGM activities.
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Table 5.22 Duration and Voting Performance of the AGM
Average duration of the AGM

Frequency

Percent

Less than 1 hour

39

65

1-2 hours

17

28

2-3 hours

4

7

Over 3 hours
Average Percentage of Voting Rights Exercise at AGM

0

0

Less than 10%

18

30

10% - 40%

6

10

40% - 60%

10

17

60% - 80%

7

12

80% - 100%

19

32

One of the fundamental rights of a shareholder is voting. Even though
shareholders are unable to present themselves at meetings, they can be represented by
allowing them to vote by mail, or by designating proxies to vote on their behalf. A high
percentage of firms surveyed (97 per cent) allow anybody to serve as a proxy. However,
only 28 per cent of the companies allow voting by mail. When analysing the voting
rights exercised at the AGMs of companies surveyed, it is noted that shareholders of
one third of firms surveyed exercise their voting rights less than 10 per cent of the time.
On average 10 per cent of companies voting at AGM varies among 10 per cent to 40 per
cent. Only 30 per cent of companies have shareholder voting participation above 80 per
cent. Given that most firms have controlling shareholders with a high concentration of
ownership, the fraction of shareholders exercising their voting rights at the AGM is
surprisingly small. For example, as shown in Table 5.5, 65 per cent of the respondent
companies have over 80 per cent share ownership concentrated in the first 10 largest
shareholders. It further shows that over 64 per cent of the companies have over 40 per
cent of ownership concentration with their largest shareholder. The voting behaviour
and length of the AGM suggests that non-controlling shareholders often do not
participate and vote in AGM activities. The restriction on voting by mail undermines the
rights of shareholders and could have aggravated the low voting rights exercised at the
AGM.

In 95 per cent of the firms, chairpersons of sub committees are available at the
AGM. 72 per cent of the firms did a prior AGM declaration of the director candidates,
while 97 per cent of the firms fully disclosed their related party transactions at the
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AGM. However, shareholders of one tenth of the firms requested extra-ordinary
meetings in the last three years. This possibly is a sign of conflict between shareholders
and the management of these companies. Sri Lanka is among the many Asian countries
which experience frequent controlling shareholder activities in the share market. The
proportion of share ownership of non-controlling shareholders should be protected in
new share issues by securing pre-emptive rights. However, 27 per cent of the companies
have not protected priority subscription rights of their shareholders.

5.4.8 Related Party Transactions
As discussed in the preceding sections, one of the problems of corporate
governance in Sri Lanka is the presence of dominant shareholders who control a group
of companies, and who are instrumental in many inappropriate actions in corporate
governance. Nam and Nam (2004) state that one of the main reasons for the Asian crisis
in 1997 related to corporate governance issues. They claim that “the most salient feature
of the corporate governance problems of the East Asian countries is the presence of
dominant shareholders who control a group of firms and who were behind many of the
illegal or inappropriate actions of managers that resulted in asset dissipation,
expropriation of minority shareholders, and lack of transparency in information
disclosure before 1997” (Nam and Nam, 2004, p.27). However, irrespective of the
evident presence of dominant shareholders in Sri Lankan companies, the SLCGC (2004)
has not given adequate attention to related party transactions (RPTs) and the best
governance practices relating to them.

Having recognized the importance of exploring the nature and intensity of RPTs
in Sri Lankan companies, this survey is carried out based on OECD principles. OECD
principles (2004) require boards to monitor and manage potential conflicts of interest of
management, board members and shareholders, including abuse in related party
transactions. Non-controlling shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by
controlling shareholders. The OECD principles (2004) state the abuses may be carried
out in various ways. These include: extraction of direct private benefits; inappropriate
RPTs; systematic bias in business decisions; and, changes in capital structure through
special issuance of shares favouring the controlling shareholder. In this respect, boards
should take the initiative by assigning a sufficient number of NEDs capable of
exercising independent judgment to the tasks where there is a potential conflict of
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interest. Furthermore, it is essential for any company to fully disclose material RPTs to
the market, including whether they have been executed at ‘arms-length’ terms. Related
parties can include entities that are under common control with the company, significant
shareholders including members of their families, and key management personnel. A
transaction with someone who has a close and privileged relationship with companies
such as controlling owners, directors, members in senior management and their
immediate family members and other affiliated companies that they control is
recognized as a RPT in this survey.
Table 5.23 Related Party Transactions
Yes
Characteristics
Firm discloses RPT(s) to shareholders
Firm requires RPT(s) to be at arm’s-length terms
Firm has outstanding loan(s) to insider(s)
Firm carryout sales and purchases from insiders
Firm rent or lease real property to or from insider(s)
Board reviewed the RPT(s) last year

No

Number

%

Number

%

60
53
10
13
13
49

100
88
17
22
22
82

0
7
50
47
47
11

0
12
83
78
78
18

Information on RPTs is provided in Table 5.23. All the firms of the sample
disclose RPTs to the shareholders as this is required by Sri Lanka’s Accounting
Standards and Companies Act (2007). However, as indicated in Table 5.18, only 15 per
cent of companies disclose RPTs on their websites. This suggests that the companies are
reluctant to disclose RPTs voluntarily. As most Sri Lankan companies have a
controlling shareholder, it is important to carry out RPTs at arm’s-length terms.
However, only 88 per cent of the companies surveyed require RPTs to be at arm’slength terms. Another measure of significance of RPTs is how many firms reported a
board review of RPTs. The majority of respondents (82 per cent) report that their boards
have reviewed the RPT’s of the previous year. A full board review of RPTs is a good
practice, but less good news is that there are a number of significant RPTs carried out
by the majority of companies surveyed. The analysis of the nature of RPTs reveals that
17 per cent of the firms have outstanding loans, 22 per cent carry out sales and
purchases transactions, and 22 per cent rent or lease real property with insiders. The
magnitude of transactions is also important in deciding the rigorousness of RPTs. As
shown in Table 5.24, nearly 50 per cent of the firms reported that the value of their
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RPTs is less than one per cent of the total revenue. However, 12 per cent of the
companies reported that the values of RPTs are over 10 per cent of total revenue.
Table 5.24 Magnitude of the RPTs
Value of RPTs as a Percentage of Total Revenue

Frequency

Percent

Less than 1%

25

42

1% - 5%

13

22

5% - 10%

1

2

Over 10%

7

12

Not Applicable

14

23

60

100

Table 5.25 Required Level of Approval for RPTs
RPTs with
executives

Required Approval Level

RPTs with controlling
shareholders

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

− Approval by the shareholders
− Approval by the non-conflicted directors or
audit committee

0

0

0

0

2

3

3

5

− Approval by the board

26

43

32

53

− Approval by the CEO

21

35

9

15

− Approval by the CFO

2

3

0

0

− No approval required

9

15

10

17

− Not Applicable

-

-

6

10

60

100

60

100

Table 5.25 shows the summarized responses relevant to approval levels of
RPT’s separately for company executives and shareholders. In both cases, none of the
companies require shareholder approval for RPTs. Furthermore, only three per cent and
five per cent of companies require approval from the non-conflicted directors or audit
committee to execute RPTs with executives and controlling shareholders respectively.
Over 15 per cent of the respondent companies state that they do not require specific
approval to carry out RPTs with either an executive or controlling shareholders. This
creates serious doubts over required levels of independence in carrying out RPTs in Sri
Lankan companies.

The majority of companies require only board approval. For example, this is 43
per cent in the case of executives and 53 per cent relating to controlling shareholders. At
the next level only CEO approval is enough to perform RPTs with executives and
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controlling shareholders for 35 per cent and 15 per cent of the companies respectively.
In three per cent of the firms, approval for RPTs with executives has been granted by
the CFO. The diverse practices adopted by Sri Lankan companies, especially with
regard to required approval levels for RPTs, indicate dominant shareholders’ influence
on the affairs of Sri Lankan companies. Furthermore, the problem of not having enough
provisions in the SLCGC, especially in relation to required levels of approval for the
execution of RPTs is clearly evident. The lack of independence of the boards and the
existence of controlling shareholder(s) as observed in preceding sections aggravates the
negative effects of RPTs on non-controlling shareholders. Thus, these factors should be
given more attention by policy makers in developing best governance practices for
RPTs.

5.5 Evaluation of Level of Compliance of Corporate Governance
Practices
The level of corporate governance of sample companies is examined by
developing a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) in achieving the third objective of the
study. As specified in Section 4.5.3 the scores of the CGI and sub-indices are analysed
based on a number of methods. The subsequent sections present the results of these
analyses. Analysis results of the overall governance score distribution and descriptive
statistics of the overall index and sub-indices are given in Section 5.5.1. As the
compliance to governance practices can significantly vary across the nature of family
ownership and foreign ownership, and the existence of controlling shareholder(s), the
level of compliance is analysed across sub-samples. The analysis results of the
comparison of sub-indices across sub samples, and the comparison of individual items
of CGI across sub samples are given in Section 5.5.2. Section 5.5.3 presents the impact
of ownership on compliance to corporate governance practices for the whole sample
across each sub index. As indicated in Section 4.5.3 the analysis of the index score is
carried out with eight sub-indices representing different dimensions of governance. The
maximum possible scores for each sub-index depend on the number of governance
practices examined in the respective sub-index. The sub-indices with maximum possible
scores are given below.
Board Structure & Independence (BSI)
Board Procedure and Effectiveness (BPE)
Audit Committee Procedure (ACP)
Directors’ Remuneration Procedure (DRP)
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- 07
- 25
- 10
- 08

Disclosure Substance (DS)
Disclosure Reliability (DR)
Shareholders’ Rights (SR)
Related Party Transactions (RPTs)

- 15
- 05
- 12
- 08

The maximum possible score for overall Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is
90, which is the addition of maximum marks of its eight sub indices.

5.5.1 Frequency Distribution Analysis of Governance Scores
When sample companies are distributed based on the overall CGI as shown in
Table 5.26, none of the companies have obtained an average score of 90 per cent or
more. However, the majority of companies have better compliance to Audit Committee
Procedure (ACP), Shareholders Rights (SR) and Directors’ Remuneration Procedure
(DR) dimensions. The ACP sub-index shows that over 33 per cent of the companies
obtained an index score of over 90 per cent. Furthermore, 33 per cent and 28 per cent of
companies obtained an average score of over 90 per cent for DR and SR sub-indices
respectively. This evidence shows the practices relating to audit committee procedure,
shareholders’ rights, and disclosure reliability. Out of the other dimensions, over 30 per
cent of the companies have obtained an average score of less than 50 per cent for RPTs
and Board Procedure and Effectiveness (BPE) sub-indices. The RPTs and BPE are the
worst performed dimensions of overall corporate governance practices.

Table 5.26 Frequency (%) Distribution of Corporate Governance Scores
Index Score (%)

Sub-indices
DRP
DS
2%
-

≥0%< 20%

BSI
2%

BPE
-

ACP
2%

≥ 20%< 30%

2%

10%

-

2%

≥ 30%< 40%

-

15%

3%

≥ 40%< 50%

17%

10%

≥ 50%< 60%

25%

≥ 60%≤ 70%

Overall
Index

DR
-

SR
-

RPTs
-

2%

-

-

3%

-

5%

12%

3%

-

8%

-

-

10%

3%

-

3%

30%

7%

25%

2%

-

18%

20%

3%

-

17%

-

7%

13%

35%

18%

-

12%

40%

35%

≥ 70%≤ 80%

37%

15%

18%

18%

33%

43%

27%

17%

32%

≥ 80%< 90%

17%

17%

28%

27%

8%

-

27%

2%

10%

-

2%
2%
33%
2%
5%
33%
28%
≥ 90%≤100%
Note: BSI - Board Structure & Independence; BPE - Board Procedure and Effectiveness; ACP - Audit
Committee Procedure; DRP - Directors’ Remuneration Procedure; DS - Disclosure Substance;
DR - Disclosure Reliability; SR - Shareholders’ Rights; RPTs - Related Party Transactions
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Figure 5-1 Distributions of Overall Corporate Governance Index Scores

The histogram (Figure 5.1) shows the fraction of firms with overall CGI scores
in indicated ranges. The histogram with a mean value of 61.17 (68 per cent) and
standard deviation of 9.79 shows the overall CGI is normally distributed. As shown in
Table 5.27, the results of the Shapiro-Wilk Test also confirm that the overall CGI is
normally distributed. If the significant (Sig.) value of Shapiro-Wilk Test is greater than
0.05 then the data is normal. The Sig. value of 0.563 for overall CGI confirms that the
overall index is normally distributed, indicating reasonable distribution is available in
respect of high compliance and low compliance companies within the sample. However,
none of the sub-indices is normally distributed, as indicated by the significant value of
the Shapiro-Wilk test which is lower than 0.05 for all the sub-indices.

Table 5.27 provides further data on the overall CGI and its sub-indices. There is
substantial spread on each of the sub-indexes, and for the CGI as a whole. As shown in
the descriptive statistics, the sub-indices indicate substantial variations of compliance to
governance practices by Sri Lankan companies. The mean values (%) of ACP, DR and
SR sub-indices are over 80 per cent, but all these sub-indices also indicate high
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variations of application of governance practices, as shown in the minimum and
maximum values. This indicates that despite high levels of compliance by most of the
companies, a minority group of companies comply less with these practices.
Furthermore, a substantial range is shown between the minimum and maximum values
of other sub-indices. This behaviour raises a question as to whether there are dominating
factors which determine compliance to governance practices by Sri Lankan companies.
Thus, it warrants further analysis of data to find out whether the existence of family or
foreign ownership, and the presence of a controlling shareholder have created diverse
impacts on governance practices in Sri Lankan companies.
Table 5.27 Descriptive Statistics for Governance Index Variables
Mean

Mean
%

BSI

4.48

64%

BPE

14.53

ACP

Std.
Devi.

Mini

Max

Max
Possible

Skewness

ShapiroWilk

1.214

0

7

7

-.841

.902

.000

58%

4.908

6

23

25

.061

.952

.020

8.53

85%

1.712

1

10

10

-2.082

.770

.000

DRP

5.43

68%

1.454

0

8

8

-1.044

.887

.000

DS

9.93

66%

2.517

4

15

15

-.397

.960

.045

DR

4.07

81%

.821

2

5

5

-.506

.838

.000

RPTs

4.63

58%

1.025

2

7

8

-.374

.911

.000

SR
Overall
Index

9.55

80%

1.294

6

11

12

-.793

.881

.000

61.17

68%

9.790

39

80

90

-.169

.983

.563

Sig.

5.5.2 Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Scores of Sub
Samples
This section deals with the comparative analysis of corporate governance scores
for six sub samples across three dimensions of ownership namely: family ownership;
foreign ownership; and, controlling shareholder’s ownership. The comparisons of sub
samples in each ownership dimension are: Family Based (FB) vs. Non Family Based
(NFB); Less (or no) Foreign Owned (LFO) vs. Substantially Foreign Owned (SFO);
and, presence of Controlling Shareholders (CSs) vs. absence of CSs. (refer Section 5.3.3
for details). The comparative analysis of governance scores across the overall CGI and
the sub-indices is carried out in the first part of this section. The comparison is carried
out in order to identify the compliance differences across each sub index and the overall
CGI. In the second part, the scores of individual variables (classified under eight sub-
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indices) are analysed to obtain a comprehensive view of the level of compliance across
each sub sample in respect of governance practices.
5.5.2.1 Comparative Analysis of Index Scores across Sub Samples
As shown in Table 5.28, the level of compliance to best corporate governance
practices by FB companies is relatively low across all governance dimensions measured
in the sub-indices. Accordingly, the overall index score for FB companies is 55 (62 per
cent) as against the score of 65 (72 per cent) for NFB companies. This evidence
suggests that family ownership has a significant negative impact on compliance to
corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan companies. In their on corporate
governance in Asia, Nam and Nam (2004) claim that the family controlled businesses
have been inadequately supervised by outside shareholders, boards of directors, or
markets for corporate control. As a result these companies have experienced inadequate
accounting disclosures and lack of transparency. Furthermore, they claim that the
controlling family owners have been able to pursue their private interests relatively
easily, often at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. In conformity with this
finding, the survey results appearing in Table 5.28 show that FB companies have
significantly lower levels of scores for BPE, ACP and DS sub indices. This suggests
that Sri Lankan family owned companies also experience similar behaviour in respect of
board procedure practices, audit committee procedures, and financial disclosures.

Corporate governance appears to be better in companies that are SFO.

In

contrast to family ownership, substantial foreign ownership constantly has a positive
impact on compliance to corporate governance best practices across the eight
dimensions considered in this survey. Specifically, more effective boards of directors
are observed in respect of these companies. Out of six sub samples, SFO companies
have the highest score (76 per cent) for the overall CGI. This indicates compliance to
governance practices is positively influenced by the presence of foreign owners. High
compliance is likely to influence the internal governance structure of these companies,
and the governance code development process in Sri Lanka. Foreign owners generally
demand a higher quality of corporate governance due to pressure from parent
companies. This is likely to produce high compliance to best governance practices.
Furthermore, as the Sri Lankan Governance Code (2008) is developed based on OECD
(2004) principles and the governance codes developed in the western countries, the
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companies which characterize companies operating in the Anglo-Saxon model are more
likely to be compliant with the Code. As such, SFO firms are likely to be able to
comply with the governance practices with ease. Given this behaviour, applicability of
the Code for the majority of Sri Lankan companies needs to be investigated more
closely.

Overall

Sub-Index
Board Structure and
Independence

Max
Possible

Table 5.28 Comparison of Index Scores across Sub Samples
Family
Ownership

Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

7

4.48
(64%)

FB
4.30
(61%)

NFB
4.59
(66%)

LFO
4.38
(63%)

SFO
4.85
(69%)

Yes
4.35
(62%)

No
4.82
(69%)

Board Procedure and
Effectiveness

25

14.53

12.22

15.97

13.62

17.85

14.05

15.76

(58%)

(49%)

(64%)

(54%)

(71%)

(56%)

(63%)

Audit Committee
Procedure

10

8.53

7.83

8.97

8.30

9.38

8.56

9.00

(85%)

(78%)

(90%)

(83%)

(94%)

(86%)

(90%)

Directors’
Remuneration Proce.

8

5.43

4.91

5.76

5.30

5.92

5.40

5.53

(68%)

(61%)

(72%)

(66%)

(74%)

(67%)

(69%)

Disclosure Substance

15

9.93

8.65

10.73

9.62

11.08

9.67

10.59

(66%)

(58%)

(72%)

(64%)

(74%)

(64%)

(71%)

4.07

4.04

4.08

4.00

4.31

4.07

4.06

(81%)

(81%)

(82%)

(80%)

(86%)

(81%)

(81%)

4.63

4.39

4.78

4.62

4.69

4.44

5.12

(58%)

(55%)

(60%)

(58%)

(59%)

(56%)

(64%)

9.55

9.35

9.68

9.45

9.92

9.49

9.71

(80%)

(78%)

(81%)

(79%)

(83%)

(79%)

(81%)

61.17

55.70

64.57

59.28

68.00

60.02

64.59

(68%)

(62%)

(72%)

(66%)

(76%)

(67%)

(72%)

Disclosure Reliability

5

Related Party
Transactions

8

Shareholders’ Rights

12

Overall Index Scores

90

Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

The presence of controlling shareholders is a common occurrence for most of
the Sri Lankan companies surveyed. As shown in Table 5.28, the presence of
controlling shareholders has a negative effect on firm compliance to corporate
governance practices. The comparative scores of the sub indices show relatively low
compliance across all dimensions is experienced by companies in which management
decisions are dominated by the controlling shareholders. Many empirical studies show
that firms with controlling shareholders tend to perform better, because they have a
strong incentive to closely monitor their firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and
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Vishny 1986). However, beneficial effects of controlling shareholders should be
expected only when management is separated from ownership, or when proper
corporate governance mechanisms are in place within the companies. These conditions
are generally not met in most Asian companies (Nam and Nam 2004). As in many other
emerging markets in Asia, the ownership of Sri Lankan companies is highly
concentrated with a presence of controlling owners. Furthermore, they are typically
preoccupied with conducting the managerial function themselves due to the perceived
agency problem. Thus, the presence of controlling shareholders can have negative
effects on many dimensions of corporate governance, as evident from the scores of sub
indices across all dimensions of corporate governance examined in this study. In most
Asian countries, directors are handpicked by controlling shareholders, and are used to
dominate boards and thus controlling shareholders are able to force managers to enter
into transactions that are beneficial to them (Nam and Nam 2004). Consistent with these
claims, the lowest level of compliance is observed in respect of board procedure and
related party transactions, as shown in an index score of 56 per cent.

The comparative analysis of corporate governance scores of the six sub samples
across three ownership dimensions provide prima facie evidence that there is a
relationship between ownership and corporate governance of companies. The level of
corporate governance of family owned companies is lower than that of non family
owned companies, indicating a negative impact on the level of corporate governance.
However, foreign ownership has created a positive influence on all dimensions of
corporate governance examined in this study. The presence of controlling shareholders
has created negative impacts on corporate governance.
5.5.2.2 A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Practices across
Ownership Dimensions
The results of a comparative analysis of sub indices’ scores across three
ownership dimensions (refer Section 5.5.2.1) provide prima facie evidence that there is
a relationship between corporate ownership and corporate governance practices in Sri
Lanka. The results suggest that family ownership has a negative influence on
governance practices, whereas foreign ownership has a positive influence on
governance practices. Further, it shows that the presence of a controlling shareholder is
a negative influence on corporate governance practices.

However, how individual

practices have contributed to this behaviour is not evident from this analysis. Thus,
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further analysis is required to diagnose the level of compliance of individual practices in
each corporate governance dimension. In this section, individual governance practices
are comparatively analysed within each dimension of ownership, in order to obtain a
comprehensive view of the level of compliance and the impact of ownership type on
individual corporate governance practices.
a) Board Structure and Board Independence (BSI)
Family Ownership and Compliance to BSI Practices:
The level of compliance of FB with best corporate governance practices in
respect of board structure and board independence is lower than that of NFB. However,
there are different compliance levels observed with regard to individual governance
practices. The level of compliance of FB companies is significantly lower than that of
NFB companies in respect of: having at least 50% of NED’s on the board; appointing
independent directors; selection of NEDs by the board or nomination committee; and,
meetings of NEDs without executive directors to discuss firm affairs (refer items 1, 2, 6
and 7; Table 5.29). These practices have contributed towards the lower BSI index score
of FB companies compared to that of NFB companies. The level of compliance of both
NFB and FB companies is weak in relation to the maintenance of a proper balance of
executive and non-executive directors on the board.
Foreign Ownership and Compliance to BSI practices:
The level of compliance of SFO companies is higher than that of LFO
companies. Compliance requires boards having at least 50% of NEDs; boards having
independent directors; the selection of NEDs by the board or nomination committees;
and, the ability of NEDs to meet without the presence of executive directors in order to
discuss company affairs (refer items 1, 2, 6 and 7 of Table 5.29). Both categories have
adequate numbers of independent directors represented, but are weaker in maintaining a
balance between executive and NEDs. It is evident that the presence of foreign owners
has significantly improved the NEDs and independent directors’ representations as well
as their participation in board activities. The independence of NEDs is also secured by
implementing proper appointment procedures and by facilitating separate meetings for
NEDs. This evidence indicates that the presence of foreign owners has a positive
influence on best governance practices of Sri Lankan companies.
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Observed Variables
BSI Sub-index
1. Board has at least 50% nonexecutive directors (NEDs)
2. Board
has
independent
directors
3. CEO is not chairman of the
board
4. Majority of
NEDs
are
independent
5. Maintain balance of executive
and NEDs
6. Selection of NEDs is done by
the
board
or
nomination
committee
7. Non-executive directors meet
without executive directors to
discuss firm affairs

Overall

Table 5.29 Board Structure and Independence
Family
Ownership

Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

64%

61%

66%

63%

69%

62%

69%

78%

70%

84%

74%

92%

77%

82%

97%

91%

100%

96%

100%

95%

100%

77%

78%

76%

79%

69%

77%

76%

53%

57%

51%

53%

54%

49%

65%

28%

43%

19%

30%

23%

26%

35%

72%

65%

76%

68%

85%

65%

88%

43%

26%

54%

38%

62%

47%

35%

Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

Controlling Ownership and Compliance to BSI Practices:
The presence of controlling shareholders, who consist of both family owners and
foreign owners if they are functioning as controlling shareholders, has a negative impact
on compliance with best governance practices. This is observed in relation to: having at
least 50% NED’s on the board; the appointment of independent directors to the board;
having a majority of independent directors within the NEDs; and, selection of NEDs by
the board or nomination committee (refer items 1, 2, 4 and 6; Table 5.29). Directors’
independence is protected if they are not employed in the company, and if they do not
have a close relationship with any of the company’s affairs. The low level of
compliance with these practices suggests that the presence of controlling shareholders
negatively impacts on the board independence of those companies.

b) Board Procedure and Effectiveness (BPE)
Family Ownership and Compliance to BPE Practices
The levels of compliance of both sub samples of family ownership based subsamples are high in respect of: directors attending at least 75% of meetings on average;
firms holding four or more regular board meetings per year; directors demonstrating
financial acumen; recording of dissents in board minutes; and, NEDs’ not receiving
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retirement pay. However, the survey results provide strong evidence that the compliance
level of FB companies is lower, compared to NFB companies for all the boards’
procedures and practices surveyed. Of these, significantly lower compliance is found in
some practices. Namely they are: the existence of nomination committees; nomination
committees consisting exclusively of NEDs; board appointments made only through
nomination committees; firms having systems to evaluate their CEOs and directors;
firms having board meetings for extended time periods;

and, NEDs’ obtaining

professional advice at their companies’ expense (refer items 8, 9, 11, 15, 18, 19, 20 and
31; Table 5.30).

Furthermore, the following practices have a low level of compliance by FB
companies.

These are namely: the chairing of the nomination committee by an

independent director; transparent procedures for the election of directors; holding four
or more board meetings annually; having board members with financial acumen; having
succession plans for the CEO; and, having bylaws governing board meetings (refer
items 10, 12, 14, 16, 21 and 32; Table 5.30).

The survey results indicate that the functioning of boards and board committees
in the FB companies under review are particularly weak, even though corporate
directors generally agree that their boards are a forum for discussion of significant
corporate matters. In FB companies, boards seem to be inactive in: establishing
nomination committees; evaluating the performance of CEOs; providing regular
training for directors; and, having an ethical code for directors. They are particularly
poor in evaluating and supporting NEDs so that they can contribute effectively as board
members. Independent and NEDs are inadequately supported with necessary
information by way of holding separate meetings with their chairman, and having
access to outside professional services and education and training.
Foreign Ownership and Compliance to BPE Practices
The SFO companies have performed better in all board procedure practices
surveyed except two, as shown in Table 5.30. This is particularly evident in relation to:
the existence of nomination committees; making appointments to the board only
through nomination committees; having one or more outside foreign directors; obtaining
professional advice for NEDs at their company’s expense; and, having bylaws to govern
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board meetings (refer items 8, 11, 28, 31 and 32). Both sub samples show high levels of
compliance in some practices such as: holding four or more board meetings annually;
the board consisting of members with financial acumen; directors attending at least 75
per cent of meetings; recording dissents in the minutes; and, NEDs not receiving
retirement pay. The only practices that are better adhered to by LFO companies are:
that the nomination committee consists exclusively of NEDs; and, there are separate
persons for the roles of CEO and chairperson.

The survey results show the presence of foreign ownership substantially
improves the governance practices relating to board procedures, resulting in an efficient
functioning of boards’ activities. In the majority of SFO companies, the boards have:
established nomination committees; secured formal and transparent procedures for
appointing directors; conducted board meetings regularly; evaluated the performance of
CEOs; provided regular training for directors; and, provided an ethical code for
directors. These companies have also taken several measures to safeguard the
independence of NEDs, securing their active involvement in board functions. In general,
the presence of foreign owners has made a positive impact on every aspect of board
functions.
Controlling Ownership and Compliance to BPE Practices
A negative impact resulting from a presence of controlling shareholders is seen
in most board procedure practices surveyed. The negative impact is particularly high in
respect of: establishing nomination committees; appointing directors; evaluating
performances of the CEO and other directors; having a succession plan for the CEO;
providing regular training; having a code of conduct for directors; ensuring accessibility
of professional advice to NEDs; and, establishing bylaws to govern the procedures of
board meetings. The inactive functioning of nomination committees suggests that
appointments of directors are dominated by controlling shareholders. The true
independence of NEDs is doubtful, judging from their role in the setting of a
performance evaluation system for the CEO and executive directors, and the pattern of
behaviour in conducting separate meetings with the chairperson.
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Overall

Table 5.30 Board Procedure and Effectiveness
Observed Variables

Family
Ownership

Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

BPE Sub-index

58%

49%

64%

54%

71%

56%

63%

8. Nomination committee (NC) exits
9. NC consists exclusively of NEDs
10. NC is chaired by an independent director
11. Appointments to the board are made only
through the NC
12. The firm has
formal and transparent
procedures for the election of directors
13. Directors are subject to a limit on the number
of directorships in other firms
14. Firm holds four (4) or more regular board
meetings per year.
15. Board meetings run for an extended time
period (over 2 hours)
16. Board consists of members with sufficient
financial acumen
17. Directors attend at least 75% of meetings, on
average
18. The firm has a system to evaluate the CEO
19. The firm has a system to evaluate other
executive directors
20. The firm has a system to evaluate NEDs
21. The firm has a succession plan for the CEO
22. The firm has a retirement age for NEDs
23. Directors receive regular training
24. The firm has a code of ethics for directors
25. The board receives materials at least 7 days
in advance of meetings
26. The CEO and chairman are different people
27. Dissents are recorded in the board minutes
28. The firm has one or more foreign directors
29. NED(s) do not receive retirement pay
30. Chairman holds separate meetings for NEDs
31. NEDs can obtain professional advice at the
company’s expense
32. Bylaws to govern board meetings exist

45%
41%
70%

26%
17%
67%

57%
48%
71%

38%
50%
72%

69%
22%
67%

42%
44%
72%

53%
33%
67%

37%

13%

51%

30%

62%

35%

41%

77%

70%

81%

74%

85%

67%

100%

23%

13%

30%

19%

38%

19%

35%

93%

83%

100%

91%

100%

93%

94%

68%

43%

84%

64%

85%

74%

53%

93%

87%

97%

91%

100%

91%

100%

97%
58%

96%
48%

97%
65%

96%
57%

100%
62%

98%
51%

94%
76%

50%
23%
68%
47%
38%
43%

39%
9%
61%
48%
30%
30%

57%
32%
73%
46%
43%
51%

47%
21%
68%
43%
30%
36%

62%
31%
69%
62%
69%
69%

42%
21%
65%
49%
37%
42%

71%
29%
76%
41%
41%
47%

87%
77%
92%
38%
100%
27%

91%
78%
91%
35%
100%
13%

84%
76%
92%
41%
100%
35%

85%
79%
91%
26%
100%
19%

92%
69%
92%
85%
100%
54%

88%
77%
91%
40%
100%
23%

82%
76%
94%
35%
100%
35%

60%
62%

43%
52%

70%
68%

51%
57%

92%
77%

58%
53%

65%
82%

Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

c) Audit Committee Procedure (ACP)
Family Ownership and Compliance to ACP
It is interesting to note that 100 per cent of firms have an audit committee,
irrespective of the category into which they fall. However, FB companies perform
relatively lower than NFB companies in relation to all aspects of audit committee
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procedure, as shown in Table 5.31. This is particularly evident in relation to items 34,
35, 37, 41 and 42, as the majority of NFB companies appoint audit committees with
clearly defined authorities and responsibilities covering a wide range of issues,
compared to FB companies. Out of these variables, the independence of the directors is
obvious in NFB businesses by the high percentages indicated in items 34, 37 and 41.
Further, firms satisfying the recommended frequency of audit committee meetings is
remarkably low (43%) in FB companies, when compared to NFB companies, indicating
relatively low activities carried out by the audit committees of family owned companies.
The lack of independence and the relatively low level of activities carried out by audit
committees of FB companies clearly suggest that the family owners even have control
over the functions of audit committees, although they are meant to be independent from
the executives and owners.

Observed Variables

Overall

Table 5.31 Audit Committee Procedure
Family
Ownership

Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

ACP Sub-index

85%

78%

90%

83%

94%

86%

90%

33. Audit committee (AC) exists
34. AC
has a
majority of
independent directors
35. The firm has terms of
reference to govern AC
36. AC
recommends
the
external auditor to the board
37. AC comprises of exclusively
NEDs
38. AC includes someone with
accounting expertise
39. AC prepares and distributes
minutes for each AC meeting
40. AC meets four or more times
per year
41. AC is chaired by an
independent director
42. AC meets with the auditor to
review financial statements.

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

88%

74%

97%

87%

92%

88%

88%

92%

78%

100%

89%

100%

88%

100%

86%

83%

89%

83%

100%

86%

88%

80%

70%

86%

78%

85%

77%

88%

97%

96%

97%

96%

100%

98%

94%

76%

70%

81%

72%

92%

74%

81%

67%

43%

81%

64%

77%

63%

76%

92%

87%

94%

91%

92%

93%

88%

88%
83%
92%
85%
100%
Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

88%

88%

Foreign Ownership and Compliance to ACP
The SFO companies have better compliance with recommended audit committee
practices. Practices to ensure full compliance are: setting terms of reference to govern
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the audit committee; recommending the external auditor to the full board, meeting
external auditors to review financial statements; and, having someone with accounting
expertise on the committee. This indicates SFO companies have active functioning
committees. Furthermore, they demonstrate greater concern for the committee
relationship with the external auditors and the independence of the committees, as
revealed by higher percentages of compliance in items 34, 36, 37, 41 and 42 of Table
5.31. The frequency of committee meetings of SFO companies also indicates the active
functioning of these committees, indicating foreign ownership has a positive influence
on securing the independence and efficiency of audit committees.
Controlling Ownership and Compliance to ACP
The analysis shows diverse behaviour in relation to audit committee practices.
However, the majority of practices surveyed show relatively low compliance by the
companies with controlling shareholders, for example, having written terms of reference
for the audit committee, and a committee comprising exclusively of NEDs. The
frequency of committee meetings is also relatively low in companies with controlling
shareholders. However, there is not much variation concerning other practices between
the sub samples. This indicates that the controlling shareholders have less influence
over their audit committees.
d) Directors’ Remuneration Procedures (DRP)
Family Ownership and Compliance to DRP
The survey results show that the level of compliance of FB companies to
recommended directors’ remuneration practices is lower in most cases compared to
those of NFB companies. The existence of: a remuneration committee; setting a
remuneration policy; formulating performance-based remuneration schemes; and
reviewing compensation packages, are essential for securing objective remuneration
policies. However, FB companies show low compliance levels with these practices.
Only 68per cent of FB companies surveyed have a remuneration committee comprising
a majority of NEDs, questioning their independence. The independent directors’
participation in remuneration committees, the written policies on directors’
remuneration and the formulation of performance based remuneration schemes seem to
be less essential for FB companies, indicating the power of family ownership in
deciding remuneration policies.
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Observed Variables

Overall

Table 5.32 Directors’ Remuneration Procedures
Family
Ownership

Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

DR Sub-index

68%

61%

72%

66%

74%

67%

69%

43. RC exists
44. RC comprises majority of
independent directors
45. RC chaired by an independent
director
46. Company has a written policies on
directors’ remuneration
47. Executive directors’ remuneration is
(at least part) performance based
48. The board review CEO
compensation annually
49. Executive Directors’ Incentive
Schemes are approved by the
Shareholders
50. Dissents are recorded in the RC
minutes

97%

96%

97%

96%

100%

98%

94%

78%

68%

83%

78%

77%

79%

75%

81%

91%

75%

82%

77%

83%

75%

67%

50%

78%

62%

85%

69%

63%

63%

39%

78%

62%

69%

58%

76%

75%

61%

84%

74%

77%

70%

88%

12%

13%

11%

11%

15%

12%

12%

81%
86%
78%
78%
92%
Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

79%

88%

Foreign Ownership and Compliance to DRP
The SFO companies show better commitment to governance practices relating to
directors’ remuneration than that of LFO companies. This is evident from higher
compliance to most of the remuneration practices surveyed in the study. In particular,
the existence of remuneration committees in all SFO companies and a written
remuneration policy for the majority of companies, suggests that foreign ownership
applies pressure to boards to establish proper procedures and policies concerning
directors’ remuneration.

Controlling Ownership and Compliance to DRP
The existence of controlling owners impacts on directors’ remuneration
procedures and policies. The survey indicates relatively low compliance with
recommended practices by the companies with controlling shareholders. For example,
practice regarding performance-based remuneration is less compliant by the companies
with controlling owners than recommended practices. This is further evident from the
practices listed in items 48 and 50 of Table 5.32, which substantiate the controlling
shareholders’ negative influence on directors’ remuneration and committee procedures.
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e) Disclosure Substance (DS) and Disclosure Reliability (DR)
Family Ownership and Compliance to DS and DR Practices
Both sub samples have fully complied with disclosing Statements of Corporate
Governance, RPTs, and resumes of directors (refer items 56 and 57 and 63; Table 5.33)
which are mandatory requirements under the Colombo Stock Exchange Listing Rules of
2009. Furthermore, both sub samples show relatively low compliance with regard to the
disclosure of information on the web compared to disclosures in the Annual Reports. It
seems that Sri Lankan companies greatly rely on Annual Report disclosures instead of
disclosing relevant information through their web sites. Apart from these distinguishing
features, the level of compliance of FB companies is relatively low for all the disclosure
practices surveyed.

In FB companies, the levels of web disclosures are exceedingly low, indicating
voluntary disclosers are not encouraged by these companies. For example, while FB
companies fully comply with publishing Corporate Governance Statements in their
Annual Reports, a very low percentage (4%) publishes their Corporate Governance
Reports on the web.

The family owners’ negative influence on voluntary disclosures is further
evident by the very low percentage (22%) of companies disclosing their directors’ share
dealings on their company’s web site. Annual Report disclosures also show that FB
companies have a relatively low level of disclosure for all the practices surveyed.
Concerning disclosures of committee reports, it is clear that FB companies have lower
disclosure (items 58, 59 and 60; Table 5.33) than that of their counterparts. Though the
disclosure of directors’ remuneration has been unsatisfactory in both sub samples, it is
remarkably low for FB companies. The separate disclosure of audit and non-audit fees
also shows poor compliance by FB companies. This evidence suggests that while
voluntary disclosures remain at low levels for all the companies under review, the issue
of low voluntary disclosure is further aggravated by the existence of controlling family
ownership in Sri Lankan companies.

Disclosure reliability always goes hand in hand with the external auditor since it
is an auditor’s responsibility to give an opinion on the financial information. In this
respect, securing external auditors’ independence is important in enhancing the
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reliability of financial information. The level of compliance regarding the audit
committee review, and the rotation of audit partners securing auditors’ independence is
higher in NFB companies compared to those of FB companies (refer items 68, 69 and
70; Table 5.34). This provides further evidence that FB companies show a lack of
interest not only in providing voluntary information, but also in protecting the reliability
of financial information.
Table 5.33 Disclosure Substance
Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

66%

58%

72%

64%

74%

64%

71%

23%

22%

24%

19%

38%

23%

24%

55%

43%

62%

51%

69%

49%

71%

62%

43%

73%

60%

69%

60%

65%

57%

43%

65%

53%

69%

58%

53%

12%

4%

16%

11%

15%

9%

18%

56. Disclose a Statement of Corporate
Governance in the AR
57. Disclose RPTs in the AR

100%
100%

100%
100%

100%
100%

100%
100%

100%
100%

100%
100%

100%
100%

58. Disclose AC Report in the AR

90%

78%

97%

87%

100%

88%

94%

59. Disclose RC Report in the AR

73%

61%

81%

66%

100%

72%

76%

60. Disclose NC Report in the AR
67%
50%
71%
61%
78%
61. Disclose Risk Management
Policies in the AR
82%
74%
86%
83%
77%
62. Disclose membership of AC, RC
and NC
97%
91%
100%
96%
100%
63. Disclose Resume of directors in the
AR
100%
100%
100%
100% 100%
64. Disclosure of Directors’
Remuneration
28%
22%
32%
28%
31%
65. Disclosure of Audit and Non-audit
fees separately in the AR
85%
70%
95%
85%
85%
Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

61%

78%

81%

82%

95%

100%

100%

100%

26%

35%

79%

100%

Observed Variables
DS Sub-index
Web disclosures
51. Firm put directors’ shares dealings
on the web
52. Discloses quarterly financial
statements on the web
53. Firms put their Annual Report on
the web
54. Firms put the Directors’ Report on
the web
55. Discloses Corporate Governance
Report on the web
Annual Report (AR) Disclosures

Overall

Family
Ownership

Foreign Ownership and Compliance to DS and DR Practices
The level of disclosure of SFO companies is higher than that of LFO companies
across all disclosure practices surveyed, showing a positive impact of foreign share
ownership on disclosures. With regard to web disclosures, SFO companies have done
better, particularly in disclosing financial statements and directors’ reports, compared to
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LFO companies (refer items 52, 53 and 54; Table 5.33). Similarly, the disclosure of
committee reports has been well adhered to by SFO companies, indicating these
companies not only ensure the proper functioning of board sub committees, but are also
interested in communicating those procedures to shareholders to enhance confidence
among non-controlling shareholders. However, it seems that foreign ownership achieves
limited success in disclosing directors’ share dealings and remuneration.

The measures taken by SFO companies to protect the reliability of information
are higher than that of LFO companies. Practices such as rotating audit partners and
reviews conducted by the audit committees, which are essential in protecting an external
auditor’s independence, are compliant more often in the case of SFO companies,
compared to LFO companies.

However, SFO companies obtain more non-audit

services from their external auditors, which is detrimental to the independence of
external auditors. Apart from this, SFO companies better protect all other practices,
safeguarding the auditor’s independence and suggesting foreign ownership has a
positive influence on protecting disclosure reliability in Sri Lanka.

Observed Variables

Overall

Table 5.34 Disclosure Reliability - Auditor Independence
Family
Ownership
FB

NFB

Foreign
Ownership
LFO

Controlling
Owners

SFO

Yes

No

DR Sub-index
81%
81%
82%
80%
86%
66. Auditor does not provide non-audit
services or non-audit fees are
<20% of total auditor fees
70%
74%
68%
74%
54%
67. Full board reviews auditor's
100
recommendations
95%
%
92%
94%
100%
68. Audit partner is rotated every 5
years
68%
65%
70%
66%
77%
69. AC recommends the external
auditor to full board
86%
83%
89%
83%
100%
70. AC conduct a formal review of the
auditor’s work
88%
83%
92%
85%
100%
Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

81%

81%

72%

65%

95%

94%

67%

71%

86%

88%

86%

94%

Controlling Ownership and Compliance to DS and DR Practices
The level of disclosures both on the web and in annual reports is lower for the
companies with controlling shareholders. It is clearly visible in respect of the disclosure
of both quarterly and annual financial statements on the web. A similar behaviour is
observed in the annual reports in respect of disclosure of board sub committees’ reports
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and non-audit fees (refer items 58, 59, 60 and 65). However, the practices required to
protect disclosure reliability shows diverse behaviour between both sub samples.
f) Related Party Transactions (RPTs)
Family Ownership and Compliance to RPTs Practices
Table 5.35 shows the impact of family ownership on the nature, volume and the
required approval level for RPTs. The results confirm that FB companies compared to
NFB companies carry out a relatively higher number of RPTs in the form of trade
transactions, loans and property leases or rented properties. The volume of RPTs is also
larger in FB companies. The approvals of shareholders, the audit committee, or nonconflicted directors are not required to generate RPTs with executives and controlling
shareholders for the majority of companies in both sub samples (refer items 77 and 78,
Table 5.35). However, the exceedingly low required approval level in FB companies
indicates that the family owners have full control over RPTs.

Table 5.35 Related Party Transactions

RPT Sub-index
71. Firm does not have loans with
insiders
72. Firm does not have significant
sales to or purchases from
insiders
73. Firm does not rent real property
from or to an insider

Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

58%

55%

60%

58%

59%

56%

64%

83%

83%

84%

81%

92%

84%

82%

78%

74%

81%

79%

77%

84%

65%

78%

83%

76%

79%

77%

70%

100%

33%

65%

74%
86%

100%
94%

9%

0%

5%

6%

Overall

Observed Variables

Family
Ownership

74. Firm had negligible revenue
from RPTs (0-1% of sales)
42%
35%
46%
47%
23%
75. RPTs are reviewed by the board
in the last year
82%
74%
86%
79%
92%
76. RPTs are on arms-length terms
88%
83%
92%
87%
92%
77. RPTs with executives approved
by non-conflicted directors or
7%
4%
8%
4%
15%
AC or shareholders
78. RPTs with controlling
shareholders approved by nonconflicted directors or AC or
5%
4%
5%
6%
0%
shareholders
Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies
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Foreign Ownership and Compliance to RPTs Practices
Foreign ownership does not materially change the nature, volume or required
approval level of RPTs. Both sub samples in the foreign ownership group show
comparable results for most of the aspects surveyed in relation to RPTs. A relatively
high volume of RPTs are carried out by companies in both sub samples, and the
majority of companies (over 95%) do not require shareholders’ or non-conflicting
directors’ approval to initiate RPTs. This raises doubts as to how the boards deliver
accountability towards their stakeholders, including non-controlling shareholders, with
respect to RPTs.

Controlling Ownership and Compliance to RPTs Practices
As discussed in Section 5.4.8, one persistent problem of RPTs in Sri Lankan
companies is the presence of dominant shareholders, who are instrumental in initiating
RPTs. As revealed in the results, companies with controlling shareholders are involved
with a large number of RPTSs in terms of property leases or rent transactions (refer
items 73; Table 5.35). It is observed that there is a lack of a full board review, and the
low levels of approvals required for companies with controlling owners (refer items 75,
77 and 78). The required level of approval is low for both sub samples. However, a lack
of board review and low approval levels, in combination with the presence of
controlling owners, could be detrimental to the objective and impartial functioning of
RPTs, indicating possible misappropriation of resources causing value deterioration of
such firms.
g) Shareholders’ Rights (SR)
Family Ownership and Compliance to SR
In the family ownership based sub sample, both categories have adequately
complied with practices relating to shareholders’ rights. Almost all companies in both
sub samples have complied with shareholders’ voting rights (refer items 79 and 82 in
Table 5.36) which is a mandatory requirement of the Sri Lankan Companies Act 2007.
The companies in both sub samples have adequately complied with proxy rights
providing an opportunity to shareholders to appoint a representative to be present and
vote at the AGM on their behalf. On the other hand, there is no practice in Sri Lankan
quoted public companies to include a separate item on the AGM’s agenda to provide
shareholders with an opportunity to raise questions. However, companies of both
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categories give an opportunity to their shareholders to express their views. (refer to item
86). Similarly high compliance is noted in both sub samples regarding the board sub
committees’ chairmen participating in the AGM to answer shareholders’ questions
(refer to item 87). However, as for: transparency issues of RPTs; guidelines in respect of
directors’ share dealings; and, having board representation from minority shareholders,
it is obvious that NFB companies have better compliance than the FB companies (refer
items 84, 89 & 90 of Table 5.36). Apart from these aspects, family ownership does not
have any material impact, either positive or negative, on shareholders’ rights.

Foreign Ownership and Compliance to SR
In many aspects of shareholders’ rights, the SFO companies show higher
compliance than do LFO companies. The SFO companies compared to LFO companies
(refer items 81 and 82 of Table 5.36) exercise a higher percentage of voting by mail and
proxy rights. While both groups allow time for shareholders to raise questions at the
AGM (refer item 86, Table 5.36), a higher percentage of compliance is noted in the SFO
category regarding revealing director candidates prior to the AGM, and the presence of
committee chairmen at board meetings to answer questions (refer items 85 and 87).
Regarding transparency issues of RPTs, and guidelines in respect of directors’ share
dealings, it is obvious that SFO companies have better compliance than LFO companies
(refer items 89 and 90 of Table 5.36). Such evidence supports the argument that the
presence of foreign owners enhances the protection of shareholders’ rights in Sri Lanka.
Controlling Ownership and Compliance to Shareholder Rights
The results show that the existence of controlling shareholders impacts on the
protection of shareholders’ rights. A higher percentage of proxy rights and a weaker
percentage of voting by mail are common features in both sub samples (refer items 81
and 82 of Table 5.36). Furthermore, adequate time is allowed to shareholders to raise
questions at the AGM by both sub groups (refer item 86 of Table 5.36). However, the
companies with controlling owners have lower compliance regarding the following
practices: revealing directorship candidates prior to the AGM; the presence of
committee chairmen at board meetings to answer questions; disclosure of RPTs at
shareholders’ meetings, and the availability of guidelines for directors’ share dealings
(refer items 85, 87, 89 and 90 of Table 5.36). The existence of controlling shareholders
results in the erosion of some rights of non-controlling shareholders.
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Table 5.36 Shareholder Rights
Foreign
Ownership

Controlling
Owners

FB

NFB

LFO

SFO

Yes

No

80%

78%

81%

79%

83%

79%

81%

90%
93%

91%
91%

89%
95%

91%
94%

85%
92%

93%
91%

82%
100%

28%

30%

27%

23%

46%

28%

29%

97%

96%

97%

96%

100%

98%

94%

90%

96%

86%

89%

92%

88%

94%

40%

35%

43%

43%

31%

42%

35%

72%

61%

78%

70%

77%

67%

82%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

95%

96%

95%

94%

100%

93%

100%

97%

96%

97%

96%

100%

98%

94%

97%

96%

97%

96%

100%

95%

100%

56%

59%

Overall

Family
Ownership

Observed Variables

SR Sub-index
79. There is no deviation from the one
share-one vote rule
80. Directors serve three-year terms
81. Firm allows voting by mail
82. Anybody can serve as a proxy
83. There is no extraordinary meeting
on the shareholders’ request in the
last 3 years
84. Board has one or more minority
shareholder representatives
85. Firm discloses directorship
candidates to shareholders prior to
the AGM
86. Adequate time is given to
shareholders to ask questions at
the AGM.
87. Chairpersons of Board Committees
are available at the AGM
88. Shareholders’ priority subscription
right in the issuance of shares or
convertible bonds is adequately
protected
89. RPTs are fully discussed with
adequate information at the
shareholders’ meeting
90. There are written guidelines in
respect of directors’ share dealings
with the firm

57%
48%
62%
53%
69%
Note: FB – Family Based Companies; NFB – Non Family Based Companies;
LFO – Less Foreign owned companies; SFO – Substantially Foreign Owned companies

5.5.3 Impact of Ownership on Level of Corporate Governance
Compliance
The comparative analysis of sub indices scores (refer Section 5.5.2.1), and the
analyses of ownership impacts on individual practices (refer Section 5.5.2.2), suggest
that corporate ownership influences the level of compliance to regulations of corporate
governance practices in Sri Lankan companies. The impact of ownership on the level of
compliance is verified statistically in this section in order to provide evidence on the
findings of the preceding sections.

180

5.5.3.1 Impact of Family Ownership
The results of the comparative analysis of the corporate governance sub indices
(refer Table 5.28) and individual practices (refer Section 5.5.2.2) indicate that family
ownership negatively influences corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan
companies. In order to provide robust evidence on these issues, a t-test for independent
samples using family based sub samples is performed. The purpose of this test is to
discover whether there is a statistically significant difference between the sub samples.
Furthermore, it identifies the most affected dimensions of corporate governance.
Table 5.37 Results of t-test on Index Scores - Family based Sub-samples
This table shows the statistical significance of the corporate governance index score and sub-indices
scores of two sub samples identified based on family ownership. The statistical significance is examined
based on the independent sample t-test.
Mean
FB

NFB

Std. Deviation
FB
NFB

BSI

4.30

4.59

1.46

1.040

-.290

-.899

58

.372

BPE

12.22

15.97

4.61

4.573

-3.756***

-3.083

58

.003

ACP

7.83

8.97

1.67

1.607

-1.147**

-2.648

58

.010

DRP

4.91

5.76

1.70

1.188

-.844**

-2.260

58

.028

DS

8.65

10.73

2.93

1.851

-2.078***

-3.371

58

.001

DR

4.04

4.08

0.77

.862

-.038

-.171

58

.865

RPT
4.39
4.78
0.99
1.031
-.392
-1.456
58
SR
9.35
9.68
1.47
1.180
-.328
-.953
58
Overall Index
55.70
64.57
9.46
8.444
-8.872***
-3.777
58
Level of significance: ***1% level and **5%level (based on the ‘p-value’ of t-statistics)

.151
.344
.000

CG Index

Mean
Difference

T

df

Sig.
p-value

As shown in Table 5.37, there are negative mean differences across all sub
indices and the overall index. This suggests that the level of corporate governance
compliance of FB companies is lower than that of NFB companies. The negative mean
difference for the overall governance index is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, the negative mean differences of four sub indices are statistically
significant. The mean differences of the board procedure and effectiveness sub index
and the disclosure substance sub index are significant at the 1% level, whereas the mean
difference of the audit committee procedure index and the directors’ remuneration index
are significant at the 5% level. These results therefore statistically confirm that family
ownership has a negative impact on the compliance of corporate governance best
practices in Sri Lankan companies.

181

The results indicate that the most negatively affected governance dimensions
are: board procedure; audit committee procedure; directors’ remuneration procedure;
and, disclosure substance. The results confirm the findings of previous research studies
carried out on the relationship between family ownership and corporate governance.
Nam and Nam (2004) claim that most large corporations owned and controlled by
families have their members holding key managerial positions. They further state that
corporate management tends to consist of controlling owners, and therefore boards of
directors in family-based enterprises serve primarily the interests of controlling families
rather than those of all shareholders. This behaviour appears to be true in Sri Lanka, as
board procedures and directors’ remuneration procedures have least priority by family
controlled companies.
Cheung and Chan (2004) state that the most significant corporate governance
issue caused by family ownership is the alignment of interests between the controlling
shareholders and the non-controlling shareholders. The proper functioning of both the
board and the audit committee and adequate disclosures are important dimensions of
corporate governance in safeguarding minority shareholders’ rights. However, a lack of
emphasis placed on these aspects indicates that minority shareholders’ rights are not
adequately protected in Sri Lankan family owned companies. The lack of applicability
of the Sri Lankan Corporate Governance Code, which has been developed on the
fundamentals of the Anglo-Saxon model, could contribute to the low level of
governance compliance experienced by family owned companies. Iu and Batten (2001)
observe that Asian cultures significantly impede the implementation of the Anglo-Saxon
model of corporate governance. The relationship-based business, especially within the
family owned group affiliation, is a common cultural tendency in Sri Lanka. Thus, the
results suggest that the Anglo-Saxon model is more alien within the family-based
companies where both ownership and management tend to be concentrated with family
members.
5.5.3.2 Impact of Foreign Ownership
The impact of foreign ownership on firm compliance with corporate governance
practices is also tested using a t-test for independent samples, to discover whether there
is a statistically significant difference between sub-samples recognized based on foreign
ownership of the sample companies. Findings indicate (refer Section 5.5.2) that the
presence of foreign ownership enhances the level of compliance with corporate
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governance best practices of Sri Lankan companies. The results of the t-test, given in
Table 5.38 provide further evidence to support this claim.

Table 5.38 Results of t-test on Index Scores - Foreign based Sub-samples
This table shows the statistical significance of the corporate governance index score and sub-indices
scores of two sub samples identified based on foreign ownership. The statistical significance is examined
based on the independent sample t-test.
Mean
SFO
LFO

Std. Deviation
SFO
LFO

BSI

4.85

4.38

1.144

BPE

17.85

13.62

ACP

9.38

8.30

DR

5.92

DS

CG Index

Mean
Difference

T

df

Sig.
p-value

1.23

.463

1.222

58

.227

5.080

4.49

4.229***

2.920

58

.005

.870

1.82

1.087***

3.033

58

.004

5.30

1.115

1.52

.625

1.383

58

.172

11.08

9.62

2.100

2.55

1.460**

2.112

58

.046

DR

4.31

4.00

.630

0.86

.308

1.201

58

.235

RPT

4.69

4.62

1.032

1.03

.075

.233

58

.817

SR

9.92

9.45

1.038

1.35

.476

1.178

58

.244

Overall Index
68.00
59.28
7.927
9.47
8.723***
3.035
Level of significance: ***1% level and **5%level (based on the ‘p-value’ of t-statistics)

58

.004

The results show that there are positive mean differences in scores of the overall
index and the sub indices. This suggests that the level of corporate governance
compliance of SFO companies is higher than that of LFO companies. The positive mean
difference for the overall governance index is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The result confirms that companies with foreign ownership have healthier governance
structures, which encourages them to comply with most of the best corporate
governance practices recommended by SLCGC (2008). Furthermore, the positive mean
differences of the BPE sub index score and the ACP sub index score are statistically
significant at the 1% level, while the mean difference of the DS sub index score is
statistically significant at the 5% level. This provides further evidence that board
procedures, audit committee procedures, and disclosure requirements are better
complied with by foreign owned companies compared to their counterparts. These
results statistically confirm that foreign ownership has a positive impact on compliance
with corporate governance best practices by Sri Lankan companies.

The results are consistent with the findings of prior research studies on corporate
ownership. Nam and Nam (2004) in their study on corporate governance in Asia, found
that firms substantially owned by foreigners have much higher corporate governance
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compliance in Asian countries, especially in Korea. They further observe that the
substantially foreign-owned firms tend to have a more effective board of directors. The
foreign owners generally demand higher quality corporate governance. A similar
behaviour is observed in substantially foreign owned Sri Lankan companies. The high
compliance with board procedures, audit committee procedures, and corporate
disclosures, indicate foreign owners are particularly interested in establishing good
internal governance structures. Furthermore, the results suggest that substantially
foreign-owned companies are likely to be more comfortable with an Anglo-Saxon
model of corporate governance, compared with family owned companies.
5.5.3.3 Impact of Controlling Ownership
Although high ownership concentration is common among Asian corporations
(Claessens and Fan, 2002, Balasubramanian et al., 2010), its impact on corporate
governance is less explored in the Asian context. A high ownership concentration is
observed amongst surveyed companies (refer Table 5.5), with the presence of
controlling shareholders in the majority of companies surveyed (refer Table 5.6). The
comparative analysis (refer Section 5.5.2) found a negative impact of controlling
ownership on corporate governance in Sri Lankan companies. However, the claim that a
presence of controlling shareholders acts as an impediment to establishing efficient
governance structures and causes low levels of compliance to corporate governance best
practices, requires further evidence to prove the validity of this claim. With a view to
providing further evidence to support this claim, a t-test for independent samples, using
categories of the presence or the absence of controlling shareholders, is carried out, The
results of this test is given in the Table 5.39.
The results show that there are negative mean differences across all sub indices
scores and the score of the overall index. This suggests that the presence of controlling
shareholders is detrimental to establishing effective governance structures in these
companies. Furthermore, the negative mean differences of BSI sub index score and RPT
sub index score are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. This
indicates that the most negatively affected corporate governance dimensions are RPTs
and the structure and independence of board. These findings are consistent with prior
research findings and assertions. Claessens and Fan (2002) state that: weak enforcement
of property rights; weak legal systems; poor law enforcement; and, corruption are the
most probable causes of concentrated ownership of Asian companies, and that this
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contributes to controlling shareholders expropriating minority shareholders’ resources.
Particularly, the low level of compliance relating to board structure and independence,
and RPTs, raises similar concerns in Sri Lanka as controlling shareholders frequently
use RPTs as a vehicle for expropriating resources from minority shareholders
Table 5.39 Results of t-test on Index Scores - Controlling Ownership
This table shows the statistical significance of the corporate governance index score and sub-indices
scores of two sub samples identified based on ownership concentration. The statistical significance is
examined based on the independent sample t-test.
Mean

Std. Deviation

Con
OS

Disp.
OS

Con
OS

Disp.
OS

Mean
Difference

t

df

Sig.
pvalue

BSI

4.35

4.82

1.33

0.81

-0.475*

-1.375

58

0.098

BPE

14.05

15.76

4.77

5.19

-1.718

-1.227

58

0.225

ACP

8.56

8.47

1.48

2.24

0.088

0.177

58

0.860

DR

5.40

5.53

1.24

1.94

-0.134

-0.319

58

0.751

DS

9.67

10.59

2.50

2.50

-0.914

-1.274

58

0.208

DR

4.07

4.06

0.80

0.90

0.011

0.046

58

0.963

RPT

4.44

5.12

1.03

0.86

-0.676**

-2.393

58

0.020

SR

9.49

9.71

1.33

1.21

-0.218

-0.583

58

0.562

Overall Index
60.02
64.06
9.22
10.87
-4.036
-1.452
Level of significance: ***1% level and **5%level (based on the ‘p-value’ of t-statistics)
Note: Con OS – Controlling Ownership; Disp. OS – Dispersed Ownership

58

0.152

CG Index

5.6 Impact of Corporate Governance Compliance on Firm
Performance
Better corporate governance is supposed to lead to better corporate performance,
by preventing expropriation by controlling shareholders, and ensuring better decision
making. Good governance restricts the expropriation of corporate resources by
managers and controlling shareholders and contributes to a better financial performance
(Irena, 2006). Investors are willing to invest more in better-governed companies
because of the lower cost of capital, contributing to better share performance for those
companies (Jianguo et al., 2006). However, there is a dearth of studies exploring the
relationship between the quality of corporate governance and firm performance.
Furthermore, observations show that the high ownership concentration in Sri Lankan
companies is creating negative impacts on corporate governance (refer Section 5.5.3).
This study assesses the extent of such a link based on a questionnaire survey, and in
doing so realizes the fifth objective of the study; the impact of compliance with
corporate governance best practices on the firm performance of Sri Lankan listed
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companies. This is examined on the premise that better governance enhances firms’
performance.

In order to examine the performance implications of corporate governance
compliance, the sample divides into two sub samples, as high compliance and low
compliance companies based on the overall index score. The maximum possible value
of the overall index score is 90. Based on mean value of the index score, a company that
has scored 61 or more for the overall index is defined as a high compliance company,
whereas an overall index score less than 61 is considered as a low compliance company.
Under this objective the sub samples of high and low compliance companies are
analysed in relation to both financial performance and market performance, based on
correlation analysis and t-tests for the independent sample as indicated in Section
4.5.3.4. The analysis addresses two issues: first whether high corporate governance
compliance improves the financial performance of Sri Lankan companies; and, secondly
whether high corporate governance compliance improves the market performance of Sri
Lankan companies. The results of these analyses are presented and discussed in the
subsequent sections.

5.6.1 Summary Statistics
The key descriptive statistics of the overall index score and the performance
variables are reported in Table 5.40. As per this table, the mean overall index score is
61 (out of 90), with a standard deviation of 9.7, and high dispersion values, between a
minimum of 39 and a maximum of 80. Similar behaviour is indicated in respect of high
compliance as well as low compliance in the sub sample. This indicates that compliance
to corporate governance best practice varies substantially across companies. As shown
in the Table 5.40, the ROA of firms in the sample have a mean value of 5.3 per cent,
and a high standard deviation, as well as high dispersion between the minimum and
maximum values. However, the mean values of the ROA between high compliance and
low compliance sub samples differ significantly, with a positive mean value for high
compliance companies and a negative mean value for low compliance companies. This
suggests that high compliance leads to companies’ better financial performance. A
similar behaviour emerges in respect of return on equity (ROE). Thus, financial
performance measures appear to improve with an increase in compliance with corporate
governance best practices. On the contrary, the mean values of both market performance
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measures (Tobin Q and MBR) are high for the low compliance sub sample, compared
with high compliance companies.
Table 5.40 Descriptive Statistics of Performance and Index Scores
This table shows the Descriptive Statistics of the firm performance and governance index score of the
overall sample and two sub samples identified based on compliance to governance practices. A
governance score value over 61 (out of maximum possible 90) is considered as high compliance whereas
a value less than 61 is considered low compliance.
Mean

Std. Devi.

Minimum

Maximum

61.183
5.336

9.788
9.616

39
-8.290

80
46.754

ROE

4.828

27.520

-156.676

103.156

Tobin Q

1.088

0.443

0.468

3.535

MBR
Sub Sample of High Compliance Firms
Index Score

1.383

1.257

0.092

6.958

67.639

5.861

61

80

ROA

9.031

10.519

-8.290

46.754

ROE

Overall Sample
Index Score
ROA

14.193

17.799

-19.484

103.156

Tobin Q

1.044

0.298

0.677

3.535

MBR
Sub Sample of Low Compliance Firms
Index Score

1.055

0.689

0.092

6.958

51.458

5.445

39

58

ROA

-0.206

3.927

-6.305

24.582

ROE

-9.220

33.428

-156.676

32.163

Tobin Q

1.154

0.599

0.468

1.838

MBR

1.875

1.706

0.449

4.753

N
60

36

24

5.6.2 Correlations Analyses and t-test Results
Correlations:
The results presented in Table 5.41 indicate the extent of correlation between the
overall index scores and performance variables used in this study. It shows that there is
a positive relationship between the index score and financial performance measures. In
the overall sample, there is a statistically positive relationship between the level of
corporate governance and ROE at the 5% level. This indicates that financial
performance tends to increase with an increase in the level of compliance to corporate
governance. In the case of ROE, it is more likely that the level of compliance improves
the ROE, as the correlation is statistically significant at the 5% level. In both sub
samples, the financial performance measures and index score are positively correlated,
indicating that governance compliance improves firms’ performance.
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However, both Tobin’s Q and MBR negatively relate to the governance index
score for the overall sample, as well as for the sub samples. The negative correlation
suggests that high corporate governance compliance causes a negative impact on market
prices. Thus, it is difficult to establish a clear relationship between compliance to
corporate governance and performance of Sri Lankan firms. The relationship between
governance compliance and financial performance is positive whereas it is negative for
market performance measures. The negative relationship could derive from the market’s
anomalies and inefficiencies. Further analysis is required to recognize the causes of this
behaviour.
Table 5.41 Correlation Matrix for Firm Performance and Index Scores
This table shows the correlation of firm performance and the governance index score of the overall
sample and two sub samples identified based on compliance to governance practices. Governance score
values over 61 (out of maximum possible 90) are considered as high compliance, whereas values less than
61 are considered low compliance.
Index
Overall Sample
Score
ROA
ROE
Tobin Q
MBR
Index Score
1
ROA

.198

1

ROE

.333**

.610**

1

Tobin Q

-.006

.139

.037

1

MBR

-.200

.019

-.214

.826**

Sub Sample of High Compliance Firms
Index Score

1

ROA

.161

1

ROE

.156

.866**

Tobin Q
MBR

ROE

1

.007

.178

.070

1

-.003

.188

.170

.963**

Sub Sample of Low Compliance Firms
Index Score
ROA

1

1

1
.222

1

.248

.128

1

Tobin Q

-.155

-.280

-.003

1

MBR

-.224

-.167

-.436*

.672**

1

Note: ** and * indicate correlation significant at 1% and 5% respectively

The t-test for Independent Samples:
The summary statistics (Section 5.6.1) and the correlation analyses of the overall
index scores and performance measures indicate that there is a positive relationship
between corporate governance compliance and the financial performance of Sri Lankan
companies. It further shows that the relationship is negative for market performance
measures. In order to provide robust evidence on these issues, a t-test for independent
188

samples is undertaken based on high compliance and low compliance sub samples. The
main purpose of the test is to discover whether there is a statistically significant
difference in performance between these sub samples.
Table 5.42 Results of t-test on Performance and Index Scores
This table shows the statistical significance of both the firm performance and governance index scores of
two sub samples identified based on compliance to governance practices. A governance score value over
61 (out of maximum possible score of 90) is considered as high compliance, whereas a value less than 61
is considered low compliance. The statistical significance is examined based on the independent sample ttest.
Mean
Performance
and Index

Std. Deviation

High
Comp.
Firms

Low
Comp.
Firms

High
Comp.
Firms

Low
Comp.
Firms

ROA

9.031

-0.206

10.519

3.927

9.237***

4.106

58

.000

ROE

14.193

-9.220

17.799

33.428

23.413***

3.528

58

.001

Tobin Q

1.044

1.154

0.298

0.599

-0.110

-0.945

58

.349

MBR

1.055

1.875

0.689

1.706

-0.819**

-2.591

58

.012

58

.000

Mean
Difference

t

Index Score
67.639 51.458
5.861
5.445
16.181*** 10.773
Level of significance: ***1% level and **5%level (based on the ‘p-value’ of t-statistics)

df

Sig. pvalue

The mean differences of ROA and ROE are positive and are statistically
significant at the 1% level, as shown in Table 5.42. This provides robust evidence that
compliance to corporate governance best practices has a significant positive relationship
with the financial performance of Sri Lankan companies. On the contrary to the
expected value implications of corporate governance, the mean differences for Tobin Q
and MBR are negative, suggesting high corporate governance compliance causes
negative price impacts in the market. This abnormal price behaviour could result from
market anomalies and inefficiencies prevailing in the Sri Lankan stock market.

The results of financial performance are consistent with the findings of previous
research carried out on the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and
firm performance. The studies of Klapper and Love (2002), and Brown and Gorgens
(2009) show that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating
and financial performance of firms. Brown and Gorgens (2009) specifically found that
companies with better corporate governance outperformed those companies that are less
compliant in relation to ROA and earnings per share (EPS). Based on corporate
governance rankings for 495 firms in 25 emerging markets, Klapper and Love (2002)
found that better governance is highly correlated to operating performance. They also
find that corporate governance provisions at the firm level matter more in countries with
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weak legal environments. Consistent with these findings, the results of this study
suggest that firm level corporate governance provisions play a critical role in improving
financial performance of Sri Lankan companies. It also suggests that good governance
possibly restricts the expropriation of corporate resources by managers and controlling
shareholders, securing better financial performance of the companies, which operate in
a weak legal enforcement environment.

Many empirical studies that investigate the relationship between corporate
governance quality and firm value show positive results. For example, the studies of
Black et al. (2003), Campos et al. (2002), Klapper and Love (2002) and Gompers et al.
(2003) show a positive relationship between overall quality of corporate governance and
the market value of firms. However, the results of this study show a negative
relationship, possibly resulting from market anomalies prevailing in Sri Lanka. In most
small markets, market prices are subject to manipulations, signalling, group behaviour,
and mistakes (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). In addition to market anomalies,
variable measurement problems such as the use of the proxy Tobin’s Q (refer Section
4.5.3.4) and the availability of a relatively small sample could have resulted in
estimation errors. Due to these reasons, the validity of market performance measures is
debatable, especially in an emerging market where market anomalies and inefficiencies
play a dominant role in deciding the market price for securities. In order to address these
problems, a further study with a larger sample incorporating both longitudinal and cross
sectional data is carried out, the results of which are discussed in Chapter 6.

5.7 Summary
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical analysis relevant to objectives
two to five of this study. The analysis of objective two reveals diverse compliance
levels in relation to corporate governance practices recommended in the SLCGC. The
functions of boards and board committees in the companies under review are generally
weak. The boards seem to be inactive in: evaluating performance and replacing CEOs;
evaluating performance and setting performance based remuneration packages for
executives; and, establishing nomination committees. They are particularly poor in
evaluating and supporting directors so that they may contribute effectively as board
members. Non-executive and independent directors are inadequately supported, in being
provided with: necessary information; access to outside professional services; and,
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education and training. The minimum duration of AGMs, and a lack of participation in
AGMs, suggests that shareholders do not utilize AGMs effectively, allowing controlling
shareholders to have more freedom to make decisions for their own benefits.
Irrespective of the high prevalence of RPTs, required levels of approvals to execute
RPTs raises serious doubts about their independence. The inadequacy of voluntary
disclosures is evident from the lack of information available on company web sites.

The analysis of objective three, based on the overall CGI, shows the level of
compliance with corporate governance best practices varies considerably amongst
companies under review, with a minimum index score of 39 being achieved, in contrast
with a maximum score of 80. The level of compliance of each dimension of corporate
governance as measured by the sub-indices, shows considerable variation indicating
more emphasis is given to aspects that are protected by the Sri Lankan Companies Act
(2007), or by the CSE bylaws. The surveyed companies are doing relatively well in
applying audit committee procedures (85 per cent), and in recognizing the protection of
shareholders’ rights (80 per cent). Board procedures including the functioning of a
nomination committee, and regulation of RPTs, are the least complied with corporate
governance dimensions in Sri Lanka. Given high levels of ownership concentration in
most Sri Lankan companies, addressing minority shareholders’ concerns seems to be
difficult.

Although ownership concentration is common for most companies, its impact on
corporate governance depends on the nature of the concentration. Family ownership has
a considerably negative impact, whereas foreign ownership has a significantly positive
impact on corporate governance. The analysis of objective four revealed that family
ownership has a statistically significant negative impact on: board procedures; firms’
voluntary disclosures; audit committee procedures; and, directors’ remuneration
procedures. The foreign affiliations of sample companies have a significant positive
impact on corporate governance generally, and a statistically significant impact on:
board procedures; audit committee procedures; and, voluntary disclosures. The overall
ownership concentration has a negative, but statistically insignificant impact as these
positive and negative influences nullify the intensity of their ultimate effects. It suggests
that policy makers need to give due consideration to the nature of ownership
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concentration in formulating governance practices as the procedure of family owned
companies is more reliant on relationship based activities.

The impact of corporate governance on firm performance shows mix results.
The analysis of objective five revealed that the level of compliance with corporate
governance regulations, measured based on the overall CGI scores, has a significantly
positive impact on the financial performance of the sample companies. This indicates
that better corporate governance leads to better operating and financial performance of
Sri Lankan companies. The market performance measures show, however, a negative
relationship with corporate governance compliance. This may result from market
anomalies prevailing in Sri Lanka. It suggests that market regulations and monitoring
mechanisms give adequate strength to restrain market irregularities such as insider
trading and price manipulations.

Stakeholders’ perceptions of internal and external corporate governance
mechanisms and required governance strategies for Sri Lankan companies are analysed
and presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6 : Survey of Stakeholders’ Perception of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Results
6.1 Introduction
The survey undertaken on corporate governance compliance (refer Sections 5.4
and 5.5) shows that internal corporate governance mechanisms, especially the functions
of boards and board committees, are generally weak in Sri Lankan companies.
Shareholders do not utilize AGMs effectively as suggested by the minimum duration of
AGMs and a lack of participation in AGMs. Ownership is highly concentrated, allowing
controlling shareholders them more freedom to make decisions for their own benefits.
The high prevalence of RPTs with minimum approval requirements, suggests that the
ability of controlling shareholders to use RPTs to their advantage. The inadequacy of
voluntary disclosures is suggested by the lack of information available on company web
sites. The boards seem to be inactive in evaluating performance, replacing CEOs, and
setting performance based remuneration packages for executives. Non-executive and
independent directors are inadequately supported with access to outside professional
services and education and training. These identified weaknesses and limitations
suggest that there might be a lack of confidence of stakeholders in the corporate
governance of Sri Lankan companies. This chapter examines how these issues are
perceived by various stakeholders of Sri Lankan companies, in order to identify the
perceived effectiveness of corporate governance in Sri Lanka.
Having examined the condition of corporate governance in Sri Lankan
companies through the survey conducted in January and February 2010, this chapter
describes an empirical investigation on the perceptions of various stakeholders of Sri
Lankan corporations in relation to: first their perceptions of these prevailing corporate
governance issues; and secondly, how the stakeholders perceive these issues should be
addressed in the Sri Lankan context. Prior studies on this aspect are confined to one or
two stakeholder groups, or consider only internal stakeholders of the company. For
example, Nam and Nam (2004) survey the opinions of executive and independent
directors whereas Ho (2005) focuses on top executives of international companies. The
opinion survey carried out by the KPMG Co in Sri Lanka (2007) focuses only on
directors and executive officers, whereas the McKinsey Co’s (2002) survey is based on
the opinion of only institutional investors. As little is known about the views of various
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stakeholders, this study examines the views of several internal and external stakeholder
groups regarding best practices, strategies and key players who promote corporate
governance in the context of the emerging market of Sri Lanka.

This chapter presents the empirical analysis and findings of objective six of the
study by analysing data collected from the questionnaire. The analysis is presented in
the following sequence. First, responses to the survey are analysed, and non-response
bias is tested, to assess the validity of the findings. Secondly, characteristics such as
educational and professional qualifications and work experience of respondents are
examined. Thirdly, the stakeholders’ opinions on current practices and major issues of
corporate governance are analysed with respect to several topics: important components
of the Sri Lankan corporate governance system; the implications of corporate
governance on firm performance; the present state of corporate governance; contentious
issues of corporate governance; corporate governance strategies; corporate governance
practices needing improvement; key players and promoters of corporate governance;
and, alternative approaches to promote corporate governance practices. In the next
section, the recommendations made by stakeholders and further issues raised by them
are analysed in order to identify their concerns about corporate governance. The
summary is provided in the final section.

6.2 Survey Responses and Non-response Bias
The total number of usable responses to the questionnaire amounted to 277,
giving a response rate of 42 per cent. The questionnaire distributed personally by the
researcher achieved a higher response rate of 60 per cent, compared to mailed
questionnaire which had a response rate of 29 per cent as only 109 of the 375
respondent returned their questionnaires. The breakdown of the responses of each
stakeholder group is displayed in Table 6.1. The response rates within stakeholders’
groups vary from 24 per cent to 73 per cent.

The overall response rate of 42 per cent compares favourably with those of
previous studies, for example: Ho (2005) 10.4 per cent; and, Nam and Nam (2004) 29
per cent. The relatively high response rate could be due to the combination of methods
used for distributing and collecting the questionnaires.
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Table 6.1 Survey Responses by Category of Stakeholders
Category
Non-executive Directors (NED)
Independent Audit Professionals (IAP)
Accountants (ACC)
Government Policy Makers (GPM)
Government Audit & Tax Officers (GATO)
Academics (ACD)
Investors (INV)
Total

Sample

Response

%

150
70
125
80
100
40
100
665

40
33
45
44
62
29
24
277

27
47
36
55
62
73
24
42

One of the major problems of a questionnaire survey is non-response bias. Nonresponsiveness can be a serious problem if the sample size is not large enough to allow
for non-responses. More specifically, non-response bias can arise if respondents differ
systematically from non-respondents (Fox et al., 1998). The non-responses can occur
due to either partial completion of the questionnaire or not responding to the
questionnaire. In this study two approaches are adopted to address this issue. First, in
the questionnaire design stage, an attempt is made to maintain the simplicity and
appearance of the questionnaire. Secondly, follow-up procedures such as follow-up by
telephone and mail are adopted to minimise non-responses.
Table 6.2 Non-response Bias by Category of Variables
Category of Variables

Significant

Important Components of Corporate Governance
Performance Impact of Corporate governance
Present Status of Corporate Governance
Major Issues of Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance Strategies
Corporate Governance Practices to be Improved
Key Players and Promoters
Total

0
1
1
0
1
2
0
5

Not
Significant
11
7
8
11
5
12
10
64

Total
Questions
11
8
9
11
6
14
10
69

Despite the conscious efforts taken to minimise non-responses, they amounted to
58 per cent of the sample in the study. Even though this rate could be considered low
when compared to non-response rate of some studies (Ho, 2005, Nam and Nam 2004), a
test is carried out to determine whether the results are representative of the population.
Non-response bias is evaluated by comparing the differences in responses between early
respondents and late respondents of the survey (Innes and Mitchell, 1995). Thus, a
sample of 105 questionnaires received within a week of distributing the questionnaire is
compared with the 33 questionnaires received after sending reminders. In order to find
out whether there is a significant difference between the two samples, the independent
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sample t-test for mean difference was carried out in respect of each variable (refer
Appendix 9). The results of the test are summarized in Table 6.2.

The information in Table 6.2 shows that there are no significant differences in
the mean scores of variables between the two sets of responses in relation to three
categories of variables. In case of other categories, the mean differences vary only for
five variables out of sixty nine. These results suggest that there is no non-responding
bias in the survey. This further suggests that the responses in this study can be regarded
as a representative sample of the population.

6.3 Profile of Respondents
The questionnaires are administered amongst seven categories of stakeholders who are
either directly or indirectly involved in policy formulation and implementation of
corporate governance of Sri Lankan listed companies. To collect respondents’
biographical data a number of questions were included in the questionnaire. In order to
limit the length of the questionnaire, this section is confined to five questions which are
focused on important characteristics such as gender, educational and professional
qualifications, work experience, and shareholdings of the respondents.

6.3.1 Educational Qualifications and Gender
As the potential respondents of the survey includes important stakeholder groups
who could either directly or indirectly involve in policy formulation, implementation or
monitoring of corporate governance, the educational background of the majority of
them is expected to be high. The respondents are asked to indicate their highest
educational qualification by ticking one of the six options given in the questionnaire.
The responses to this question are summarized in the first section of the Table 6.3.

As shown in the Table 6.3, over 85 per cent of respondents received tertiary
education indicating that they possess an ability to make independent judgments on the
issues addressed in this study. As expected all academics and government tax and audit
officers have tertiary education as it is a requirement of these professions. These results
indicate that the level of education amongst investors and non-executive directors
selected for this study is reasonably high, despite there being no formal educational
prerequisite for these roles.
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Table 6.3 Educational Qualifications and Gender
Highest Educational Qualifications

NED

IAP

ACC

GPM

GATO

ACD

INV

ALL

School Level
17.5
39.4
6.7
4.5
0.0
0.0
8.3
10.5
10.0
0.0
8.9
6.8
0.0
0.0
8.3
4.7
Diploma
37.5
54.5
68.9
34.1
54.8
34.5
37.5
46.9
Bachelor’s Degree
5.0
3.0
2.2
11.4
17.7
0.0
12.5
8.2
Post Gradate Diploma
30.0
3.0
13.3
43.2
27.4
37.9
33.3
26.7
Master’s Degree
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.6
0.0
3.1
Doctoral Degree
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total (%)
Professional Qualifications
None
15.0
0.0
15.6
25.0
38.7
34.5
4.2
21.7
12.5
12.1
13.3
18.2
38.7
27.6
33.3
22.4
ICASL / CIMA/ACCA Parts
47.5
81.8
60.0
22.7
9.7
20.7
45.8
38.3
Member (ICASL/CIMA / ACCA)
5.0
0.0
2.2
13.6
1.6
3.4
8.3
4.7
Attorney at law
Other
20.0
6.1
8.9
20.5
11.3
13.8
8.3
13.0
Total (%)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Gender
Male
72.5
57.6
51.1
38.6
56.5
44.8
79.2
56.0
27.5
42.4
48.9
61.4
43.5
55.2
20.8
44.0
Female
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total (%)
Total Respondents
40
33
45
44
62
29
24
277
Notes: NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC - Accountants;
GPM – Government Policy Makers; GATO - Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD - Academics;
INV – Investors; ICASL – Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka; CIMA – Chartered Institute of
Management Accountants ; ACCA - Association of Chartered Certified Accountants

In addition to educational qualifications, respondents are also asked to provide
their professional qualifications. As it is expected that an accounting qualification
facilitates understanding of corporate governance, information on accounting
professional qualifications is given prominence in the questionnaire. The results of
respondents’ professional qualifications are summarized in Table 6.3. The results show
that 38 per cent of respondents are professionally qualified accountants. It further shows
that 22 per cent of respondents have partially completed accounting professional
examinations. Since accounting knowledge is also required for the professions of IAP,
ACC and GPM categories, the results are as high as expected for these groups in the
sample. Similarly, because academic respondents are selected from the academics in
commerce and management faculties, respondents have a high rate of professional
qualifications. Overall 80 per cent of respondents have some kind of professional
qualification indicating the selected sample is adequately equipped with relevant skills
and qualifications to the perception survey conducted.
It is interesting to note that the selected sample is evenly balanced in terms of
gender. Overall 56 per cent respondents are males. However, the GPM category, which
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represents the staff grade employees of the SEC, Treasury and Central Bank of Sri
Lanka, represents 61 per cent of females, suggesting fair recruitment policies adopted
by government organizations. However, the NED and INV categories are dominated by
males. Other categories show balanced gender distribution indicating the perception
survey is free from gender bias.

6.3.2 Work Experience and Company Directorship Experience
In order to gain understanding of the work experience of respondents, they are
asked to indicate how long they have been working in their present profession. The
results are summarized in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Work Experience and Company Directorship Experience
Work Experience
Less than one year
1 – 5 years
5 – 10 years
10 – 15 years
15 - 20 years
Over 20 years
Total (%)
Experience as a Director
Yes
No
Total (%)
Total Respondents

NED

IAP

ACC

GPM

GATO

ACD

INV

ALL

0.0
27.5
0.0
10.0
12.5
50.0
100

0.0
39.4
45.5
6.1
6.1
3.0
100

15.6
31.1
35.6
6.7
4.4
6.7
100

11.4
40.9
22.7
6.8
11.4
6.8
100

1.6
71.0
6.5
3.2
6.5
11.3
100

20.7
31.0
13.8
10.3
17.2
6.9
100

4.2
16.7
25.0
16.7
4.2
33.3
100

7.2
40.8
19.9
7.6
8.7
15.9
100

100
0.0
100
40

6.1
93.9
100
33

2.2
97.8
100
45

15.9
84.1
100
44

0.0
100.0
100
62

0.0
100.0
100
29

20.8
79.2
100
24

19.9
80.1
100
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Notes: NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC - Accountants; GPM – Government Policy
Makers; GATO - Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD - Academics; INV - Investors

Overall 52 per cent of respondents have over five years working experience
while 32 per cent of overall respondents have over 10 years working experience. The
government audit and tax officer group comprises the least experience of professionals
as 71 per cent of them have less than five years working experience. However, all
respondents of this group have tertiary education with 45 per cent of them having post
graduate qualifications (refer Table 6.3). The NED group represents the persons with
more experience. In this group, over 72 per cent of respondents have more than 10 years
of experience. 50 per cent of NEDs have over 20 years working experience, compared
to IAPs who have only 3 per cent of the group with over 20 years experience. Overall
only 7.2 per cent of respondents have less than one year of working experience. Thus, it
is inferred that the sample consists of young and experienced professionals.
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Furthermore, with a view of understanding respondents’ active involvement in
corporate governance activities, they are asked whether they have experience in serving
as a director of a public limited company. This question is important for all the groups
except NED as it indicates their experience as a director of a company. While there is
no one in the GATO and ACD groups with directorship experience, 20.8 per cent of the
INV group has experience as a director of a company. The GPM group also has 15.9%
of respondents with company directorship experience. Overall, over 19 per cent of
respondents have company directorship experience indicating they have immediate
experience in implementing corporate governance practices.

6.3.3 Shareholdings
It is assumed that share ownership creates interest amongst investors in a
company’s affairs, especially an interest in their performance and the factors that
influence performance, including corporate governance.

Hence information about

respondents’ shareholdings is also gathered through the questionnaire. The purpose of
this question is to determine the number of companies the respondents have invested in.
The results are summarized in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5 Share Holdings of the Respondents
Share Holdings
NED
IAP
ACC
GPM
GATO
ACD
INV
ALL
30.0
72.7
64.4
72.7
67.7
65.5
0.0
57.0
None
0.0
15.2
15.6
15.9
14.5
17.2
0.0
11.9
One company
35.0
12.1
20.0
11.4
17.7
17.2
0.0
17.3
2 – 5 companies
17.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
62.5
7.9
6 – 10 companies
5.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12.5
1.8
11 - 20 companies
Over 20 companies
12.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
25.0
4.0
Total (%)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total Respondents
40
33
45
44
62
29
24
277
Notes: NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC - Accountants;
GPM – Government Policy Makers; GATO - Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD - Academics;
INV - Investors

As shown in the Table 6.5, 43 per cent of the respondents own shares in one or
more companies with 13.7 per cent of them investing in more than 5 companies. The
GPM and IAP groups have shown least interest in investing in shares as over 72 per
cent of respondents in these groups have no investment in shares. All respondents of the
INV group have invested in over five companies, while 25 per cent have invested in
more than 20 companies. NED group have over 70 per cent of respondents with share
investments in more than two companies.
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Overall, the demographics of the respondents show they are well qualified in terms of
educational and professional qualifications, work experience, and an interest in
investing in company shares. These traits suggest the respondents are able to make
independent judgments regarding the corporate governance issues addressed in the
survey.

6.4 Analysis of Survey Results
This section provides an analysis of respondents’ perceptions of various aspects
of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. The study uses a questionnaire of 69 items on a
5-point Likert scale to collect primary information from seven stakeholder groups. As
indicated in Section 4.6.3 seven aspects of corporate governance surveyed are:
important components of corporate governance; firm performance implications of
corporate governance; the present status of corporate governance; major issues of
corporate governance; corporate governance strategies; corporate governance practices
needing improvement; and key players and promoters. The average score of each item
and the agreed and disagreed percentages are separately analysed and reported under
each aspect. Both the answers rated 4 and 5 are considered ‘agreed’ while both the
answers rated 1 and 2 are considered to be ‘disagreed’, in ascertaining agreed and
disagreed percentages. The Kruskal-Wallis test is carried out for all 69 items listed in
the questionnaire to find out whether there are significant differences among
stakeholder groups with regard to governance issues addressed in the survey.

6.4.1 Important Components of a Corporate Governance System
The corporate governance system of a country is embedded in its unique
historical, cultural, legal and economic environment. As a result different governance
systems with different governance practices emerge across the world (refer Section 2.4).
With the globalisation of the marketplace the quality of a corporate governance system
becomes a crucial factor for corporate survival. As referred in Section 2.4, Weimber and
Pape (1999) undertook a comprehensive overview of governance systems which define
as “a more or less country specific framework of legal, institutional and cultural factors,
shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision
making”(p.152). The main characteristics and the importance given to various corporate
governance components differ across the different corporate governance models. As
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referred to in the Section 2.4.3 emerging markets’ systems consist of characteristics of
both a market-oriented and a network-oriented system.

In order to understand the importance given to various components of the Sri
Lankan corporate governance system, the respondents were asked to indicate whether
they agree with the given component as a part of the corporate governance system of the
country. The summarised results of the responses to this question are given in Table 6.6.
The results denote the quantum of importance the various categories of respondents
have given to the components of the corporate governance system. Eleven components
are addressed in this question of which the detailed findings of each are analysed.
Furthermore, in order to examine whether there would be any significant difference
between the seven stakeholder groups with regard to the importance that they have
given to each component of corporate governance, the Kruskal-Wallis test is carried out
and the test results are also given in Table 6.6, along with the chi-square (X2) and
asymptotic significant (p) values of this test.
All categories of respondents, with the exception of GATO, rate highly the
importance of companies’ internal management structure and their board to effective
corporate governance, with average scores ranging from 4.04 to 4.25. The board is
considered to be of central importance to a corporate governance framework (Allen et
al., 2004, Bonn et al., 2004.). Therefore its commitment is vital. However, in all
categories a small percentage of respondents (ranging from 3% to 12%) do not regard
the board an important component. Such a view of these respondents is surprising given
that they are highly informed in terms of their qualifications and work experience.

The groups ACC (4.18), GPM (4.21), ACD (4.14) and INV (4.00) indicate that
where companies’ internal management regulations and policies are important for
corporate governance. However, groups NED and IAP are of the opinion that this factor
is less important than the internal management structure and the board.
The judiciary system of Sri Lanka facilitates legal interpretation and law
enforcement to ensure the functioning of corporate governance. An increasing number
of high-profile corporate scandals globally require rigorous corporate legislation and
enforcement. However, most of the respondents did not place great significance on the
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judiciary being a relevant component of a corporate governance system, with an average
survey score of 3.63 being given, the lowest of the eleven corporate governance
component surveyed. When compared with the average survey score for the financial
reporting framework of 4.19 it is clear that the respondents perceive financial aspects
rather than legislative aspects are more crucial for a sound corporate governance
practice in Sri Lanka.
Table 6.6 Components of Corporate Governance System
Components
Companies’ internal
management structure
and the board
Companies’ internal
management
regulations, policies and
procedures
Judiciary system of the
country
Regulatory framework
including monitoring
institutions of the
country
Financial reporting
framework of the
country
Ownership structure of
the companies
Code of best practices
of corporate
governance
Corporate culture and
practices
Relationship among
core stakeholders
Code of conduct and
ethics applicable in
business
Culture and value
system of the society

NED

IAP

ACC

GPM

GATO

ACD

INV

ALL

X2

Av
A
D
Av
A
D

4.05
74%
11%
3.79
58%
13%

4.09
78%
3%
3.81
69%
9%

4.18
76%
4%
4.18
73%
4%

3.93
72%
12%
4.21
72%
9%

3.57
50%
8%
3.82
72%
11%

4.25
89%
4%
4.14
82%
4%

4.04
65%
9%
4.00
65%
9%

3.97
70%
7%
3.99
70%
9%

19.34 0.00

Av
A
D
Av
A
D

3.29
63%
24%
4.05
79%
11%

3.63
56%
13%
4.10
84%
3%

3.98
69%
11%
4.27
82%
2%

3.14
47%
21%
4.12
77%
9%

3.90
66%
10%
3.66
62%
10%

3.61
61%
18%
4.04
79%
7%

3.77
68%
14%
4.35
87%
0%

3.63
61%
15%
4.04
77%
7%

16.69 0.01

Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D

4.23
77%
3%
3.61
55%
5%
4.39
89%
3%
4.03
76%
8%
3.76
61%
8%
4.37
82%
0%
3.67
59%
13%

4.09
75%
9%
3.69
63%
6%
4.38
88%
3%
4.06
75%
3%
3.59
59%
9%
4.28
91%
3%
3.66
63%
6%

4.41
86%
2%
3.95
70%
14%
4.50
91%
2%
4.09
78%
7%
3.91
67%
4%
4.29
87%
2%
3.71
62%
9%

4.19
84%
5%
3.79
58%
16%
4.43
89%
5%
3.70
63%
7%
3.72
51%
5%
4.16
74%
5%
3.72
60%
16%

4.00
74%
2%
3.13
48%
24%
3.82
64%
11%
3.53
60%
13%
3.60
50%
5%
3.53
69%
15%
3.76
65%
16%

4.15
89%
7%
3.82
64%
14%
4.32
86%
7%
3.79
71%
11%
4.00
79%
7%
4.07
82%
7%
3.39
61%
21%

4.39
87%
0%
4.22
70%
4%
4.74
91%
0%
4.04
78%
9%
4.00
65%
4%
4.30
91%
9%
3.73
64%
14%

4.19
81%
4%
3.67
60%
14%
4.31
83%
5%
3.85
70%
8%
3.77
60%
6%
4.08
80%
6%
3.68
62%
14%

10.52 0.10

P

9.17 0.16

16.45 0.01

21.41 0.00

23.75 0.00

20.40 0.00

8.20 0.22

28.37 0.00

2.64 0.85

Notes:
1) Av – Average; A – Agree; D – Disagree
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors

202

Monitoring institutions are considered vital for good corporate governance by all
responding categories, this aspect receiving an average score of 4.04. It is interesting to
note that the GATO group rated the importance of monitoring institutions lowest of the
groups, indicating an average score of 3.66. Similarly, the majority of respondents
believe that the financial reporting framework of the company is also a significant
component of the corporate governance system, indicating an average sample rating of
4.19.
As evident from the Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 of the study, the ownership
structure of Sri Lankan companies is important to the corporate governance system. It is
obvious that corporate governance effectiveness is weaker in companies with family
ownership or concentrated ownership. However, most of the respondents do not
consider ownership structure as an important component influencing corporate
governance effectiveness. However, INV group strongly agrees that the ownership
structure is important, showing an average score of 4.22. Similarly with respect to the
survey response regarding the importance of the judiciary system, an overall average
score of 3.67 illustrates the disagreement in including this component in the governance
system.
The ‘Code of Best Practices of Corporate Governance’ and the Code of Conduct
and Ethics’ applicable in business are considered essential components of corporate
governance by all groups, which indicate an overall average of 4.31 (highest of the
sample of all questions) and 4.08 respectively. The GATO group ranked this score
3.82, indicating they place least importance on these codes to the governance system. A
notable point is that in the NED category, almost all respondents indicate that codes of
conduct and ethical values are a crucial factor in good corporate governance.
The exception of three stakeholder groups (GPM, GATO and ACD) the other
four groups agree that ‘corporate culture and practices’ is a vital component of a
corporate governance system. The NED, IAP, ACC and INV groups show a tendency in
believing the preservation of corporate culture and practices are important for better
corporate governance. However, most of the respondents are of the view that culture
and value systems of society are not important for better corporate governance. A
similar opinion is expressed with regard to the relationship among core stakeholders as
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indicated by the lower overall average of 3.77. However, this is considered as
significant by ACD and INV groups, contradicting with the views of other groups.
In order to examine whether there is a significant difference among stakeholders
in relation to the perceived importance they give to various components of a corporate
governance system, the Kruskal-Wallis test is performed. The significant differences are
found between stakeholder groups in respect of seven of the eleven items listed in the
questionnaire. All significant differences are significant at the one per cent level,
suggesting the importance given to these items varies significantly across the seven
stakeholder groups. Accordingly it can be concluded that there is no agreement amongst
stakeholders in respect of the importance given to each component of corporate
governance system.

6.4.2 Implications for Firm Performance of Corporate Governance
Better corporate governance is supposed to lead to better corporate performance,
by preventing expropriation by controlling shareholders, and ensuring better decision
making (Klapper and Love, 2002, Brown and Gorgens, 2009). Investors are willing to
invest more in better-governed companies because of the lower cost of capital,
contributing to better share performance for those companies. As evident in the Section
5.6, compliance to corporate governance best practices has a significant positive
relationship with the financial performance of Sri Lankan companies. However, how
stakeholders perceive performance implications of corporate governance is a central
issue that needs to be addressed in formulating and implementing corporate governance
practices. Thus, in order to understand the stakeholders’ perception regarding
performance implications of corporate governance, the respondents are asked to indicate
whether better corporate governance would improve various aspects of company
performance. The summarized results of the responses to this question are given in
Table 6.7. Eight significant implications have been considered in this area and the
findings are illustrated below.

The majority of respondents across all categories have answered positively with
an average of 4.17 to the question whether good corporate governance improves
financial performance. When comparing results among each category, ACD and almost
all INV placed more emphasis on this fact with averages of 4.31 and 4.45. These
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responses are consistent with the findings of the test results given in the Section 5.6
where it is found that better compliance to corporate governance best practices has a
significant positive relationship with the financial performance of Sri Lankan
companies. However, an average minority of 4% of respondents disagree on this issue.
Table 6.7 Performance Implications of Corporate Governance
Performance Implications
Improve financial
performance
Improve ability to
generate equity
capital
Improve access to
new capital
Increase market
value of shares
Reduce share
price volatility
Reduce political or
regulatory
intervention
Reduce cost of
capital
Improve corporate
social responsibility

Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D

NED

IAP

ACC

GPM

GATO

ACD

INV

ALL

X2

P

4.03
79%
8%
4.50
83%
8%
4.58
83%
0%
4.20
68%
5%
3.38
48%
18%
3.33
55%
23%
3.46
51%
18%
4.35
85%
3%

4.06
79%
3%
3.67
70%
9%
3.97
76%
6%
3.82
73%
9%
3.41
41%
9%
3.24
36%
15%
3.06
21%
15%
4.24
85%
3%

4.07
80%
9%
3.91
64%
2%
4.02
70%
5%
4.16
84%
4%
3.70
66%
11%
3.53
51%
18%
3.49
49%
13%
4.20
73%
2%

4.34
84%
2%
4.05
72%
7%
4.02
74%
2%
4.05
74%
2%
3.56
49%
7%
3.88
63%
9%
3.56
47%
16%
3.95
74%
7%

4.10
79%
3%
3.54
64%
8%
3.70
59%
8%
3.87
69%
5%
3.26
31%
13%
3.79
64%
11%
3.69
61%
5%
4.24
85%
6%

4.31
90%
3%
4.21
90%
3%
4.10
86%
3%
4.07
83%
10%
3.59
59%
7%
3.79
69%
10%
3.57
54%
11%
4.41
86%
0%

4.45
91%
0%
4.48
78%
0%
4.48
78%
0%
4.48
81%
5%
3.43
43%
17%
3.52
61%
9%
3.35
52%
30%
4.52
96%
4%

4.17
82%
4%
3.99
73%
6%
4.07
73%
4%
4.06
75%
6%
3.46
47%
12%
3.61
57%
14%
3.49
49%
14%
4.25
83%
4%

8.07

0.23

47.08

0.00

32.10

0.00

14.60

0.02

9.75

0.14

11.46

0.08

11.15

0.08

10.37

0.11

Notes:
1) Av – Average; A – Agree; D – Disagree
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors

As to the question whether sound corporate governance improves the ability to
generate equity capital, the groups’ average response is 3.99. Although it is not as
positive as the perception that good corporate governance improves financial
performance, the majority of respondents agree on this issue, with only 6 per cent
disagreeing on average. The categories of NED, GPM, ACD and almost all INV support
this fact with a stronger agreement. A similar behaviour has been observed with regard
to the raising of new capital. The stakeholders responded with an overall average of
4.07 to the question whether sound corporate governance improves access to new
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capital. It is again noted that the entirety of NED and INV agreed fully in favour with
this statement with averages of 4.58 (highest of the sample) and 4.48 respectively. Even
though corporate governance is considered to be one of the key aspects that lenders and
investors measure to assess the overall soundness of company management, on average
4 per cent of the respondents are of a contradictory view.

The groups’ response to the statement that ‘market value of shares increase
because of sound corporate governance’ is positive, with an overall average of 4.06.
Those who do not significantly support this fact are the IAP and GATO with averages
of 3.82 and 3.87 while INV are the most supporting category with an average of 4.48.

However, the least agreed performance measure is that ‘good corporate
governance manages to reduce share price volatility’. Those who agree on this point fell
below 50% of the total respondents with the lowest overall average of 3.46. It is noted
that NED and INV groups who hold share investments in a larger number of companies
(refer Table 6.5) show higher levels of disagreement. These perceptions are consistent
with the findings of the test given in Section 5.6. This examination fails to find any
positive impact of corporate governance compliance on market performance, suggesting
the existence of abnormal price behaviour in the Sri Lankan stock market.

Poor corporate governance is one of the main sources of corruption and
corruptive relationships between business and political circles (Nam and Nam 2004). It
can be inferred that better corporate governance reduces political intervention and
corruption. However, for the statement ‘sound corporate governance reduces political or
regulatory intervention’, most respondents disagree with an overall average of 3.61,
indicating political influence cannot be avoided in the Sri Lankan context even with
sound corporate governance. It is interesting to note that NED shows the highest level
of disagreement at 23 per cent. The validity of their claim is supported by their direct
experience in corporate governance.

Convention assumes investors and lenders are keen on investing in firms with
good governance due to the fact that sound corporate governance reduces costs of
capital. However, the majority of respondents disagree with the proposition that the
cost of capital reduces as a result of sound corporate governance. Most of the
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respondents agree with the claim that good corporate governance improves corporate
social responsibility. All the groups have responded positively with an overall average
of 4.25. This is the highest average indicate that a vast majority agree that corporate
governance improves corporate social responsibility.

The responses are tested using the Kruskal-Wallis test to see whether there is a
significant difference between the opinions of different groups with regard to the
performance implications of corporate governance. Significant differences are found
between stakeholder groups in respect of three of the eight items listed in the
questionnaire. The significant differences at the one per cent level are noticed in relation
to the propositions that: first, corporate governance improves the ability to generate
equity; and, secondly corporate governance improves the ability to generate new capital.
This suggests that stakeholders’ opinions on these items vary significantly across
groups. Thirdly, opinions are significantly different regarding the perceived impact of
corporate governance on market price performance. Apart from these three items,
opinion differences of other items are not significant suggesting different stakeholder
groups are in agreement in respect of their opinions on these items.

6.4.3 Status of Corporate Governance
The recognition of the weaknesses of the prevailing Sri Lankan corporate
governance system is essential in formulating governance reforms. In this respect, it is
important to discover how stakeholders perceive the present status of corporate
governance. Thus, in order to understand the stakeholders’ perceptions, the respondents
are asked to indicate their opinion about various aspects of the prevailing corporate
governance system of the country. The summarized results of the responses to this
question are given in Table 6.8.
The respondents are asked to express their views regarding the present
positioning of Sri Lanka’s corporate governance system as a whole, compared to: first
that of a developed country; and secondly, to that of an Asian country. The majority of
respondents disagree with the statement ‘the standard of corporate governance in Sri
Lanka is comparable to that of a developed country’. The responses are significantly
low with an overall lowest average of 2.33, indicating a large majority believe that Sri
Lanka’s corporate governance system as a whole requires considerable improvement.
207

The respondents across all categories have clear opinions on this issue, as reflected by
their overall disagreement rate of over 50 per cent. In analysing the disagreeing
respondents across categories, it can be seen that NED are at the top with 59% followed
by GATO, ACD and INV with percentages of 53, 55 and 52 respectively. The results
are slightly better to the next question of whether Sri Lanka is comparable to that of
Asian countries, achieving an overall average of 3.29 agreements. Over 50 per cent of
respondents in the IAP and GPM groups believe that it is comparable, but this is less
obvious in respect of other categories.
Table 6.8 Status of Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka
Status of Corporate Governance
Standard of CG in Sri
Lanka is comparable to CG
of a developed country.
Standard of CG in Sri
Lanka is comparable to that
of Asian countries.
The existing CG
regulations are adequate to
ensure good CG
The existing CG rules are
effectively implemented by
most of the firms
Regulatory monitoring of
CG compliance is
adequate.
The CSE should have
introduced more rigorous
CG rules.
Most listed companies
have taken measures to
strengthen their CG.
Most listed companies
could have done more to
strengthen their CG.
The interests of minority
investors are adequately
protected

Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D

NED
2.05
13%
59%
3.18
28%
21%
2.38
20%
53%
2.46
13%
62%
2.85
18%
49%
2.79
38%
31%
3.51
36%
15%

IAP
2.48
9%
39%
3.52
55%
6%
2.55
21%
39%
2.45
9%
58%
2.45
12%
52%
3.55
58%
9%
3.36
36%
3%

ACC
2.49
16%
47%
3.27
38%
16%
2.42
22%
51%
2.47
11%
49%
2.31
11%
62%
3.36
42%
20%
3.24
36%
13%

GPM
2.44
9%
42%
3.37
51%
12%
2.47
19%
40%
2.47
5%
44%
2.44
7%
58%
3.81
49%
5%
3.28
35%
7%

GATO
2.26
11%
53%
3.15
40%
21%
2.79
29%
32%
2.63
17%
47%
2.71
15%
40%
3.44
41%
13%
3.27
42%
13%

ACD
2.17
10%
55%
3.31
41%
17%
2.39
14%
46%
2.63
15%
48%
2.00
14%
59%
4.00
62%
7%
3.28
38%
10%

INV
2.43
30%
52%
3.43
39%
9%
2.43
17%
48%
2.39
13%
52%
2.30
13%
43%
4.17
70%
9%
2.70
26%
30%

ALL
X2
2.33 5.02
13%
50%
3.29 5.82
42%
15%
2.52 5.20
22%
43%
2.51 2.45
12%
51%
2.48 13.16
13%
51%
3.53 27.83
49%
14%
3.26 6.08
36%
13%

P
0.54

Av
A
D
Av
A
D

3.46
67%
13%
2.85
15%
43%

3.70
61%
6%
2.61
6%
42%

3.91
72%
9%
2.58
18%
49%

4.32
73%
5%
2.40
17%
40%

3.70
62%
8%
2.51
23%
39%

3.79
66%
3%
2.34
10%
45%

4.30
74%
9%
2.04
22%
61%

3.86 27.44
67%
8%
2.51 6.84
16%
44%

0.00

0.44

0.52

0.87

0.04

0.00

0.41

0.34

Notes:
1) Av – Average; A – Agree; D – Disagree
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors

The respondents’ opinion regarding the adequacy and implementation
efficiency of exiting corporate governance regulations are the next considered aspects of
corporate governance. The disagreement is clearly visible across all categories
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regarding the perceived adequacy of existing corporate governance regulations to ensure
good corporate governance, scoring a low overall average of 2.52.

Most of the

respondents are of the view that the existing regulations are not enough to safeguard the
good corporate governance, suggesting policy makers fail in their duties to formulate
adequate governance regulations. The respondents in NED, ACC and INV groups show
more disagreement than other groups, with disagreement rates of 53 percent, 51 percent,
and 48 percent respectively. The responses for the proposition that there is ‘effective
implementation of existing regulations’ show even more disagreement. The overall
average for agreement with the statement was 2.51. NED and IAP groups indicate
stronger disagreement than the overall average, as reflected by their disagreement rates
of 62 percent and 58 percent respectively. The overall disagreement rate over 51 percent
show a majority of respondents require companies to pay more attention in their
implementation of existing corporate governance regulations.

The statement ‘the regulatory monitoring of corporate governance compliance is
adequate’ has received low agreement, with responses being an overall average of 2.4,
indicating most of the respondents require regulators to increase their monitoring
activities. The disagreement is clearly visible among the ACC, ACD and GPM groups,
who recorded disagreement rates of 62 per cent, 59 per cent and 58 per cent
respectively. The overall disagreement rate of 51 per cent is consistent with the
disagreement expressed in relation to effective implementation of regulations. Thus,
respondents are of the view that the regulators need to formulate mechanisms to
safeguard effective monitoring, as companies do not implement the regulations
effectively. Furthermore, there was a positive response from those surveyed on the
introduction of more rigorous corporate governance rules by the CSE as indicated by an
overall average of 3.53. However, the NED group disagreed with the introduction of
rigorous corporate governance rules. The lack of implementation of corporate
governance rules and regulations to date, and resistance to the introduction of new rules,
can be interpreted as a negative attitude and commitment by company directors towards
corporate governance regulations.

When asked whether most listed companies could have done more to strengthen
their corporate governance, respondents agreed recording an overall average of 3.86, or
over 60 per cent. The strongest group agreeing with the statement is INV with an
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agreement rate of 74 per cent. This is a clear message that companies need to improve
their internal corporate governance mechanisms as the majority of stakeholders are not
happy with the present form of corporate governance implemented by respective
companies. Furthermore, the respondents have expressed strong negative views in
relation to the adequacy of protection of minority shareholders’ interests, with an
overall average of 2.51. The overall disagreement rate is over 44 per cent. It is
interesting to note that the disagreement rate of the INV group is over 61 per cent, since
they have direct experience of the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. This
further confirms the view that the Sri Lankan companies could do more in strengthening
their corporate governance.
The Kruskal-Wallis test results show that the differences between stakeholder
groups are significant only for three of the nine items listed in the question. The
significant differences at the one per cent level are noticed in relation to the adequacy of
regulatory monitoring and the introduction of more rigorous governance rules. The
NED group disagrees with the introduction of new rules resulting in a significant
difference from other groups. Furthermore, the item that the companies need to do more
in strengthening their corporate governance also shows significant difference. Apart
from these three items, opinion differences of other items are not significant suggesting
most of the aspects of the present status of Sri Lankan corporate governance are
collectively agreed upon by all stakeholder groups.

6.4.4 Identified Issues of Sri Lankan Corporate Governance
Corporate governance provides the structure through which accountability and
responsibility to stakeholders can be exercised. Thus, effective board functioning is of
paramount importance for sound corporate governance, especially given the aftermath
of high-profile corporate scandals in recent years. In order to understand the corporate
governance issues faced by Sri Lankan companies, the respondents are given eleven
issues and are asked to indicate whether they regard the stated issues are major or
minor. Summarized results of their responses are given in Table 6.9.
A majority of the respondents think that there is a significant lack of integrity
and ethics amongst top management, as indicated by an overall average response of
4.08. 73 per cent agree that this is a relevant issue in Sri Lankan companies. More than
83 per cent of respondents in the ACD and INV groups agree that this is a significant
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issue. No investor surveyed selected this as a minor issue. Furthermore, a lack of
transparency is also considered a significant issue by a majority of respondents, scoring
an overall average of 4.13, or 73 per cent. However, noticeably respondents in the IAP
group do not rate transparency as a major issue while all other groups agree that a lack
of transparency is an issue, with an agreement rate of over 70 per cent. In the case of
ACD, respondents give virtually no negative responses.
Table 6.9 Issues of Corporate Governance
Issues of Corporate Governance
Lack of integrity and ethics
among top management
Lack of transparency in
financial reporting
Insider trading (directors
artificially control share
prices for personal gain)
Inadequate protection of
minority shareholders’ rights
Conflicts of interest of
directors
Drain off of funds through
associate or subsidiary
companies
Independent directors do not
exercise true independence
in decision making
Inadequate and inefficient
risk management
Lack of transparency about
directors’ remuneration
Lack of proper balance
between executive and
NEDs in the board
Ineffective connectivity
between board and
management

Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi
Av
Mj
Mi

NED
4.21
74%
5%
3.79
74%
15%
3.36
59%
15%
3.59
59%
3%
3.46
67%
13%
3.68
71%
8%
3.90
69%
8%
3.79
69%
5%
3.46
51%
5%
3.44
44%
15%
3.51
59%
13%

IAP
3.88
64%
6%
3.45
48%
3%
3.67
61%
9%
3.42
48%
9%
3.75
59%
9%
3.64
70%
6%
3.79
67%
9%
4.00
79%
0%
3.82
67%
6%
3.58
58%
6%
3.64
52%
6%

ACC GPM
4.02 4.02
76% 73%
7% 11%
3.71 4.27
76% 70%
9%
5%
3.98 4.34
66% 75%
9%
5%
3.49 4.14
51% 64%
7%
9%
3.73 4.20
58% 68%
11%
9%
3.87 4.41
64% 77%
4%
5%
3.84 4.00
69% 75%
7%
5%
4.11 3.84
80% 70%
2%
5%
3.84 4.32
64% 70%
7%
2%
3.64 3.52
53% 57%
7% 11%
3.98 3.55
67% 50%
4%
5%

GATO
3.85
66%
10%
4.52
82%
5%
3.80
49%
8%
3.87
53%
8%
3.73
53%
15%
3.92
51%
0%
3.58
53%
11%
3.85
74%
10%
4.06
65%
11%
3.60
61%
11%
3.68
53%
3%

ACD
4.52
83%
3%
4.62
83%
0%
4.34
76%
3%
4.17
69%
3%
4.28
69%
3%
4.17
66%
7%
4.00
72%
7%
3.69
62%
3%
4.21
72%
10%
3.52
55%
17%
3.76
62%
3%

INV
4.48
83%
0%
4.52
83%
4%
4.00
61%
13%
4.13
61%
0%
4.48
78%
0%
4.30
70%
0%
4.22
78%
0%
4.26
83%
0%
4.26
74%
13%
3.96
74%
4%
3.57
57%
9%

ALL
4.08
73%
7%
4.13
74%
6%
3.91
63%
9%
3.81
57%
6%
3.89
63%
10%
3.98
66%
4%
3.86
67%
7%
3.92
74%
4%
3.99
65%
8%
3.59
57%
11%
3.68
57%
6%

X2
P
18.20 0.01

73.37 0.00

26.03 0.00

25.30 0.00

26.04 0.00

26.78 0.00

11.11 0.09

10.93 0.09

28.40 0.00

5.80 0.45

7.38 0.29

Notes:
1) Av – Average; Mj – Major Issue; Mi – Minor Issue
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors
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Concerning insider trading, a majority of respondents consider it as a significant
issue, with an overall average response of 3.91, over 50 per cent. The ACD and GPM
rank highest in agreeing insider trading is a problem, recording 76 per cent and 75 per
cent respectively, and disagreement rates of only 3 per cent and 5 per cent respectively.

Conflicts of interest rated as being a relevant issue with an overall average score
of 3.89 and positive response rate of 63 per cent. These scores are almost on par with
what respondents scored for the topic insider trading. Once again, responses exceed 50
per cent in all categories, while INV rank ‘conflicts of interest’ the highest with an
average of 4.48, a positive rate of 78 per cent and a nil negative rate.

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they regarded the drain off of funds
through associate or subsidiary companies as a key issue for Sri Lankan corporate
governance. Respondents indicated that they did perceive this as significant, giving an
overall average of 3.98, with 66 per cent agreeing with the statement. Only 4 per cent
disagreed, which is the lowest of the sample. Both GATO and INV recorded a nil rate.

The issues of insider trading, conflicts of interest of directors and drain off of
funds through associate companies reflect ineffective functioning of a company’s board.
All these issues are identified as relevant to a lack of confidence placed by stakeholders
in the proper functioning of boards of Sri Lankan companies.

Respondents were questioned on their perceptions of whether independent
directors exercise true independence in their decision making. This was perceived as a
major issue by respondents, with an overall average of 3.86 agreeing that independent
directors do not exercise true independence in decision making. On this question, INV
recorded the highest average of 4.22, over 78 per cent of respondents in the group. No
respondent in INV group considered this a minor issue.

Concerning directors’ remunerations, all the categories of respondents except NED
agree that there is a lack of transparency. The strength of this opinion is obvious as this
is the highest rating amongst all issues. It is interesting to note that the respondents of
NED are the least supportive of the notion of the lack of transparency of directors’
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remuneration as a problem, recording the lowest average of 3.46. This reflects NED’s
reluctance to disclose remunerations.

The next issue included in the perception questionnaire is that of whether the
respondent thinks a proper balance between executive and non-executive directors on a
board is important for good corporate governance.

This question received similar

responses to the previous question on directors’ remuneration, with an overall average
of 3.59. All the categories except NED are of the view that a lack of proper balance in
the board is a major issue, with over 50 per cent in agreement with the proposition.
However, NED rated this issue as minor.

The responses are analysed statistically using the Kruskal-Wallis test to see
whether there is a significant difference between the opinions of different groups with
regard to the given issues. The significant differences are found in respect of seven of
the eleven issues listed in the questionnaire. All significant differences are significant at
the one per cent level, indicating there are clear differences among groups’ opinions.
As most of the given issues are related to board functioning and transparency, it is not
surprising therefore that NEDs’ opinions are different to the opinion of other groups.

6.4.5 Importance of Different Corporate Governance Strategies
The efficiency of alternative governance structures depends upon the
environment within which they operate. Fan (2004) claims that existing theories of
corporate governance have not been successful in recognizing the determinants of good
corporate governance as it operates in highly complex diverse environments. To
improve corporate governance practices, various strategies can be adopted. The
improvement of operational efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms
such as: board functioning; composition; compensation; and, managerial shares
ownership is one strategy to promote good corporate governance practices. Also, the
development of operational efficiency of external corporate governance mechanisms
such as: the market for corporate control; large shareholders; the legal system; creditor
protection; and, leverage is another strategy to promote good corporate governance
practices. However, their success depends on both various constituent components of a
corporate governance system, and the environment within which these components
operate. The area which should be given priority in Sri Lanka is an important issue to be
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addressed. In order to understand stakeholders’ opinions on these issues, respondents
were asked to indicate the importance they give to six named corporate governance
strategies. The summarized results of their responses are given in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Corporate Governance Strategies
Corporate Governance Strategies
Making the internal corporate
governance mechanisms work
better
Making the external corporate
governance mechanisms work
better
Enhancing the standards of
accounting, audit and
disclosures
Conducting corporate
governance ratings of
companies
Prohibiting or tightly controlling
some types of RPTs
Reducing ownership
concentration

Av
Mi
Li
Av
Mi
Li
Av
Mi
Li
Av
Mi
Li
Av
Mi
Li
Av
Mi
Li

NED
4.10
78%
0%
3.54
59%
10%
3.97
71%
0%
3.80
70%
5%
4.00
76%
3%
3.53
53%
20%

IAP
4.21
88%
0%
3.94
82%
3%
4.52
79%
0%
3.78
68%
16%
4.21
70%
9%
3.55
58%
15%

ACC GPM
4.24 4.64
89% 89%
4%
2%
4.27 4.64
84% 86%
2%
0%
4.04 4.79
80% 93%
2%
0%
4.18 4.16
80% 82%
5%
2%
4.41 3.95
75% 73%
2% 11%
3.89 3.84
64% 66%
2%
5%

GATO
4.50
84%
6%
4.13
69%
8%
4.23
82%
5%
3.98
74%
2%
3.94
73%
6%
3.56
49%
13%

ACD
4.31
97%
0%
4.62
86%
0%
4.34
86%
3%
4.03
76%
3%
3.93
75%
4%
3.79
66%
3%

INV
4.25
71%
4%
3.96
75%
8%
4.21
67%
4%
4.13
88%
0%
4.13
67%
8%
3.71
58%
17%

ALL
4.35
85%
3%
4.16
77%
5%
4.30
81%
2%
4.01
77%
4%
4.07
73%
6%
3.69
58%
11%

X2
P
26.06 0.00

50.76 0.00

36.24 0.00

8.73 0.19

14.20 0.03

5.10 0.53

Notes:
1) Av – Average; Mi – More Important; Li – Less Important
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors

The strategy of ‘making internal corporate governance mechanisms work better’
is considered important by all groups, as is demonstrated by an overall score of 4.35. 85
per cent of respondents consider this as a very important strategy, and in the ACD group
over 97 per cent consider it as an important strategy. Overall, only 3 per cent of
respondents consider ‘making internal corporate governance mechanisms work better’
as a less important strategy. In the NED, IAP and ACD groups, no one considers it as a
less important strategy.
A similar response is observed in relation to the question about external
corporate governance mechanisms. Overall 77 per cent of respondents consider ‘making
the external corporate governance mechanisms work better’ as an important strategy to
achieve improved corporate governance. . GPM strongly view this as an important
strategy, recording a score of 4.64. The GPM and ACD have completely eliminated it as
being less important, giving a rating of zero. This opinion indicates both internal and
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external governance mechanisms are perceived as important for Sri Lanka to promote
good governance practices.
All respondents have a strong positive attitude that enhancing the standards of
accounting, audit and disclosures is a strategy that will improve corporate governance.
This is reflected in response rates to the statement ranging from a low of 67 per cent by
INV to 93 per cent by GPM. An overall average of 4.30 is noted while the respondents
who think that it is of less importance are recorded at only 2 per cent. The respondents
in NED, IAP and GPM groups have given zero rating for ranking this strategy in the
‘less importance’ category.
Conducting corporate governance ratings of companies have also been treated as
an important strategy by most of the respondents, reflected in an overall average of
4.01. More than 65% of all respondents indicate conducting corporate governance
ratings is an important strategy to improving corporate governance, while only 4%
express a contradictory view.
Furthermore, the prohibiting or tightly controlling some types of RPTs is also
accepted by respondents as an important strategy, scoring an overall average of 4.07,
and an acceptance rate of 73 per cent.
However, changes to ownership concentrations are not well accepted by
respondents as good strategy to achieve better corporate governance in Sri Lanka.
Ownership concentration and the presence of family ownership are common
characteristics of Sri Lankan companies (refer Section 5.3.3).
With respect to corporate governance strategies, the Kruskal-Wallis test results
found that four of the six strategies surveyed have significant differences between the
opinions of different groups. The differences relating to internal governance
mechanisms, external governance mechanisms, and accounting & auditing standards are
significant at the one per cent level whereas the difference in views relating to the
control of RPTs is significant at the five per cent level. These differences are clearly
visible between the NED group and the GPM group. The overwhelming majority of
government policy makers accepted these strategies as important but acceptance among
NED groups is relatively low. The test results show that there is no significant
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difference among respondent groups in relation to changes in ownership concentration
strategy. This confirms the fact that changes to ownership concentration is not
acceptable to stakeholders surveyed in the Sri Lankan context.

6.4.6 Corporate Governance Practices that Need Improvement
In emerging economies, the concern of corporate governance in publicly listed
companies is controlling-shareholder expropriation (Claessens and Fan, 2002). The
OECD (2004) principles intend to mitigate this kind of major corporate governance
problem by recommending good governance practices. These principles promote
various good governance practices such as an active board of directors; separation of
chairperson and the CEO; significant presence of outside directors; adequate
disclosures; independent directors’ independence both from management and
substantial shareholders. However, whether these practices are capable of mitigating
specific problems faced by emerging markets is an important issue to be addressed.
Thus, in order to understand whether these practices are capable of enhancing corporate
governance in Sri Lanka from the stakeholders’ point of view, the respondents are asked
to indicate whether the corporate governance of Sri Lankan companies can be improved
by adhering to given practices. The respondents’ views relevant to these practices are
summarized in Table 6.11. A survey was carried out seeking stakeholders’ opinions on
14 such practices. Certain similarities are found in responses to some practices.
Therefore, the 14 practices have been analysed under three segments, depending on the
results received.
Several practices received a higher level of agreement amongst respondents,
with an overall average score of over 4.00 for each identified practice. These practices
are: improvements in respect of giving the audit committee greater power to investigate
financial reporting; full disclosure of RPT’s; the same person not holding positions of
both CEO and chairman; independent directors being independent of both management
and major shareholders; and, the adoption of a code of conduct and ethics for all
directors, officers and employees. The majority of respondents across all segments are
of the opinion that the adoption of a code of conduct is of paramount importance
(average 4.41) to improve the corporate governance in Sri Lanka.
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Table 6.11 Corporate Governance Practices that need Improvement
Governance Practices
Giving the audit committee
greater power to investigate
financial reporting
Full disclosure of related party
transactions
Not obtaining audit and non audit
services from the same provider
The CEO and Chairman
positions are not held by the
same person
Remuneration of EDs are closely
tied to performance
Key advisory committees are
composed entirely of
independent directors
There should be an age limit for
directors
Independent directors should
make up at least half of the board
Independent directors should be
independent of both
management and major
shareholders
Full disclosure of the recruitment
policy of new directors
Full disclosure of the
remuneration policy for executive
directors
The exact remuneration of each
director should be disclosed in
the annual reports
Imposed limitations on the
number of directorships held by a
director at any one time
Adoption of a code of conduct
and ethics for all directors,
officers and employees

NED
3.87
68%
5%
4.50
95%
0%
3.73
70%
8%
4.10
80%
5%
3.72
69%
5%
3.43
60%
13%
3.68
48%
5%
3.49
49%
15%
4.10
80%
5%

IAP
4.52
79%
0%
4.21
82%
3%
3.45
67%
12%
4.09
79%
6%
3.52
58%
18%
3.58
61%
9%
3.27
42%
30%
3.64
61%
6%
4.21
85%
0%

ACC GPM
4.36 4.70
76% 89%
9%
0%
4.31 4.34
78% 84%
2%
0%
4.11 4.30
76% 75%
2% 11%
3.96 4.40
67% 88%
11% 5%
4.02 4.02
71% 77%
2%
5%
4.00 4.36
67% 75%
13% 0%
3.64 3.36
60% 45%
18% 20%
3.98 3.55
64% 57%
2% 16%
4.31 4.27
87% 84%
7%
2%

3.65
60%
10%
3.33
50%
10%
2.85
28%
43%
3.56
51%
18%
4.41
87%
3%

3.91
66%
3%
4.00
72%
3%
3.15
45%
27%
3.64
64%
15%
4.24
85%
3%

4.02
71%
2%
4.04
71%
2%
3.51
53%
22%
3.93
67%
9%
4.50
89%
0%

4.02
80%
2%
4.14
68%
7%
3.61
57%
16%
4.05
73%
9%
4.55
89%
0%

X2
P
39.40 0.00

GATO
4.08
77%
5%
4.02
71%
8%
3.56
44%
21%
3.89
68%
10%
4.13
68%
3%
4.10
65%
8%
2.87
32%
40%
3.47
48%
10%
3.94
71%
8%

ACD
3.83
69%
10%
4.11
82%
0%
3.93
62%
3%
4.11
79%
0%
4.07
66%
3%
3.93
71%
4%
3.11
39%
29%
3.66
59%
14%
4.38
76%
3%

INV
4.42
79%
4%
4.46
88%
0%
4.25
67%
0%
4.42
83%
0%
4.39
78%
9%
4.22
65%
0%
3.22
43%
30%
3.70
57%
4%
4.17
70%
17%

ALL
4.25
77%
5%
4.26
82%
3%
3.88
64%
10%
4.10
76%
6%
3.98
69%
6%
3.96
66%
7%
3.29
44%
25%
3.63
56%
10%
4.17
79%
6%

3.84
66%
6%
3.74
61%
6%
3.58
55%
16%
3.49
49%
10%
4.28
79%
2%

3.79
64%
0%
4.10
59%
0%
3.72
66%
7%
3.72
72%
14%
4.28
83%
0%

3.87
65%
4%
4.75
92%
0%
3.63
50%
13%
4.29
79%
4%
4.71
100%
0%

3.88 4.76 0.58
68%
4%
3.95 42.06 0.00
66%
5%
3.44 15.67 0.02
51%
21%
3.77 20.20 0.00
63%
11%
4.41 9.98 0.13
86%
1%

9.03

0.17

26.28 0.00

11.09 0.09

18.36 0.01

26.41 0.00

15.47 0.02

7.42

0.28

8.88

0.18

Notes:
1) Av – Average; A – Agree; D – Disagree
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors
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The practices which received an overall average ranking of 3.75 to 4.00 are
classified as the next level. These practices are: not obtaining audit and non- audit
services from the same provider (3.88); closely tying remuneration of executive
directors to performance (3.98); composing key advisory committees entirely of
independent directors (3.96); fully disclosing the recruitment and remuneration policies
of directors (3.88, 3.95); and, imposing limitations on the number of directorships held
by a director at any time (3.77). It is interesting to note that these practices rated low
levels of acceptance from the NED group, but rated a higher level of acceptance from
the respondents of INV, GPM and ACD groups.
The practices which received overall average ratings of 3.75 or below are
categorized as the third group. These practices include: at least half the board comprised
of independent directors; disclosing exact remuneration of directors in the annual
reports; and, setting an age limit for directors. These practices received the lowest
overall averages of 3.63, 3.44 and 3.29 respectively. All these practices also received
the lowest level of acceptance from the NED group. Disclosing directors’ exact
remuneration in the annual reports is rejected by most respondents in NED, recording a
disagreement rate of 43 per cent. However, most other groups’ acceptance rate of this
statement is over 50 per cent.
The Kruskal-Wallis test results found that eight of the fourteen practices have
significant differences between the opinions of different groups. All these practices,
except one, relate to the second and third categories of practices. In the first category
only the practice of giving the audit committee greater power to investigate financial
reporting shows a significant difference, which is significant at the one per cent level.
Most of the groups agree with this practice with a higher acceptance rate, but the
acceptance level of NED and ACD is relatively low. In all other cases, the acceptance
level of the NED group is relatively low compared to other groups, resulting in
significant differences between groups. However, with the exception of NED there are
no major differences among other groups.

6.4.7 Efficiency of Key Players of Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka
The promotion of good corporate governance practices is an outcome of
combined activities performed by various institutions and activists in civil society.
Various activities relating to corporate governance such as: policy formulation; setting
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of codes; enacting rules and regulations; monitoring and enforcement; and, effective
implementation are essential devices for good corporate governance. In Sri Lanka,
several organizations are involved either directly or indirectly in carrying out these
functions. In order to understand the efficiency of these organizations, the respondents
are asked to indicate their perception about whether these institutions carry out their role
efficiently. The respondents’ views are summarized in Table 6.12.
Table 6.12 Key Players of Corporate Governance
Key players and Promoters
Securities and Exchange
Commission of Sri Lanka
Colombo Stock Exchange

Financial supervisory
agencies (e.g. Central Bank)
The Institute of Chartered
Accounts of Sri Lanka
Other Professional
Accounting Institutions
The judiciary

Sri Lanka Institute of Directors

Outside Directors
(Independent and NEDs)
Civil Activists (Investors
Association, Minority
Shareholder etc)
Financial Press and Other
Media

Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D
Av
A
D

NED
3.33
50%
18%
3.35
45%
13%
3.10
46%
33%
3.43
55%
13%
2.97
30%
30%
2.76
24%
37%
2.88
33%
43%
2.92
26%
26%
2.56
8%
44%
2.62
23%
46%

IAP
3.48
58%
6%
3.39
45%
6%
3.27
39%
18%
3.67
64%
6%
3.06
27%
15%
2.97
24%
24%
2.81
13%
28%
2.94
12%
15%
2.58
12%
42%
2.79
15%
33%

ACC
3.40
44%
9%
3.40
44%
7%
3.38
40%
11%
3.49
51%
9%
3.02
29%
29%
2.96
22%
24%
2.76
18%
36%
2.78
16%
36%
2.42
11%
60%
2.71
18%
42%

GPM
3.57
55%
11%
3.51
47%
7%
3.40
51%
16%
3.51
58%
19%
2.95
23%
28%
3.21
35%
16%
2.95
16%
19%
2.90
14%
21%
2.65
5%
35%
2.86
19%
33%

GATO
3.39
47%
16%
3.45
45%
8%
3.42
52%
16%
3.58
58%
10%
3.10
31%
20%
3.23
35%
19%
2.84
16%
25%
2.75
9%
25%
2.82
18%
34%
2.93
31%
34%

ACD
3.38
52%
10%
3.38
48%
7%
3.31
41%
14%
3.34
41%
10%
3.18
25%
4%
3.07
38%
28%
2.93
14%
18%
2.86
17%
28%
2.66
10%
31%
2.97
28%
28%

INV
3.04
33%
29%
3.21
38%
21%
3.08
33%
29%
3.25
54%
29%
2.68
27%
45%
2.87
30%
35%
2.45
14%
55%
2.57
26%
57%
2.35
13%
65%
2.54
17%
58%

ALL
3.39
49%
14%
3.40
45%
9%
3.31
45%
19%
3.49
55%
13%
3.01
28%
24%
3.04
30%
25%
2.82
18%
30%
2.82
16%
28%
2.60
11%
43%
2.79
22%
38%

X2
5.91

P
0.43

1.75

0.94

3.52

0.74

4.28

0.64

4.69

0.58

7.18

0.30

6.25

0.40

5.14

0.53

9.71

0.14

6.40

0.38

Notes:
1) Av – Average; A – Agree; D – Disagree
2) NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC – Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO – Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD – Academics; INV – Investors

All the institutions and groups under review receive relatively low scores. No
institution or groups received overall average over 4.00 indicating that the perception is
that these institutions are not carrying out their role efficiently to satisfy stakeholders’
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expectations. However, four of the ten organizations did receive an overall average
over 3.30. These institutions are the: SEC; CSE; Financial Supervisory Agencies; and,
ICASL. The ICASL is selected by the respondents, with the highest overall average of
3.49, as the most efficient among other institutes which play a role in promoting good
corporate governance. Investors deviate slightly from the other groups however, by
disagreeing (29 per cent each) more to the role played by SEC and ICASL. A similar
view is expressed by NED and INV with regards to financial supervisory agencies,
reflected in disagreement rates of 33 per cent and 29 per cent respectively.
The judiciary and professional accounting institutions receive an overall rating
average slightly over 3.00. However, their overall averages (3.04 and 3.01respectively)
show that the majority of respondents believe these institutions do not carry out their
functions efficiently in promoting good governance practices. Judicial enforcement is
vital for promoting good governance. However, as shown by an overall disagreement
rate of over 25 per cent, the majority of respondents are not satisfied with the judiciary
functions. The NED and INV groups show higher levels of dissatisfaction with
disagreement rates of 37 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. This evidence indicates
the respondents have lost their confidence in the efficiency of judiciary system in Sri
Lanka, in its ability to promote good corporate governance practices.
The highest levels of dissatisfaction are observed in relation to the activities of
the Sri Lanka Institute of Directors, outside directors, civil activists and the media. The
respondents across all groups consider these institutions are highly inefficient as shown
by the average scores of 2.82, 2.82, 2.60 and 2.79 respectively. The respondents believe
that the activities of the media and civil activists are extremely inefficient. This
indicates that there are no active social organizations such as investor associations and
free financial media who are capable of functioning as whistleblowers. 43 per cent of
respondents report that they are not satisfied with the level of efficiency of the
functioning of civil activists, compared with 65 per cent recorded among the investors
group. It is concluded that corporate governance policy makers need clear policies to
promote the activities of civil organizations, including free access to information and
protection of their legal rights, especially whistleblower protection. The Kruskal-Wallis
test results also found that there are no significant differences between the opinions of
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the different groups, suggesting that all group members agree these institutions are not
as efficient as they are expected to be.

6.4.8 Alternative Approaches to Promote Good Corporate
Governance Practices
There are three possible regulatory approaches to promoting good corporate
governance, namely: prescriptive; non-prescriptive; and, mixed or balanced approaches.
The prescriptive approach requires companies to adopt specific corporate governance
practices prescribed by regulations. The non-prescriptive approach allows companies to
determine their own corporate governance practices, subject to voluntary disclosures of
corporate governance practices that they are adopted. The mixed or balanced approach
consists of the characteristics of both prescriptive and non-prescriptive approaches,
where only essential governance practices are prescribed, and detailed governance
practices are normally published in accordance with voluntarily corporate governance
codes. Presently the mixed approach is adopted in Sri Lanka. In order to understand the
respondents’ views regarding the most suitable approach to promote good corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka, respondents are asked to choose among these three
approaches. The summarized results of respondents’ views are given in Table 6.12.
Table 6.13 Approaches to Promote Corporate Governance Practices
Approaches

NED
IAP
ACC
GPM
GATO
ACD
INV
23%
18%
31%
25%
21%
21%
21%
Prescriptive approach
No.
9
6
14
11
13
6
5
78%
82%
69%
75%
74%
72% 79%
Mixed approach
No.
31
27
31
33
46
21
19
0%
0%
0%
0%
5%
7%
0%
Non- prescriptive approach
No.
0
0
0
0
3
2
0
Total Respondents
40
33
45
44
62
29
24
Notes: NED – Non-executive Directors; IAP – Independent Audit Professionals; ACC - Accountants; GPM –
Government Policy Makers; GATO - Government Audit and Tax Officers; ACD - Academics; INV - Investors

ALL
23%
64
75%
208
2%
5
277

75 per cent of respondents prefer the mixed approach. Only two per cent of
respondents selected the prescriptive approach as their preferred approach.

These

results reflect the true nature of corporate governance. There is no universally
acceptable model which fits all circumstances to achieve good corporate governance
practices. Although widely accepted principles are set, the implementation of these
principles differ according to various circumstances and conditions such as cultural
values of the society, the legal framework of the jurisdiction, industry, and institutional
cultures and value systems of organizations. Thus, a majority of respondents prefer
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organizations to enjoy some regulatory flexibility in implementing good corporate
governance practices. However, 23 per cent of respondents prefer the prescriptive
approach. This opinion may have been motivated by the lack of commitment of Sri
Lankan companies in implementing corporate governance best practices. As shown in
the Section 5.4, the compliance to corporate governance practices diverges considerably
among Sri Lankan companies. Thus, a number of respondents believe the prescriptive
approach better severs the purpose of promoting good corporate governance practices in
Sri Lankan companies.

6.5 Issues of Corporate Governance Identified by Stakeholders
In addition to opinion survey questions, the questionnaire includes two openended questions in which respondents could make comments. In the first question, the
respondents are given the opportunity to express their opinion on perceived corporate
governance problems or issues faced by Sri Lankan companies. Altogether 113
respondents commented. When analysing these comments, several themes emerge.
Seven themes are identified as most significant to the respondents. These themes are:
lack of education and awareness of corporate governance; inadequate regulations and
enforcement; lack of integrity and independence of directors; insufficient ethical
standards; lack of transparency; ownership concentration; and, corruption, insider
trading and political interventions. Detailed findings and some of the comments of the
respondents are illustrated below.
The lack of awareness and proper education of corporate governance is
highlighted as a significant issue by most respondents. Approximately 30 per cent of
respondents (33 of 113) recognize lack of awareness as a major issue. Specifically
identified were: a lack of qualified staff; inadequate awareness about corporate
governance among various stakeholders; inadequate understanding about corporate
governance practices and their benefits; and, a lack of interest and inadequate
knowledge with regard to benefits that can be acquired through applying corporate
governance. The following are notable comments of respondents on this theme.

“The pressure from investors to improve corporate governance is minimal due to their
lack of understanding.”
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“Misunderstandings and misconceptions about governance; e.g. Governance impedes
growth.”
“We never attempt to address the vacuum in educational system when grooming the
managers.”
“Top management is not up to date with the latest pronouncements on best corporate
governance codes and regulations.”
“Lack of pressure from the media and the public to improve corporate governance due
to their lack of understanding of its importance”
Inadequate regulations and enforcement are highlighted as a significant issue by
28 respondents. Regulatory failures, an inefficient regulatory framework, a lack of
guidance given to companies by regulatory authorities, a lack of monitoring
mechanisms in governance rules, and an absence of an authoritative institution with
wider regulatory powers are some of the problems highlighted by respondents in
relation to regulations and enforcement. The following are some of comments made on
regulatory issues.
“Bureaucrats in the regulatory institutions do not understand the concepts fully and
therefore they focus on trivial matters rather than on fundamentals”
“It is important to get the balance between performance and governance/regulations
right. Must avoid 6-star governance in a 3-star economy”
“Regulations must be strict and at the same time flexible, they should address key
loopholes in the governance mechanism”
“Violation of established corporate governance rules are occurring as a result of lack of
commitment to prosecute under existing law”
“Legal bodies who carry out inquiries and investigations are acting like puppets”
“Companies do not consider corporate governance seriously since it is not a legal
requirement”
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About 23 per cent of respondents (26 of 113) made observations on the lack of
integrity and independence of directors as a significant problem in Sri Lankan
companies. The shortage of persons of integrity and character to fill pools of
independent directors; problems of securing independence of independent directors and
not appointing independent or non-executive directors as the chairman of audit
committees are some of common problems highlighted by the respondents. Some of the
striking comments made by respondents on directors’ independence and integrity are
given below.
“Independent directors are often friends and relatives of the principle shareholders and
therefore do not act independently”
“The main principle that drives good governance is integrity of the management and the
employees.”
“Independent directors are in fact not independent as they are appointed by dependent
directors in most cases”
Insufficient ethical behaviour among directors and managers has been identified
by 22 respondents as another problem of Sri Lankan corporate governance. Poor ethical
standards of top management; a lack of responsibility towards the stakeholders and the
society; a lack of trustworthiness of accounting and auditing practices; and, undue
influence to promote unethical business from politicians are among the issues
highlighted. Some comments that are worth mentioning are;
“Roles of executive and non-executive directors do not show proper professional
behaviour”
“Managers simply tend to cow tow to the whims of the bosses to safe guard the job”
“Lack of trustworthiness of accounting and auditing practices”
Lack of transparency earned 16 comments from the respondents. Identified
issues are: key decisions and the rationales of such decisions are not transparent; a lack
of transparency regarding directors’ remuneration; and, a lack of transparency in
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applying governance codes are some of the repeated comments made by the
respondents. Examples of such comments are given below.
“Most of the Sri Lankan companies are practicing corporate governance rules since
they are compulsory, but the transparency and the effectiveness of these practices are
doubtful as there is no transparency.”
“In some companies the major shareholders are family members therefore lack
of transparency becomes a common problem”
Concentration of ownership is also identified by twelve respondents as a
significant issue faced by Sri Lankan companies. One of the salient facts regarding
ownership concentration is that the ultimate ownership of most of the companies lies
with a few individuals, more often family members and close friends, preventing
effective corporate practices. Respondents’ views are reflected further by the following
comments.
“Most of the company directors are shareholders of the company, more over family
members, who do not want to apply corporate governance”
“Most of the public companies are family businesses; hence owners are not willing to
delegate powers to the directors and top management of the company”
“Presence of major shareholders with controlling of about 35% - 60% of issued share
capital is noticed in most of the companies. Hence, the interest in governance is merely
a compliance issue”
“The ownership structure of most of the companies has not been widely spread”
Undue political influence and corruption are widely accepted as problems in
emerging economies. Political influence, corruption and insider trading are
interchangeably highlighted by over 30 respondents in the survey. Government
intervention in business transactions; political interventions; endemic corruption
between the state and private sector dealings; a vicious circle of corruption due to a lack
of strong legislation; and, insider trading and unethical behaviour of directors are
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identified repeatedly in some of the remarks given by respondents. Respondents’ views
on these issues are further revealed by the following comments.
“Too many interventions by both the shareholders and the government, hence the
management and the directors in the board are biased in decision making”
“The president acting as the minister of finance”
“The old boy network that exists in the private sector which leads to overlook the
venalities of directors and top management if they are in their good books”
“CG in Sri Lanka is pathetic. All the big players cover-up themselves using their high
hand connections when an issue comes-up”
“It seems that many directors are involved in insider trading and unethical cross holding
of shares in order to achieve individual targets as well as to support the political wing
which they belong to”
The summarized results given in Table 6.9 show that most of the given corporate
governance issues (refer question 10 in the questionnaire) are considered as the major
problems by the respondents. In addition to these issues, the problems discussed in the
preceding section have collectively been recognized by respondents based on their
experience and expertise.

6.6 Recommendations Made by Stakeholders
In the second open ended question, the respondents were given the opportunity
to make recommendations to improve corporate governance in Sri Lanka. Altogether 94
respondents make their recommendations. These recommendations are categorized
under five basic themes: more regulations and regulatory monitoring; sufficient
education; more emphasis on judiciary enforcement: increased ethical standards; and,
prevention of political intervention. Detailed findings and some of the comments of the
respondents are illustrated below.

Placing more emphasis on rules and regulations is found to be the most cited
recommendation which is made by 30 respondents. It’s a notable fact that about half of
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the recommendations made by members in the IAP and GPM groups focus on
increasing regulations and regulatory monitoring. However, a few recommendations go
against strict regulation, arguing the need for more relaxed voluntary application of
governance practices. Some of the comments which highlight their suggestions are
worth mentioning.
“Obtaining corporate governance ratings and disclosing them in the annual reports
should be made compulsory”

“Regulatory authorities must guide and review the corporate governance practices of
companies on a regular basis”
“ICSAL should introduce proper monitoring system to identify the practicing members’
bad practices on corporate governance with coordination of other regulatory bodies and
general public”
“Impose rules and regulations to get quick actions against violations”
“It is important to establish a separate regulatory institution having combine
characteristics of executive and judiciary similar to the Department of Labour and
Labour Tribunal”
“Regulations need to be strict and monitoring of adherence to corporate governance
regulations need to be done more rigorously”
“The regulators should be given more power and autonomy to act on their own without
intervention from other parties”
“Close monitoring of SEC, CSE, Central Bank and the Judiciary”
“Principle-based corporate governance is likely to be more effective than rule-based
approach. Rules tend to be broken or circumvented, whereas corporate governance
implemented out of conviction would yield better results.”

“Need to go beyond the declaration in Annual Reports. Most Companies pay lip-service
to the corporate governance guidelines.”
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Educating board members, management, employees and stakeholders about
principles and policies, best practices, regulatory requirements, and performance
implications of corporate governance is also a strong suggestion made by the
respondents, especially academics. Over 25% of respondents commented on this issue.
They even go to the extent of suggesting that education on corporate governance needs
to be started in secondary education, followed by higher education, essentially before
holding managerial positions. Introducing corporate governance as a subject in
accounting and business degrees and accounting professional qualifications; compiling
simple and understandable corporate governance guidelines which can be understood
even by a layman and conducting awareness programs for stakeholders by professional
institutions are some of the frequent recommendations made by the respondents. The
importance of education and awareness of corporate governance is well reflected from
the following comments.
“Education, Education, Education at middle and operational management level”
“Corporate governance is a culture: state of mind. It all starts from the school level and
home.”
“All professionals should be educated in this regard before they become professionals
and this should be tested in their professional exams”
“Business community has to be educated about corporate governance practices and their
benefits”
“Basic concepts of the corporate governance and ethics should be included in the
education syllabus of the school level”
“Directors of the companies, Head of finances of the companies and Audit firm partners
should be improved of their knowledge about corporate governance through seminars
and any other communication tool.”
“We need to seriously pay attention in the development of curriculum for secondary and
higher education stages to ensure that adequate weight is given to instil the values of
good governance among the student population.”
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Another significant recommendation of respondents is the strengthening of the
judiciary and judicial enforcement system. They suggest that the judicial system on
governance has to be tightened and reinforced with more powers. Severe punishment
for those who violate governance rules and regulations are among the common
recommendations. Some relevant comments are listed below:
“Company legislation has to be periodically revised in line with the global changes”
“Activate company law review committees”
“The judiciary system on governance has to be tightened”
“Regulators should act fearlessly and objectively to punish violators irrespective of the
person concerned”
“Very tight rules to be brought giving more powers to the judiciary system in Sri
Lanka”
“Effective judiciary system, especially for related business activities”
Respondents emphasize improving ethical standards of companies. Over 15 per
cent of responses focus on this issue. Most of them are of the view that ethical standards
have to be cultivated from a very young age. Some responses are as follows:
“Basic concepts of corporate governance and ethics should be included in the
curriculum at school level”
“Values, integrity and ethical behaviour together with cultural values should be
improved as a long term solution”
“Importance of ethics and integrity imbibed from very young age”
“Ethical standards commencing from the school level and all social institutions should
drive this concepts”
Prevention of political intervention also is another significant recommendation
made by the respondents. The respondents are of the view that the prevention of
corruptive links between large businesses and politicians may result in a more
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favourable business environment for small and medium scale businesses and secure
equitable distribution of income. The respondents’ attitudes are summarized as follows;
“No political influences should be directed towards statutory authority”
“A clear common line of sight without personal prejudices”
“Sri Lanka should first have an honest political leadership who obey the judiciary
decisions. Political governance before corporate governance”
The summarized results given in Table 6.11 show that majority of respondents
agree that Sri Lankan corporate governance can be improved by adhering to good
governance practices. In addition to specific governance practices, they collectively
agree that these aspects also need to be addressed in order to improve the overall
corporate governance environment in Sri Lanka.

6.7 Summary
This chapter examines perceptions of various stakeholder groups on the present
status, issues, strategies and practices of the corporate governance system of Sri Lanka.
This is achieved by examining the perceptions of seven stakeholder groups through a
questionnaire survey of 277 stakeholders. In this process, stakeholder perceptions on
eight aspects of the corporate governance system in Sri Lanka are examined. The
Kruskal-Wallis test is carried out to examine whether there are significant differences
between opinions of stakeholder groups. Furthermore, the stakeholders’ perceptions of
problems of corporate governance and their recommendations to cope with these
problems are analysed in order to identify their real concerns about corporate
governance.
The findings of this study reveal that various stakeholders consider: governance
codes; the financial reporting framework; the regulatory framework; and, codes of
conduct and ethics, as the important components of the corporate governance system of
the country. However, their emphasis on the judiciary system, corporate ownership
structure, and culture and value systems of the society as important components of the
corporate governance system is relatively low. The examination of performance
implications of corporate governance reveals that the majority of respondents consider
better corporate governance improves financial, market and corporate social
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performance, and ability to access new capital. However, the impact of corporate
governance on reducing share price volatility, political intervention and cost of capital
has earned relatively low levels of agreement. The stakeholders’ opinions on corporate
governance reveal that a majority of respondents are not happy with the present status of
various aspects of Sri Lanka’s corporate governance system. The majority believe that
the governance system is not comparable to that of a developed country and the specific
aspects such as regulations, implementation and monitoring are also not adequate.
The examination of the perceptions on various issues of corporate governance
reveals that all the given issues of: a lack of integrity; a lack of independence;
inadequate

transparency;

insider

trading;

inadequate

protection

of

minority

shareholders; and, conflicts of interest of directors are considered major issues by the
respondents. It is also found that the majority of respondents agree to several corporate
governance strategies such as the development of internal and external governance
mechanisms and improvement of accounting and auditing standards are suitable to
improve the efficiency of corporate governance practices. However, changing
ownership concentrations is not accepted as a successful strategy. On examination of
the importance of certain governance practices, the majority of respondents agree that:
giving greater powers to audit committees; full disclosure of RPT’s; separation of the
CEO and chairman positions; independence of NEDs; and, adoption of codes of conduct
and ethics as importance practices. The investigation of suitable approaches to promote
good governance practices in Sri Lanka reveals that an overwhelming majority opt for
the balanced approach.
When the respondents are given the opportunity to comment on perceptions of
major corporate governance problems in Sri Lanka, they recognize a number of issues
based on their experience and expertise. After classifying these issues under several
themes, it is revealed that: a lack of education and awareness of corporate governance;
inadequate regulations and enforcement; a lack of integrity and independence of
directors; insufficient

ethical standards; a lack of transparency; ownership

concentration; and, political interventions, insider trading and corruption are recognized
by most as major problems in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, their recommendations to
improve corporate governance practices consist of five main aspects: namely strict
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regulations and regulatory monitoring; sufficient education; more emphasis on judiciary
enforcement; increased ethical standards; and, prevention of political intervention.
The findings of this corporate governance survey (refer Section 5.3.3) reveal that
ownership of Sri Lankan companies is highly concentrated and family ownership
concentration impacts negatively on corporate governance compliance. These findings
are consistent with stakeholders’ perceptions as a majority of respondents recognize
ownership concentration as a major corporate governance problem. However, the
impact of ownership concentration on company performance is yet to be explored in Sri
Lanka. Thus, this impact is examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7 : The Impact of Ownership Concentration on
Firm Performance of Sri Lankan Companies
7.1 Introduction
The survey analysis shows (refer Section 5.3.3) the ownership of Sri Lankan
listed companies is highly concentrated, with a presence of controlling shareholders. It
further reveals that in most cases, ownership is concentrated either with family owners
or foreign owners. These survey results are consistent with previous research conducted
in Sri Lanka regarding share ownership of public listed companies. For example, the
studies of Samarakoon (1999) and Senaratne and Gunaratne (2007) reveal that the
ownership structure of Sri Lankan listed firms is characterized by highly concentrated
ownership with the presence of a controlling shareholder, usually another corporate
entity, and with family owners holding ultimate ownership. The survey results of this
study further reveal that family ownership has considerable negative impact, whereas
foreign ownership has significant positive impact on the corporate governance of firms
(refer Section 5.5.3).

Relationship-based

businesses,

especially

within

family

owned

group

affiliations, are a common cultural tendency in Sri Lanka. Thus, the lack of applicability
of the Anglo-Saxon model may contribute to low levels of governance compliance
experienced by family owned companies. Irrespective of low compliance to corporate
governance practices by family based companies, it can be assumed that ownership
concentration leads to better performance in Sri Lankan companies as a result of
controlling shareholders’ direct participation in business affairs, which reduces
monitoring costs and encourages relationship based business practices. This study
examines the impact of ownership concentration and structure on firm performance in
Sri Lanka.Since no prior research on this aspect of Sri Lankan companies has been
reported in the literature to date, the findings of this study provide valuable insights to
Sri Lankan policy makers for improving corporate governance of the country.

This chapter presents the empirical analysis and findings of objective seven of
the study. The analysis is presented in the following sequence. First, a brief discussion
on the background of the study is provided with reference to: performance implications
of ownership concentration; Sri Lankan corporate governance; and, its affiliated social
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conditions. Secondly, a brief review of regulatory requirements for shareholding in Sri
Lankan listed companies is provided. In the third section, the sample companies’ profile
and the nature of ownership concentration of sample companies are examined. In the
next section, the analysis and empirical findings are discussed with reference to findings
of prior research. The summary is then provided in the final section.

7. 2 Relationship of Ownership and Performance
Much of the literature on corporate ownership structure show a high level of
ownership concentration in many countries — especially outside the Anglo-Saxon
countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou,
2007). Many studies examine the impact of ownership concentration on performance,
concluding that higher ownership concentration may improve performance by
decreasing monitoring costs. Alternatively, performance can decline if large
shareholders use their control rights to achieve private benefits (Demsetz and Lehn,
1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Thomsen
et al., 2006; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). As most of these studies are conducted in
developed economies, their results cannot be generalized without paying attention to
contextual idiosyncrasies.

The contextual settings of developed countries differ vastly from those of
emerging markets; therefore, the findings and theories based on the evidence collected
from developed countries may have limited applicability to emerging markets. As
Zeitun and Tian (2007) point out, the social, economic and cultural factors of a country
affect corporate ownership structure, which in turn impacts on firm performance. Very
little is known about the performance implications of ownership structures in emerging
markets, and there is a dearth of studies in this area. This issue, combined with the
divergent results produced by similar previous studies conducted in developed
economies (Morck et al., 1988, La Porta et al., 2002, Gompers et al., 2003, Drobetz et
al., 2004), creates a vacuum in the academic literature on corporate governance
practices in emerging markets.

As in many other emerging markets in Asia, the ownership of Sri Lankan
companies is highly concentrated, with a presence of controlling shareholders in most
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enterprises (refer Section 5.3.3). Sri Lankan corporate entities have strong historical ties
with the systems inherited from British colonial rule. For example, Sri Lankan
accounting and auditing systems are products of British inheritance and more recently,
international standards and practices (Asian Development Bank, 2002). Sri Lanka
adopted liberalized economic policies from 1977, and is heavily dependent upon foreign
aid and foreign direct investment for its economic development. These adopted policies
permit international funding agencies such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank to directly influence corporate
governance practices and policies of the country. Furthermore, these historical ties and
economic policies influence foreign ownership concentration in Sri Lankan companies.
However, traditionally, relationship-based businesses, especially within family owned
group affiliations, are a common cultural tendency in Sri Lanka. This kind of
inconsistency creates a challenging environment for Sri Lankan companies to achieve
strong financial performance while at the same time maintaining a high level of
compliance with prescribed corporate governance practices.

Corporate control in Sri Lanka often lies in the hands of a few individuals,
families or corporate groups who hold the majority of ownership. Existing governance
structures of Sri Lankan companies, characterized by controlling shareholders, show
similarities to an ‘insider’ corporate governance model, as ownership concentration
tends to produce better financial performance for Sri Lankan companies. Furthermore,
ownership concentration by individuals rather than institutions tends to produce better
performance (Zeitun and Tian, 2007). However, whether this type of ownership
concentration affects firm performance has not been examined in any prior research on
Sri Lanka. In order to examine the impact of ownership concentration and structure on
firm performance, this chapter addresses the following questions:
(1) Is there any impact of ownership concentration on firm performance of Sri
Lankan-listed companies?
(2) Is there any impact of ownership structure on firm performance of Sri Lankanlisted companies?
Regression analysis is carried out based on the sample data and the empirical
analysis and the results are provided in Section 7.6 of this chapter.
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7.3 Regulations Governing Shareholdings of Sri Lankan Listed
Companies
Listed companies in Sri Lanka are governed by various regulations such as the
Companies Act No. 07 of 2007, the CSE bylaws, and SEC bylaws. As per the provisions
of the Companies Act, a limited liability company can be started with two shareholders.
However, the CSE requires companies to satisfy a specified public float at the time of
initial listing, as well as thereafter. In order to be quoted on the Main Board, a company
should have stated capital representing shares of a value of not less than 100 million
rupees and have a minimum public holding of 25 per cent of the total number of shares,
which shall be in the hands of a minimum number of 1000 public shareholders holding
not less than 100 shares each. However, there is provision in the listing rule to accept
lower than 25 per cent of public holding, if the CSE is satisfied that such a lower
percentage is sufficient for a liquid market. A quotation in the Second Board requires a
company to have a stated capital representing shares of a value of not less than 35
million rupees and have a public holding of 10 per cent (CSE 2009).

The public holding is the percentage of shares that must be held by the public,
excluding share holdings by parent, subsidiary or associate companies, and holdings by
directors, members of their families and/or their nominees. The listed company must
disclose the names and the number of shares held by the 20 largest holders along with
the percentage of such shares held. It also requires disclosing the public share holding
percentage. Furthermore, companies are expected to disclose the categories of
shareholdings such as individual and institutional shareholdings, and resident and nonresident shareholdings. It is expected that these disclosures act as a self regulating
control mechanism in order to maintain minimum public share holding requirements. It
is the duty of the board of directors to ensure that all rules are met on a continuing basis.
The minimum public holding maintained by some companies falls short of the required
float, as these requirements are not properly monitored on a continuous basis.

The Company Takeover and Merger Code of 1995, as amended in 2003,
imposes restrictions on acquiring large blocks of shares of a company when the target
company is a public limited company. The purpose of this Code is to ensure fairness for
all shareholders, especially for non-controlling shareholders in relation to a takeover.
According to this Code, SEC approval is required for any takeover offer. The SEC may
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grant its approval for an offer which results in the ‘offerer’ holding shares carrying less
than 30 per cent of the voting rights of the ‘offeree’ company. However, if an ‘offerer’
intends to acquire shares carrying 30 per cent or more of the voting rights of the
‘offeree’ company, or holds not less than 30 per cent and not exceeding 50 per cent of
the voting rights of the ‘offeree’ company, and acquires additional shares carrying more
than two per cent of the voting rights, they are obligated to make a mandatory offer to
all the remaining shareholders in order to obtain SEC approval for such an offer.
Although the mandatory offer is intended to ensure the rights of non-controlling
shareholders in a takeover bid, it does not restrict ownership concentration since any
individual or person can acquire a majority shareholding of a public limited company,
causing a highly concentrated ownership structure for listed companies.

The bank, finance and insurance sector in Sri Lanka is governed by specific acts
and regulations where restrictions are imposed on share transfers and share ownership.
For example, according to the direction given by the monetary board under section
46(1) (d) of the Banking Act No. 30 of 1988, no person or company may hold more than
15 per cent of issued share capital carrying voting rights in a licensed commercial bank
incorporated in Sri Lanka. As a result, relatively dispersed ownership structures are
observed in the banking sector, compared with non-banking counterparts.

The listing rules attempt to minimise share ownership concentration by
stipulating a minimum number of share holdings by the public. However, the regulators
expect directors to implement these requirements without having adequate enforcement
of the code. The Mergers Code of 1985, although codifying non-controlling
shareholders’ rights, does not restrict ownership concentration through mergers and
acquisitions. A lack of provisions as well as implementation weaknesses allows Sri
Lankan listed companies to have controlling owners with large percentages of share
ownership, leaving only a small percentage for the public. However, the Banking Act
restricts the share ownership concentration and therefore the finance sector’s share
ownership behaviour cannot be compared with other sectors in the market.
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7.4 Issues in Estimating the Ownership and Performance
Measures
Many empirical studies which examine the relationship between firm ownership
and performance use both accounting and market measures concurrently, or market
performance measures alone, such as Tobin’s Q (TQ) (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck
et al., 1988; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Thomsen et
al., 2006; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Zeitun and Tian 2007). As discussed in
Section 4.7.3, this study uses both accounting and market performance measures. While
ROA is used to measure how well a firm is using its resources, TQ measures a firm’s
performance in the market. In addition, ROE is also used on the grounds that owners
normally have the strongest needs and incentives to be informed about the residual
income of the firm. In theory, the TQ ratio identifies the combination of the marginal
efficiency of capital and the financial cost of capital. Thus, the TQ ratio is positively
related to investors’ perceptions of managerial quality. This suggests investors are
willing to pay a premium over the value of the firm’s assets in anticipation of good
future prospects under the present management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The TQ
ratio can therefore be employed as a proxy for the market valuation of the firm’s assets,
whereas accounting profit is an estimate of what management has accomplished.
However caution is needed in estimating and interpreting such measures, as they are
subject to measurement problems. TQ is normally affected by investors’ psychology
concerning their future expectations of the market, whereas accounting profit is not
affected by such expectations. As small markets are more vulnerable to market
manipulations and insider dealings, in Sri Lanka accounting performance measures
could be better indicators of firm performance, rather than market measures.

It is true that accounting performance variables are subject to various limitations
which typically result from the fundamental limitations of financial statements. Though
the financial statements are prepared based on generally accepted accounting standards,
the accounting process is dominated by subjective interpretations of standards and the
application of firm-specific accounting rules and policies. This makes it difficult to
compare firm performance measured in accounting terms in a realistic manner. Despite
this inherent limitation, the applicable legal requirements and the financial statement
preparation process of Sri Lankan listed firms are on par with the international standards
in many respects. The Sri Lankan firms are required to prepare financial statements
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based on Sri Lanka Accounting Standards which are fully compliant with the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The financial statements of Sri
Lankan companies are required to be audited by a qualified auditor as per the
Companies Act No.07 of 2007. Furthermore, as stated Section 7.3, they are required to
comply with the listing rules of the CSE and are subject to constant monitoring by the
SEC and the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board. The
published financial statements can therefore serve as the prime data source for obtaining
information in measuring accounting performance of companies (De Zoysa and Rudkin,
2010).

Market performance measures, especially TQ, also suffer from accounting
measurement problems. Prior studies which examine the performance implications of
ownership structure argue that accounting and market performance measures differ in at
least two important aspects (Demsetz 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al.,
1988; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; and Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos and
Lazaretou, 2007). The first relates to the time horizon. Accounting profit is based on the
historical performance of the firm, and is therefore a backward-looking measure; while
the TQ ratio reflects the investors’ expectations, and is therefore a forward-looking
measure. The second difference arises due to measurement problems: accounting profit
is largely distorted by accounting principles, but TQ is based on market values and thus
it is claimed that it is less vulnerable to distortion. However, market values are affected
by investors’ expectations about future events, which are subject to manipulations,
signalling, group behaviour, and mistakes (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). This
makes TQ less reliable, especially in a small market where more market manipulation is
possible. Furthermore, TQ also suffers from accounting measurement problems, due to
the use of proxy book values in place of replacement values of tangible assets. Book
values generally have problems caused by inflation and arbitrary depreciation choices.
TQ does not reveal the investment made in intangibles; and neither does it reflect the
value placed by investors in intangibles (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). Due to
these reasons, the validity of TQ as a performance measure is debatable, especially in an
emerging market where market anomalies and inefficiencies play a dominant role in
deciding the market price for securities.
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Many prior studies which examine the impact of ownership structure on firm
performance employ the fraction of shares owned to identify influential shareholders,
on the assumption that those shareholders owning a greater fraction of shares in a firm
have greater influence on strategic and operating decisions compared with those
shareholders owning smaller fractions of shares (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al.,
1988; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; and Zeitun and
Tian 2007). Consistent with this argument, the fraction of shares owned is applied in all
measures of ownership concentration and structure used in this study. The fraction of
share ownership of the three (SH3), five (SH5) and ten (SH10) largest shareholders is
given priority in estimating concentration ratios. The Herfindahl Index (HERF), which
gives greater weighting to shareholders with larger shareholdings, is used to measure
the fraction of shares owned by the top five shareholders.

Agency theory argues that investors are protected from abuse by management if
ownership is concentrated with a few large shareholders, as they can effectively monitor
the functions of management. The fraction of shares owned by the largest shareholders
is not a reliable measure of the protection of investors if management holds a larger
fraction of shares, putting them into the significant shareholders’ category. Thus, some
studies use managerial ownership as an essential variable of ownership structure
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 2007,). Direct managerial
ownership in Sri Lankan companies is relatively small, because ownership is usually
dominated by another corporate entity. The data analysis shows that of the total issued
share capital of the sample companies, on average 70 per cent of shares are owned by
other corporate entities (refer table 7.3). These entities are usually other limited liability
companies and they more often have family ownership as the ultimate owners. Direct
managerial ownership therefore does not play an influential role in the Sri Lankan
context. However, controlling owners have more power to participate in the operational
activities of a firm, especially in the Sri Lankan market, where controlling shareholders’
influence over management is high. For example, the survey results show that over 70
of the companies have controlling shareholders’ influence in major decisions (refer
Section 5.3.3 and Table 5.6). On the basis of these arguments, this study investigates the
impact of ownership structure on firm performance using the fraction of shares owned
by individuals (F-Ind) and fractions of shares owned by a corporate entity (F-Com),
instead of using managerial share ownership.
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Another issue that needs to be addressed in this study is whether the ownership
structure of Sri Lankan companies is endogenous to performance. If the ownership
structure is endogenous as argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership is more
likely to be affected by firm performance. Managerial ownership has been found to be
affected by performance due to factors such as performance based compensation and
insider information. Management compensation in the form of stock options is found to
be one of the main reasons for a reverse causation where firm performance affects
ownership structure (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Performance based compensation and
stock options for executives are extremely low in Sri Lankan companies. For example,
the survey shows that over 85 per cent of companies do not use stock options or
performance based compensation for their directors (refer Section 5.4.3). Thus, the
impact of performance on ownership structure, especially managerial ownership is
likely to be low in Sri Lankan companies.

The ownership is likely to be exogenous to performance in a corporate
governance system where ownership structure is much more stable, (Gugler and
Weigand, 2003). The ownership structure of Sri Lankan listed firms is very steady and
characterized by: concentrated ownership with the presence of controlling shareholders;
controlling ownership usually held by another corporate entity; and, ultimate ownership
is held by family owners (refer Section 5.3.3 and Table 5.6). These factors guide Sri
Lankan firms to have stable ownership structures, and therefore ownership is more
likely to be exogenous to performance. If the ownership structure is endogenous, it
must be taken into account when determining the relationship between ownership and
performance. Failing to do so may yield biased regression estimates. As the ownership
structure of Sri Lankan companies is more likely to be exogenous to performance, this
study does not examine the endogeneity of ownership structure. Further, it assumes that
regression estimates do not yield bias results due to the endogeneity issue.
Consequently, greater emphasis is given to ownership concentration amongst the first
five largest shareholders and the fraction of shares owned by individuals vs. corporate
entities, assuming these ownerships are exogenous to performance.
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7.5 The Sample profile
The sample of the study consists of 157 companies listed on the CSE over the
period 2001–2009. On average, 230 companies are listed on CSE during this period and
thus the sample represents approximately 68 per cent of the listed companies in Sri
Lanka. However, missing data across the sample period reduces the sample. The final
sample consists of 846 firm-years. Table 7.1 presents the sample profile of companies
across years and industry sectors. These companies belong to different industrial
sectors, of which the manufacturing sector represents the largest number of companies
(26 per cent) in the sample. As per Table 7.1, the number of companies in each industry
sector ranges between 3 per cent and 26 per cent.

Table 7.1 Profile of the Sample
Year

FirmYears

%

Industry

Total

Sample

Sample
%

Firms

FirmYears

%

2009

148 17.5

Beverage and food

18

14

78

95

11.2

2008

154 18.2

Diversified

11

7

64

48

5.7

2007

149 17.6

Health

6

6

100

21

2.5

2006

114 13.5

Hotel

32

25

78

123

14.5

2005

54

6.4

Invest. & property

29

11

38

65

7.7

2004

26

3.1

Manufacturing

45

40

89
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26.0

2003

30

3.5

Motors

6

6

100

42

5.0

2002

87 10.3

Plantations

18

22

122

108

12.8

2001

84

Service and trading

20

17

85

79

9.3

Other

12

9

75

45

5.3

Bank and Finance

33

-

-

-

-

230

157

68

846

100

Total

846

9.9

100

Total

The data set contains detailed information on performance, measured in terms
of: accounting and market returns; ownership concentration (OC); ownership structure
(OS); and, other financial information capable of measuring the size, age and leverage
of the companies. Table 7.2 provides a profile of the sample companies, giving an
indication of size, operational experience and profitability.

Table 7.2 shows a significant dispersion among sample companies in respect of
size, as measured by: total assets; sales; age; and, return on assets. The total assets of the
sample companies ranged from 6 million rupees to 96,188 million rupees, showing a
substantial variation among companies. While the average total assets of companies
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amounted to 3,948 million rupees, the total assets of a sizeable proportion of these
companies (41 per cent) are less than 1,000 million rupees. A similar situation emerges
when the size of companies is measured in terms of sales, which varies from 0.07
million rupees to 47,939 million rupees, also showing a substantial disparity between
sample companies. The sample of companies consists of both young and old enterprises,
with their age ranging from one to 164 years. The majority of companies in the sample
(60 per cent) are under 30 years old, while only 23 per cent of companies are over 50
years old. As for the profitability level of companies, once again there is a wide
disparity. While 676 firm-years in the sample reported positive returns, the remaining
170 firm-years reported negative returns on their assets from the sample period. The
average profitability ratio of the sample companies is 5.5 per cent, while the majority of
companies (65 per cent) earned less than 7.5 per cent of return on their assets.
Table 7.2 Profile of Sample Companies
Total Assets
Rs millions
Frequency
%
0–100
51
6
101–500
148
17.5
501–1,000
146
17.3
1,001–5,000
358
42.3
5,001–10,000
78
9.2
>10,000
65
7.7
Total
846
100
Descriptive statistics
Rs. millions
Mean
3,948
Standard deviation
9,482
Minimum
6
Maximum
96,188

Sales
Rs millions
Frequency
%
0–25
41
4.8
26–100
90
10.6
101–1,000
286
33.8
1,001–2,500
191
22.6
2,501–10,000
163
19.3
>10,000
75
8.9
Total
846
100
Descriptive statistics
Rs. millions
Mean
3,151
Standard deviation
6,172
Minimum
0.07
Maximum
47,939

Age

Return on Assets

Years
Frequency
0–5
16
6–15
181
16–30
316
31–50
141
51–100
145
> 100
47
Total
846
Descriptive statistics
Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum

%
1.9
21.4
37.4
16.7
17.1
5.6
100
Years
38
32
1
164

Per cent
Frequency
< −10%
29
−10–0%
141
0–7.5%
383
7.5–15%
206
15–30%
76
> 30%
11
Total
846
Descriptive statistics
Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum

243

%
3.4
16.7
45.3
24.3
9
1.3
100
Per cent
5.49
10.24
−113.22
87.83

7.6 Analysis, Results and Discussion
7.6.1 Summary Statistics
The ownership and performance variables are initially examined with
exploratory data analysis and descriptive statistics and the results are shown in Table
7.3. The descriptive statistics shows that the first three OC ratios (SH3, SH5 and SH10)
indicate a high ownership concentration in the sample of Sri Lankan companies.
Specifically, the mean values of each of the three OC ratios in the sample were above
70 per cent, with an overall mean value of 77 per cent. The data also indicates that a
substantial variation across firms in ownership concentration exists. The average range
of the three OC ratios is 66 per cent, with an average standard deviation (SD) of 14 per
cent. The data in Table 2 reveals that the first ten-largest shareholders (approximately
80 per cent of the sample firms) held over 75 per cent of shares. This indicates that the
majority of firms are not in compliance with the CSE listing rule requirement which
stipulates that a minimum float of 25 per cent shares should be held by at least 1,000
shareholders. The forth OC ratio, the HERF index, further confirms the existence of a
high concentration of ownership in Sri Lankan firms. As per the data in Table 7.3, the
mean value of the HERF index amounted to 3,210. According to the merger guidelines
issued by the US Department of Justice (2010), an HERF index in excess of 1,800
points is considered as a high concentration. This also indicates the presence of a
controlling shareholder in most of the Sri Lankan firms surveyed.
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables; 2000–2008
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Skewness

Kurtosis

ROA
ROE
Tobin Q
MBR
SH3
SH5
SH10
HERF
F-Ind
F-Com
TD/TA
LN-TA
LN-Age
LN-TSal

5.49
8.09
1.09
1.26
70.36
77.51
84.06
3,209
28.65
71.34
0.51
14.10
3.31
13.57

10.24
24.45
0.58
2.40
16.99
13.94
10.90
2,097
22.96
22.96
0.35
1.50
0.79
1.93

−113.21
−327.30
0.23
−9.33
25.27
30.27
41.48
270
1.49
0.00
0.00
8.70
0.00
4.24

87.83
153.77
4.94
55.01
98.44
98.87
99.76
8,952
100.00
98.50
3.92
18.38
5.10
17.68

−0.817
−3.380
2.802
14.757
−0.452
−0.864
−1.187
0.894
1.258
−1.258
3.469
−0.218
−0.067
−0.552

28.430
48.640
10.768
309.140
−0.482
0.671
1.975
0.071
0.880
0.880
27.266
0.487
0.469
0.621

Sample (N) = 846.
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ShapiroWilk
.820
.710
.741
.317
.960
.939
.917
.920
.863
.863
.770
.993
.977
.981

Prob.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

While the results of this study suggest that Sri Lankan firms have high OC, the
OS of firms as measured by fraction ratios, indicates greater corporate ownership
compared to individual ownership. According to the data in Table 7.3, the average value
of the fraction of shares owned by other corporate entities (F-Com) is 72 per cent,
compared to 28 per cent owned by individuals (F-Ind).
In the correlation and regression analysis, SH3 and the HERF index are used as
an indicator of OC to investigate whether OC increases a firm’s performance. The SH3
ratio records the highest dispersion among the three OC ratios, with a range of 73 per
cent and a standard deviation of 17 per cent. The HERF index is considered to be a good
indicator of OC as it gives more weight to larger shareholders (or a controlling
shareholder). The leverage, size and age are represented by the TD/TA ratio, log of
total sales (LN- Tsal) and log of age (LN-Age) respectively.

7.6.2 Correlation Analysis
Table 7.4 presents the correlation matrix for the sample used. The results show a
significant relationship between firm performance and OC variables. As expected, SH3
is positively correlated to ROA, ROE and TQ and is significant at the 1% level for ROE
and 5% level for ROA and TQ. The negative correlation between SH3 and MBR hints
at market anomalies prevailing in the Sri Lankan market. HERF is positively correlated
with all performance variables and is significant at the 1% level for ROE and TQ. The
correlation of structure ratios with performance variables show mixed results. F-Ind
ratio is positive for ROA but it is negative for ROE and TQ. As expected, F-Com ratio
is positively correlated to ROA but negatively correlated to ROE and TQ. The claim
that higher individual ownership leads to higher firm performance whereas higher
corporate ownership leads to poorer firm performance is not shown by the results.

The results of the correlation analysis further indicate the extent of correlation
between the explanatory variables used in this study. The size of the firm is negatively
correlated with the OC ratios, implying that larger firms tend to have more dispersed
ownership. A similar relationship is observed between the age of the firms and OC
ratios. The older firms tend to have less concentration, as they are normally subjected to
expansion through public share issues. As expected, the two OS ratios, SH3 and HERF,
are highly correlated with each other. However, because they are used in the regression
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model alternately, the high correlation between these two variables has no impact on the
model. The result also shows that the F-Com ratio is positively correlated with the OC
ratios. This implies that most of the Sri Lankan firms in the sample had parent
companies as their principle shareholder, with larger share ownership. In addition, the
negative relationship between F-Ind ratio and OC ratios shows that the individually
owned companies were less concentrated.

Table 7.4 Correlation Matrix of Variables, 2000–2008
ROA
ROE
TQ
MBR SH3
HERF
**
ROE
.523
1
.000
TQ
.009
.005
1
.799
.881
**
**
MBR
-.003
-.459
.410
1
.939
.000
.000
*
**
*
SH3
.077
.102
.076
-.005 1
.025
.003
.026
.876
**
**
**
HERF
.055
.096
.119
.036 .825
1
.108
.005
.001
.296 .000
*
**
**
**
F-Ind
.001
-.075
-.097
.037 -.570
-.556
.980
.030
.005
.277 .000
.000
*
**
**
**
F-Com
-.001
.075
.097
-.037 .570
.556
.980
.030
.005
.277 .000
.000
**
**
TD/TA
-.163
.015
.321
.038 -.034
-.040
.000
.654
.000
.274 .325
.240
*
LN-Age .061
.042
-.022
.021 -.068
-.023
.078
.223
.524
.551 .049
.496
**
**
LN.271
.227
-.067
-.022 -.042
-.067
TSal
.000
.000
.053
.523 .220
.052
Note: ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level.

FInd.

FCom.

TD/TA

LNAge

1
**

-1.0
.000
.013
.702
**
.111
.001
-.020
.562

1
-.013
.702
**
-.111
.001
.020
.562

1
.046
.185
**
.262
.000

1
**

.109
.002

7.6.3 Regression Analysis
The Berle-Means (1932) thesis implies that diffuse ownership adversely affects
firm performance. This assertion is tested by assessing the impact of OC on
performance using pooled regression models. As illustrates in Table 7.4, the correlation
coefficients of some explanatory variables are more than 50 per cent. This suggests the
existence of multicollinearity among the variables in the regression models. Thus, a
diagnostic test which show variance inflation factors (VIF) (collinearity statistics) is
carried out with each regression model.

The VIF quantifies the severity of

multicollinearity of explanatory variables in the regression models. The summary scores
of the VIF with correlation coefficients of explanatory variables are given in Table 7.5.
The results indicate fewer than 2 scores for all variables in each regression model. In
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general, VIF scores under 10 (or scores under 2.5 even in a weaker model) can be
considered as a good indicator for non-multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).

Table 7.5 Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables, 2000–2008
SH3

HERF

F-Ind

F-Com

SH3
1
HERF
.825**
1
F-Ind
−.570**
−.556**
1
F-Com
.570**
.556** −1.000**
1
TD-TA
−.034
−.040
.013
−.013
LN-Age
−.068*
−.023
.111**
−.111**
LN-TSal
−.042
−.067
−.020
.020
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level.

TD-TA

1
.046
.262**

LN-Age

LN-TSal

VIF

1

1.488
1.465
1.499
1.499
1.075
1.026
1.090

1
.109**

Table 7.6 shows the results of the pooled regression models for 846 sample
observations for the period 2000 to 2008 for each of the performance measures, using
the SH3 ratio as the measure of OC. The regression results indicate that a significant
positive relationship exists between the OC ratio and accounting performance measures.
The SH3 variable is found to have a positive and significant impact on both ROA and
ROE at the one per cent significance level.
Table 7.6 Estimates of Ownership–Performance using SH3 & F-Ind Variables
Constant
OC-SH3
Leverage (TD/TA)
Age (LN-Age)
Size (LN-TSal)
Structure (F-Ind)

ROA
−23.367
(−7.028)***
0.080
(3.399)***
−7.234
(−7.581)***
0.448
(1.080)
1.799
(10.204)***
0.037
(2.111)**

ROE
−44.474
(−5.360)***
.151
(2.588)***
−3.103
(−1.303)
.805
(.779)
3.036
(6.901)***
−.013
(−.298)

TQ
1.461
(7.641)***
.001
(.841)
.604
(11.017)***
−.007
(−.289)
−.049
(−4.843)***
−.002
(−2.167)**

MBR
1.132
(1.345)
.003
(.544)
.311
(1.287)
.056
(.530)
−.042
(−.951)
.005
(1.118)

No. of observations
846
846
846
846
2
R
.145
.067
.139
.005
2
Adjusted R
.140
.061
.134
−.001
F-stat
28.559
11.977
27.105
.760
P-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.579
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Numbers in
parentheses are t-values.
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However, the analysis of the impact of ownership concentration on marketbased performance measures finds no significant positive relationship between
variables. More specifically, SH3 has no significant impact on both TQ and MBR and
the estimated coefficients of SH3 for all the models are close to zero, indicating an
insignificant relationship between OC and market performance in Sri Lankan
companies. This also implies the existence of market anomalies in Sri Lankan markets
where market performance indicators may not necessarily reflect the company
fundamentals.
Table 7.7 Estimates of Ownership–Performance using SH3 & F-Com Variables
Constant
OC-SH3
Leverage (TD/TA)
Age (LN-Age)
Size (LN-TSal)
Structure (F-Com)
No. of observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F-stat
P-value

ROA

ROE

TQ

MBR

−19.690
(−6.556)***
.080
(3.399)***
−7.234
(−7.581)***
.448
(1.080)
1.799
(10.204)***
−.037
(−2.111)**

−45.769
(−6.107)***
.151
(2.588)***
−3.103
(−1.303)
.805
(.779)
3.036
(6.901)***
.013
(.298)

1.244
(7.203)***
.001
(.841)
.604
(11.017)***
−.007
(−.289)
−.049
(−4.843)***
.002
(2.167)**

1.625
(2.137)**
.003
(.544)
.311
(1.287)
.056
(.530)
−.042
(−.951)
−.005
(−1.118)

846
.145
.140
28.559
0.000

846
.067
.061
11.977
0.000

846
.139
.134
27.105
0.000

846
.005
−.001
.760
0.579

Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Numbers in
parentheses are t-values.

The impact of ownership structure on firm performance is also tested based on
the argument that larger individual ownership is positively related to firm performance,
while larger corporate ownership is negatively related to firm performance. Table 7.6
and Table 7.7 show the results for regression models where F-Ind and F-Com is
respectively used as the ownership structure variable.

The results indicate strong

evidence of a positive significant relationship between individual ownership (F-Ind) and
ROA, and a significant negative relationship with corporate ownership (F-Com) and
ROA. Both are significant at the five per cent level. This result is consistent with the
argument that individual owners (compared to corporate owners) are actively engaged
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in operational activities or are highly influential in monitoring the functions of firms. As
a result, agency costs are expected to be reduced, resulting in higher performance; and
the counter-argument is true for corporate ownership.

This study however finds conflicting results in relation to ROE and market
performance measures. As shown in Table 7.6, the sign of the coefficients of F-Ind are
negative with regard to ROE and TQ, while the coefficient is positive but nonsignificant for MBR. This suggests that either a negative relationship exists between FInd and performance, or that individual ownership is irrelevant to firm performance. As
shown in Table 7.7, the corporate ownership (F-Com) has positive coefficients with
ROE and TQ, contrary to expectations. The TQ coefficient is significant at the five per
cent level. This implies that, although the controlling shareholder of a company is
another corporate entity, its ultimate owners have reasonable influence on company
affairs through indirect ownership. Furthermore, a larger fraction of corporate
ownership does not necessarily indicate that a firm has a greater ownership
concentration than with external investors. The existence of controlling ownership
acquired directly or indirectly through another corporate entity, is a common feature of
Sri Lankan companies. Therefore, ownership concentration with individuals (F-Ind) or
with corporate entities (F-Com) does not necessarily have any significant
distinguishable performance implications.

Table 7.8 presents the results of the pooled regression models for the same
sample observations, where the HERF index is used as the measure of OC and F-Ind is
used for the structure variable. The results indicate that the HERF index also has a
positive and significant impact on both ROA and ROE at the one and five per cent
levels respectively. This suggests that concentrated ownership plays a governing role in
Sri Lankan firms in improving performance, through reducing agency costs by effective
monitoring or direct involvement in management, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling
(1976).

Furthermore, the other OC variable of the HERF index has a positive impact on
both TQ and MBR at the five and 10 per cent significant levels. The coefficients of all
models however, are close to zero, indicating a negligible impact. This strongly
suggests that anomalies exist in Sri Lankan securities markets where economic and
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company fundamentals are not reflected in share prices, restricting the ability of market
prices to give a true picture of company performance.
Table 7.8 Estimates of Ownership–Performance using HERF & F-Ind Variables
Constant
OC- HERF
Leverage (TD/TA)
Age (LN-Age)
Size (LN-TSal)
Structure (F-Ind.)
No. of observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F-stat
P-value

ROA
−19.125
(−6.831)***
.001
(2.728)***
−7.241
(−7.570)***
.385
(.926)
1.808
(10.205)***
.030
(1.707)*
846
.141
.136
27.609
0.000

ROE
−37.642
(−5.401)***
.001
(2.560)**
−3.097
(−1.301)
.658
(.635)
3.073
(6.966)***
−.015
(−.349)
846
.066
.061
11.946
0.000

TQ
1.415
(8.838)***
.000
(2.478)**
.606
(11.080)***
−.010
(−.430)
−.047
(−4.668)***
−.001
(−1.285)
846
.144
.139
28.366
0.000

MBR
.914
(1.296)
.000
(1.932)*
.317
(1.313)
.044
(.420)
−.036
(−.804)
.008
(1.898)*
846
.009
.003
1.449
0.204

Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
Table 7.9 Estimates of Ownership–Performance using HERF & F-Com Variables
Constant
OC- HERF
Leverage (TD/TA)
Age (LN-Age)
Size (LN-TSal)
Structure (F-Com)
No. of observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F-stat
P-value

ROA
−16.166
(−5.759)***
.001
(2.728)***
−7.241
(−7.570)***
.385
(.926)
1.808
(10.205)***
−.030
(−1.707)*
846
.141
.136
27.609
0.000

ROE
−39.148
(−5.603)***
.001
(2.560)**
−3.097
(−1.301)
.658
(.635)
3.073
(6.966)***
.015
(.349)
846
.066
.061
11.946
0.000

TQ
1.287
(8.023)***
.000
(2.478)**
.606
(11.080)***
−.010
(−.430)
−.047
(−4.668)***
.001
(1.285)
846
.144
.139
28.366
0.000

MBR
1.743
(2.465)**
.000
(1.932)*
.317
(1.313)
.044
(.420)
−.036
(−.804)
−.008
(−1.898)*
846
.009
.003
1.449
0.204

Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Numbers in parentheses are t-values.

The impact of ownership structure is also tested with the HERF ratio, the results
of which are given in Table 7.8 and Table 7.9. F-Ind and F-Com are respectively used
as the ownership structure variables. These regression models also provide evidence of
a positive significant relationship between individual ownership (F-Ind) and ROA, and a
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significant negative relationship with corporate ownership (F-Com) and ROA. Both are
significant at the ten per cent level. These models also reveal conflicting results in
relation to ROE and market performance measures. Thus, the results confirm that
ownership concentration of individuals (F-Ind) or of corporate entities (F-Com) do not
necessarily have any significant distinguishable performance implications for Sri
Lankan companies.

In all regression models, both firm size in terms of Total Sales and Firm Age
have a positive impact on firm performance, measured by ROA and ROE. While Firm
Size is significant at the one per cent level, Firm Age is not significant. Furthermore,
leverage measured in TD/TA has a negative impact on both ROA and ROE. However,
while the impact on ROA is significant at the one per cent level, ROE is non-significant.
In general, the sign of the coefficients for control variables on ROA and ROE are
inconsistent with previous findings and the economic arguments. However, both size
and age have a significant negative impact on TQ; whereas the impact on MBR is not
significant and leverage has a positive impact on TQ and MBR. These results are robust,
and provide further evidence for the existence of market anomalies, which are inherent
to most of the small emerging markets such as Sri Lanka.

The significant impact of the OC variables on ROA and ROE support Shleifer
and Vishny’s (1986) hypothesis that concentrated ownership might reduce agency costs,
and hence increase firm performance. These results are also consistent with the claims
made by Zeitun and Tian (2007); that ROA and ROE are the most important factors
used by investors, not market measures of performance. This finding is also consistent
with the results found by Wu and Cui (2002); that a positive relationship exists between
ownership concentration and accounting profits, measured in terms of ROA. The
insignificant results of concentration variables on both TQ and MBR could be due to the
inefficiency of the Sri Lankan equity market, where company fundamentals are not
impounded into share prices efficiently. The use of a proxy TQ might have aggravated
the problem because accounting measurement problems are also imbedded into TQ, in
addition to market inefficiencies. Both TQ and MBR are subjected to inherent market
anomalies, such as insider trading and price fixing, which are common in small markets.
Furthermore, other factors not considered in the model could affect market
performance.
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The empirical evidence suggests that ownership concentrated in individuals has
a positive effect on performance measured by ROA, and a negative effect on
performance if ownership is concentrated in corporate entities. However, the empirical
evidence in respect of other performance measures, such as ROE, TQ and MBR show
conflicting results. Despite the conflicting outcome, these empirical results support the
assertion that a relationship exists between ownership structure and firm performance
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

7.7 Summary
The academic literature mostly discusses corporate governance issues within the
context of developed economies. Although corporate governance is identified as one of
the structural weaknesses of emerging markets, less attention has been paid to various
corporate governance issues in these markets. One governance issue that has attracted a
large amount of attention in developed markets, but which has not been examined
adequately in emerging markets, is whether ownership concentration and ownership
structure can affect corporate performance. The studies conducted on this aspect in
developed markets offer divergent results. Although some theories suggest that
ownership structure affects firm performance, numerous empirical investigations
suggest that performance implications of ownership structure are largely contextual.
Because no prior studies exist on this issue in Sri Lanka — an emerging economy with
unique social, cultural and economic settings—an objective of this study is to examine
the impact of ownership concentration and structure on the performance of public listed
firms in Sri Lanka. For this purpose, this correlation analysis and pooled data regression
analysis carried out based on a sample of 157 Sri Lankan public listed firms for a nineyear period between 2001 and 2009, was undertaken. This study provides useful
information on the relationship between various ownership concentration and structure
measures and their influence on both accounting and market performance.

Empirical findings indicate that a significant relationship exists between
ownership concentration, measured by SH3 and the accounting performance measures
ROA and ROE. The HERF index also has a positive and significant impact on both
ROA and ROE. This result suggests that a greater concentration of shares leads to either
effective monitoring of management behaviour or larger internal ownership, which
results in better performance. However, ownership concentration did not show any
252

significant effect on market-based performance measures, which suggests the existence
of market anomalies and inefficiencies which are common to most emerging markets
such as Sri Lanka.

An examination of the impact of ownership structure on performance provides
evidence that share ownership fractions have a significant effect on ROA. However, all
other performance measures show conflicting results in respect of the sign of the
coefficients or significance thereof. These results provide evidence for a pattern of share
ownership in Sri Lankan firms, for most of which, the ultimate controlling share
ownership lies in the hands of families or business conglomerates acquired through
individuals or other corporate entities. Therefore, the fraction ratios, measured as the
percentage of shares owned by individuals, and the percentage of shares owned by other
corporate entities do not have any significant distinguishable effects on performance.

The scope of this study is limited to an examination of the ownership
concentration and structure measured in terms of direct shareholdings without analysing
ultimate ownership. However, given the nature of ownership structure in Sri Lankan
companies, ultimate ownership which is acquired either directly or indirectly could have
significant impact on performance. However, due to the limitation on indirect
ownership data, only direct ownership is considered in the study. While outside the
scope of this thesis, future studies should therefore extend the definition of ownership
beyond direct shareholdings to examine the impact of ultimate ownership on firm
performance. Another limitation of this study is the use of pooled data regression
analysis, which assumes that the intercept and slope coefficients are constant across
time and sectors.
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Chapter 8 : SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
8.1 Introduction
Studies which examine the suitability of prevailing corporate governance best
practices around the world have increased considerably since the collapses of a large
number of well-known companies. Corporate governance is particularly important for
emerging markets to secure economic development and to avoid economic crisis.
However, studies investigating the suitability of existing corporate governance practices
for emerging markets are relatively few compared to those conducted on developed
markets. Sri Lanka, being an emerging market, is not an exception. Sri Lankan
corporate governance practices are largely influenced by corporate governance codes
developed in U.K. and other developed economies. The suitability of these corporate
governance practices developed in Anglo-Saxon countries and promoted to Sri Lankan
companies is questionable, as no systematic research has been done to examine their
validity in an emerging market context. Therefore, an objective of this study is to fill
this gap by examining the compliance of corporate governance best practices by Sri
Lankan companies with ownership implications, and to analyse this issue from
stakeholders’ points of view.

In summary, this study contributes a comprehensive literature review on
corporate governance (refer Chapter 2) giving an insight into previously identified
corporate governance issues of both developed and emerging markets. The historical
developments of corporate governance in Sri Lanka, together with its legal and
institutional framework are discussed in Chapter 3, placing this study in the Sri Lankan
context. The research design and the methods adopted in empirical examinations are
discussed in Chapter 4. On the basis of data obtained from a questionnaire survey,
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of compliance to corporate governance best practices by
Sri Lankan companies. In doing so, a bespoke corporate governance index is
constructed with eight sub-indices, examining the comparative levels of compliance
with corporate governance best practices by Sri Lankan companies, and to examine the
impact of such compliance on firm performance. Chapter 6 focuses on the perceptions
of various stakeholders of corporations, on the basis of questionnaire survey data
regarding prevailing corporate governance issues and as to how those issues should be
addressed in the Sri Lankan context. As ownership concentration is a common
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characteristic of most Sri Lankan companies, Chapter 7provides an analysis of the
impact of ownership concentration on firms’ performance. The main purpose of this
chapter is to discuss the findings of various aspects of corporate governance analysed in
the previous chapters and to present conclusions of this study. On the basis of these
findings and the conclusions, this chapter also makes recommendations for the
improvement of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka.

8.2 Summary of Findings
8.2.1 Compliance to Corporate Governance Best Practices
Compliance to corporate governance best practices by Sri Lankan listed
companies is examined based on data collected from a questionnaire survey carried out
amongst CEOs and the chairmen of sample companies. This is carried out to achieve
four specific objectives. First, the nature of compliance to best corporate governance
practices is evaluated using percentage and frequency analysis. Secondly, the level of
compliance to corporate governance practices is assessed using a corporate governance
index developed based on questionnaire survey data. As it is expected that the
concentration of ownership of family, foreign or controlling owners could have a
significant impact on corporate governance compliance by firms, impacts of such
ownership concentration is examined in the third section. Finally, the impact of
compliance with corporate governance practices on firms’ performance is examined
using index scores and financial and market performance variables.
8.2.1.1 Nature of Compliance to Corporate Governance Best Practices:
In order to find out the nature of compliance of best corporate governance
practices by Si Lankan listed companies, an analysis of the questionnaire survey results
is carried out across eight dimensions. Following are the major findings of this analysis:
(1) Board Size, Structure and Independence: The size of boards varies from six to
ten members with an average of 75 percent of NEDs for the companies under
review. Although the majority of companies have independent directors, 24 per
cent of them have lower than the mandatory number of independent directors. The
boards of directors seem to be average in size with a high proportion of NEDs, but
with few independent directors. This suggests that despite having a high proportion
of NEDs on boards, board functions are not adequately monitored by independent
directors in most companies. The size of the board should be large enough to secure

255

sufficient expertise on the board.

Nam and Lum (2005) argue that the most

effective size of a board for corporate governance purposes is no more than twelve
members. Salmon (2000) claims that a board is likely to have difficulty in staffing
board sub-committees if its members are fewer than eight. The size of the boards of
Sri Lankan companies is likely to be large enough for adherence to best corporate
governance practices in terms of securing expertise and staffing board subcommittees.
Although, the majority of companies (75%) have separate persons for the
Chairman and the CEO positions, non-controlling shareholders and institutional
investors are generally not adequately represented on boards. Insufficient
representation of independent directors and inadequate representation of noncontrolling shareholders and institutional investors on boards are common issues
faced by the majority of companies. The true independence of independent
directors is rather doubtful, judging from selection processes, as selected
independent directors and NEDs are determined by either the CEO or controlling
shareholders in approximately 30% of companies surveyed. Such compositions of
boards and the selection processes of directors can have negative implications for
boards’ independence, with a strong possibility board’s decision making processes
could be centralized towards the CEO’s or controlling shareholders’ views. Hence
it is inferred that not only the composition of boards, but also the selection process
of directors can have negative implications on the independence of the boards.
(2) Board Procedure and Effectiveness: The board practices and meetings, board
committees, appointments, and performance evaluation of directors are analysed in
this aspect. The results show that a majority (92%) of respondent companies has
recorded dissenting views in their minutes, and over 90 per cent of the boards have
a schedule of matters reserved for consideration. However, 40 per cent of boards do not
have bylaws to govern board meetings and the majority of boards (57%) do not
conduct separate meetings of non-executive directors. Although most companies
have audit and remuneration committees, only 45 per cent of companies have
established nomination committees. Inactive functioning of nomination committees
(63% met once a year) has aggravated the problem of the low prevalence of
nomination committees. For example, only 37 per cent of companies made
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appointments to the boards through their nomination committees. It is implied that
the CEO or controlling shareholders dominate in board appointments.

The boards seem to be somewhat inactive in monitoring and replacing CEOs and
evaluating performance of directors. For example, a majority of companies (60%)
do not evaluate performance of directors individually. Although a majority of
companies evaluate performance of CEOs (58%) and executive directors (50%),
only 23 per cent evaluate NEDs’ performance. Non-executive and independent
directors are inadequately supported with education and training. A majority of
companies (62%) do not provide training opportunities for newly appointed
directors. Further, 57 per cent of companies do not have a written code of conduct
and ethics for directors. The insufficient number of independent directors on
boards, their selection by CEOs or controlling shareholders, and a lack of support
for and evaluation of independent directors, raises serious doubts about the true
independence of independent directors of Sri Lankan companies.
(3) Directors'

Remuneration:

Although

most

companies

have

established

remuneration committees, 50 per cent of companies do not have proper
remuneration policies for directors. Further, 33 per cent of companies do not have
written terms of reference for governing the activities of remuneration committees.
Stock options and other forms of performance based remuneration components for
CEOs and directors are a rare occurrence in Sri Lankan companies. Thus, the
performance of an individual director or the company is not a limiting factor for
directors to receive regular remuneration. Only 13 per cent of firms compensate
their CEO using stock options, suggesting that share market performance is not a
deciding factor for CEOs to secure their remuneration. As the directors and CEOs
are not at risk of losing their remuneration for poor firm performance, there may be
a lack of motivation for them to perform in the best interests of shareholders. This
could have a negative impact on firm performance, leaving shareholders at risk.
(4) Audit committee procedure: A relatively higher compliance level is observed on
the practices of audit committees in comparison to the practices of nomination and
remuneration committees. All companies surveyed have audit committees. The
results show that both composition and processes of audit committees of the
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majority of companies have satisfied the requirements of corporate governance
regulations. The audit committees of a majority (92%) of sample firms are chaired
by an independent director, and 88 per cent of the firms had committees comprising
a majority of independent directors. The survey results further show that 97 per cent
of the firms have an accounting professional on the committee. Over 80 per cent of
companies comply with the recommended processes of audit committees such as
having terms of reference, circulating committee minutes, meetings with external
auditors, and making recommendations to their board for the appointment of
external auditors.
(5) Disclosure and transparency: The analysis shows that over 60 per cent of firms
surveyed disclose financial information on their website. However, less than 20 per
cent of firms regularly disclose on their websites price sensitive information such
as: related party transactions; directors’ share dealings; the resume or background
of directors; directors’ remuneration; policies on risk management; audit and nonaudit fees; memberships of sub-committees; and, committee reports, indicating
most companies are reluctant to disclose information voluntarily. Such a lack of
disclosure has a negative effect on corporate governance practices (Susilowati et
al., 2005). Thus, promoting disclosures of information directly related to directors’
affairs and other price sensitive information should be given priority by policy
makers.
(6) Disclosure reliability: The reliability of financial disclosures is largely dependent
on external auditor’s independence. Results show rotation of audit partners (68%)
and the review of external auditors’ works by the audit committees (88%) are
carried out by a majority of companies indicating that they take reasonable efforts
to maintain the independence of the auditor. However, 58 per cent of firms obtained
non-audit services from their external auditor, suggesting a negative impact on
auditors’ independence.
(7) Shareholders’ Rights: Shareholders’ rights, such as voting in shareholders’
meetings, appointing proxies, appointing the board members, timely receipt of
information, and the presence of chairpersons of sub-committees at the AGM, are
respected by the majority of surveyed companies. This is primarily due to the
availability of elaborate regulations on shareholders’ rights and the procedure of
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shareholders’ meetings prescribed in The Companies Act and the SEC regulations.
Nevertheless, there is substantial room for improvement. Voting by mail and
shareholders’ priority subscription rights are not protected by most companies. The
shareholders of 90 per cent of companies surveyed did not request an extraordinary
meeting in last 3 years. Given the high ownership concentration in most companies,
the ability of non-controlling shareholders to address their concerns by calling a
special shareholders’ meeting seems to be difficult.
The average duration of the AGM is less than one hour for 65 per cent of firms
surveyed. It is noted that average voting participation in the AGM is less than 10
per cent for one third of the sample firms. Only 30 per cent of companies have
shareholder voting participation above 80 per cent. Given that most firms have
controlling shareholders with a high concentration of ownership, the fraction of
voting rights exercised at AGMs is significantly low. The restriction on voting by
mail undermines the rights of shareholders, and this could have aggravated the low
voting rights exercised at AGMs. The voting behaviour and length of the AGM
suggests that non-controlling shareholders do not often actively participate in the
process of selecting board members and other AGM activities.
(8) Related Party Transactions: The problem of not having enough provisions in the
SLCGC is clearly evident from the diverse practices adopted by Sri Lankan
companies, especially with regard to the approval of RPTs. The execution of RPTs
requires only minimum levels of approval for most companies. None of the
surveyed companies requires shareholder approval to execute major RPTs
suggesting dominant shareholders influence the affairs of Sri Lankan companies.
For example, 15 per cent of respondents state that their companies do not require
specific approval to carry out RPTs, and 35 per cent of companies require only
CEO approval to perform RPTs. Over 95 per cent respondents stated that their
companies do not require either non-conflicted directors or audit committee
approval to execute RPTs. The lack of independence in the boards and the presence
of controlling shareholders in most Sri Lankan companies are likely to aggravate
the negative effects of RPTs. This evidence suggests that non-controlling
shareholders are at great risk of losing their investments. Thus, these factors should
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be given more attention by policy makers in developing best governance practices
for RPTs.

Salient Features of Corporate Governance Practices: Under this category both
positive and negative features are identified based on the nature of compliance of
corporate governance best practices by sample companies. The ‘positive features’
represent the items of best practice with which the majority of sample companies have
complied, and non-compliance items are represented in ‘negative features’.
The positive features are as follows: the availability of a clear role for the board
to play as there is a formal schedule of matters reserved for its decision making;
adequate representation of NEDs on the board; separate persons for the CEO and the
chairman; the submission of the majority of directors for re-election at regular intervals;
conduct of regular board meetings; recording of dissents in the board minutes; the
availability of directors with financial acumen on the board; the succession planning of
directors and senior management; the existence of an audit committee and remuneration
committee; the formulation of terms of reference of board committees; the appointment
of an audit committee and its membership consisting of non-executive directors with
necessary financial expertise and experience; the availability of a clearly defined role,
responsibility and authority of the audit committee; regular conduct of audit committee
meetings; the evaluation of executive directors’ and CEO’s performance annually; the
provision of information to directors for decision making on a timely manner; the
availability of proper procedures for a remuneration committee; review of external
auditors’ work by an audit committee; the rotation of audit partners in every 5 years;
review of audit recommendations by the board; allowing anybody to serve as a proxy;
the presence of chairpersons of sub-committees at the AGM; the execution of RPTs at
arm’s length terms; and, the review of RPTs by the board.

The negative features are as follows: a lack of independent non-executive
directors on boards; a lack of independent members on board subcommittees;
insufficient representation of institutional and non-controlling shareholders on boards;
the presence of controlling shareholders’ family members on boards; the appointment of
NEDs by the CEO or controlling shareholders; the absence of bylaws to govern board
meetings;failure to conduct separate meetings of NEDs; insufficient performance
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evaluation of directors; low prevalence of nomination committees; inactive functioning
of nomination committees; not limiting the number of directorships that can be held by
a director; insufficient board appointments through nomination committees; the failure
to conduct annual performance evaluations of NEDs; a lack of attention paid to
maintaining written codes of conduct and ethics for directors; insufficient attention paid
to the professional development of directors; insufficient training provided to newly
appointed directors; insufficient written policies on directors’ remuneration; insufficient
performance-based remuneration packages for executives; non-provision of share
options for CEO and NEDs; a lack of voluntary disclosures on company websites;
obtaining significant amounts of non-audit services from external auditors;

not

allowing voting by mail; insufficient provisions to protect shareholders’ priority
subscription rights; exercising low voting rates at AGMs; not having an AGM for a
reasonable duration; insufficient provisions of appropriate approval levels to execute
RPTs; not obtaining audit committee or non-conflicting directors’ approval for RPTs;
and, lack of transparency in relation to disclosures of directors’ remuneration.
8.2.1.2 Level of Compliance of Corporate Governance Best Practices:
The third objective of this study is to examine the level of compliance with
corporate governance best practices in terms of corporate governance scores calculated
based on the CGI. The CGI is developed with eight sub-indices representing the eight
dimensions of corporate governance examined in the study. The maximum possible
overall score for the CGI is 90, which is the addition of the maximum marks of each of
its eight sub-indices. The distribution of corporate governance scores and descriptive
statistics of the overall index and sub-indices are analysed to find out overall behaviour
indicated by the index scores. As the compliance to governance practices can
significantly vary across the nature of family ownership and foreign ownership, and the
presence of controlling shareholders, the level of compliance is analysed across these
dimensions of ownership.

(a) Overall Level of Corporate Governance: The descriptive statistics of the CGI
and the sub-indices show that the mean value of the overall CGI is 61.17 (68%) and
the mean values of sub-indices vary from 58% to 85%. The distribution analysis of
CGI scores show that none of the companies obtained an average score of 90 per
cent or more. However, scores of the sub-indices show that the majority of
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companies have better compliance with audit committee procedures, shareholders’
rights, and directors’ remuneration procedure dimensions, with mean values of over
80%. The RPTs and board procedure and effectiveness are the least complied with
dimensions of overall corporate governance practices. The mean value of the scores
of these sub-indices is 58% each. The descriptive statistics of scores of the CGI
show that there are substantial variations of compliance with governance practices
by Sri Lankan companies, ranging from a minimum score of 39 to a maximum
score of 80. This behaviour raises the question of whether there are dominant
factors which determine the level of corporate governance compliance of
companies.

(b) Comparative Analysis of Sub-Indices Scores across Three Ownership
Dimensions: Having observed the significant variations of sub-indices scores
amongst the companies in the overall sample, the study identified a primary cause
for these variations. The concentration of ownership either with family owners,
foreign owners or controlling owners is a common feature of most Sri Lankan
companies. Thus, the comparative analysis of sub-indices scores are carried out
across three dimensions of ownership namely: family ownership; foreign
ownership; and, controlling ownership.

The results reveal that the level of compliance to best corporate governance
practices by FB companies is relatively low across all corporate governance
dimensions measured in the sub-indices. The average CGI score of FB companies
is 62 per cent compared to 72 per cent of NFB companies. Furthermore, the FB
companies have significantly lower levels of scores in three sub-indices compared
to those of NFB companies. The sub-indices scores of BPE (49% against 64%),
ACP (78% against 90%), and DS (58% against 72%) show significant variation
between these sub samples. This indicates that family ownership exerts a significant
negative influence on board procedure practices, audit committee procedures, and
financial disclosures practices. In contrast to family ownership, foreign ownership
constantly results in a positive influence on compliance with corporate governance
best practices across all dimensions considered in the study. The average CGI score
of SFO companies is 76 per cent compared to 69 per cent of LFO companies. This
indicates compliance to governance practices is positively influenced by the
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presence of foreign owners. The presence of controlling shareholders is a common
occurrence for most Sri Lankan companies surveyed. The results show that the
presence of controlling shareholders has a negative effect on compliance with
corporate governance practices across all dimensions examined in the study.

(c) Comparative Analysis of Individual Corporate Governance Practices Across
three Ownership Dimensions: The results of a comparative analysis of subindices’ scores across three ownership dimensions (refer Section 5.5.2.1) provide
prima facie evidence that family ownership has a negative influence on governance
practices, whereas foreign ownership has a positive influence on governance
practices. Further, it shows that the presence of controlling shareholders has a
negative impact on corporate governance practices. In order to find out whether
individual practices also have similar behaviour, a comparative analysis of each
individual practice is carried out. The analysis of the scores of each individual
practice of CGI (refer Section 5.5.2.2) provides a detailed account of the level of
compliance of two corresponding sub- samples across three ownership dimensions
examined in the study. This analysis shows that non-family based companies have
complied better than family based companies in relation to almost all individual
items. A similar observation is made in relation to other ownership dimensions too.
These results confirm that the ownership of a company has direct impact on their
compliance with corporate governance best practices.

8.2.1.3 Impact of Ownership on Level of Corporate Governance Compliance:
Objective four examines the impact of ownership on the level of compliance
with corporate governance requirements and recommendations. The comparative
analysis of sub-indices scores and individual practices across sub samples of each
ownership dimension indicates that ownership influences the level of compliance with
corporate governance best practices. This impact is statistically verified using a t-test for
the independent sample, for the purpose of discovering whether there is a statistically
significant difference between the subsamples regarding the compliance level.
(a) Impact of Family Ownership: The results show that the level of corporate
governance compliance of FB companies is lower than that of NFB companies, as
indicated by the negative mean differences in scores of all sub indices and the CGI.
The t-test results show that the negative mean difference is statistically significant
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at the 1% level for the CGI. The scores of sub indices show that family ownership
has a statistically significant negative impact on: board procedures; firms’ voluntary
disclosures; audit committee procedures; and, directors’ remuneration procedures.
(b) Impact of Foreign Ownership: The results show that there are positive mean
differences in scores of the CGI and the sub indices indicating the level of corporate
governance compliance of SFO companies is higher than that of LFO companies.
The positive mean difference for the CGI is statistically significant at the 1% level
indicating that foreign ownership has a significant positive impact on compliance to
corporate governance regulations and recommendations. The statistically
significant results of sub indices provide further evidence that board procedures,
audit committee procedures, and disclosure requirements are better complied with
by foreign owned companies compared to their counterparts.
(c) Impact of Controlling Ownership: The results show that there are negative mean
differences in scores of all sub indices and the CGI indicating the presence of
controlling shareholders is detrimental to establishing effective governance
practices. Furthermore, the statistically significant negative mean differences of
BSI and RPTs sub indices indicate that the presence of controlling owners has a
negative impact on board independence and related party transactions. This result
suggests that non-controlling shareholders of these companies are exposed to a
higher level of risk than controlling owners, through the expropriation of company
resources by controlling owners.

8.2.1.4 Impact of Corporate Governance Compliance on Firm Performance:
Objective five examines the impact of compliance to corporate governance
practices on firms’ performance, proposing that a higher level of compliance will
enhance firm performance. The level of compliance is measured by the scores of CGI.
High and low compliance sub samples are identified using the cut-off index score of 61,
which is the mean value of the overall sample. The financial performances considered in
the study are Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) while market
performances are Tobin’s Q (TQ) and Market to Book Value (MBR). The analysis
addresses two issues: whether higher levels of corporate governance compliance
improve firms’ financial performance; and, whether the higher levels of corporate
governance compliance improve market performance of Sri Lankan companies. The
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impact is statistically verified using correlation analysis and a t-test for an independent
sample.
The impact of corporate governance on firm performance shows mixed results.
Higher levels of compliance have a significant positive impact on financial performance
measures, indicating better corporate governance leads to better operating and financial
performance of Sri Lankan companies. The market performance measures show,
however, a negative relationship with corporate governance compliance. This may be
due to market anomalies such as insider trading and price manipulations, which prevail
in the Sri Lankan stock market.

8.2.2 Stakeholders’ Perceptions on Corporate Governance
Objective six of the study is to examine the perceptions of various stakeholder
groups on the present status, main issues, strategies and practices of the corporate
governance system of Sri Lanka. This is achieved by examining the perceptions of
seven stakeholder groups through an analysis of data collected from a questionnaire
survey conducted in Sri Lanka in early 2010. Six hundred and sixty five questionnaires
were distributed among seven stakeholder groups namely: NED (150), IAP (70), ACC
(125), GPM (80), GATO (100), ACD (40), and INV (100). The study uses a
questionnaire with 70 questions on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 =
strongly agree) to collect primary data from these stakeholder groups about their
perceptions on eight aspects of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. Further, respondents
were asked to answer two open ended questions regarding major problems and
recommendations of corporate governance in Sri Lanka. The total number of usable
responses to the questionnaire amounted to 277, giving a response rate of 42 per cent.
The test conducted to investigate the non-response bias indicated that there was no such
bias. Thus, the responses can be regarded as a representative sample of the population.
The analysis of the profile of respondents reveals that the majority of respondents have
high level of education (85% with tertiary education), professional education (78% with
professional qualifications), work experience (53% with over five years work
experience), and share investment experience (43% invested in shares). Thus, the
respondents are well qualified to make independent judgments regarding corporate
governance issues addressed in the survey.
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The analysis addresses the stakeholders’ perceptions on eight aspects of
corporate governance system in Sri Lanka. The Kruskal-Wallis test is carried out to
examine whether there are significant differences between opinions of stakeholder
groups. Following are the major findings of this analysis:

(1) In order to understand the importance given to various components of the Sri
Lankan corporate governance system, the respondents were asked to indicate their
extent of agreement with given components as an important aspect of the corporate
governance system of the country. The findings of the study reveal that a majority
of stakeholders consider governance codes, the financial reporting framework, the
regulatory framework, and codes of conduct and ethics as important components of
corporate governance system. However, the importance given to the judiciary
system, corporate ownership structure, and culture and value systems of the society
as components of the corporate governance system is relatively low. The corporate
governance codes and financial framework of the country are considered as the
most important components whereas the judiciary system is considered as the least
important component. This suggests that the respondents put more emphasis on
financial aspects rather than on legal enforcement to instil sound corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka. However, it was found that the degree of
importance placed on the seven components listed in the questionnaire varied
significantly across stakeholder groups, indicating these groups have different
opinions as to what aspects should be given priority in policy making.
(2) Stakeholders’ opinions on the performance implications of corporate governance
compliance reveal that the majority of respondents consider better corporate
governance improves financial, market and corporate social performance, and
increases the ability to access new capital. However the majority of respondents
believe that political interventions and share price volatility cannot be minimized in
Sri Lanka by improving its corporate governance system. The Kruskal-Wallis test
results also show that the stakeholder groups have different opinions on whether the
better corporate governance can improve market performance and the ability to
generate new capital. These findings are consistent with the corporate governance
survey results which show that high compliance with corporate governance
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recommended and regulated practices cannot improve the market performance of
the company (refer Section 5.6).

(3) Stakeholders’ opinions on the present status of corporate governance reveals that a
majority of respondents are extremely dissatisfied with the various aspects of the
corporate governance system in Sri Lanka, believing that it is not comparable to
that of a developed country. The majority of respondents strongly disagreed with
the adequacy of existing corporate governance regulations and protection of
minority shareholders’ rights in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, they are of the view that
the implementation and monitoring are also not adequate. The differences in
opinion of most items are not significant. This suggests the shareholder groups
collectively agree that the present status of Sri Lankan corporate governance is not
up to their expectations.

(4) The analysis of stakeholders’ perceptions on various issues of corporate governance
reveals that all the given issues such as: a lack of integrity; inadequate
transparency; a lack of independence of independent directors; insider trading;
inadequate protection of minority shareholders; and, conflicts of interest of
directors are considered as major issues by a majority of respondents. This result is
consistent with the survey results (refer Section 8.2.1.1.) which show that the
practices recommended to avoid these issues are not fully embraced by most
companies. Thus, corporate governance policy makers should pay more attention to
these issues in formulating and standardizing governance practices.

(5) It is also found that the majority of respondents agree that the given corporate
governance strategies of: improving internal and external governance mechanisms;
conducting corporate governance ratings of companies; controlling some types of
RPTs; and, enhancing accounting and auditing standards are suitable to improve the
efficiency of corporate governance practices. However, changing ownership
concentration is not accepted as an effective strategy by the majority of
respondents. It suggests that the market has accepted the very nature of ownership
in Sri Lankan companies and therefore policy makers need to pay attention to other
strategies and practices which are capable of controlling adverse effects of
ownership concentration, instead of having legal restrictions on ownership.
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(6) In order to understand the importance of corporate governance practices which are
capable of enhancing corporate governance in Sri Lanka from the stakeholders’
point of view, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent of importance they
place on each of the given governance practices. The results identified three levels
of importance placed by the respondents. The practices which received the greatest
level of importance from the respondents are: giving greater power to audit
committees; full disclosures of RPTs; the separation of the CEO and chairman
positions; independent NEDs; and, adoption of codes of conduct and ethics. The
practices in the second level are: not obtaining audit and non audit services from the
same provider; closely tying remuneration of executive directors to performance;
composing key advisory committees entirely of independent directors; fully
disclosing the recruitment and remuneration policies of directors; and, imposing
limitations on the number of directorships held by a director at any time. The
practices which received the least level of importance are: board composition
comprising at least half independent directors; disclosing exact remuneration of
directors in annual reports; and, setting an age limit for directors. It suggests that
the market as a whole agreed that the board independence, ethical practices and
controlling RPTs are important aspects to be given high priority by policy makers
in formulating corporate governance practices.

(7) In order to understand the efficiency benefits to organizations which carry out
various functions of corporate governance, the respondents are asked to express
their views on whether these organizations carry out their role efficiently in
promoting good corporate governance in Sri Lanka. All organizations under review
received low scores indicating they do not carry out their roles efficiently to satisfy
stakeholders’ expectations. However, the organizations such as the SEC, CSE and
ICASL received relatively better acceptance compared to other organizations. The
judiciary, Sri Lanka Institute of Directors, outside directors, civil activists and the
media received low levels of acceptance, indicating that the roles played by these
organizations/groups in enhancing corporate governance in Sri Lanka are not
adequate to satisfy the expectations of the market.
(8) The majority of respondents prefer the prevailing balanced approach to corporate
governance regulation, consisting of both mandatory and voluntary practices, as
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most suitable to promote good governance practices in Sri Lanka. This suggests the
importance of encouraging regulatory enforcement, and securing flexibility in
business operations.

(9) When the respondents were given the opportunity to comment on perceived
corporate governance problems in Sri Lanka, they recognized a number of issues
based on their experience and expertise. After classifying these issues into several
themes, it is revealed that: a lack of education and awareness of corporate
governance; insufficient regulations and regulatory enforcement; a lack of integrity
and independence of directors; insufficient ethical standards; a lack of transparency;
ownership concentration; and, political interventions, insider trading and corruption
are most recognized as problems in Sri Lanka.

(10) Respondents were given an opportunity to make recommendations to improve
corporate governance in Sri Lanka. These are classified into five themes, namely:
strict regulations and regulatory monitoring; sufficient education for board
members and senior management; more emphasis on judiciary enforcement;
increased ethical standards; and, prevention of political intervention.

8.2.3 Impact of Ownership Concentration on Firm Performance
Objective seven of this study is to examine the impact of ownership
concentration on firms’ performance. This is achieved by examining the relationship
between ownership concentration and performance data of listed companies in Sri
Lanka. The sample includes companies in all industrial sectors of the CSE, excluding
the bank, finance and insurance sector for the period of 2001 to 2009. The final sample
consists of 157 companies which is approximately 68 per cent of the listed companies of
the CSE. The final data set consists of 846 firm-years for the entire sample period. The
OC variables are: the percentage of shares held by first three(SH3), first five (SH5) and
first ten (SH10)largest shareholders; and, the HERF Index. The OS is measured using
two fraction ratios: the fraction owned by individuals, and the fraction of shares owned
by institutions. ROA and ROE are employed as the accounting performance measures,
while the proxy TQ ratio and MBR are used as the market performance measures in the
study. Several control variables were also employed in the analysis to control the size,
age and leverage of the sample companies.
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Correlation analysis and the pooled data regression analysis are used to measure
the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. The analysis is carried out
on the premise of agency theory, which argues ownership concentration and individual
share ownership make positive impacts on firm performance. This study provides useful
information on the relationship between various ownership concentrations and structure
measures, and their influence on both accounting and market performance. Following
are the findings of this analysis:

The descriptive statistics show that all SH ratios indicate a high ownership
concentration in the sample of Sri Lankan companies. The mean values of SH3 ratio is
70 per cent while it is 84 per cent for SH10 ratio. The data reveal that that ownership of
Sri Lankan companies is highly concentrated and the ten-largest shareholders of some
companies held over 75 per cent of total share capital. This indicates that these firms are
not compliant with the CSE listing rule requirements which stipulate that a minimum
float of 25 per cent shares should be held by at least 1,000 shareholders. While the
results of this study suggest that Sri Lankan firms have high OC, the OS of firms as
measured by fraction ratios, indicates the average proportion of shares held by a
corporate entity (72%)is high compared to individual ownership (28%).

Correlation analysis results show a significant relationship between firm
performance and OC variables. The SH3ratio is positively correlated to ROA, ROE and
TQ, but it is negatively correlated with MBR indicating market anomalies prevailing in
the Sri Lankan market. The correlation of ownership structure variables with
performance variables show mixed results. F-Ind ratio is positive for ROA but it is
negative for ROE and TQ. The claim that higher individual ownership leads to higher
firm performance whereas higher corporate ownership leads to poorer firm performance
is not supported by the results.

Regression analysis results indicate that a significant relationship exists between
the SH3ratio and the accounting performance measures of ROA and ROE. The HERF
index also has a positive and significant impact on both ROA and ROE. This suggests
that concentrated ownership plays a governing role in Sri Lankan firms in improving
performance, through reducing agency costs by effective monitoring or direct
involvement in management, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976).However,
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ownership concentration did not show any significant effect on market-based
performance measures, which suggests the existence of market anomalies and
inefficiencies which are common to most emerging markets.

An examination of the impact of ownership structure on performance provides
evidence that share ownership fractions have a significant effect on ROA. However, all
other performance measures show conflicting results in respect of the sign of the
coefficients or significance thereof. The fraction ratios, measured as the percentage of
shares owned by individuals, and the percentage of shares owned by other corporate
entities do not have any significant distinguishable effects on performance. This may be
due to the use of only direct ownership in the study, without analysing the ultimate
ownership of companies.

8.3 Conclusions and Recommendations
The following conclusions are made based on: the analysis of relevant literature;
the results of questionnaire surveys on levels of compliance; the stakeholders’ opinions
on corporate governance practices; and, findings about the impact of ownership on firm
performance in the form of answers to stated research questions.

(1) What is the historical development and current status of corporate governance
in Sri Lanka?
The history of corporate governance in Sri Lanka dates back to its period under
the British regime. The introduction of English company law and the
commencement of share trading activities by the CBA are major contributing
factors to the development of corporate governance of Sri Lankan companies in the
colonial era. The fundamental corporate governance framework of the country
during this period was provided by the provisions of the Companies Ordinance and
the listing rules and guidelines stipulated by the CBA. In the post colonial period
and after 1977, interest in corporate governance re-emerged with the introduction of
open economic policies. The development of capital markets and influences of the
international funding agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, who advocate
a market based model, also contributed to the development of the regulatory and
institutional framework for corporate governance. Thus, development of corporate
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governance requirements was influenced by both historic and economic factors,
resulting in them showing characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon model.

The existing corporate governance framework of Sri Lanka is a mixture of
government intervention through statutes (e.g. the Companies Act, SEC Act, and the
Accounting and Auditing Standards Act), and professional accounting institutions’
interventions through their development of voluntary corporate governance codes.
Thus, these requirements are now governed by the provisions of Companies Law,
SEC Rules, CSE Listing Rules, the SLCGC (2008) and supplementary codes on
corporate governance. Amongst these, the corporate governance codes play a
dominant role in recommending detailed corporate governance practices. However,
these codes are not mandatory and therefore considerable freedom is enjoyed by the
management if firms in applying these recommendations. Although some
mandatory rules on corporate governance are incorporated into the Colombo Stock
Exchange (CSE) Listing Rules of 2007, their coverage is limited in aspects of
corporate governance. Two additional mandatory codes were issued in 2009, but
these are limited to banking and finance sector companies. Despite these
limitations, the introduction of corporate governance requirements into listing rules
and sector specific mandatory codes can be considered as encouraging features of
recent developments of corporate governance in Sri Lanka.

Despite these developments, all Sri Lankan codes were devised primarily based
on British codes. For example, The ICASL Code (2003) was developed based on
The Combined Code (1998) and The Code (2008) was adopted from The Combined
Code (2003) of the U.K. As a result, corporate governance practices implemented
in developed economies were introduced to Sri Lanka without proper evaluation of
their suitability. These codes were developed on the assumption that ownership and
control of corporate entities are separated, and therefore they are largely focused on
the responsibilities, structure and organization of the board with the aim of
improving its monitoring role. Sri Lankan companies however, experience high
ownership concentration and therefore the corporate governance codes produced in
developed markets have limited applicability to Sri Lankan companies. For
example, the results of the corporate governance survey (refer Section 5.5.2) show
that the compliance levels of foreign owned companies was significantly higher
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than that of ownership concentrated companies and family owned companies. Thus,
policy makers should be more attentive to ownership structure and other
characteristics of Sri Lankan companies in developing corporate governance codes.

Although Sri Lankan company law was amended consistent with changes to
British company law, the local law did not keep pace with its British counterpart.
The Companies Ordinance No.51 of 1938 was enacted based on the English
Companies Act of 1929. Until the Companies Act No.17 of 1982 was enacted based
on the English Companies Act of 1948, the Companies Ordinance of 1938 remained
as company law in Sri Lanka. The Companies Act 2007 of Sri Lanka has many
provisions that encourage good governance practices. However, until enacting this
Act in 2007, Sri Lankan companies were governed by the older Companies Act
No.17 of 1982, which was adapted from UK Companies Act of 1948. In spite of
immense changes in the business environment in Sri Lanka, especially after the
introduction of open economic policies in 1977, until 2007 Sri Lankan businesses
were governed by an Act virtually 60 years old. This allowed various regulatory
lapses to creep into business practices.

Limitations in the legal system have implications for the governance structure of
Sri Lankan companies. La Porta et al. (1998) assume that the legal system is a
fundamental to a corporate governance mechanism. They argue that the evolution
of corporate governance in a country is determined by the availability and proper
enforcement of law which protects the rights of investors. They claim that
concentrated ownership is a necessary condition in countries without strong
protection for investor rights, as it gives power to shareholders to monitor and
control managers. The delay in enforcing new company law with adequate
provisions to protect investors’ rights could have contributed to ownership
concentration in Sri Lankan listed companies. Further it is revealed (refer Section
5.5.2) that ownership concentration has a negative impact on the compliance of
corporate governance practices of these companies.
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(2) What is the nature and level of compliance maintained by Sri Lankan
companies in respect of the corporate governance best practices?
Variations in CGI scores (ranging from 43 per cent to 88 per cent)indicate that
there are significant differences in compliance levels by Sri Lankan companies to
corporate governance best practices. Furthermore, scores of sub indices indicate
levels of compliance with different aspects of corporate governance vary
significantly. Recommended audit committee procedures, shareholders’ rights, and
directors’ remuneration procedures are better complied with compared to
compliance with recommendations for RPTs, and board procedure and
effectiveness aspects. This is indicated by the range in mean values of their subindices (58 per cent to 85 per cent).As companies voluntarily comply with the
requirements of best practice, the variation in index scores indicates divergence in
companies’ interests in and commitments to compliance. Results suggest that while
some companies are compatible with practices originating from the Anglo-Saxon
model, poorly compliant companies indicate this circumstance is not uniform. For
example, the analysis of ownership structure with compliance levels (refer Section
5.5.2) shows that the variations in corporate governance compliance are directly
related to the ownership structures of companies. Thus, it is recommended that in
Sri Lanka, an analysis of the nature of corporate ownership of companies is needed,
before formulating policy on corporate governance practices and regulations, in
order to improve the efficiency of the corporate governance system of Sri Lanka.

The salient corporate governance features of sampled companies are
summarized in Section 8.2.1.1. It is concluded that there are both positive and
negative features of corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan companies, with
evidence suggesting that Sri Lankan companies using positive practices align
themselves with the Anglo-Saxon model. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) state
that the basic corporate form has already achieved a great deal of uniformity. They
further claim that economies are approaching a world-wide consensus that
managers should act in the interests of shareholders and this should include both
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Reed (2002) states that the inclination
of developing countries towards the Anglo-Saxon model is associated with both
historical and economic reasons. In the Sri Lankan context historical reasons refer
to strong historical ties with British colonial rule and economic reasons include the
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adoption of open economic policies and the influence of international funding
agencies. These factors drive companies to comply with governance practices
originating in Anglo-Saxon economies, despite most Sri Lankan companies having
concentrated ownership.

Further, these features provide evidence of functional convergence (refer Section
2.5) of corporate governance practices by Sri Lankan listed companies. Functional
convergence occurs when individual firms adapt stronger governance than
mandated, despite the lack of an appropriate legal structure (Hansmann and
Kraakman, 2001). Companies with foreign ownership are likely to improve their
corporate governance practices unilaterally to comply with the requirements of their
parent companies, resulting in functional convergence of corporate governance
practices.

The negative features identified are evidence of the inadequacies in compliance
with corporate governance best practice by Sri Lankan companies. These negative
features are closely linked to the presence of firms’ controlling shareholders, who, it
is conjectured, inhibit firms’ fully benefiting from the positive features of best
corporate governance practices.

(3) Does the concentration of ownership with family, foreign or controlling owners
impact the level of compliance with corporate governance in Sri Lankan
companies?
Analysis of the questionnaire survey indicates that diffused ownership is rare in
Sri Lankan companies. In most cases, the ownership of companies is concentrated
in a few individuals or institutional owners. The holding of controlling ownership
(ownership of over 50 per cent of issued share capital) by the largest shareholder is
observed in 48 per cent of companies under review. Further, it shows that if the first
ten largest owners are considered, the controlling ownership has increased to 97 per
cent of the companies surveyed, suggesting the presence of controlling owners for
most Sri Lankan companies. This characteristic implies that most Sri Lankan listed
companies are owner-managed or owner-controlled companies. Studies conducted
in Asian and Western European countries also reveal ownership concentration in
most companies (La Porta et al., 1999, Faccio and Lang, 2002). As revealed in the
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analysis, another salient characteristic of ownership is the wide prevalence of
family ownership, as in the case of other Asian countries. Claessens et al. (2000)
show that in family controlled Asian firms, the controlling shareholder often acts as
a top manager of the company.

The concentrated ownership structure of Sri Lankan companies strongly
influences the level of corporate governance as discussed in Sections 5.5.2 and
5.5.3. Some of the inadequacies in compliance with best practice are closely linked
to the presence of the controlling shareholders, which is a common phenomenon in
the Asian Region, as shown in the OECD White Paper on Corporate Governance in
Asia (2003). Controlling shareholders influence: the appointment of directors; the
independence of non-executive directors; the conduct of board meetings; noncontrolling shareholders’ participation on the board; and, performance evaluations
of directors. Hence, this potentially creates problems in relation to protecting noncontrolling shareholders’ rights. The successful implementation of the corporate
governance best practice in Sri Lankan companies therefore, depends very much on
the level of influence of controlling shareholders, and their ownership patterns.
Given the nature of ownership concentration of Sri Lankan companies, it is
recommended that policy makers put more weight on the protection of
shareholders’ rights, especially non-controlling shareholders’ rights in formulating
corporate governance standards.

Extensive family ownership and the dominance of family members on boards
are prevalent in Sri Lanka. The level of compliance as measured by the scores of
the CGI and sub-indices provide prima facie evidence that family ownership has a
negative influence on corporate governance practices. The negative impact is
particularly strong in respect of board procedures, voluntary disclosures, audit
committee procedures, and directors’ remuneration procedures, suggesting family
owners’ dominate board procedures. Family ownership raises the question whether
or not family management brings equivalent levels of professionalism
organizations, as is experienced in companies of more widely held ownership and
in which professional managers are employed. The impact of family ownership on
the corporate governance structures would depend on the extent of involvement of
family members in the company. Further, the context within which the family
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members operate affects their behaviour in the governance process. The context
could constitute factors such as family culture, individual competence, preference
and values, and business conditions (Jain, 2006). As in many Asian nations family
ownership is part of cultural inheritance in Sri Lanka. Although family ownership
leads to lower levels of compliance with corporate governance best practices,
family ownership is not always harmful if the best possible people are available to
operate the firm. However, low compliance levels suggest that existing corporate
governance practices are not compatible with the governance structure of family
owned companies. The appropriateness of existing corporate governance practices
is a key issue needing to be addressed by policy makers when they develop
corporate governance practices for Sri Lankan companies.

In contrast to family ownership, substantial foreign ownership has been found to
have a positive impact on compliance with corporate governance best practices
across, all the corporate governance dimensions considered in this survey.
Specifically, more effective boards of directors are observed in respect of these
companies. These greater levels of compliance are likely to result from the
governance structure of these companies, and the governance code development
process in Sri Lanka. Foreign owners generally demand a higher quality of
corporate governance due to pressures from parent companies. This is likely to
produce greater compliance with best governance practices. Furthermore, because
the SLCGC (2008)was developed based on the codes developed in the UK and
other western countries, the companies which characterize companies operating
under the Anglo-Saxon model are more likely to be compliant with the Code. As
such, SFO firms are able to comply with recommended governance practices with
ease. Given this behaviour, the applicability of the SLCGC (2008) for the majority
of Sri Lankan companies needs to be investigated more closely.

The findings of the survey indicate that companies with foreign ownership
embrace the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance framework thoroughly. The
prevalence of family ownership and the presence of controlling shareholders raises
the question how appropriate is the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance
for Sri Lankan companies, as it presumes that ownership of publicly traded
companies is widely held. Existing governance structures of Sri Lankan companies
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that are dominated by controlling shareholders show some similarity to inside
systems of relationship-based corporate governance, as is widespread in
Continental European and Asian countries, where ownership concentration is a
usual characteristic. This implies that a hybrid corporate governance system which
has the characteristics of both the Anglo-Saxon model and inside systems of
corporate governance is in operation in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s inclination towards
the Anglo-Saxon model stems primarily from the development of Sri Lankan
Company Law and governance codes based on British counterparts due to the
colonial influence. But most Sri Lankan companies are more likely to be
comfortable with the relationship-based system since it matches the existing
ownership structure of these companies. Thus, the policy makers on corporate
governance need to do more research on the suitability of the Anglo-Saxon model
in formulating corporate governance standards for Sri Lankan companies. As Sri
Lanka has already invested a great deal by way of establishing legal and financial
systems, and an institutional framework to put the Anglo-Saxon model in place, the
relationship-based model could be a complementary model rather than a substitute
for existing model in Sri Lanka.

(4) Does facilitating corporate governance best practice improve corporate
performance in Sri Lankan companies?
Empirical analysis reveals in improving governance practices of Sri Lankan
listed companies, there is a positive impact on their financial performance as
measured in terms of return on assets and return on equity. This suggests that
companies are able to improve their operational and financial efficiency by
securing greater levels of compliance with corporate governance practices, through
the establishment of strong internal corporate governance mechanisms. There is
also a growing body of evidence that corporate governance influences growth
prospects of companies, which would ultimately contribute to the economic
development of a country. Claessens et al. (2000) find that better corporate
governance frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower
costs of capital, and better performance. Furthermore, the OECD (2009) provides
evidence on the key components of corporate governance, such as the role of board
and board composition on improving performance of companies. The findings of
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the study are consistent with these findings, which suggest that corporate
governance can strengthen the operational efficiency of companies, resulting in
improved performance.

Many empirical studies (Klapper and Love, 2002, Gompers et al., 2003, Black et
al., 2003) find that well governed companies receive higher market valuations.
However, the results of this study show a negative relationship between corporate
governance and market values, possibly resulting from market anomalies prevailing
in Sri Lanka. In most small markets, market prices are subject to manipulations,
signalling, group behaviour, and mistakes (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). In
addition to market anomalies, variable measurement problems such as the use of
the proxy Tobin’s Q and the use of a relatively small sample may have resulted in
estimation errors. Due to these reasons, the validity of market performance
measures is debatable, especially in an emerging market where market anomalies
and inefficiencies play a dominant role in deciding market prices. Further studies
with a larger sample incorporating both longitudinal and cross sectional data are
desirable to address these issues in the Sri Lankan context.

(5) Do the current corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka meet
stakeholders’ expectations?
The results of the stakeholders’ perception survey found that the majority of
stakeholders are not happy with the present status of corporate governance in Sri
Lanka. They are of the view that it is not comparable to that of a developed country,
or even an Asian country, indicating their strong dissatisfaction. On the basis of this
finding, it can be concluded that the companies and regulators, including
monitoring authorities, have failed to satisfy stakeholders’ expectations of corporate
governance standards. The majority of them agree that sound corporate governance
practices have an impact on corporate financial, market and social performance,
suggesting that investors are willing to pay a premium price for the shares of well
governed companies. However, they are of the view that the political interventions
cannot be minimized in the Sri Lankan context, even with sound corporate
governance, indicating the severity of political interventions in Sri Lanka.
According to their opinion, the important components of the corporate governance
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system in Sri Lanka include governance codes, a financial reporting framework, a
regulatory framework, and codes of conduct and ethics. However, the judiciary is
not recognized as an important component, indicating stakeholders’ dissatisfaction
with a weak judicial enforcement prevailing in Sri Lanka. Furthermore,
stakeholders are of the view that other organizations which formulize and monitor
corporate governance requirements of listed companies are not executing their
functions efficiently.

When the stakeholders are asked to identify issues of concern regarding
corporate governance in Sri Lanka, they select: a lack of education in and
awareness of corporate governance; inadequate regulations and enforcement; a lack
of integrity and independence of directors; insufficient ethical standards; a lack of
transparency; ownership concentration; and, political interventions, insider trading
and corruption as significant corporate governance problems in Sri Lanka. Their
recommendations to address these issues include the enforcement of strict
regulations through regulatory monitoring; sufficient education for board members
and senior management; more emphasis on judicial enforcement; increased ethical
standards; and, prevention of political intervention. The findings of the survey
provide a number of directions regarding aspects to be considered in developing
corporate governance best practice to suit the local conditions, and the factors to be
considered in improving the efficient implementation of these practices in the Sri
Lankan environment. Furthermore, this survey highlights the importance of
undertaking similar kinds of surveys from time to time covering all types of
stakeholder groups, to get an understanding of the stakeholders’ opinions on
governance standards and their enforcement.

(6) Does the ownership concentration influence firm performance of Sri Lankan
companies?
The effects of ownership concentration on firms’ performance are considered
important in the search for an appropriate governance model for an economy. One
of the objectives of this study is to examine the impact of ownership concentration
on the performance of public listed companies in Sri Lanka. Many studies examine
the impact of ownership concentration on performance conclude that higher levels
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of ownership concentration may improve performance by decreasing monitoring
costs or alternatively, performance can decline if large shareholders use their
control rights to achieve private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Morck et al.,
1988, Thomsen et al., 2006, Zeitun and Tian, 2007). Further, these studies suggest
that performance implications of ownership concentration are largely contextual.
This study finds that ownership concentration has a positive and significant impact
on financial performance of ROA and ROE. Further, it is found that the ownership
structure, which is measured in terms of ownership concentration with either
individuals or a corporate entity, has a significant effect on ROA. However,
ownership concentration did not show any significant effect on market-based
performance measures of TQ and MBR.

The results of the study can partially be explained by the arguments of agency
theory. The significant impact of the OC variables on ROA and ROE support
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) hypothesis that concentrated ownership might reduce
agency costs, and hence increase firm performance. The survey on corporate
governance in Sri Lanka shows that ownership is concentrated with the presence of
controlling shareholders in most firms. Further, controlling shareholders’
participation in management was also evident from the survey results (Section
5.5.3). Thus, the results are also consistent with the claims made by Jensen and
Meckling (1976); that the inside owners have incentives to pursue their own
benefits relative to the amount of ownership held by them, which in turn are aligned
to enhance firm performance and value. Thus, the results of this study show that
ownership concentration has a positive impact on financial performance.

However, insignificant results of the concentration of variables on both TQ and
MBR are not consistent with agency theory arguments. Prior studies that examine
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value have produced
mixed results (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001,
Thomsen et al., 2006). The insignificant results of market performance measures
may be due to the inefficiency of the Sri Lankan equity market, where company
fundamentals are not impounded into share prices efficiently. The use of a proxy
TQ might have aggravated the problem because accounting measurement problems
are also imbedded in TQ, in addition to market inefficiencies. Both TQ and MBR
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are subject to inherent market anomalies, such as insider trading and price fixing,
which are common in small markets. These factors could have resulted in the
insignificant relationship observed in the study.

8.4 Limitations of the Study
The questionnaire survey is used as the primary method of data collection in the
study. Therefore the limitations commonly applicable to questionnaire surveys are
equally applicable to this study. The scope of the study of the corporate governance
survey is limited to public companies listed on the CSE. Due to practical reasons, no
attempt was made to include both government sector organizations and non-listed
companies. The result of the study would have been different if the sample had
extended to include these sectors. This limitation may restrict the generalizability of the
findings only to listed companies. The level of compliance to corporate governance
practices by government owned enterprises and private owned small and medium
enterprises in Sri Lanka cannot be comprehended by analysing the results of this study
due to differences in applicable laws and regulations. Therefore, there is a need to
increase the coverage of similar surveys to obtain a more comprehensive picture of
corporate governance in Sri Lanka.

The analysis of the corporate governance survey is limited to sixty publicly
listed companies, due to data collection limitations. Although the sample is small, it
represents fourteen sectors out of twenty sectors of the CSE. As a result the sample is
representative of companies listed on the CSE. However, the small size of the sample
restricts in-depth statistical analysis such as regression analysis to find out the causal
relationships between the variables. Although a 26% overall response rate is acceptable
for survey research, it would have provided more comprehensive insights into the
compliance of corporate governance practices in the Sri Lankan context if a higher
response rate was achieved in the survey.

The CGI of the study is contracted based on the codes of best practice that have
been developed in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. However, the practices developed
in the Anglo-Saxon model may not fully address the requirements of Sri Lankan
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companies. Therefore, benchmarking governance practices of local companies with this
model may not fully reflect the exact status of their governance.

The analysis of performance implications of ownership concentration is limited
to direct shareholdings of owners, without analysing ultimate ownership. However,
given the nature of ownership structures in Sri Lankan companies, ultimate ownership
which is acquired either directly or indirectly could have a significant impact on
performance. Only direct ownership is considered in the study due to the practical
limitation of accessing indirect ownership data for Sri Lankan companies. Further, the
analysis of ownership structure is limited to family, foreign and controlling ownership,
but there are other types of ownership structures such as institutional ownership and
controlling-family ownership. Non availability of data at this level of detail has
prevented in depth analysis of ownership structure of sample firms. Thus, future studies
should extend the definition of ownership beyond direct shareholdings to examine the
impact of ultimate ownership on firm performance. Another limitation of this study is
the use of pooled data regression analysis, which assumes that the intercept and slope
coefficients are constant across time and sectors.

8.5 Directions for Future Research
This study has provided some interesting insights into the three aspect of
corporate governance in Sri Lanka. First, the corporate governance survey provides the
nature and level of compliance with corporate governance best practices by listed
companies. Secondly, the analysis of major issues and the present status of corporate
governance in Sri Lanka from stakeholders’ points of view is a novel exploration, as no
prior research has been made to examine stakeholders’ perceptions on corporate
governance in Sri Lanka.

Thirdly, the performance implications of ownership

concentration provide in-depth analysis of the nature and implications of ownership
concentration on Sri Lankan companies. Thus, the combined outcomes of these
examinations provide a broader framework for future research in this area. Mentioned
below are some aspects that deserve future research.

There is a properly articulated regulatory and institutional framework for
corporate governance in Sri Lanka. The corporate governance requirements of Sri
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Lankan listed companies have been strongly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon model of
corporate governance. This is because codes of best practices, company law and other
regulations have been developed in line with this model, owing to colonial influences.
Although constancy in the legal, accounting and corporate governance systems is a
legacy of a colonial past, and this is common to many emerging nations, findings of this
study concur with previous studies in expressing concern as to the appropriateness of
such systems to the local environment (Perera, 1985, Wijewardene and Yapa,
1998).This exposure raises an important issue to consider in future research, by
exploring how a model originating from developed countries can be readily and
effectively transposed into a developing country like Sri Lanka.

It is found that in Sri Lanka, compliance with corporate governance practices is
directly influenced by ownership patterns. The salient characteristics of ownership
structure are the wide prevalence of family ownership, foreign ownership and the
presence of controlling shareholders in most companies. Ownership concentration to a
certain extent is associated with the Asian culture. Hence, the cultural dimension
justifies to a certain extent the wide prevalence of family ownership of Sri Lankan
companies. The corporate governance and associated issues of Sri Lankan companies
should be explored from a much broader perspective. Thus, an interdisciplinary
approach covering disciplines such as strategic management, sociology and political
science could be adopted in future research.

The study of the performance implications of ownership concentration is limited
to industrial sector companies of the CSE excluding the bank, finance and insurance
sector. This sector was excluded due to the non-comparability of applicable regulations
regarding share ownership concentration, profitability measures and liquidity
assessment compared to industrial sectors. Also, the sample of companies was limited to
publicly listed companies in Sri Lanka. However, the banking sector and SME sector
are of vital importance to the economic development of the country. Therefore an
attempt could be made to cover these business sectors in the future studies.

The examination of performance implications of ownership concentration shows
that it has a positive impact on financial performance. However, the level of compliance
with best practices is negatively affected by the presence of controlling shareholders and
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family ownership concentration. Levels of compliance, as measured in terms of scores
of the CGI, have been assessed based on corporate governance best practices promoted
by the codes and other governance principles originating in developed countries. These
practices may not be suitable to some companies which have strong family orientation.
The well performing family owned companies may have been governed by their own
governance practices. These indigenous governance practices could originate from the
socio-cultural context of the country. This aspect is not explored in the study and it
could be an interesting research issue to explore in future studies. Hence, it is
recommended to explore the fact whether Sri Lankan listed companies are adopting any
indigenous governance practices, how these practices differ from the best practices
recommended in the governance codes, and their impacts on the performance of
companies. As it is vital to examine corporate governance practices more closely, the
case study approach can be applied to carry out a comprehensive analysis of family
based companies or groups of companies.

The stakeholders’ opinion survey has provided vital information for policy
makers, corporate governance monitoring agencies and company directors who are
ultimately responsible for implementing best practices in their companies. However, no
prior research had made any attempt to examine the stakeholders’ perceptions of
corporate governance in Sri Lanka. Therefore, this research is a stepping stone for
future research in this area. This research can be extended to cover broader aspects of
corporate governance with larger sample of stakeholders. Furthermore, future research
can expand to cover a specific stakeholder group on a particular aspect of corporate
governance to get in-depth understanding on the issue examined. For example, the study
of NEDs’ perception on compliance with corporate governance practices or the
effectiveness of board sub committees in their respective companies. This will enable
discovery of the practical nature of compliance from differing points of view.
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Appendix 1: List of Specified Business Enterprises
 Companies licensed under the Banking Act, No. 30 of 1988.
 Companies authorised under the Control of Insurance Act, No. 25 of 1962, to
carry on insurance business.
 Companies carrying on leasing business.
 Factoring companies.
 Companies registered under the Finance Companies Act, No. 78 of 1988.
 Companies licensed under the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, No. 36
of 1987, to operate unit trust.
 Fund Management Companies
 Companies licensed under the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, No.36
of 1987, to carry on business as stockbrokers or stock dealers.
 Companies licensed under the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, No. 36
of 1987, to operate a Stock Exchange.
 Companies listed in a Stock Exchange licensed under the Securities and
Exchange Commission Act, No.36 of 1987.
 Other Companies:
•
Which have a turnover in excess of Rupees of 500 Million.
•
Which at the end of the previous financial year, had shareholders equity
in excess of Rupees 100 Million.
•
Which at the end of the previous financial year had gross assets in excess
of Rupees 300 Million.
•
Which at the end of the previous year, had liabilities to banks and other
financial institutions in excess of Rupees 100 Million.
•
Which have a staff in excess of 1000 employees.
•
Public Corporations engaged in the sale of goods or the provision of
services.
•
A group of companies, any one of which falls within any of the above
categories. For this purpose, a group of companies means a holding
company and its subsidiaries, the accounts of which have to be
consolidated under section 147 of the Companies Act No.17 of 1982.
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Appendix 2: Main Principles of Sri Lankan Corporate Governance
Codes of 2003 and 2008
Code of Best Practice - 2003

Code of Best Practice - 2008

Ref.
No.

Main Principles

Ref.
No.

Main Principles

A
A.1

Directors
Concept: The Board
Principle: Should have an effective
Board and it should lead and control
the company

A
A.1

Directors
Concept: The Board
Principle: Should have an effective
Board and it should Direct, lead and
control the company
Meet regularly and have at least one
meeting per quarter

A.1.1
A.1.2

A.1.1
Board should have formal schedule
of matter for decision including:

A.1.2

1.2.1 Review/formulate and monitor
implementation of strategy.

Board should be responsible for matters
including:
1.2.1 Ensuring formulation and
implementation of strategy.

1.2.2 Ensure CEO and Management
Team is competent.
1.2.3 Effective CEO and
management succession plan.

1.2.2 Ensure CEO and Management
Team is competent.
1.2.3 Ensure effective CEO and
management succession plan.

1.2.4 Effective information, control
and audit system.

1.2.4 Ensure effective information,
internal control and risk mgt.

1.2.5 Compliance with legal and
ethical standards.
1.2.6 Ensure prevention and
management of risks.
1.2.7 Perform other board functions.

1.2.5 Ensure compliance with legal and
ethical standards.
1.2.6. Ensure all stakeholders' interest
in corporate decisions
1.2.7 Ensure the use of company values
and standards in accounting policies
and financial regulations.
1.2.8 Perform other board functions.
Board collectively and directors
individually must act in accordance
with laws of the country. Take
independent professional advice if
necessary at company’s expense.
All directors should have access to
company secretary.
All directors should bring an
independent judgment.
Dedicate adequate time & effort.
Receive training on general aspects of
directorship and matters specific to
industry and company.
Concept: Chairman and CEO

A.1.3

Take independent professional
advice if necessary at company’s
expense.

A.1.3

A.1.4

All directors should have access to
company secretary.
All directors should bring an
independent judgment.
Dedicate adequate time & effort.
Receive training on general aspects
of directorship and matters specific
to industry and company.
Concept: Chairman and CEO

A.1.4

A.1.5
A.1.6
A.1.7

A.2

A.1.5
A.1.6
A.1.7

A.2

Principle: Two roles should be
clearly segregated, with clear
division of responsibilities.

Principle: Two roles should be clearly
segregated, with clear division of
responsibilities.
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A.2.1

A.3

A.3.1

A.4

A.5

A.5.1

A.5.2

A.5.3

If two roles are combined:
Justification should be presented.
Should have a strong, independent
NEDs in the board with identified
lead directors.
Concept: Chairman’s Role
Principle: Responsible for running
of board, preserve order and
facilitate effective discharge of
board functions
Should ensure:
3.1.1 Effective participation of
executive director & NEDs.

If two roles are combined:
Justification should be presented and
highlighted in the annual Report.

A.3

Concept: Chairman’s Role
Principle: Responsible for running of
board, preserve order and facilitate
effective discharge of board functions

A.3.1

Should ensure:
3.1.1 Effective participation of
executive director & NEDs.

3.1.2 All directors effectively
contribute for the benefit of the
company.
3.1.3 Balance of power in the board.
3.1.4 Sense or decision of directors
on issues is ascertained

3.1.2 All directors effectively contribute
for the benefit of the company.

3.1.5 Board is in complete control of
company affairs.
Concept: Financial Acumen
Principle: Board should ensure
availability of financial acumen
amongst its members
Concept: Board Balance.
Principle: Have a balance of
executive and non-executive
directors. No individual or group can
dominate the board decision
Director to be deemed independent
if the director has no material
relationship with the company.

3.1.5 Board is in complete control of
company affairs.
Concept: Financial Acumen
Principle: Board should ensure
availability of financial acumen
amongst its members
Concept: Board Balance.
Principle: Have a balance of executive
and non-executive directors. No
individual or group can dominate the
board decision
Should include NEDs with sufficient
calibre and NEDs should be two or 1/3
whichever is higher in the board. In
case of CEO duality NEDs should be
the majority. Numbers should be based
on last AGM.
If only have two NEDs, they must be
independent and all other cases two or
1/3 of NEDS which ever higher should
be independent.

Should include NEDs with sufficient
calibre and in number not less than
1/3 of the board. In case of CEO
duality NEDs should be the
majority.
Majority of NEDs should be
independent of management and free
of any business and other
relationship. They should be
identified in the annual report.

3.1.3 Balance of power in the board.
3.1.4 Sense or decision of directors on
issues is ascertained

A.4

A.5

A.5.1

A.5.2

A.5.3

Director is deemed independent if he is
independent of Management and free of
any business with the firm.

A.5.4

Each NEDs should declare his or her
independence or non-independence.
(Using Schedule H Form)
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A.5.5

A.5.6

A.5.7

A.5.8

A.6

A.6.1

Concept: Supply of Information
Principle: Board should have access
to timely information of quality
required for decision making.
Management has an obligation for
supply of information. Directors
make further inquiries if necessary.

A.5.9

If the board con not have unanimous
decision this fact should be minuted.

A.6

Concept: Supply of Information
Principle: Board should have access to
timely information of quality required
for decision making.
Management has an obligation for
supply of information. Directors make
further inquiries if necessary.
Minutes, agenda and paper required for
a meeting be provided at least 7 days
prior to meeting.
Concept: Appointments to the Board

A.6.1

A.6.2

A.7

A.7.1

A.7.2

Concept: Appointments to the
Board
Principle: Should have a formal and
transparent procedure for the
appointment of new directors.
Nomination committee should be
established to make
recommendations for all new board
appointments. Terms set out in
Schedule A
Chairman of nomination committee
should be a NED and majority of
members should also be NEDs.
Either nomination committee or
board assesses board-composition in
terms of knowledge and experience
of the board and whether it matches
the company requirements on annual
basis.

Board should determine annually the
independence or non-independence of
directors based on declaration and
disclose in the annual reports. When
criteria are not met but if the board
decided to consider NED as
independent director that fact should be
disclosed in the annual reports.
In case of CEO duality, Senior
Independent Director should be
appointed and disclose in annual
reports.
Senior Independent Director should be
available for confidential discussion
with other directors in matters
concerning to business.
Chairman should hold, at least once a
year, meeting with NEDs without EDs.

A.7

A.7.1

A.7.2
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Principle: Should have a formal and
transparent procedure for the
appointment of new directors.
Nomination committee should be
established to make recommendations
for all new board appointments. Terms
set out in Schedule A

Either nomination committee or board
assesses board-composition in terms of
knowledge and experience of the board
and whether it matches the company
requirements on annual basis.

A.7.3

Upon new appointment to board, the
company should disclose to
shareholders, about such directors: a
brief resume, expertise, other
directorship.

A.7.3

A.8

Concept: Re-election
Principle: all directors should pose
themselves for re-election at regular
intervals and at least once every
three years.
NEDs should be appointed for a
specified term and re-appointment
should not be automatic.
Chairman and all directors should be
subject to election by shareholders
and hold offices for a period not
more than 3 years and re-elected.
Concept: Appraisal of Board
Performance
Principle: Boards should
periodically evaluate own
performance.
In annual self-appraisal process
board should evaluate its key
responsibilities focusing on;

A.8

9.1.1 Reviewing/formulating and
monitoring of sound business
strategy.
9.1.2 Ensure that CEO and
management team are competent
and succession plans are developed.
9.1.3 Prevalence of effective
systems on information, control and
audit.
9.1.4 Ensure compliance with legal
& ethical standards, and
prevention/management of risks.
(Schedule B- Board Performance
Evaluation Checklist)

A.9.2

A.8.1

A.8.2

A.9

A.9.1

A.8.1

A.8.2

A.9

A.9.1

Upon new appointment to board, the
company should disclose to
shareholders, about such directors: a
brief resume, expertise, other
directorship, whether the director can
be considered independent.
Concept: Re-election
Principle: all directors should pose
themselves for re-election at regular
intervals and at least once every three
years.
NEDs should be appointed for a
specified term and re-appointment
should not be automatic.
Chairman and all directors should be
subject to election by shareholders and
hold offices for a period not more than
3 years and re-elected.
Concept: Appraisal of Board
Performance
Principle: Boards should periodically
evaluate own performance.
In annual self-appraisal process board
should evaluate its performance in
discharging responsibilities as set out in
A.1.2 (Schedule B- Board Performance
Evaluation Checklist)
Board should evaluate the performance
of its committees.

A.9.3

How such performance evaluation is
conducted should be disclosed in the
annual report.

A.10

Concept: Disclosure of information in
respect of Directors
Principle: Shareholders should be kept
informed about the details of directors.
Main information about directors such as
brief profile, expertise, immediate family
and material business relationship with
other director of the company, other
directorship in listed companies,
attendance to meetings, committee
membership etc. should be disclosed in
the Annual report.

A.10.1
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A.10

A.11

Concept: Appraisal of CEO
Principle: Assess CEO performance at
least on annual basis.

A.10.1 At the beginning of each financial
year CEO should be given targets,
which are set by board and CEO
together, to be met in line with
corporate objectives.
A.10.2 Undertake appraisal of CEO's
performance at the year-end.

A.11.1

At the beginning of each financial year
CEO should be given targets, which are
set by board and CEO together, to be
met in line with corporate objectives.

A.11.2

Undertake appraisal of CEO's
performance at the year-end.

B
B.1

Directors’ Remuneration
Concept: Remuneration
Procedure
Principle: formal, transparent
procedure for setting director
remuneration should be in force. No
director involve with deciding his or
her own remuneration.
Set-up remuneration committees
comprised of NEDs in reference to
company specific terms of reference
on executive remuneration packages.
Remuneration committees comprise
only of independent NEDs.

B
B.1

Directors’ Remuneration
Concept: Remuneration Procedure

B.1.1

Principle: formal, transparent
procedure for setting director
remuneration should be in force. No
director involve with deciding his or her
own remuneration.
Set-up remuneration committees
comprised of NEDs in reference to
company specific terms of reference on
executive remuneration packages.
Remuneration committees comprise
only of independent NEDs.

Members of remuneration
committees should be disclosed
annually to shareholders of the
company.
NED remuneration should be
determined either by shareholders if
permitted by articles of association,
or by board as a whole. If articles
permitted by a small sub-committee.
Remuneration committee should
consult the chairman and/or CEO on
proposals relating to remuneration of
other directors, and have access to
professional advice(s) of outside the
company.

B.1.3

Members of remuneration committees
should be disclosed annually to
shareholders of the company.

B.1.4

NED remuneration should be
determined either by shareholders if
permitted by articles of association, or
by board as a whole. If articles
permitted by a small sub-committee.
Remuneration committee should
consult the chairman and/or CEO on
proposals relating to remuneration of
other directors, and have access to
professional advice(s) of outside the
company.

Concept: The Level and Make-up
of Remuneration
Principle: Level and makeup of
Director remuneration should be at a
level sufficient to attract & retain
directors needed for success of the
company.
In respect of above matter
remuneration committees should,

B.2

B.1.1

B.1.2
B.1.3

B.1.4

B.1.5

B.2

Concept: Appraisal of CEO
Principle: Assess CEO performance
at least on annual basis.

B.1.2

B.1.5
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Concept: The Level and Make-up of
Remuneration
Principle: Level and makeup of
Director remuneration should be at a
level sufficient to attract & retain
directors needed for success of the
company.
In respect of above matter
remuneration committees should,

B.2.1

B.2.2

B.2.3
B.2.4

B.2.5

B.2.6

B.2.7

B.2.8

B.2.9

B.3

B.3.1

C
C.1

C.1.1

C.1.2

Provide packages needed to attract
directors of right quality and to
avoid excess pay.
Judge where to position the
company in relative to other
companies.
Be sensitive to pay and employment
conditions elsewhere in the group.

B.2.1

B.2.3

Be sensitive to pay and employment
conditions elsewhere in the group.

Performance related elements in the
executive director remuneration are
aligned with interests of
shareholders.
Executive share options should not
be offered at a discount i.e. less than
prevailing market price.
Follow requirements in schedule D
of CGBP in relation to designing
schemes of performance related
remuneration.
Set notice periods of one year or less
not to disrupt the business
operations.
Should consider what compensation
commitments would entail in the
event of early termination.

B.2.4

Performance related elements in the
executive director remuneration are
aligned with interests of shareholders.

B.2.5

Executive share options should not be
offered at a discount i.e. less than
prevailing market price.
Follow requirements in schedule D of
CGBP in relation to designing schemes
of performance related remuneration.

Avoid rewarding poor performance
and reduce remuneration of
departing directors’ to reflect their
obligation to compensate the loss.
Concept: Disclosure of
Remuneration
Principle: Disclose in annual report
of remuneration policy and details of
remuneration of the board as a
whole.
Total remuneration of the executive
and NEDs should be disclosed
separately, but not of individual
directors.
Relationship with Shareholders
Concept: Constructive use of the
AGM
Principle: Board use AGM to
communicate with investors and
encourage their participation.
All proxy votes should be counted
except when polls called and should
indicate the votes for and against the
resolution.
Separate resolutions should be inforce for substantial issues and
adoption of accounts.

B.2.9

B.2.2

B.2.6

B.2.7

B.2.8

B.3

Provide packages needed to attract
directors of right quality and to avoid
excess pay.
Judge where to position the company in
relative to other companies.

Should consider what compensation
commitments would entail in the event
of early termination.
Avoid rewarding poor performance and
reduce remuneration of departing
directors’ to reflect their obligation to
compensate the loss.
Level of remuneration of NEDs should
reflect the time and responsibilities of
their job.
Concept: Disclosure of Remuneration
Principle: Disclose in annual report of
remuneration policy and details of
remuneration of the board as a whole.

B.3.1

Total remuneration of the executive and
NEDs should be disclosed separately,
but not of individual directors.

C
C.1

Relationship with Shareholders
Concept: Constructive use of the
AGM
Principle: Board use AGM to
communicate with investors and
encourage their participation.
All proxy votes should be counted
except when polls called and should
indicate the votes for and against the
resolution.
Separate resolutions should be in-force
for substantial issues and adoption of
accounts.

C.1.1

C.1.2
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C.1.3

C.1.4

C.1.5

C.2

C.2.1

D
D.1

D.1.1

D.1.2

D.1.3

D.1.4
D.1.5

Chairman of the board should
facilitate that Chairpersons of audit,
remuneration and nomination
committees are available at AGM to
respond questions.
Should arrange notice annual report
to reach shareholders before 21 days
prior to scheduled date.
Should circulate with notice of
AGM summary of procedures on
voting at AGM.
Concept: Major Transactions
Principle: Disclose to Shareholders,
all proposed corporate transactions
which would materially alter
company’s net assets.
Directors should disclose all
material facts of all transactions
which would materially affect net
assets of the company.
Accountability and Audit
Concept: Financial Reporting
Principle: Board should present a
balanced and understandable
assessment of the company's
position and prospects.
Board is responsible for submission
of interim and price sensitive public
reports,and information required by
statutes.
Annual report contains declaration
by the board covering aspects:

C.1.3

C.1.4

C.1.5

C.2

D
D.1

D.1.1

D.1.2

Chairman of the board should facilitate
that Chairpersons of audit,
remuneration and nomination
committees are available at AGM to
respond questions.
Should arrange notice annual report to
reach shareholders as determined by
statute, prior to scheduled date.
Should circulate with notice of AGM
summary of procedures on voting at
AGM.
Concept: Major Transactions
Principle: Disclose to Shareholders, all
proposed corporate transactions which
would materially alter company’s net
assets.
Directors should disclose all material
facts of all transactions which would
materially affect net assets of the
company.
Accountability and Audit
Concept: Financial Reporting
Principle: Board should present a
balanced and understandable
assessment of the company's position
and prospects.
Board is responsible for submission of
interim and price sensitive public
reports and information required by
statutes.
Annual report contains declaration by
the board covering aspects:

Company has not engaged in
unlawful and activities against
regulations.
Directors have declared all their
material interests in contracts.

Company has not engaged in unlawful
and activities against regulations.

Company has ensured equitable
treatment to shareholders.

Company has ensured equitable
treatment to shareholders.

Business is going concern.
Have conducted a review of internal
controls.
Annual report should contain a
statement on responsibilities of the
board together with a statement from
Auditors about their responsibilities.
Annual report should contain a
Management Report.
Directors should report that business
is 'Going Concern'.

Business is going concern.
Have conducted a review of internal
controls.
Annual report should contain a
statement on responsibilities of the
board together with a statement from
Auditors about their responsibilities.
Annual report should contain a
Management Report.
Directors should report that business is
'Going Concern'.

Directors have declared all their
material interests in contracts.

D.1.3

D.1.4
D.1.5
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D.1.6

D.2

D.2.1

D.2.2

D.3

D.3.1

D.3.2

In the event the net assets of the
company falls below one half of
shareholder funds an extra-ordinary
meeting should be called and notify
shareholders of the position and
remedial actions.
Concept: Internal Control
Principle: Board should maintain
sound internal control system to
safeguard "SHs, investments, and
Assets.
Board should conduct annual review
of system of internal control and
report to shareholders.
In the event an internal audit is not
available, consider periodically need
for one.
Concept: Audit Committee &
Auditors
Principle: Establish formal and
transparent arrangements to consider
application of financial reporting
and internal control principles and to
maintain appropriate relationship
with company auditors.
Establish audit committee of at least
three NEDs; majority of them should
be independent, with clear terms of
reference.
Audit committee should review the
scope, results of the audit,
independence and objectivity of the
auditors.

D.1.6

D.2

D.2.1

D.2.2

D.3

D.3.1

D.3.2

D.3.3

D.3.4

D.4
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In the event the net assets of the
company falls below one half of
shareholder funds an extra-ordinary
meeting should be called and notify
shareholders of the position and
remedial actions.
Concept: Internal Control
Principle: Board should maintain
sound internal control system to
safeguard "SHs, investments, and
Assets.
Board should conduct annual review of
system of internal control and report to
shareholders.
In the event an internal audit is not
available, consider periodically need for
one.
Concept: Audit Committee (AC)
Principle: Establish formal and
transparent arrangements to consider
application of financial reporting and
internal control principles and to
maintain appropriate relationship with
company auditors.
Establish audit committee of at least
two independent NEDs or exclusively
NEDs majority of them should be
independent.
Audit committee should review the
scope, results of the audit,
independence and objectivity of the
auditors.
Audit committee should have written
terms of reference. This should include
purpose and duties and responsibilities
of Audit committee. Purpose: Assist
Board over sighting matters such as:
Accounting and Financial Statements,
Compliance with regulations, Internal
control, Going Concern assessment and
external auditors’ independence and
performance. Responsibilities are
included in code of best practices of
audit committee (2002).
Disclosures in AR includes: Name of
AC members, Basis for determination
of Auditors independence;
Concept: Code of Business Conduct
and Ethics
Principle: Companies must adopt a
code of Business conduct and ethics for
directors and Senior management team
and disclose any waivers.

D.4.1

D.4.2

D.4

D.4.1
E
E.1

E.2

F
F.1

F.2

Concept: Corporate Governance

D.5

Principle: Directors should disclose
the extent to which company adheres
to principles/practices of corporate
governance best practices.
CG report should be included into
D.5.1
Annual Report.
Institutional Investors.
E
Concept: Shareholders Voting
E.1
Principle: Institutional investors
should use their votes and take steps
that their voting rights are translated
into practice.
E.1.1
Concept: Evaluation of
Governance Disclosures
Principle: Institutional investors
give due weight in evaluating
governance arrangements
particularly board structure and all
relevant factors drawn to their
attention.
Other Investors
Concept: Investing and deinvesting decisions
Principle: In investing and divesting
decisions, individual investors
should seek expert advice.
Concept: Shareholder Voting
Principle: Individual investors
should participate in AGMs and
exercise voting rights.

E.2

F
F.1

F.2
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Companies must disclose whether they
have such code and compliance with
this code by its directors and senior
management. If they are unable do such
declaration that fact must disclose with
reasons.
Chairman must disclose in the annual
report that he is not aware of any
violation of code of ethics.
Concept: Corporate Governance
Disclosures
Principle: Directors should disclose the
extent to which company adheres to
principles/practices of corporate
governance best practices.
CG report should be included into
Annual Report.
Institutional Investors.
Concept: Shareholders Voting
Principle: Institutional investors should
use their votes and take steps that their
voting rights are translated into
practice.
Should conduct a regular and structured
dialogue with shareholders.
Concept: Evaluation of Governance
Disclosures
Principle: Institutional investors give
due weight in evaluating governance
arrangements particularly board
structure and all relevant factors drawn
to their attention.
Other Investors
Concept: Investing and de-investing
decisions
Principle: In investing and divesting
decisions, individual investors should
seek expert advice.
Concept: Shareholder Voting
Principle: Individual investors should
participate in AGMs and exercise
voting rights.

Appendix 3: Listing Rules 2009: Section 7.10 Corporate Governance
Compliance
a. A Listed Entity shall publish in the annual report relating to the financial year
commencing on or after 01st April 2007 a statement confirming that as at the date of
the annual report they are in compliance with the Corporate Governance Rules and if
they are unable to confirm compliance, set out the reasons for its inability to comply.
b. A Listed Entity shall comply with these Corporate Governance Rules with effect
from the financial year commencing on or after 01st April 2008 and the annual report
must contain the relevant affirmative statements.
c. Where a Listed Entity is required by any law applicable to such Listed Entity to
comply with rules on Corporate Governance promulgated under such law, the board
of directors of the Exchange may exempt such Listed Entity from the requirement to
comply with these Corporate Governance Rules either in full or in part. Such Listed
Entity shall make disclosures of compliance with Corporate Governance Rules
applicable to that sector and the annual report must contain the relevant affirmative
statements.
7.10.1 NON – EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
a. The board of directors of a Listed Entity shall include at least, - two non-executive
directors; or - such number of non-executive directors equivalent to one third of the
total number of directors whichever is higher.
b. The total number of directors is to be calculated based on the number as at the
conclusion of the immediately preceding Annual General Meeting.
c. Any change occurring to this ratio shall be rectified within ninety (90) days from the
date of the change.
7.10.2 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
a. Where the constitution of the board of directors includes only two non-executive
directors in terms of Rule 7.10.1.a above, both such non-executive directors shall be
‘independent’. In all other instances two or 1/3 of non-executive directors appointed
to the board of directors, whichever is higher shall be ‘independent’.
b. The board shall require each non-executive director to submit a signed and dated
declaration annually of his/her independence or non-independence against the
specified criteria. A specimen of the said declaration is given in Appendix 7A of this
Section.
7.10.3 DISCLOSURES RELATING TO DIRECTORS
a. The board shall make a determination annually as to the independence or nonindependence of each non-executive director based on such declaration and other
information available to the board and shall set out in the annual report the names of
directors determined to be ‘independent’.
b. In the event a director does not qualify as ‘independent’ against any of the criteria set
out below but if the board, taking account all the circumstances, is of the opinion that
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the director is nevertheless ‘independent’, the board shall specify the criteria not met
and the basis for its determination in the annual report.
c. In addition to disclosures relating to the independence of a director set out above, the
board shall publish in its annual report a brief resume of each director on its board
which includes information on the nature of his/her expertise in relevant functional
areas.
d. Upon appointment of a new director to its board, the Entity shall forthwith provide to
the Exchange a brief resume of such director for dissemination to the public. Such
resume shall include information on the matters itemized in paragraphs (a), (b) and
(c) above.
7.10.4 CRITERIA FOR DEFINING ‘INDEPENDENCE’
Subject to Rule 7.10.3 (a) and (b), a non-executive director shall not be considered
independent if he/she:
a. has been employed by the Listed Entity during the period of two years immediately
preceding appointment as director;
b. currently has/had during the period of two (2) years immediately preceding
appointment as a director, a Material Business Relationship with the Listed Entity,
whether directly or indirectly;
c. has a Close Family Member who is a director, Chief Executive Officer (and/or an
equivalent position) in the Listed Entity;
d. has a Significant Shareholding in the Listed Entity;
e. has served on the board of the Listed Entity continuously for a period exceeding nine
(9) years from the date of the first appointment; provided however, if such director is
re-appointed after a period of two (2) years from the date of completion of the
preceding nine (9) year period, he will be considered as ‘independent’ for the
purposes of this Section.
f. is employed in another company or business,
(i) in which a majority of the other directors of the Listed Entity are employed or are
directors; or
(ii) in which a majority of the other directors of the Listed Entity have a Significant
Shareholding or Material Business Relationship; or
(iii) that has a Significant Shareholding in the Listed Entity or with which the Listed
Entity has a Business Connection;
g. Is a director of another company,
(i) in which a majority of the other directors of the Listed Entity are employed or are
directors; or
(ii) that has a Business Connection in the Listed Entity or a Significant Shareholding;
h. Has a Material Business Relationship or a Significant Shareholding in another
company or business,
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(i) in which a majority of the other directors of the Listed Entity are employed or are
directors; and/or
(ii) which has a Business Connection with the Listed Entity or Significant
Shareholding in the same.
For the purposes of Rule 7.10.4;
•

Close Family Member shall mean and include the director’s spouse, parents,
grandparents, children, brothers, sisters, grandchildren and any person who is
financially dependent on such director.
‘Financially dependent’ individuals include any person who received more than
half of their support for the most recent fiscal year from a director and/or his or
her spouse.

•

Listed Entity shall mean the listed Entity to the board of which the director is
appointed, its parent and/or subsidiary company, and a subsidiary of the parent
company.

•

Material Business Relationship shall mean a relationship resulting in
income/non-cash benefits equivalent to 20% of the director’s annual income.

•

Business Connection shall mean a relationship resulting in transaction value
equivalent to 10% of the turnover of that company or business.

•

Significant Shareholding shall mean a shareholding carrying not less than 10%
of the voting rights of a company.

7.10.5 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE
A Listed Entity shall have a remuneration committee in conformity with the following:
a. COMPOSITION
The remuneration committee shall comprise;
of a minimum of two independent non-executive directors (in instances where an
Entity has only two directors on its Board);
or
of non-executive directors a majority of whom shall be independent, whichever
shall be higher.
In a situation where both the parent company and the subsidiary are ‘listed Entities’,
the remuneration committee of the parent company may be permitted to function as
the remuneration committee of the subsidiary.
However, if the parent company is not a Listed Entity, then the remuneration
committee of the parent company is not permitted to act as the remuneration
committee of the subsidiary. The subsidiary shall have a separate remuneration
committee.
One non-executive director shall be appointed as Chairman of the committee by the
board of directors.
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b. FUNCTIONS
The Remuneration Committee shall recommend the remuneration payable to the
executive directors and Chief Executive Officer of the Listed Entity and/or
equivalent position thereof, to the board of the Listed Entity which will make the
final determination upon consideration of such recommendations.
c. DISCLOSURE IN THE ANNUAL REPORT
The annual report should set out the names of directors (or persons in the parent
company’s committee in the case of a group company) comprising the remuneration
committee, contain a statement of the remuneration policy and set out the aggregate
remuneration paid to executive and non-executive directors.
The Term “remuneration” shall make reference to cash and all noncash benefits
whatsoever received in consideration of employment with the Listed Entity.
(excluding statutory entitlements such as Employees Provident Fund and Employees
Trust Fund).

7.10.6 AUDIT COMMITTEE
A Listed Entity shall have an audit committee in conformity with the following:
a. COMPOSITION
The audit committee shall comprise;
of a minimum of two independent non-executive directors (in instances where a
Entity has only two directors on its board);
or
of non-executive directors a majority of whom shall be independent, whichever
shall be higher.
In a situation where both the parent company and the subsidiary are ‘listed Entities’,
the audit committee of the parent company may function as the audit committee of
the subsidiary.
However, if the parent company is not a Listed Entity, then the audit committee of
the parent company is not permitted to act as the audit committee of the subsidiary.
The subsidiary should have a separate audit committee.
One non-executive director shall be appointed as Chairman of the committee by the
board of directors.
Unless otherwise determined by the audit committee, the Chief Executive Officer
and the Chief Financial Officer of the Listed Entity shall attend audit committee
meetings.
The Chairman or one member of the committee should be a Member of a recognized
professional accounting body.
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b. FUNCTIONS
Shall include,
(i) Overseeing of the preparation, presentation and adequacy of disclosures in the
financial statements of a Listed Entity, in accordance with Sri Lanka Accounting
Standards.
(ii) Overseeing of the Entity’s compliance with financial reporting requirements,
information requirements of the Companies Act and other relevant financial
reporting related regulations and requirements.
(iii) Overseeing the processes to ensure that the Entity’s internal controls and risk
management, are adequate, to meet the requirements of the Sri Lanka Auditing
Standards.
(iv) Assessment of the independence and performance of the Entity’s external auditors.
(v) To make recommendations to the board pertaining to appointment, re-appointment
and removal of external auditors and to approve the remuneration and terms of
engagement of the external auditors.
c. DISCLOSURE IN THE ANNUAL REPORT
The names of the directors (or persons in the parent company’s committee in the case
of a group company) comprising the audit committee should be disclosed in the
annual report.
The committee shall make a determination of the independence of the auditors and
shall disclose the basis for such determination in the annual report.
The annual report shall contain a report by the audit committee, setting out the
manner of compliance by the Entity in relation to the above, during the period to
which the annual report relates.
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Appendix 4: Survey Questionnaire and Cover Letter

26 December 2009
Chairman/CEO/Director,
Dear Sir/Madam,
Survey on Corporate Governance Practices of listed companies in Sri Lanka
I am a doctoral candidate in the School of Accounting and Finance at the University
ofWollongong, Australia. My doctoral study includes a research project on corporate
governance practices of Sri Lankan listed companies. The major purpose of this
research is to assess the effectiveness of the existing corporate governance practices
in achieving better performance by Sri Lankan companies.
I invite your participation in this research by completing the attached questionnaire
which will take approximately 15-20 minutes. Your co-operation in this regard is
greatly appreciated. The results of the survey will be used only in an aggregated form
and therefore the confidentiality of your responses is assured. This research is subject
to review by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Wollongong. Please refer ‘Participation Information Sheet’ for further information.
Please send the completed questionnaire using the self addressed envelope enclosed
by 15th January 2010. We look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire
and if you have any query regarding the research or questionnaire, please contact me
on 0779371170 or e-mail athula@uow.edu.au. The supervisors of the project can be
contacted on their email: Dr. Kathy Rudkin, krudkin@uow.edu.au and Dr. Anura
Zoysa, anura@uow.edu.au.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Yours faithfully,

Athula Manawaduge
B.Sc(Mgt.), M.A.(Acc. &Fin.), ACA

Doctoral Candidate
University of Wollongong
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Survey on Corporate Governance Practices of listed companies in Sri Lanka
1) Please complete the questionnaire by the CEO /a director / a suitable
representative on their behalf.(Please refer question 1)
2) Please focus only on the company to which you are attached in providing your
responses. Do not focus on other companies in the group.
Part – I: General Information
Please tick (√) the appropriate cage for the given statements
1. Indicate your position in the firm.
Chairman
CEO
Executive
Director

Non-Executive
Director

Company
Secretary

Senior
Manager

Other

2. Gender
Male
Female
3. Indicate your major background (You may choose more than one if applicable)
Business executive
Accounting or Financial professional
Lawyer
Other professional
Other: ____________________________________________________________
4. Indicate whether your firm is a
Single (stand-alone) company
Subsidiary of a family-based business group
Subsidiary of a business group not controlled by families
Holding company of a family-based business group
Holding company not controlled by families
5. Select the statement that best describes the foreign investment in your firm:
There is no foreign investment
There is little ownership by foreign investors
There is substantial ownership by foreign investors
Subsidiary of a foreign firm
Other:______________________________________________
6. Who has the greatest influence over the policies of your firm?
The largest shareholder the firm
Several bulk-shareholders collectively
No particular shareholder or group since there is no dominant shareholder(s)
Other:_______________________________________________

7. Does your firm have a labour union(s)?

Yes
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No

Part –II: The Board: Structure and practices
8. The board has a director representing:
(i) Institutional investor(s)
(ii) Minority shareholders
(iii) Controlling shareholder’s family

Yes

9. The board of the firm comprises:
(i) Independent directors
Yes
(ii) Foreign nationals
Yes
(iii) A Chairman distinct from the CEO
(iv) If the answer to (iii) above is No;
Has the board appointed a Senior Independent director?

(how many : .……) No
(how many : .........) No
Yes
No
Yes

10. Board structure and practices
(i) Does the board have bylaws to govern board meetings
(ii) Does the board have a schedule of matters reserved for its consideration
and approval?
(iii) Are dissents recorded in the board minutes?
(iv) Does your board have professional(s) in Accounting and Finance?
(v) Do the non-executive directors meet without executive directors to discuss
firm affairs?
(vi) Does the board periodically evaluate its performance as a whole?
(vii) Is the performance of the directors individually assessed each year?
11. Who has the strongest voice in the selection of non-executive directors?
Board or its nomination committee (autonomously)
CEO
Controlling shareholder(s) (who is not the CEO)
Other: ________________________________________
12. How many board meetings were held last financial year?
Less than 4
4–6
6 – 10
More than 10
13 On average, how many hours did a board meeting last?
Not more than 1 hour
1-2 hours
2-3 hours
Over 3 hours
14. On average, what was the attendance rate for the board meetings?
90 - 100%
75 - 89%
60 - 74%
50 - 59%
15. Does your board have the following committees?
(i) Audit Committee
(ii) Remuneration Committee
(iii) Nomination Committee
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Yes

No

No

No
Yes

No

16. If the board has these committees, how many meetings were held last financial year?
1
2–3
4–6
over 7 Unsure
(i) Audit Committee
(ii) Remuneration Committee
(iii) Nomination Committee
17. Please give your responses to the following if your board has an Audit Committee.
(i) Is there a written terms of reference specifying role and
responsibilities of the committee?
(ii) Does the committee have someone with accounting expertise?
(iii) Is it comprised exclusively of non-executive directors?
(iv) Does the committee have a majority of independent director
(v) Is it chaired by an independent director?
(vi) Are committee minutes circulated among all the members of the board?
(vii) Does the audit committee recommend the external auditor to the full board?
(viii) Can minority shareholders elect an audit committee member?
(ix) Did the audit committee hold meetings with the external auditor
in the last financial year?
(x) Are the audit committee members paid a fee or allowance for
serving on the audit committee?

Yes

18. Please give your responses to the following if your board hasa Remuneration Committee
Yes
(i) Are there written guidelines specifying role and responsibilities of
the remuneration committee?
(ii) Is the committee comprised entirely or a majority of independent directors?
(iii) Is the committee chaired by an independent director?
(iv) Are committee minutes circulated among all the members of the board?
(v) Are dissents recorded in the committee minutes?
19. Please give your responses to the following if your board has a Nomination Committee
Yes
(i) Are there written guidelines specifying role and responsibilities of the
remuneration committee?
(ii) Does the committee comprise exclusively of non-executive directors?
(iii) Is the committee chaired by an independent director?
(iv) Are committee minutes circulated among all the members of the board?
(v) Are dissents recorded in the committee minutes?

No

No

No

20. Appointment of directors
Yes
(i) Are all appointments to the board made only through the nomination committee?
(ii) Does your firm have formal and transparent procedures for the election
of directors?
(iii) Are directors subject to re-election at least once in three years?
(iv) Are directors subject to a limit on the number of simultaneous
directorships served in other firms?

No

21. Directors’ Remuneration
Yes
(i) Does your company have a written procedure and/or policies on
directors’ remuneration?
(ii) Does the non-executive directors’ remuneration include share options?
(iii) Is the CEO given share options?
(iv) Does the board review CEO compensation annually?
(v) Is any component of the executive directors’ remuneration performance-based?

No
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(vi) Does any performance based remuneration component require
shareholders’ approval?
22. Executive Directors and their performance
Yes
(i) Does the board formally evaluate the CEO’s performance annually?
(ii) Does the board formally evaluate the executive directors’ performance annually?
(iii) Is there a succession plan for the CEO and the senior managers?
(iv) Has the board replaced the CEO during last 5 years?

No

23. Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and their performance
(i) Does the board formally evaluate the performance of NEDs annually?
(ii) Is there a retirement age for NEDs?
(iii) Do NEDs receive retirement pay?
(iv) Did a NED(s) resign due to a policy disagreement during last 3 years?
(v) Did the chairman hold separate meetings for non-executive directors
during the last year?
(vi) Can NED(s) obtain professional advice at the company expense?

Yes

No

24. Code of conduct and other assistance
Yes
(i) Does your firm have a written code of conduct & ethics for directors?
(ii) Are there written guidelines in respect of directors’ share dealings of the firm?
(iii) Do board members receive materials at least seven days in advance
of the board meeting?
(iv) Does the firm provide any training opportunities for newly appointed directors?

No

Part –III: Stakeholders’ Rights
25. Shareholders voting and other involvements
(i) Is voting by mail allowed?
(ii) Can anybody serve as a proxy?
(iii) Was there a shareholders request for an extraordinary meeting in last 3 years?
(iv) Are candidates for directorships disclosed to shareholders prior to the AGM?
(v) Are chairpersons of board sub-committees always available at the AGM?
(vi) Are shareholders given adequate time for asking questions at the AGM?
(vii) Are shareholders’ priority subscription rights in the issuance of shares
adequately protected?
(viii) Are related-party transactions fully disclosed and discussed at the AGM?
(ix) Is there any deviation from the one-share one-vote rule in your firm?

Yes

No

26. External Auditor
(i) Does the audit committee conduct a formal review of the auditor’s work?
(ii) Does the external audit partner rotate every 5 years?
(iii) Are audit recommendations subject to full board review?
(iv) Does the external auditor provide non-audit services also to your firm?

Yes

No

27. What is the non-audit fee as a percentage of total fees of the last financial year?
Not applicable
Less than 20%
Between 21% and 50%
51% or over

28. How long did the previous year AGM last?
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Less than 1 hour
1-2 hours
2-3 hours
Over 3 hours
29. What was the approximate percentage of voting rights exercised by the shareholders at the last year
AGM?
Less than 10%
10%- 40%
40%-60%
60%-80%
80%-100%
30. Does your firm disclose the following on the firm’s web page?
(i) Quarterly financial statements
(ii) Audited Annual reports
(iii) Directors report
(iv) Directors’ selling or buying shares in the firm (if any)

Yes

No

31. Does your firm disclose the following information? If yes, please indicate whether they are disclosed
in the Annual Report (AR) and/or the firm’s Web Page (Web).
Yes
No
AR
Web
(i) Related-party transactions (if any)
(ii) Resume or background of directors
(iii) Individual remuneration of directors
(iv) Policies on risk management
(v) Corporate governance report
(vi) Separate disclosure of audit and non-audit fees paid (if any)
(vii) Members of board sub committees
(viii) Audit committee report
(ix) Remuneration committee report
(x) Nomination committee report

Part –IV: Related Party Transactions (RPTs)
Related party transactions (RPTs) include all business transaction between the firm and related parties
such as directors of the firm, principle owners, management and their immediate families, the affiliated
companies etc.
32. Related Party Transactions (RPTs)
Yes
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

No

Does the firm disclose RPT(s) to shareholders?
Does the firm require RPT(s) to be at arms-length terms?
Does the firm have any outstanding loan(s) to insider(s)?
Does the firm make any sale to or purchase from insiders?
Does the firm rent or lease real property to or from insider(s)?
Did the board review the RPT(s) last year?

33. What is the approximate percentage value of RPT(s) relative to the revenue in the last financial year?
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Not applicable
Less than 1% of total revenues of the firm
1% to 5% of total revenues of the firm
5% to 10% of total revenues of the firm
More than 10% of total revenues of the firm

34. What is the level of approval required to exercise a RPT(s) with executives in your firm?
No approval required
Approval by the CEO
Approval by the board
Approval by the non-conflicted directors or audit committee
Approval by the shareholders
Other (Please Specify):
________________________________________________________________________
35. What is the level of approval required to exercise a RPT(s) with controlling shareholder(s) in your
firm?
No approval required
Approval by the CEO
Approval by the board
Approval by the non-conflicted directors or audit committee or shareholders
Other (Please Specify):
________________________________________________________________________
Name of the company (Optional)

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
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Appendix 5: Participation Information Sheet

PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET
RESEARCH TITLE: Corporate governance practices and their impacts on corporate
performance in an emerging market: The case of Sri Lanka
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH:
The purpose of the research is to examine the relevance of corporate governance
practices originated in developed counties to Sri Lanka, and to assess the effectiveness
of existing corporate governance practices in achieving better performance and
competitiveness by Sri Lankan companies.
INVESTIGATORS:
Mr. Athula Manawaduge
Researcher
School of Accounting &
Finance
University of Wollongong
+61 2 4221 4711
athula@uow.edu.au

Dr Anura De Zoysa
Supervisor
School of Accounting &
Finance
University of Wollongong
+61 2 4221 5382
anura@uow.edu.au

Dr Kathy Rudkin
Supervisor
School of Accounting &
Finance
University of Wollongong
+61 2 4221 3148
krudkin@uow.edu.au

COOPERATION SOLICITS FROM THE PARTICIPANTS:
This is an invitation to participate in a research study conducted by researchers at the
University of Wollongong. We seek your cooperation to complete a questionnaire to
gather information for this research study. The survey requests your responses to
questions on the current corporate governance practices in your firm and your opinion
on the effectiveness of these practices. Your accurate and frank response is a key to
measure the effectiveness of corporate governance practices of Sri Lankan firms.
Your involvement in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation
from the study at any time.
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION
The completion and return of completed questionnaire to researchers is considered as
the consent to participation in this survey.
BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH:
This research will provide useful insights into corporate governance practices in Sri
Lanka. It will formulate policy recommendations for corporate governance practices in
Sri Lankan context and therefore, the outcomes of the study will be immensely
beneficial to Sri Lankan companies and policy makers. Findings from this study will be
reported in a thesis and conference and academic journal articles.
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CONFIDENTIALITY, ETHICS REVIEW AND COMPLAINTS:
The confidentiality in relation to all data collected through the questionnaire will be
assured. No information gained from this survey will be identified with name of the
organisation in the report. The results will be presented only in aggregate in the research
report.
The completed questionnaires will be kept securely in the lockers at the Faculty of
Commerce, University of Wollongong and they can only be accessible to the members
of the research team mentioned above.
This study has been continuously reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee
(Social Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong.
If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way this research has been
conducted, you can contact the University Ethics Officer on +61 2 4221 4457.
Thank you for your interest in this study.
Ethics Unit
Research Services Office
University of Wollongong
Wollongong NSW 2522
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Appendix 6: Reminder Letter

20th January 2010

Dear Sir/Madam
Survey on Corporate Governance Practices of listed companies in Sri Lanka
This is further to my letter dated December 26, 2009 inviting you to participate in
a research by way of completing a questionnaire on the above topic. If you have
already returned the completed questionnaire I take this opportunity to thank you
for your corporation. However, in case of your busy schedule did not allow you to
respond to it so far, will you please send the completed questionnaire at your
earliest convenience? In this regard please pay no attention to the deadline
stipulated in the previous letter.
As you will agree the findings of this survey will be of immense value to the
corporate sector as well as policy makers on corporate governance. Further, since
this type of study requires coverage of a large cross-section of companies your
participation and the views will be of utmost importance. Thus, I hope that you
will extend your support in this regard.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Yours faithfully,

Athula Manawaduge
B.Sc(Mgt.), M.A.(Acc. &Fin.), ACA

Doctoral Candidate
University of Wollongong

Appendix 3: Participation Information Sheet
330

Appendix7: Corporate Governance Index: Variables and Mean
Values

Variables and Sub-indices

Marks

Reference to
Questionnaire

Compliance
Mean
Yes No
(%)

Board Structure and Independence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

64.05

Maintain balance of executive and nonexecutive directors
Board has at least 50% non-executive
directors
Board has Independent directors
CEO is NOT chairman of the board
Majority of non-executive directors are
independent
Selection of non-executive directors is
done by the board or nomination
committee
Non-executive directors meet without
executive directors to discuss firm affairs

Total Score

1

AR

17

43

28.33

1

AR

1

9 (i)

1

9 (iii)

47
58
46

13
2
14

78.33
96.67
76.67

1

AR

32

28

53.33

1

11

43

17

71.67

1

10 (v)

26

34

43.33

7

Board Procedure and Effectiveness
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Nomination committee exits
Nomination Committee consists of
exclusively by non-executive directors
Nomination Committee chaired by an
independent director
Appointments to the board are made only
through the nomination committee
Firm have formal and transparent
procedures for the election of directors
Directors are subject to a limit on the
number of simultaneous directorships
Firm holds four (4) or more regular board
meetings per year.
Board meetings : Extended time period
(over 2 hours)
Board consist of members with sufficient
financial acumen
Directors attend at least 75% of meetings,
on average.
Firm has system to evaluate CEO
Firm has system to evaluate other
executives directors
Firm has system to evaluate nonexecutive
directors
Firm has succession plan for CEO

1

15 (iii)

27

33

58.13
45.00

1

19 (ii)

11

16

40.74

1

19 (iii)

19

8

70.37

1

20 (i)

22

38

36.67

1

20(ii)

46

14

76.67

1

20(iv)

14

46

23.33

1

12

56

4

93.33

1

13

41

19

68.33

1

10 (iv)

56

4

93.33

1

14

1

22 (i)

58
35

2
25

96.67
58.33

1

22 (ii)

30

30

50.00

1

23 (i)

14
41

46
19

23.33
68.33

32
37
34

46.67
38.33
43.33

1

22 (iii)

Firm has retirement age for nonexecutive
directors
Directors receive regular training

1

23 (ii)

1

24 (iv)

Firm has code of ethics for directors

1

24 (i)

28
23
26

1

24 (iii)

52

8

86.67

1

9 (iii)

46

14

76.67

Board receives materials at least 7 days in
advance
CEO and board chairman are different
people.
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27
28
29
30
31
32

Dissents are recorded in board minutes.

1

10 (iii)

55

5

91.67

Firm has one or more foreign outside
directors.
NED(s) do not receive retirement pay.

1

9 (ii)

1

23 (iii)

23
60

37
0

38.33
100.00

1

23 (v)

16

44

26.67

1

23 (vi)

1

10 (i)

36
37

24
23

60.00
61.67

1

15 (i)

60

0

85.33
100.00

1

17 (iv)

52

7

88.14

1

17 (i)

54

5

91.53

1

17 (vii)

51

8

86.44

1

17 (iii)

47

12

79.66

1

17 (ii)

57

2

96.61

1

17 (vi)

45

14

76.27

1

16 (i)

40

20

66.67

1

17 (v)

54

5

91.53

1

17 (ix)

52

7

88.14

Chairman hold separate meetings for nonexecutive directors
Nonexecutives can obtain professional
advices at company expenses
Bylaws to govern board meetings exist.

Total Score

25

Audit Committee Procedure
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Audit committee exists
Audit committee has majority of
independent directors
Firm has written terms of reference
governing audit committee
Audit committee recommends the external
auditor to full board
Audit committee. comprises of exclusively
non-executive directors
Audit committee includes someone with
expertise in accounting.
The committee prepare and distribute
minutes for each audit committee meeting
Audit committee meets four or more times
per year.
Audit committee is chaired by an
independent director
Audit committee meets with external
auditor to review financial statements.

Total Score

10

Directors’ Remuneration Procedure
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Remuneration Committee exists
Remuneration Committee comprises
majority of independent directors
Remuneration Committee chaired by an
independent director
Company has a written procedure or/and
policies on directors’ remuneration
Executive directors’ remuneration is (at
least part) performance based
The board review CEO compensation
annually
Long-term Incentive Schemes for
Executive Directors are approved by the
Shareholders
Dissents are recorded in the remuneration
committee minutes

1

15(ii)

58

2

67.92
96.67

1

18 (ii)

45

13

77.59

1

18 (iii)

47

11

81.03

1

18 (i)

39

19

67.24

1

21(v)

38

22

63.33

1

21(iv)

45

15

75.00

1

21(vi)

7

53

11.67

1

18 (v)

47

11

81.03

8

Total Score

Disclosure Substance
51
52
53

66.22

Related party transactions are disclosed to
shareholders
Firm put directors buying and selling
shares in the web
Firm puts quarterly financial statements on
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1

32 (i)

60

0

100.00

1

30(iv)

1

30 (i)

14
33

46
27

23.33
55.00

web

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Firm puts annual report on web

1

30 (ii)

Firms put directors’ report on web

1

Firm puts corporate governance report on
web
Firm put Statement of Corporate
Governance in Annual reports
Audit Committee Report in Annual reports
Remuneration Committee Report in
Annual reports
Nomination Committee Report in Annual
reports
Risk Management Policies and Process

30 (iii)

37
34

23
26

61.67
56.67

1

31(v)

7

53

11.67

1

31(v)

1

31 (viii)

60
54

0
6

100.00
90.00

1

31 (ix)

44

16

73.33

1

31 (x)

18
49

9
11

66.67
81.67

2
0
43

96.67
100.00
28.33

9

85.00

1

31(iv)

Membership of Audit, Remuneration and
Nomination Committees
Resume of directors

1

31(vii)

1

31(ii)

Disclosure of Directors’ Remuneration

1

31 (iii)

58
60
17

Disclosure of Audit and Non-audit fees
separately

1

31 (vi)

51

Total Score

15

Disclosure Reliability
66
67
68

81.33

Non-audit fees are < 20% of total auditor
fees or no non-audit services
Full board reviews auditor's
recommendations
Audit partner is rotated every 5 years

1

26 (iv) & 27

42

18

70.00

1

26 (iii)

1

26 (ii)

57
41

3
19

95.00
68.33

Audit committee recommends the external

69 auditor to full board
70

1

17 (vii)

51

8

86.44

Audit committee conduct a formal review
of the auditor's work

1

26 (i)

53

7

88.33

Total Score

5
1

32(iii)

50

10

57.92
83.33

1

32(iv)

47

13

78.33

1

32 (v)

47

13

78.33

1

33

25

35

41.67

1

32 (vi)

49

11

81.67

1

32 (ii)

53

7

88.33

Related Party Transactions
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Firm does not have loans to insiders
Firm does not have significant sales to or
purchases from insiders
Firm does not rent real property from or to
an insider
Firm had negligible revenue from RPTs (01% of sales)
RPTs are reviewed by the board in the last
year
Related party transactions are on armslength terms
RPTs with executives approved by nonconflicted directors or audit committee

1

34

4

56

6.67

RPTs with controlling shareholders
approved by non-conflicted directors or AC

1

35

3

57

5.00

Total Score

8

Shareholder Rights
79
80

79.58

There is no deviation from the one shareone vote rule
Directors serve three-year terms
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1

25 (ix)

1

20 (iii)

54
56

6
4

90.00
93.33

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Firm allows voting by mail

1

25 (i)

Anybody can serve as a proxy

1

There is no extraordinary meeting on
shareholders’ request in last 3 years
Board has one or more minority
shareholder representatives
Firm discloses director candidates to
shareholders prior to AGM
Adequate time is given to shareholders for
asking questions at the AGM.
Chairpersons of Committees are available
at the AGM to answer questions
Shareholders’ priority subscription right in
the issuance of shares is adequately
protected
RPTs are fully discussed with adequate
information at the shareholders’ meeting
There are written guidelines in respect of
directors’ share dealings of the firm

Total Score

25 (ii)

17
58

43
2

28.33
96.67

1

25 (iii)

54

6

90.00

1

8 (ii)

24

36

40.00

1

25 (iv)

43

17

71.67

1

25(vi)

60

0

100.00

1

25 (v)

57

3

95.00

1

25(ii)

58

2

96.67

1

25 (viii)

58

2

96.67

1

24 (ii)

34

26

56.67

12

334

Appendix 8: Perception Survey Questionnaire and Cover Letter

02 January 2010

Dear Sir/Madam,
Questionnaire Survey on Corporate Governance Practices in Sri Lanka
This is an invitation to participate in a research study at the University of
Wollongong, Australia. As a part of my doctoral study, I am currently undertaking a
research project on corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka.
Corporate governance is the system by which corporate entities are directed and
controlled. Given the recent high profile corporate scandals in Sri Lanka, the
effectiveness of the existing corporate governance system has been questioned by
various constituent groups in the country. The main purpose of my study is to
identify the key problems and to assess the effectiveness of the existing corporate
governance system in Sri Lanka.
I solicit your cooperation in this research by completing the attached questionnaire
which will take approximately 15-20 minutes. Your co-operation in this regard is
greatly appreciated. Please send the completed questionnaire using the self addressed
envelope enclosed by 20th January 2010. I look forward to receiving your completed
questionnaire and if you have any query regarding the research or questionnaire,
please contact me on 0779371170 or e-mail athula@uow.edu.au .
Thank you for your co-operation.
Yours faithfully,
Athula Manawaduge
B.Sc (Mgt.), M.A.(Acc. &Fin.), ACA

Doctoral Candidate
University of Wollongong
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A Questionnaire Survey on Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka
Part – I: Participant Information
1

Please indicate [ ] your occupation.


2

3



Partner/ Manager/ Senior in an audit firm





Audit Superintendent/Audit officer



Assessor/ Tax officer

Fin. Manager/Accountant in a company



Banker/Executive in a bank



Manager/Executive in the Govt.



Financial analysts



Lecturer / Researcher



Investor

Gender
 Male
 Female
Professional Qualifications






5

Director/Executive in a company

None
MAAT/SAT, ICA / CIMA/ACCA parts,
ICASL/ICMA/ CIMA/ACCA membership
Attorney at law
Other (Please Specify):

How long have you been in your present
profession?
 Less than one year
 1 – 5 years
 5 – 10 years
 10 – 15 years
 15 - 20 years


4 Highest Educational qualification (Tick one box.)
 School Level
 Diploma
 Bachelor’s Degree
 Post Gradate Diploma
 Master’s Degree
 Doctoral Degree
 Other (Please specify):
6

In how many companies have you purchased
shares?






Over 20 years



None
One company
2 – 5 companies
6 – 10 companies
11 - 20 companies
Over 20 companies

7. Do you have experience in serving as a director of a public limited company?

Yes

No

Part –II: Corporate Governance: Components and Performance Implications
Please tick on a scale from 1 - 5 to indicate the extent of your agreement with the given statements.
8. The corporate governance system of a country should include:
(i)

Companies’ internal management structure and the board

Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5

(ii) Companies’ internal management regulations, policies and procedures
(iii) Judiciary system of the country

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

(iv) Regulatory framework including monitoring institutions of the country

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Financial reporting framework of the country

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Ownership structure of the companies

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) Code of best practices of corporate governance

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Corporate culture and practices

1

2

3

4

5

(ix) Relationship among core stakeholders

1

2

3

4

5

(x) Code of conduct and ethics applicable in business

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) Culture and value system of the society

1

2

3

4

5
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9. Do you agree that better corporate governance will have the following impacts on a company’s performance?
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
(i) Improve financial performance
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) Improve ability to generate equity capital

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) Improve access to new capital

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) Increase market value of shares

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Reduce share price volatility

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Reduce political or regulatory intervention

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) Reduce cost of capital

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Improve corporate social responsibility

1

2

3

4

5

Part –III: Sri Lankan Corporate Governance: Current Status and Major Issues
10. Do you agree with the following statements about Corporate Governance (CG) in Sri Lanka?
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
(i) The standard of CG in Sri Lanka is comparable to that of a developed country.
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) The standard of CG in Sri Lanka is comparable to that of Asian countries.

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) The existing CG regulations are adequate to ensure good CG in Sri Lanka.

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) The existing CG regulations are effectively implemented by most Sri Lankan firms. 1

2

3

4

5

(v) Regulatory monitoring of CG compliance is adequate.

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) The Colombo Stock Exchange should have introduced more rigorous CG rules.

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) Most listed companies have already taken measures to strengthen their CG.

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Most listed companies in Sri Lanka could have done more to strengthen CG.

1

2

3

4

5

(ix) The interests of minority investors are adequately protected in Sri Lanka.

1

2

3

4

5

11. Indicate to what extent you regard the following CG issues as either major or minor issues in Sri Lanka?
Minor
Major
Issue
Issue
(i) Lack of integrity and ethics among top management
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) Lack of transparency in financial reporting

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) Insider trading (directors artificially control share prices for personal gain)

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) Inadequate protection of minority shareholders’ rights

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Conflicts of interest of directors

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Drain off of funds through associate or subsidiary companies

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) Independent directors do not exercise true independence in decision making

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Inadequate and inefficient risk management

1

2

3

4

5

(ix) Lack of transparency about directors’ remuneration

1

2

3

4

5

(x) Lack of proper balance between executive and non-executive directors in the board1

2

3

4

5

(xi) Ineffective connectivity between board and management

2

3

4

5
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1

Part –IV: Sri Lankan Corporate Governance: Strategies and Practices
12. Indicate the importance you place on the following corporate governance strategies in improving corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka.
Less
More
Important Important
(i) Making the internal corporate governance mechanisms work better
(E.g. effective board functions, active shareholder participation etc.)
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) Making the external corporate governance mechanisms work better
(E.g. enact specific regulations, monitoring, facilitating hostile acquisitions etc.)

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) Enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and disclosures

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) Conducting and publicizing corporate governance ratings of companies

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Prohibiting or tightly controlling some types of related-party transactions
(E.g. lending to directors, cross-guarantees of repayment etc)

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Reducing ownership concentration
(E.g. tighter control on cross-shareholding and pyramid ownership structure etc)

1

2

3

4

5

13. Do you agree that the corporate governance of Sri Lankan companies can be improved by adhering to following
practices?
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
(i) Giving the audit committee greater power to investigate financial reporting
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) Full disclosure of related party transactions

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) Not obtaining audit and non-audit services from the same provider

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) The CEO and Chairman positions are not held by the same person

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Remuneration packages for executive directors are closely tied to performance

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) Key advisory committees are composed entirely of independent directors

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) There should be an age limit for directors

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Independent directors should make up at least one-half of the board

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

(x) Full disclosure of the recruitment policy of new directors

1

2

3

4

5

(xi) Full disclosure of the remuneration policy for executive directors

1

2

3

4

5

(xii) The exact remuneration of each director should be disclosed in the annual reports 1

2

3

4

5

(xiii) Imposed limitations on the number of directorships held by a director at one time

1

2

3

4

5

(xiv) Adoption of a code of conduct and ethics for all directors, officers and employees 1

2

3

4

5

(ix) Independent directors should be independent of both management
And major shareholders

Part –V: Sri Lankan Corporate governance: Key Players and Promotion
14. Do you agree that the following institutions and groups are carrying out their role efficiently to improve corporate
governance practices in Sri Lanka?
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
(i) Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka
1 2 3 4 5
(ii) Colombo Stock Exchange

1

2

3

4

5

(iii) Financial supervisory agencies (e.g. Central Bank)

1

2

3

4

5

(iv) The Institute of Chartered Accounts of Sri Lanka

1

2

3

4

5

(v) Other professional accounting institutions

1

2

3

4

5

(vi) The judiciary

1

2

3

4

5

(vii) Sri Lanka Institute of Directors

1

2

3

4

5

(viii) Outside directors (Non-executive and independent directors)

1

2

3

4

5

(ix) Civil activists ( such as investors association, minority shareholder etc)

1

2

3

4

5

(x) (Financial) press and other media

1

2

3

4

5
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15. In your opinion what approach is suitable to promote good corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan firms?
(Please tick one option)
Prescriptive approach: Prescription of specific corporate governance rules and practices by regulations.
Non- prescriptive approach: Allowing companies to determine their own corporate governance practices
Mixed approach: Prescription only the basic framework by regulations and allowing companies to develop
more detailed practices by their own (based on voluntary governance code)
16. In your opinion, what are the other major corporate governance problems or issues faced by Sri Lankan
companies?

17. Other comments and recommendations that you would like to make to improve corporate governance in Sri
Lanka.

Part –VI: Personal Information (Optional)
I.

Name:

II.

Designation:

III.

Name of the Organization:

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
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Appendix 9: Test of Non-response Bias
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

N
105
32
105
32
105
32
105
32
104
32
106
32
105
32
106
32
106
32
106
32
106
32

Mean
3.92
3.91
3.97
3.88
3.63
3.84
4.10
4.03
4.10
4.19
3.58
3.69
4.24
4.22
3.86
3.81
3.73
3.81
4.07
4.16
3.73
3.844

Std.
Dev.
.987
1.228
.975
1.264
1.265
1.221
.946
.897
.887
.931
1.186
1.176
1.033
.751
1.064
1.091
.900
1.030
1.007
.847
1.143
.987

Sig.*
.934
.941
.650
.693
.397
.391
.735
.729
.615
.626
.668
.668
.922
.908
.832
.834
.647
.672
.646
.616
.601
.573

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

106
32
107
33
108
32
107
33
107
33
107
33
107
33
108
33

4.085
3.94
3.93
4.06
3.87
4.28
4.01
3.94
3.52
3.45
3.76
3.36
3.48
3.36
4.25
4.15

.896
1.105
.914
1.088
.887
.888
.906
1.059
.925
1.003
1.026
1.141
1.031
.994
.822
.834

.442
.494
.510
.549
.023
.026
.710
.733
.715
.727
.063
.083
.580
.574
.549
.554

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1

108
33
108
33
107
33
106
32
108
33
107

2.53
2.52
3.29
3.09
2.77
2.36
2.48
2.22
2.58
2.24
3.36

1.018
.906
.967
.765
1.104
.929
.897
.792
1.033
.708
.925

.949
.946
.288
.232
.060
.042
.139
.117
.079
.035
.417

Major Component of Corporate Governance
I

Companies’ internal management structure and the board

II

Companies’ internal management regulations, policies
and procedures
Judiciary system of the country

III
IV
V

Regulatory framework including monitoring institutions
of the country
Financial reporting framework of the country

VI

Ownership structure of the companies

VII

Code of best practices of corporate governance

VIII

Corporate culture and practices

IX

Relationship among core stakeholders

X

Code of conduct and ethics applicable in business

XI

Culture and value system of the society

I

Performance implication
Improve financial performance

II

Improve ability to generate equity capital

III

Improve access to new capital

IV

Increase market value of shares

V

Reduce share price volatility

VI

Reduce political or regulatory intervention

VII

Reduce cost of capital

VIII

Improve corporate social responsibility

V

Status of Corporate governance in Sri Lanka
The standard of CG in Sri Lanka is comparable to that of
a developed country.
The standard of CG in Sri Lanka is comparable to that of
Asian countries.
The existing CG regulations are adequate to ensure good
CG in Sri Lanka.
The existing CG regulations are effectively implemented
by most of the Sri Lankan firms.
Regulatory monitoring of CG compliance is adequate.

VI

The Colombo Stock Exchange should have introduced

I
II
III
IV
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VII
VIII
IX

more rigorous CG rules.
Most listed companies in Sri Lanka have already taken
measures to strengthen their CG.
Most listed companies in Sri Lanka could have done
more to strengthen their CG.
The interests of minority investors are adequately
protected in Sri Lanka.

I

Major Issues of Corporate Governance
Lack of integrity and ethics among top management

II

Lack of transparency in financial reporting

III
IV

Insider trading (directors artificially control share prices
for personal gain)
Inadequate protection of minority shareholders’ rights

V

Conflicts of interest of directors

VI

VIII

Drain off of funds through associate or subsidiary
companies
Independent directors do not exercise true independence
in decision making
Inadequate and inefficient risk management

IX

Lack of transparency about directors’ remuneration

X

Lack of proper balance between executive and nonexecutive directors in the board
Ineffective connectivity between board and management

VII

XI

I
II
III
IV
V
VI

I
II
III
IV
V

Corporate Governance Strategies
Making the internal corporate governance mechanisms
work better
Making the external corporate governance mechanisms
work better
Enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and
disclosures
Conducting and publicizing corporate governance ratings
of companies
Prohibiting or tightly controlling some types of relatedparty transactions
Reducing ownership concentration
Governance Practices need improvements
Giving the audit committee greater power to investigate
financial reporting
Full disclosure of related party transactions
Not obtaining audit and non-audit services from the same
provider
The CEO and Chairman positions are not held by the
same person
Remuneration packages for executive directors are
closely tied to performance
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2
1
2
1
2
1
2

33
108
32
107
32
107
33

3.52
3.21
2.94
3.69
3.63
2.53
2.55

.939
.774
.669
.829
.976
1.031
.794

.423
.071
.054
.703
.728
.948
.941

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

107
33
108
33
108
33
108
33
108
33
107
33
108
33
108
33
108
33
108
33
108
33

3.93
3.79
3.94
3.79
3.74
3.79
3.72
3.64
3.68
3.76
3.90
3.82
3.86
3.91
3.79
3.91
3.81
3.52
3.60
3.45
3.69
3.67

.997
.740
.874
.781
.961
.927
.915
.859
.994
.902
.800
.846
1.009
.879
.918
.843
.987
.834
.937
.869
.837
.924

.466
.396
.358
.331
.804
.801
.633
.623
.674
.659
.625
.637
.806
.792
.497
.479
.117
.089
.423
.406
.871
.878

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

108
33
108
33
106
33
107
32
106
33
108
33

4.08
4.24
4.03
4.12
4.14
4.09
4.00
3.97
3.90
4.06
3.59
4.03

.844
.751
.814
.893
.920
.631
.836
.897
.925
.864
1.014
.918

.333
.306
.574
.594
.769
.722
.855
.861
.367
.352
.028
.023

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

107
33
107
33
108
33
106
33
106
33

3.98
4.15
4.09
4.48
3.81
3.97
3.97
4.27
3.95
3.91

.879
.667
.864
.619
1.036
.918
1.046
.911
.844
.947

.308
.241
.017
.005
.415
.387
.140
.115
.801
.813

VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV

Key advisory committees are composed entirely of
independent directors
There should be an age limit for directors
Independent directors should make up at least one-half of
the board
Independent directors should be independent of both
management and major shareholders
Full disclosure of the recruitment policy of new directors
Full disclosure of the remuneration policy for executive
directors
The exact remuneration of each director should be
disclosed in the annual reports
Imposed limitations on the number of directorships held
by a director at any one time
Adoption of a code of conduct and ethics for all
directors, officers and employees

I

Key players and Promoters
Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka

II

Colombo Stock Exchange

III

Financial supervisory agencies (e.g. Central Bank)

IV

The Institute of Chartered Accounts of Sri Lanka

V

Other professional accounting institutions

VI

The judiciary

VII

Sri Lanka Institute of Directors

VIII

Outside directors (Non-executive and independent
directors)
Civil activists ( such as investors association, minority
shareholder etc)
Financial press and other media

IX
X
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1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

106
33
106
33
107
33
107
33
107
32
108
33
108
33
108
33
107
33

3.78
3.88
3.11
3.73
3.44
3.73
4.09
4.15
3.79
3.78
3.80
3.73
3.48
3.45
3.61
3.94
4.32
4.39

.995
.960
1.312
1.126
1.002
1.232
.906
.795
.789
1.008
.806
.944
1.164
1.252
1.058
.899
.784
.864

.627
.622
.017
.011
.174
.227
.741
.724
.982
.984
.680
.706
.909
.913
.109
.084
.635
.653

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

108
33
108
33
108
33
108
33
104
32
107
33
105
32
105
32
106
33
107
33

3.28
3.48
3.49
3.58
3.17
3.33
3.33
3.48
2.97
3.09
2.99
3.24
2.81
2.69
2.84
2.69
2.60
2.67
2.82
2.67

.874
.939
1.857
.830
1.098
.957
1.005
1.004
.908
1.027
.927
.969
.722
1.176
.722
1.061
.869
1.080
1.053
.957

.244
.265
.799
.712
.434
.402
.450
.451
.519
.547
.179
.193
.477
.582
.360
.457
.733
.762
.450
.428

